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Identity, Citizenship and Moral Education

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Abstract

Questions of identity such as 'Who am I?' are often answered by appeals to one or more affiliations with a specific nation (citizenship), culture, ethnicity, religion, etc. Taking as given the idea that identity over time—including identification and re-identification—for objects of a particular kind requires that there be criteria of identity appropriate to things of that kind, I argue that citizenship, as a 'collectivist' concept, does not generate such criteria for individual citizens, but that the concept person—which specifies the kind of entity that I am—does generate such criteria. Confusion on this point has led some writers on citizenship to equivocate between identity for individuals and what is properly called self-determination in terms of their group affiliations and commitments. In the second part of the paper, I articulate and defend a relational view of personhood, and argue that it provides adequate grounding for morality in general, and moral education in particular. While not denying the value of civics or citizenship education, the link between morality and citizenship is derivative, at best. Finally, I examine the implications of a relational conception of personhood for the specific context of schools and classrooms, arguing that this conception is appropriately represented when the classroom functions as a community of inquiry, in which each member is encouraged to see her/himself as one among others. Drawing on the theory and practice of Philosophy for Children, I conclude with a call to reunite citizenship and moral education with their philosophical roots.

Keywords: identity, citizenship, moral education, persons, relational, inquiry

Identity, Citizenship and Moral Education

Under what circumstances might someone seriously inquire, 'Who am I?'?[1] Alternatively, under what circumstances might someone declare, 'I don't know who I am!'? (Lee, 2002, p. 43). Barring such phenomena as amnesia, a number of writers have suggested that just such circumstances are apt to arise when someone is attempting to *conceptualize* their own identity and, moreover, that specifying—or constructing—the kind of conceptualization required is central to contemporary reflections on citizenship and citizenship education (for example, Parmenter *et al.*, 2000). I happen to agree with both points but claim that, taken together, they reveal a conceptual confusion which continues to threaten the debate about citizenship (irrespective of whether this debate focuses on local communities, nations, cultures, or even global citizens). Resolving the confusion is crucial to the overall coherence of the citizenship debate. It also has important implications for a topic which is often linked to citizenship education, namely, moral or values education. My primary goal

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in this paper is to pry apart the concepts of identity, morality and citizenship, arguing both that *citizenship* does not provide an appropriate framework for resolving issues relating to identity and morality (specifically, moral or values education), and that the more fundamental concept of *personhood* does provide such a framework.

Identity and Identity Criteria

I will take, as my starting point, the following *identity assumption* (IA):

> (IA) If something (a material object, a person, an institution, an event) exists through time and space, then there must be, known or unknown, a *criterion of identity* for things of its particular kind.[2]

The key idea of a criterion of identity is a familiar, albeit contentious tool in philosophy. It provides conceptual grounding for such mundane utterances as the following:

1. 'And is the person you saw pull the trigger in this courtroom today? Can you point him out?'
2. 'Can you identify this (gun) as the (same) weapon which was used to shoot the victim?
3. 'The war, while punctuated by significant periods of calm, lasted forty years and ranged over three continents.'
4. 'Oh no, she's wearing the same dress as me; and I bought mine especially for this party.'
5. 'You are not wearing that (same) shirt again; it has to be washed.'
6. 'Painting something blue may or may not destroy it: compare my living room with a work of art.'
7. 'I catch the same train to work every day.'
8. 'That invention was my idea, and you stole it!'
9. 'Here is an old school photo of my class fifty years ago. See if you can find *me*.'

Each of these examples involves a scenario in which someone is required to perform (at least) two identity-related tasks: identify one or more objects for what it is, and re-identify one or more objects as the *same* object (or, alternatively, to distinguish them as *different* objects).[3] Both tasks, in turn, require that the agent in question understand and apply an appropriate identity criterion, the existence of which, according to IA, is a condition of being able to speak coherently about any of the objects in the first place. Accepting that persons, guns, wars, dresses and shirts, living rooms, art works, trains, flocks of birds and inventions are all entities that exist in space and/or time, criteria of identity underlie our capacity to *track* them through space and over time.

Some comments on these examples are warranted. First, I am not implying that they are clear-cut in terms of their resolution (i.e. answering the questions or agreeing to the assertions). It is easy to imagine potential disputes here. I take it that examples 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7, while empirically contentious perhaps, are conceptually clear (although 4 and 5 serve to bring out the crucial distinction between an object and a *type or kind* of object; 7 reflects a similar ambiguity in the concept *train*).[4] On the other hand, 3, 6, and 8 are more puzzling, precisely because the relevant criteria of identity are less clear. Wars, as we know all too well, are human contrivances, as are paintings and inventions, so one might

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claim that there really is no fact of the matter which could settle such disputes of identity. Depending on which criterion is chosen (and by whom), they could go either way. Example 9 is crucial for my purposes here and will be discussed below.

Secondly, it will be useful for what follows to distinguish, conceptually at least, between *human being* and (*human) person*. The former is a member of the biological species *Homo sapiens*, while the latter is a being with properties that extend well beyond the biological (even if the former are grounded in the latter). I will return to this point.[5]

Thirdly, when contemplating our common humanity (including the species that we belong to, its evolutionary origins, etc.), I cannot easily wrest persons and their bodies apart. As persons, we co-exist in space and time like all other material things.[6] Consider the familiar scenario in example 9. The photo is identified by the tell-tale sign being held up in the front row, as 'Grade 3, Ormond State School, 1958'. But notice, in saying 'me', I am indeed referring to *me*, the adult person who owns the photo, who is *the very same person as* the child in the picture. Not only does this literal re-identification override all such claims as 'But you are completely different; all your cells have died and been reborn hundreds of times; you had hair then; you were a brat then and now you are a kind and loving man ...', but the very intelligibility of these claims relies on the re-identification being correct. After all, it is *I* who has changed so much, whose body has replaced its cells, etc. Further, by IA, underlying both the possibility and the actuality of this persistence through space and time is a criterion of identity which constitutes a good part of our understanding of what it means to be a person.[7]

Assumption IA ties existence through space and time to criteria of identity *appropriate to the kind of thing we wish to identify*. Accordingly, the conceptual task of specifying which criteria are appropriate in a given case will be dependent on the kind in question. Furthermore, it is not always clear-cut which kinds—hence, which criteria—are in play. Where one person sees a priceless piece of sculpture, another may see a hunk of clay; accordingly, their criterially-based judgments about matters of identity and persistence are likely to differ. Reshaping the clay into something else does not destroy the (lump of) clay *per se*, but it does destroy the sculpture. In general, the kinds or concepts under which we classify objects are crucial to the tasks of identification and re-identification. In the absence of such conceptual specification, our conversations about, and reference to, a world of objects, would be hopelessly ambiguous.

In making these claims, I am drawing on the distinction between an object—*qua particular*—and the kind(s) of thing—*qua concept or universal*—that it is. Kant, among many other philosophers, was adamant on the point that these notions are of equal importance and entirely interdependent.[8] The concepts by which we understand and classify the things we encounter in experience have no existence apart from those things; and the things have no existence—as determinate objects—apart from the concepts which make them intelligible to us.

Persons and their Identities

In practice, human persons are classified under a myriad of concepts or kinds: they are children/adults, males/females, professionals/managers/artists, considerate/cruel, ... as

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well as citizens (of states, of nations, of supra-nations, of the world), members of ethnic, religious, cultural and family groupings, and on and on. However, these various classifications are not all equivalent in terms of their conceptual roles and powers. It may well be of some importance that I am an official, an adult, a male, a considerate person, an Australian citizen, etc. Still, in *almost* all such cases, I could (both conceptually and empirically) and often do, survive the loss of the kind in question. As noted above, it is still I who matured from infancy to adulthood, is transformed from a bully to a nurturer, who gives up citizenship of one country to become a citizen of another (or takes up *dual* citizenship), etc.[9]

Notice the qualification 'almost' here. In contrast to the classifications just listed, there are some which, necessarily, belong to me, in the sense that my very existence is linked to them. And among these, there is one which determines the conditions of my identity, in the sense we have been discussing. It is not particularly controversial to suggest that my belonging to the class of human persons—or, more straightforwardly, my *being a person*—is what determines these conditions. And we must keep in mind that they allow for several possibilities, including: my identification with others who are also persons (i.e. of the same kind), my distinctness from non-persons, *and my distinctness from others who are also persons*.

It is this last possibility that has largely been overlooked in discussions of identity relating to citizenship, and it is the failure of *citizenship* and its related concepts to ground or provide appropriate identity criteria for those objects—namely human persons—which fall under them, that compels a re-examination of what, if anything, citizenship has to do with identity.[10]

Persons and Citizens; Individuals and Collectives

Citizenship is a 'collectivist' concept. It is one manifestation of our propensity to gather together, or associate, with others.[11] I do not wish to deny that it can enhance and enrich the quality of our lives, in addition to serving various practical functions; but it can do these things without making dubious claims regarding identity. Several points should be noted here. First, collectivism, in its most extreme form (which Noddings calls 'the dark side of community' (2002, p. 66)) imposes a strict categorization on persons, so that their own sense of identity is consumed—completely defined—by the group. In danger of being lost here is not only the individual's sense of himself *as* an individual but—and this is the second point—his sense of himself as a member of various other groups at the same time. Our freedom in a democratic society is marked, among other things, by our freedom of association. I may see myself as a Jew, but also as a university academic, a singer, an Australian citizen, an eldest son, etc. Even if some of our group memberships are compulsory or involuntary, others are not. To insist that one such association is overriding or exclusive, is to commit what Amartya Sen calls the 'Fallacy of Singular Affiliation' which he sees as being at the very heart of much of the intolerance and discord to which we bear witness around the world today (Sen, 2006, pp. 20ff.).

The Fallacy of Singular Affiliation afflicts especially the 'large' groupings of culture, race, nationality, religion, etc. The reason for this, I suggest, is that their 'largeness' consists, not merely in their size, but in the extent of their claims on our allegiances and

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life-stories. Where a 'small' collective like a book club is (usually) just that—a group of individuals with a common (literary) purpose which may nevertheless persist over time—membership of a particular nationality, religion or culture carries with it, and is sustained by, a considerable amount of 'baggage', some of it morally innocuous, but some not. To be a member of that religion or culture is, necessarily, to share the load of that baggage which—as recent instances have underscored—can impose contentious, even dangerous, impositions on its members.[12]

There is a further—conceptual—point to be made here, in relation to the claim that the conditions for individual identity can be derived from one's membership of, or affiliation with, one, two or any number of collectives. Mindful of the inherent ambiguity in such phrases as 'same dress' or 'same train' (above), there is a difference between *type* (or *kind*) identity and *token* (or *individual*) identity and, moreover, *no amount of the former can yield the latter*. To claim otherwise is to commit a serious *category mistake*. No matter how strongly Chinese citizens identify with China, neither this nor any other affiliation provides a criterion of identity that can serve to define them as individuals. At best, it provides the identity conditions for the class of Chinese citizens, i.e. the nation-state of China *per se*. Furthermore, no combination of affiliations (such as Chinese citizen of Hong Kong, Asian-American, etc.) can do this job either. Suppose that, as a matter of fact, there is one and only one person who is ethnically Chinese, linguistically Cantonese, religiously Jewish, female, and left-handed. These groupings, whether considered separately or together, *still do not define who that person is* (though they may well serve uniquely to identify her on any given occasion. But then, if she is the only Jew in the room, the term 'Jewish' serves uniquely to *identify* her in that context, even though it clearly does not *define* her).

The development of logic and semantics changed fundamentally with the 19th century realization that subjects and predicates are not two *kinds of thing*, as had been thought for thousands of years. The old distinction between particular and universal gave way to the distinction between the subject (which has various properties) and its properties (as expressed by the *predicates* which attach to it). This, in turn, allows us to refer to an object (e.g. a person) as something which persists through time even while undergoing change; its persistence is linked to the kind of thing that it is, while its changes—also governed by the kind in question—are reflected, semantically, as *changes in predication*. The person who was 9 years old, had long hair and was a brat is now 50 years old, balding and mellow. Ontologically, there is only one entity here, and it persists through all these changes (but not through all possible changes).[13]

This re-conceptualization of the most basic of logico-linguistic distinctions made it possible to reject two extreme views about existence and identity: (A) the view (famously defended by David Hume in his sceptical challenge to philosophical dogmatism) that identity through time (i.e. persistence) is illusory because if we assume that an object's properties are subject to change and that there is no way to conceive the object independently of said properties, then there is nothing left which genuinely persists; and (B) the view that independently of any and all properties that an object may have, there is a kind of mysterious *this-ness*, essence or particularity which defines the object but can never be described or characterized (because to do so requires referring to the very properties from which we have just abstracted). By conceptualizing objects as being of

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certain kinds which are associated with appropriate identity conditions and, in turn, with specific criteria governing the kinds of changes those objects can endure, we draw a sharp distinction between an object and its properties.

Being clear about the difference between statements asserting identity and those of predication (allowing for the fact that the latter may allow us to *identify* an individual on a given occasion) can help make sense of scenarios relating to citizenship which may seem problematic or even contradictory. Take, for example, a recent study of Chinese college students who grew up in China but also developed a strong affinity for Western culture in the form of movies, music, etc. (Gu, 2009). One student, Helena, compared English and Chinese movies, expressing great affection for the former and wondering why the local film-makers 'could not produce good work that could move Chinese' (p. 9). The author interprets this as follows:

> The *identities* Helena displayed in the above text were multiple and *contradictory*. On the one hand, through her appreciation of the differences between English and Chinese movies and her preference for the former, she *identified* herself with English culture; on the other hand, she constructed an 'us/other' relationship between Chinese and Westerners by referring to Western directors as 'they', and Chinese directors as 'our'. (Gu, 2009, p. 9, emphasis added)

The author went on to demonstrate that this student changed her views about national and global identity over time, but where, precisely, is the alleged contradiction in the first place? I suggest that the problem here is actually one of equivocation over the term 'identity'. If the statements 'I am a Chinese citizen' and 'I am an English person' are interpreted as *identity statements*, then we do, indeed, have a problem, for this student will be saying that she is identical to two things which are, themselves, distinct, thereby violating the principle of the transitivity of identity. Is this problem resolved by using 'identification' instead of 'identity', as in: 'I identify with China (or as Chinese)' and 'I identify as English'? The answer depends on how we are to interpret 'identify' here, but with the problem of transitivity failure lurking in the background, it is important that whatever terms are employed, the underlying logic be seen as predication rather than identity. *Being Chinese* and *being (a lover of things) English* are properly seen as two ways of *describing* someone, rather than two ways of *identifying* them.[14]

Given the types of issues and problems with which the social sciences are concerned—including social equality, culture, exclusion, discrimination, etc.—it is not surprising that in discussions of citizenship and identity, the literature has focused on groups or collectives, rather than individuals.[15] In so doing, however, some writers have equivocated on the concept of identity, claiming to be addressing the issue of individual (token) identity, but actually sliding back to the level of the collective, i.e. type identity. Isin and Wood take on the challenge of reconciling the concepts of citizenship and identity, stating (correctly) that 'while citizenship has been associated with the universal, identity is associated with the particular' (Isin & Wood, 1999, p. 14). Later, they assert that:

> 'Identity' is a concept that presupposes a dialogical recognition of the other; it is a relational concept. But it is also a concept that presupposes identification in the sense that individuals recognize attributes or properties in each other

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> that are construed as identical or at least similar. These properties, then, are used as an index of individual position and disposition. Identity is therefore a concept not so much of uniqueness or distinction as of resemblance and repetition. (p. 19)

However, in shifting the focus from distinctness to resemblance, they thereby move irrevocably in the direction of the universal, away from the particular—despite their claims to the contrary. As I have already emphasized, the criteria grounding judgments relating to identity necessarily include both resemblance (type identity) *and* distinctness (token difference). As long as we restrict considerations of identity to what binds individuals together (and, thereby, to what makes them different from other individuals who are not part of the group) we are referring to the identity of the group, not to that of its actual members.

For another example, consider the following comments from Hall, who traces the concept of identity from the 'individualist' subject of the Enlightenment; through the 'sociological' subject, where 'identity is formed in the 'interaction' between self and society', to:

> ... the post-modern subject, conceptualized as having no fixed, essential or permanent identity. Identity becomes a 'moveable feast': formed and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural systems which surround us ... the subject assumes different identities at different times, identities which are not unified around a coherent 'self'. (Hall, 1992, p. 277)

Notwithstanding Hall's plausible analysis of these three conceptions of identity—including appropriate references to Enlightenment philosophers such as Descartes, Locke and Leibniz (who did focus on the issue of identity for individual persons)—he, too, equivocates on the identity question, as evidenced by his acknowledgment that the fragmentation, displacement and pluralisation characteristic of post-modernist thinking, threatens to destroy the individual subject and its identity.[16] I concede that the project of aligning myself with various groups and collectives has become muddied by the reality that *their* identities are no longer fixed or determinate; but this no more destroys my own identity than it does that of the individual who has changed so drastically since that grade 3 photo was taken.[17]

Elsewhere Hall expresses a preference for the concept of *identification* over *identity*:

> In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. (Hall, 1996, p. 2)[18]

Once again, however, in so far as identification is a relation of alignment rather than distinction—we identify *with* something or someone—it cannot capture the full conditions of identity that apply to individual persons.

I am claiming that collectivist concepts—including *citizenship*—whose extensions are grouped together by virtue of shared properties, do not generate adequate identity

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criteria for their (individual) members (i.e. persons).[19] I am also claiming that the concept *person*—construed as defining the kind of being that persons are—does generate such criteria. With respect to the latter, Western philosophy has generated a plethora of theories tying the property of being a person with appropriate criteria of identity (in line with assumption IA). Such criteria ground our everyday judgments—'She is the same person as ...', 'He is a different person ...', 'That person no longer exists (because he has died)', 'Aliens and higher primates could be regarded as persons (albeit not *human* persons)'—as we track individuals through space and time. To claim that being a person is associated with specific identity criteria is tantamount to declaring that *person* is the appropriate kind or concept for objects which fall under it (i.e. individual persons). This means, *inter alia*, that the very existence of a person depends on the applicability of the criterion. So, on the one hand, if the criterion fails, then the person ceases to be a person and, *thereby*, ceases to be, *period*. On the other hand, as long as the criterion succeeds in identifying and re-identifying a specific person (through space and time), then that person retains his identity *in the face of all other changes* (recall the school photo example).

Such concepts as citizenship, religion, culture (considered in its specific sense, which allows pluralisation), and ethnicity serve to divide as much as to unite—if only in political and legal terms (but usually in moral and affective terms as well; citizens are often exhorted to feel a sense of pride and loyalty to their particular nation or state, which often, albeit not inevitably, leads to feelings of superiority over, and disdain for, others who are members of different nations). It is hard to see any merit in attempting to 'define' oneself in terms of a divisive classification, particularly when it comes to seeing ourselves as *moral agents*. I shall return to this point.[20]

Relations Matter

As several writers have observed, the major political movements over the past four hundred years (since the Enlightenment and the rise of Modernism)—ranging from extreme liberalism or individualism to extreme communitarianism or collectivism—are associated with corresponding views about how individual persons relate to, and function in, the broader socio-political framework. Locating the individual person somewhere along this range does not, I suggest, capture what is most important about personhood. An alternative model identifies *personhood* as an irreducibly *relational* construct. In this model, the idea that each of us exists in, and through, our relations with other persons, is at the very heart of our understanding of what being a person means.[21] This idea has been articulated by writers and theorists in several disciplines and coming from several distinct perspectives. It is a recurring theme in the pragmatists C. S. Peirce, G. H. Mead and, of course, John Dewey; no less so in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin, Charles Taylor, Jürgen Habermas and Hans-Georg Gadamer; and again, in the theoretical and applied research of Lev Vygotsky and Jerome Bruner (where the skills and tools of thought are seen in terms of internalized social and linguistic behaviour). Among contemporary philosophers, Taylor is a prominent proponent of the view that human life has a fundamentally dialogical—hence, relational—character in virtue of the status of human persons as, essentially, *reason*-making creatures (Taylor, 1991, p. 33). In Taylor (who duly acknowledges the work of Bakhtin on our 'inner dialogicality' (Taylor, 1991, p. 127)), we find a line of thought which

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offers a genuine alternative to the familiar dichotomy of the subjective or monological view of the self *versus* some kind of externalized or objectified conception).[22]

Interpersonal relationships may be identified at all points on the spectrum from individual to universal. From the intimate perspective of Buber's 'I-Thou', to the broadest conception of global citizenship, the key building-block is the idea of persons in relationship with one another.[23] Constructing appropriate identity criteria—as required by our key assumption IA—may be seen as part of the broader project of 'finding/conceptualizing oneself' which, when viewed relationally, involves the ongoing task of positioning myself as *one among others*.[24]

I intend the idea of construing personhood in terms of a *project* to be taken seriously.[25] While part of this project is the general one of determining appropriate identity criteria, etc. (as we must do for all objects which we identify and refer to as belonging to some kind or other), another essential part is quite personal. Each of us must participate, from an early age, in the task of *self-determination* in regard to others, where 'others' here refers both to other individual persons and to the collectives to which we belong—whether by choice or not. We are born into specific families, cultures, religions, language groups, nations, etc. and, depending on the nature of the collective and our own circumstances, we may or may not have opportunities to make choices about these affiliations. Such choices may include regarding one such affiliation as more central to our lives than others—not, in itself, a bad thing (although the Fallacy of Singular Affiliation needs to be borne in mind here). The proper response here, so I have argued, is to regard *all* our affiliations as characteristics or properties of ourselves as *persons*. This is precisely the distinction between self-determination—concerning the *kind* of person I am or want to be—and (numerical) identity—concerning the very person that I am.

It may well be true that the post-modernist metaphors of fragmentation and incompleteness apply to such entities as cultures, nations, ethnicities, and so on. But I interpret this as a challenge to those who maintain that these collectivist notions remain viable, in both semantic and practical terms. On the point of viability, I remain open-minded. My concern is with the individuals who are thus collected and classified; *their* viability is guaranteed by the simple fact of their persistence through space and time, according to whichever criteria of identity are judged to be adequate to the task.

In the following sections of the paper, I point out some implications of this conceptualization of personhood for moral and citizenship education. Regarding the relational concept of a person as the appropriate locus for ethical behaviour relieves the concept of *citizenship* of a prescriptive burden for which it is ill-suited.

Persons, Citizens and Morality

It seems reasonable to take, as a starting point, the idea that morality comes into play because we persons are both *social* and *reflective* creatures: continually interacting with one another, and with the capacity—hence, the obligation—to think about our behaviour in *prescriptive*, as well as descriptive, terms. Further, assuming a relational conception of personhood allows—indeed necessitates—the construction of an ethical framework whose most basic prescriptions apply to all, and only, persons in the context of their relationships with one another.

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I would also submit that in so far as it is persons who are obliged to act morally, it is also persons whose interests and concerns ought to be taken most seriously in ethical judgment and decision-making. This by no means excludes our moral obligations to non-persons but it does imply a 'pecking' order. Killing a child is universally, and appropriately, regarded as being more serious than killing a rabbit, etc. Further—and this point is especially pertinent—it implies that persons—*qua* those individuals like you and me, who live (and die) according to the usual patterns of nature and circumstance—are more important, ethically speaking, than any and all collectives with which they may be associated. I am not proposing that when faced with a choice between killing one person and killing an entire group, we should opt for the former, but this is because such a group is constituted simply of individuals who are each persons in their own right. My target here is the group or collective, considered in more abstract or institutional terms. Consider the following examples:

> 'Gay marriage would destroy the sanctity of the Family'.
> 'The State is more important than the individuals in it'.
> 'Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country!'
> 'That's not the way we do things in this family/culture/society'.

In each of these examples, the rights and wellbeing of one or more actual persons are subjugated to those of the broader collective, where the latter is construed as having moral value *above and beyond* any properties of its actual members (the whole is greater than the sum of its parts). In critiquing such instances, my point is not to resurrect some version of crude Individualism over an equally crude Collectivism; rather, it is to question the propriety of elevating the collective, as an entity in its own right, over those individuals who, at any given time, are members of it.[26] It also calls attention to the power of collectives to impose their own 'baggage' on their members, in so far as they view themselves as being greater than the sums of their constituent parts.

As with issues of identity, the literature on citizenship commonly makes claims about morality and moral education which, in my view, are not warranted. I maintain that *citizenship* has little, if anything, to contribute to conceptions of morality and moral education that is not already covered by reference to persons who, after all, are the key players in moral transactions. Granted, we may judge that someone (for example, a loyal and unquestioning state executioner) is a good citizen but not a good person or, indeed, *vice versa* ('Robin Hood' might be judged a good person but a bad citizen). But the prescriptive modifiers here depend for their sense on the concepts which they modify. Accordingly, if we build notions of autonomy and critical thinking into the concept of citizenship (following Halstead, below), we may decide that Robin Hood is both a good person and a good citizen, but that the executioner is neither—hardly a surprising conclusion given that in this scenario, citizenship and personhood are virtually synonymous.

Further, I do not question the right of the state, nation, society or (even) religion to articulate and implement the kind of education—including moral education—that it deems appropriate (although I have strong views about what form this should take if it is worthy of being called 'education'). After all, most governments take their commitment to

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education seriously.[27] However, from the premise that moral education is provided by the state, it does not follow that the state is justified in inserting itself as a specific beneficiary or even a stake-holder when it comes to the moral commitments of its citizens. This would be akin to a teacher of ethics insisting that her students hold her in special regard, morally speaking, simply because of her role as teacher.

One commentator who has taken a more nuanced stance on the relationship between citizenship and morality is J. Mark Halstead. He has proposed several models of what citizenship education might look like, within a broadly Liberal moral and political framework, but rejects the thesis—which, he sees as gaining ground in the UK—that citizenship education, properly construed, would make moral education redundant (Halstead & Pike, 2006; Halstead, 2006; I refer to this henceforth as the 'redundancy thesis'). I agree with his conclusion here, but would go further and suggest that it is moral education, when properly conceived and implemented, that challenges the idea that citizenship education 'adds value' to this conception.

Halstead proposes three models of citizenship education, whose key aims may be summarized as follows: (1) to produce informed citizens (Halstead & Pike, 2006, p. 34), specifically citizens (i.e. adult persons who are part of the nation in question) who are knowledgeable *about* citizenship (Halstead, 2006, p. 203); (2) to socialize students into the dominant values of the society, with an emphasis on obedience, commitment, patriotism and authority; this is also called 'Education for *good* citizenship' (2006, p. 204, emphasis added); (3) 'to prepare children for active participation in the political, civil and social life of the community'; also called 'Education for *active* citizenship' (2006, p. 206, emphasis added). Halstead claims, first, that while (1) is basically descriptive, (2) and (3) are clearly prescriptive; and secondly, that while (3) has a strong critical component—reflecting the value of autonomy in Liberal society—(2) deliberately presents values and issues as uncontroversial because it values conformity and passivity over autonomy.[28]

In the context of the question which forms the title of his 2006 paper ('Does citizenship education make moral education redundant?'), Halstead favours (3) over the other two models—which is to be expected given his preference for a liberal democratic value scheme (Halstead & Pike, 2006, ch. 2). I endorse his preference, but not because of anything specific to citizenship education; rather, the point is that *every* subject should be taught in a critical and reflective spirit, allowing—indeed, encouraging—students to question what is presented to them. It is a cliché that nothing in education (or schooling) is value-free. Every subject that is taught—or not taught—carries prescriptive baggage which is more often implicit than explicit. The muddled idea of 'moral neutrality', while pretending to offer protection to vulnerable youngsters, actually threatens to impose on them—if only by default—the moral agenda of the dominant *status quo* and other interest groups. Accordingly, one key goal of moral education must be to provide students with the wherewithal to 'sniff out' and reflectively critique such agendas whenever and wherever they occur. In so far as citizenship education does embrace or reflect certain values (and I shall say more about this below) these, too, along with other aspects of civic 'knowledge', should be open to question.

In rejecting the redundancy thesis, Halstead maintains that citizenship education is, and should be treated as, a separate domain from moral education. He holds that a

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proper conceptual framework for citizenship will include values that are not moral values but, rather, political, civic, economic and legal values. In particular, given his commitment to a liberal socio-economic framework, he proposes three core liberal values, viz. *freedom, equality and rationality,* where the third-mentioned acts as a normative safeguard between the first two, which are often in conflict (Halstead & Pike, 2006, p. 28). What are we to make of these claims?

Values: Private or Public?

Much depends here on an appropriate understanding of *values*, for they will be key substantive components in citizenship education, over and above civic knowledge (which, presumably, is largely factual in nature). Halstead offers the following definition:

> Values are principles and fundamental convictions which act as justifications for activity in the public domain and as general guides to private behavior; they are enduring beliefs about what is worthwhile, ideals for which people strive and broad standards by which particular practices are judged to be good, right, desirable or worthy of respect. (Halstead & Pike, 2006, p. 24)

There is much to like about this definition, particularly its focus on values as ideals and standards (criteria) for making good judgments.[29] Still, whether or not we classify *freedom and equality,* (along with other values such as *democracy, pluralism,* etc ... .), as underpinning Citizenship, they are, surely, *moral* values. From Halstead's discussion of these values, it is clear that they are justified in terms of their contribution to *personal and interpersonal wellbeing*. Democracy, for example, 'is seen by liberals as the most rational safeguard against tyranny and the best way of guaranteeing the equal right of citizens to determine for themselves what is in their own best interests' (Halstead & Pike, 2006, p. 29). I grant that the concept of democracy might best be accommodated in a course on civics, or politics, etc.; my point is that as a value, it is justified, ultimately, in *moral* terms.

Why, then, do Halstead and other writers on citizenship education persist in the view that there are values which are tied to citizenship (perhaps via politics or the law) rather than morality? The answer lies in the so-called distinction between *private* and *public* values, the idea being that whereas the former belong to the sphere of (personal) morality—and are, thereby, subjective and contestable—the latter are the common (shared) threads that hold a citizenry together—and, accordingly, must be relatively objective and uncontroversial (Halstead & Pike, 2006, p. 37; Halstead, 2006, p. 207; also McLaughlin, 1992). However, even noting Halstead's own reservations about the private/public distinction, I maintain that on a relational view of personhood, this distinction does not stand up to scrutiny.[30]

I am sympathetic to Halstead's project of locating values between the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism (Halstead & Pike, 2006, p. 25). But I would go further and assert that values, like concepts generally, fit precisely into the middle ground which prevents these extremes from gaining purchase in the first place. To take as given the distinction between subjectivist (purely private) and objectivist (public) domains (as

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in both the Cartesian and classical Empiricist traditions) is to court semantic and epistemological disaster. On the one hand, the private realm of the subjective must necessarily be separate for each individual thinker; indeed, it could, at best, be known only in the first person, thereby rendering shared communication and interpretation intrinsically impossible. In short, if we begin with 'private' knowledge, we will never move beyond it.[31] On the other hand, the idea that values are *given* objectively, i.e. as objects independently of our own perceptions and conceptions, leads to the exclusion of any individual interpretation or construction, and to wondering how it is possible for values to be internalized, on the one hand, or challenged, on the other. Elsewhere, I have argued that the key concepts of *inquiry* and *judgment* are also to be located between these same extremes, and for the same reason, viz. to remind us that the subjective and objective realms of experience are conceptually interwoven (Splitter, 2005, 2009). It is in this context that I question the viability of the private-public distinction.[32]

The idea that being a person should be understood relationally, i.e. in terms of how individual persons relate to one another, implies that the various properties associated with personhood are also understood as applying equally to myself and to other persons. As noted above, the possibility of moral judgment depends upon this relationship and, hence, on all interpersonal relationships.[33]

To conclude my comments on moral education, I wish to reflect briefly on the British experience, in response to perceptions of a decline in moral standards and political awareness on the part of young people and, more specifically, to the tragic events on the London Underground, in July 2005.[34] Whereas the events on the east coast of the USA on September 11, 2001, led—politically, at least—to the development of an 'Us (Americans)-and-Them (anyone who disagrees with us)' mentality, those in Britain exacerbated a more introspective response that was already under-way; namely, to seek to unite what had become a pluralistic or multi-cultural society around a core set of values that captured or represented the idea of 'Britishness' (Kiwan, 2008; Taylor, 2006). But this idea is confused at best and dangerous at worst. It could succeed only at the cost of producing the same kind of 'us-and-them' mentality adopted by the US Government for several years after 9/11; even within Britain, emphasis on some core set of shared values would result in either a largely innocuous set of findings ('Britons value peace and fairness', etc.) or a growing sense of exclusion on the part of those British citizens who happened not to share those values.

On the other hand, my use of the term 'innocuous' is a reminder that we do not need the heavy and potentially divisive language of patriotism, nationalism and citizenship, to identify and urge the appropriate moral point. The tragedy of July 2005, in moral terms, was *not* that a group of British Muslims wrought havoc in Britain and on the lives of other British citizens, but that *a group of human persons murdered another group of human persons*. In the same vein, the appropriate educational and moral response should focus on how it is possible for people to behave in this way toward other people (and, in turn, how to prevent such behaviour), rather than on the implications of being confused about one's own 'identity', in nationalistic and religious/ethnic terms.

To reiterate an earlier point, I am not criticizing the idea that a particular nation, as educational provider to its citizens, should seek to respond, morally and educationally, to this or any other crisis. But the devil lies in the details of such a response, and my point

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is that these details have everything to do with what it means to be a person in the world, and little, if anything, to do with what it means to be British, Muslim, etc.

Educational Implications: The Classroom as a *Community Of Inquiry*

In rejecting the private/public distinction, at least with respect to values, the challenge of providing a viable alternative values framework remains. On this point, I have argued that a form of *Constructivism*, suitably interpreted, has much to offer (Splitter, 2009). Values, like concepts, and unlike biases, prejudices and other belief-forms, are constructed according to the norms and standards of *collaborative inquiry*. Referring back to the definition offered by Halstead and Pike, the key theme of (moral) values being beliefs and ideals about what *is judged* to be good, right, and desirable, begs the question of *who* is doing the judging here. In their chapter entitled 'How children learn values', the authors emphasize the role of 'critical reflection and discussion' in values formation and application (Halstead & Pike, 2006, p. 148), albeit as one strategy among others. The transformation of classroom into collaborative thinking environments is an invitation to young people to take an active role in their own values education.[35]

Adopting terminology based on the work of Dewey, Vygostky and others, such collaborative thinking environments may be called *communities of inquiry* ('coi') (Seixas, 1993). Participating in a coi allows students, individually and collaboratively, to develop their own ideas and perspectives based on appropriately rigorous modes of thinking *and* against the background of a thorough understanding and appreciation of those ideas and perspectives that, having stood the test of time, may be represented as society's best view of things to date.[36]

In a coi, learning is transformed into thinking (or, better, inquiry), and knowledge into understanding and good judgment. Bearing in mind that the process of inquiry described here is both reflective and collaborative, the coi unifies two projects which are seen, by many students, to become more and more *disconnected* as their school experience continues: (1) that of gaining a deep, critical understanding of, and appreciation for, subjects and disciplines deemed by society to be worthwhile; and (2) that of working out what they stand for, what they are committed to, and what *they* judge to be worthwhile.

I readily concede that among the things for which we stand, to which we are committed, and which we judge to be worthwhile, our affiliations with, and memberships of, associations of one sort or another are bound to be prominent. My nation, my religion, my language, my culture (*qua* 'large group' affiliations) may well feature here, along with a range of other ('small group') connections such as (to) my family, my friends, my class or school; as well as my values, core beliefs and convictions. Granted, these affiliations and connections are elaborations of what kind of person I am, but—remembering the person in the school photo—*they presuppose, rather than constitute, my continuing identity*. This process of elaboration includes but is not restricted to the moral domain, although that domain is central to it. To regard myself as a member of an inquiring community is to see myself as *one among others* which, in turn, has three key components which are both cognitive and affective: understanding and appreciating my own self-worth and place in

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the community; understanding and appreciating that others are striving for the very same kind of self-appreciation; and understanding and appreciating that self-appreciation and appreciation for others are interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

The coi is an interactive environment whose entire rationale is the wellbeing of its members (in intellectual, moral, and affective terms). This means, first, that issues of concern—including those affiliations and connections referred to in the previous paragraph—should be treated as open to collaborative inquiry and decision-making; and secondly, that the community itself has no agenda over and above that of the wellbeing its members. As a network of interpersonal relationships, it is, as I like to put it, *no larger than the sum of its parts* (Splitter, 2007, 2009). There is no inherent value or worth in the coi, as a collective, beyond that of its members. It serves as a vital means to an end, and that end is the personal development of those members.[37]

The contrast with our respective national, cultural, and religious affiliations is stark, for these groups are seen as worth preserving *in their own right*—as being, in other words, greater than the sums of their parts—hence the potential for tension and conflict as each of them vies for our allegiance. It is this sense of allegiance to something larger than any and all of us that threatens the possibility of seeing oneself simply *as one among others.* Conversely, the coi acts as a safeguard against manipulation and indoctrination—which is why it is an appropriate environment for moral education—precisely because it is regulated by the normative ideal of thinking critically and carefully about matters of importance.[38]

Arguments for and against including specific subjects in the school curriculum may now proceed on the assumption that whatever is taught will be viewed, by students and teachers alike, as *forms of inquiry*, to be judged and assessed, ultimately, by criteria deemed to be appropriate in that context. I see no reason why moral and citizenship education could not be included here, as legitimate areas of inquiry, alongside language, literature, mathematics, etc. But within the framework of the classroom coi, none of these disciplines threatens our own (personal) identity, although they may well affect and shape our judgements of what we regard as important.

Whither Citizenship in the Classroom?

In terms of actual school and classroom practice, there are several important implications. First, if citizenship is to remain a viable construct in educational terms, students from an early age should be encouraged to regard themselves as citizens *here and now*, and not merely as ‘future citizens in training’. Secondly, this intrinsic sense of citizenship by no means rules out the idea that schooling should (help) prepare them to be well-informed, more active and critically reflective citizens of society-at-large. Indeed, to borrow a phrase from Leung and Yuen, the school and classroom might be seen as *crucibles for democracy* (Leung & Yuen, 2009), in which genuine deliberation on real issues leads to decision-making and action. Thirdly, however, in a classroom coi, to be (or to become) a citizen is no more—but also no less—than to be (or to become) a person, in the sense defended in this paper; that is, an individual who is working out their path in life by engaging, critically and empathetically, with others who are doing like-wise. It is *not* about instilling a misguided sense of loyalty or commitment to the classroom or school as an entity in its

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own right. Finally, those in charge of running schools and classrooms must think carefully about the full extent of any commitment to transform them into inquiring communities. It is dishonest to the point of hypocrisy for adults in power to 'allow' young people to think for themselves and form their own judgments in some areas but not others. Non-negotiability is corrosive to inquiry, whether the context be the formal school curriculum or beyond it. Students whose power in the school context is relatively limited cannot engage in critical reflection under the constraint that some, at least, of what they are critically reflecting about—for example, so-called key public values—is not really open to question and must, ultimately, be accepted as the price of belonging to one's society. As C. S. Peirce and others committed to the ideals of collaborative inquiry stressed, *the path to genuine inquiry should not be blocked*. Pre-empted conclusions or, worse, 'taboo' topics, block the process of inquiry and should be avoided.[39]

A Philosophical Perspective

I conclude with a recommendation for a conceptual framework that is tailor-made for both moral education and citizenship education. The framework in question draws from the discipline of philosophy in combination with the coi as outlined above. Its salient features are as follows:

- It acknowledges that such familiar concepts as *Citizenship, Personhood, Identity,* and *Values*—as well as the various principles and rules that are proclaimed under these headings—are contestable, and cannot reasonably be 'presented' or 'transmitted' to students as clear-cut;
- It encourages students to draw on a range of resources, including the knowledge and belief systems of their own (and others') societies, cultures, etc., but also the thoughtful contributions of the coi itself;
- It draws on, and works within, the great traditions of (philosophical) thought and practice; these include logic, ethics, epistemology and aesthetics. For example, the contentious domain of morality, when structured by critical and reflective thinking, as well as by such imaginative strategies as *moral imagination* ('What if ... ?' scenarios), becomes a legitimate form of *inquiry* in the curriculum;
- It requires students to negotiate norms of (civic) behaviour, such as careful listening, respectful criticism, intellectual humility and courage, ... ;
- It urges students to think for themselves about the kind of society/world in which they wish to live, and how they perceive themselves in this world;
- It steers a careful path between vacuity and mindless relativism, on the one hand, and the mind-numbing dogmatism of absolute certainty, on the other;
- It is sparked by a desire, on the part of students, to 'dig deep' and 'get to the bottom of things'—i.e. to *inquire*;
- It is driven by *dialogue* which may be construed as the coi *thinking-out-loud*.

I am proposing the community of inquiry as an appropriate framework for the development of persons in the rich sense I have articulated in this paper. If I am right, then the prospects for securing respectability and coherence for such contentious areas of the curriculum as citizenship and moral education rest, in large part, on

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society's willingness to embrace such a framework holistically and with a sense of real commitment.

I would, however, go further than this, in recommending that the conceptually and ethically complex subjects of citizenship and moral education be reunited with the venerable discipline of philosophy—where the latter is reconstructed so as to be accessible and sensitive to students and their concerns. It is no accident that so much of our intellectual heritage in such areas as politics, social studies and ethics (not to mention science and psychology), has its roots in philosophy. The combination of attending carefully to reasoned argument, and engaging in a rigorous—albeit open-ended and, often, open-textured—examination of key concepts, qualifies philosophy as a highly appropriate framework in which to identify and address key questions in the ongoing debates on citizenship, ethics and identity.[40] Many writers on citizenship—including those cited above—have shown recognition of this connection (by drawing on the views of philosophers ranging from Aristotle to Appiah, for example), but have invariably failed to follow through on its potential implications for actual classroom practice. I remain optimistic that the major stake-holders in these debates will acknowledge the role that philosophy has played, and can play.

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Notes

1. This question is raised by Cheng *et al.*, 2006b. They also see it as a question about identity, to be resolved, somehow, through values education. However, they interpret it in terms of three different kinds of identity: personal, relational and communal. Hence in their search for 'unity in diversity', they exemplify the kind of equivocation over *identity* that I critique below.
2. David Wiggins has written, with great authority, on the subject of individuals, kinds (or sorts) and their respective criteria of identity; see Wiggins, 1980.
3. Example 6 requires an identity judgment about whether or not a particular object continues to exist (i.e. *persists* over time).
4. Most of us manage quite well to move among different levels of abstraction when identifying and re-identifying persisting objects. The train that I catch to work has carriages and runs on rails, but my reference to 'same' in example 7 depends upon a more abstract entity: the train time-table.
5. Aliens and higher primates might be examples of non-human persons. Conversely, and more controversially, a human foetus and a brain-dead individual might be examples of human non-persons.
6. I will not explore such disembodied entities as minds, souls and spirits here.
7. Disputes about the importance of the (human) body to our conception of *person* have long been a feature of philosophical, psychological and religious discourse.
8. Kant's view here is famously summarized as follows: 'Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions [sense data] without concepts are blind' (Kant, 1781, A 51).
9. One such transition that many societies are struggling to accommodate is that from male to female or *vice versa*. Transgendered individuals often face severe forms of discrimination but here, too, the change in question makes sense only on the assumption that it is *the very same individual person* who was once male and is now female. Metamorphoses in nature provide

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further examples of continuing identity in the face of significant change. In such cases, the continued identity of a single organism remained contestable until an appropriate covering concept or kind was identified.

10. Cheng *et al.*, 2006b is an exception here; they acknowledge that such collective concepts as *citizen(ship)* do not distinguish among distinct individuals who are citizens of the same state or nation.
11. Not all groups of significance come into being by way of a mutual recognition of shared characteristics, beliefs or values. Indeed, as Anthony Appiah has pointed out, culturally-based differences and affinities are as likely to be the result of collective 'identities', as the other way round (Appiah, 2005, pp. 62ff).
12. 'In some ways, terrorism is an outgrowth of collectivism taken to its extreme. For collectivist-oriented individuals, the group (e.g. family, nation, religion) takes precedence over the individual ... . The terrorist becomes fused with the group he represents, so much so that he is willing to sacrifice his own life to advance the group's agenda and purposes' (Schwartz, 2005, p. 304).
13. The logical or semantic distinction between subject and predicate is not accurately captured by the surface-level grammar. One problem faced by English language speakers is radical ambiguity in the verb 'to be'. Compare: 'Fong *is* a proud Chinese citizen of Hong Kong', with 'Fong *is* the person who pulled the trigger', and also with the less common 'Fong *is*' (meaning 'Fong exists'). There is general agreement in the philosophy of language that the first example involves the 'is' of predication. But the second example is more contentious; in so far as the two noun phrases 'Fong' and 'the person who pulled the trigger' both refer to individuals, then the statement is one of identity. Miller, 2002 provides a useful review of this topic.
14. Even to see the student's statement as posing a conflict of identity, the author had to infer *an identification with (things) English* from *a love of (things) English*; but of course the latter is even more clearly an example of predication, not identity. My point here is a conceptual variant of Sen's Fallacy of Singular Affiliation.
15. Even with what I am calling 'large' collectives, the distinction between individuals and groups can be blurred, often with tragic consequences. The phenomena of stereotyping, prejudice and discrimination rely on illegitimate inferences from individuals to groups, and back again.
16. See also Hall, 1996, where he reiterates his rejection of any kind of *essentialist* conception of identity. The view that I am defending could be described as essentialist in the sense that *being a human person* is the essential property that allows us to track individual persons through space and time.
17. Elsewhere, I have written about these historical transitions in terms of the concept of *authenticity* (Splitter, 2009).
18. Hall goes on to posit identification as an ongoing 'construction, a process never completed'. I prefer to characterize this project in terms of a shifting or evolving set of identifications and differences but—for reasons which I have tried to make clear—my actual continuing identity is not in question. Hall, in a review of Postmodernist perspectives on persons—specifically, on the challenge of bridging our social and psychological conceptions of the self—remarks on the influence of Paul Hirst's critique, which is essentially a charge of *question-begging* (Hall, 1996, p. 7): the construction of the self within and through discourse assumes that the self is already constituted as subject. My argument, based primarily on semantic considerations, is along similar lines.
19. Philosophers who employ such concepts as *criteria of identity* are not likely to be confused about these issues. But the same cannot be said for the social science literature on citizenship, as evidenced by the comments from Gu, Isin and Wood, and Hall. Even in ordinary discourse, identity claims made on behalf of individual persons usually turn out to refer to groupings, kinds, types, or roles.
20. Martha Nussbaum notes that 'at bottom, nationalism and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one another—but akin' (Nussbaum & Cohen, 1996, p. 5). One writer who appreciates

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the distinction between citizenship—as it applies to persons—and national identity is Habermas who points out that freedom in the name of national independence is quite different from the freedom enjoyed (or not) by citizens within a nation: 'Citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity' (Habermas, 1994, p. 23).

21. Citizenship is also relational, but in a quite different sense, namely, between an individual and a collective such as a nation.
22. Where Cheng *et al.*, view the relational construction of personhood as challenging the notion of personal identity, I see them as entirely consistent; see Cheng *et al.*, 2006b, p. 4.
23. Buber, 1971.
24. The relational conception I am defending places the *person* at the centre of the 'Who am I?' debate, thereby distinguishing it from the universalist view called 'Cosmopolitanism', as espoused by Nussbaum and others (Nussbaum & Cohen, 1996). As sympathetic critics have pointed out, Nussbaum's case against nationalism and patriotism can be restated without recourse to any such universalist commitments. For example, Putnam, replying to Nussbaum, says: 'That someone is a fellow being [person], a value passenger to the grave, has moral weight for me; "citizen of the world" does not' (Nussbaum & Cohen, 1996, p. 95). I agree also with Gutman, who points out that such phrases as 'the community of human beings in the entire world' and 'citizens of the world' reflect 'another parochial form of nationalism, albeit on a global scale' (in Nussbaum & Cohen, 1996, p. 70). I would view the more contemporary term 'global citizenship' in the same light.
25. From Rousseau comes the idea that authenticity can be viewed as a process—or, better, a *project*—of self-construction/creation which depends, crucially, on egalitarian relationships of inter-subjectivity (see Ferrara, 1992). This idea, as Appiah (2005, p. 15) points out, is also in J. S. Mill. See Splitter, 2009.
26. I leave aside the question of whether these claims actually make sense! The third example, famously proclaimed by John F. Kennedy in January, 1961, reflects a noble sentiment which might better be expressed as 'Ask not what your country can do for you *personally*; ask what *we can do together*'. I do not reject the value of 'the common good', as long as this term refers to the goods held in common by individuals, rather than the goods allegedly held by some collective which exists in abstraction from individuals.
27. This commitment is somewhat blurred with the growth of private and home schooling. Such non-public institutions often impose or reflect moral viewpoints that are at odds with those advocated by the state. See also note 38, below.
28. McLaughlin (1992) sees (1), (2) and (3) in terms of a continuum, ranging from 'minimal' to 'maximal' conceptions of citizenship. He criticizes British Government policy of the day—and, one can imagine, of today as well—for working with and promoting a muddled conception of citizenship, one whose educational implications in terms of such components as morality and critical thinking are quite unclear.
29. Not all values 'act as justifications for activity'. *Aesthetic* values (not acknowledged by Halstead) are not directly linked to any specific actions. Beauty and integrity, for example, are values in so far as they are the outcomes of aesthetic *judgments*.
30. I agree with Kiwan who questions the link between citizenship and values on the grounds that 'Human rights are rights of an individual, underpinned by common values for *all* human beings [read: human persons], rather than rights inherently based on or derived from being a member of a political community or nation-state' (Kiwan, 2008, p. 55).
31. Many philosophers have been critical of both classical dualism and empiricism. See, for example, Wittgenstein's argument against the idea of a 'private language', Wittgenstein, 1953, §§243ff. My thinking here follows P. F. Strawson, in his celebrated account of the concept *person* as *primitive* with respect to, and preempting any conceptual gap between, mind and body; see Strawson, 1959, Ch. 3. For Strawson's final statement on this issue, see Magdalen College, 2008, pp. 83ff. My views on the subject/predicate distinction, and on the relational nature of *person*, are also strongly influenced by Strawson, although I am not sure that he would agree with the former.

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32. McLaughlin, while endorsing the 'private/public' distinction with respect to morality, points out some of the difficulties in maintaining that autonomy and other values should be classified as public—hence, uniformly accepted—in the absence of a broad-ranging and comprehensive public debate.
33. Habermas may plausibly be interpreted along similar lines. In focusing attention on the role of citizens (of whatever nation) as contributing to an 'intersubjectively shared praxis', he looked forward to a 'European Community' which respects democratic and other citizen-related rights, unencumbered by historical national boundaries. His idea of 'deliberative democracy' is akin to that of the 'community of inquiry', in so far as the latter can be imagined at a broad social level. Habermas, 1994, pp. 24ff.
34. See Kiwan, 2008 for a comprehensive review of citizenship education in the UK, where this topic has been much debated over the past twenty years. The tensions wrought by cultural and other large-scale divisions are often exacerbated by the tabloid media. Headlines like 'Are they British or Muslim?' referring to the young men behind the London subway bombings, assume that a person cannot be both or, at least, that even if he is both, one must take priority over the other. This is an example of Sen's Fallacy of Singular Affiliation. Further, I suggest that while such questions appear to reflect a concern for *individual* identity, they actually are grounded in a concern for *the identity of the collective(s)* in question. The real issue behind the 'British or Muslim' question above is not the interests or identities of British citizens or Muslims; rather, it is the interests and identity of *Britain* or *Islam* as national and religious institutions, respectively.
35. In my teaching, I criticize the 'heirloom' view of values, according to which values are precious, fragile objects handed down from generation to generation, with a stern admonition not to examine them too carefully lest they fall apart. Such an ossified, inert conception of values is both popular in the public mind and worthless in educational terms.
36. The community of inquiry is one type of *community of practice* (Wenger, 1998), but as a normative or prescriptive construct, it guarantees that the practice in question is worthwhile and not destructive or toxic. The coi has been most fully developed in the literature and practice of *Philosophy for Children*. Journals such as *Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children*, and *Critical and Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy for Children* are excellent resources for work in this area. See also Lipman, 2003; Splitter & Sharp, 1995; Lipman *et al.*, 1980; Splitter, 2007, 2009.
37. Children belong to a variety of communities which come and go in their turn. It is the job of education to enable students to grow as persons, by *internalizing the processes of collaborative inquiry à la* Vygotsky, even as these various communities—including communities of inquiry—eventually fall by the wayside.
38. This normative ideal is crucial. Without it, pluralistic and multi-cultural societies face irresolvable difficulties in accommodating moral and cultural traditions which are simply incompatible—either with one another or with the prevailing state or government framework. Teaching children to think for themselves will amount to little if it is not part of the culture of *every* educational institution. A similar point is made, in no uncertain terms, by Sen, in his critique of governments and societies that encourage the formation of narrowly-sectarian school communities in the name of cultural pluralism (2006, p. 117). Sen is critical of the agendas of such communities, which are likely to be inimical to open, structured inquiry and the skills and dispositions associated with it. Although he does not refer specifically to classroom dynamics, he emphasizes the importance of teaching children how to reason and make good choices, decisions and judgments. The better option is right before our eyes—at least for those living in large urban centers: it is the institution of *public schooling* which, inevitably, brings together just the kinds of diversity that are needed for genuine inquiry. With a multitude of nations, cultures, religions and other categories right there in the classroom, teachers have a wonderful opportunity to apply the principle that we find out who we truly are through being one among others.

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39. Leung and Yuen (2009) cite a study in which students at a Hong Kong secondary school were encouraged to negotiate their own style of school uniform, within a context in which such actions as 'Changing natural colour of the hair' were simply ruled as unacceptable!
40. I grant that philosophy's refusal to accept anything as beyond question makes it less attractive than religion to those seeking a firm foundation for their ethical views and values. But my concern in this paper is with education and forms of schooling which are conducive to the wellbeing of children.

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