

Armenian History and the Question of Genocide

Armenian History and the Question of Genocide

Michael M. Gunter

palgrave
macmillan



ARMENIAN HISTORY AND THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE
Copyright © Michael M. Gunter, 2011.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2011 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®
in the United States – a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN: 978–0–230–11059–5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Gunter, Michael M.

Armenian history and the question of genocide / Michael M. Gunter.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978–0–230–11059–5 (alk. paper)

1. Armenian massacres, 1915–1923. 2. Armenian massacres, 1915–1923—
Historiography. 3. Armenians—Turkey—History. 4. Armenian question.
5. Turkey—Ethnic relations. 6. Genocide—Turkey. I. Title.

DS195.5.G85 2010

956.6'20154—dc22

2010043764

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by MPS Limited, A Macmillan Company

First edition: May 2011

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Printed in the United States of America.

Dedicated to the memory of
Lynx Gunter (1999–2010):
a peacemaker

Contents

Foreword	ix
1 The Historical Origins of the Turkish-Armenian Animosity	1
2 What Is Genocide?	27
3 Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century	57
4 Politicizing History	75
5 Turkish Counterterror and Harassment?	99
6 Rapprochement?	119
Notes	139
Selected Bibliography	173
Index	187

Foreword

I was a senior Fulbright Lecturer in International Relations at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey, during the 1978–79 academic year. The experience changed my academic life and I have been interested in matters dealing with Turkey ever since. As everybody knows, Turkey has long had serious problems regarding its relations with various minority groups including the Armenians and Kurds. For the most part, opinions hostile to Turkey are frequently heard in the West given various reasons that will become clear in this book. Without whitewashing what happened to the Armenians, I have long wanted to present an objective analysis of the Turkish point of view on this subject. Given recent attempts between Turkey and Armenia to reach an accommodation, such a study has become all the more relevant.

Thus, my book presents the Turkish position regarding the Armenian claims of genocide during World War I and the continuing debate over this issue. Nevertheless, I offer an equal examination of each side's historical position in [Chapter 1](#). [Chapter 2](#) asks what is genocide? Here I illustrate that although this is a useful concept to describe such evil events as the Jewish Holocaust in World War II and Rwanda in the 1990s, the term has also been overused, misused, and therefore trivialized by many different groups seeking to demonize their antagonists and win sympathetic approbation for them. I include the Armenians in this category because, although as many as 600,000 of them died during World War I, it was neither a premeditated policy perpetrated by the Ottoman Turkish government nor an event unilaterally implemented without cause. Of course, in no way does this excuse the horrible excesses committed by the Turks.

To illustrate my point, I use the recent work of the noted French scholar Jacques Semelin, and such long-suppressed Armenian personalities as Hovhannes Katchaznouni (the first Prime Minister of Armenia after World War I) and K. S. Papazian (an historian), among others. I also illustrate how today Armenians have sought to politicize and legislate their version of history

in parliamentary and other governmental bodies around the world, damning their opponents as genocide deniers and perpetrators of hate speech. The case of the renowned scholar Bernard Lewis is a prime example of this Armenian misuse and distortion of their politicized version of history. I also analyze the hypermobilized Armenian lobbying tactics that have achieved considerable success in politicizing their version of history. Among many other issues, I also analyze the recent “soccer diplomacy” between Turkey and Armenia, which led to their signing treaties in October 2009 that would have established diplomatic relations between them and an historical commission to analyze their different versions of history. Unfortunately, ultranationalist elements in both states have prevented these treaties from being ratified. Nevertheless, their very signing illustrates the progress these two ancient antagonists have made on reaching new understandings. Thus, all the more an analysis such as mine should be fruitful for those wanting to understand the issue fully. Of course, it is up to the two parties to put the final stamp of agreement on all this. My analysis is simply one of the background building blocks.

The method I use for this book is that of traditional scholarly analysis. My audience promises to be much larger than the traditional narrow scholarly one as the recent “soccer diplomacy” has made this issue of great interest and legitimacy for the intelligent lay public in general, the broad Turkish and Armenian publics, and various interested government officials.

My book proceeds logically and reads well. It does not get bogged down in mind-boggling analyses that are difficult to follow and comprehend and therefore fail to make their case. It will be very easy for the many who disagree with me to understand readily my point of view. On the other hand, it will also be unproblematic for others who want to understand the Turkish point of view to follow my narrative. As noted already, this ancient issue recently gained new importance and prominence since Turkey and Armenia signed treaties in October 2009 agreeing to establish diplomatic relations and a historical commission to study their different positions, the very events my book analyzes. Therefore, this book should prove invaluable for up front and background analysis as this ancient process plays out toward a possible final solution.

Given the “received wisdom” on the Turkish-Armenian issue, some will argue this book is a Turkish apology. It is not! Rather this book is an attempt to show how the Armenians have misused the term “genocide” for their one-sided political agenda and that while the Turks committed many horrible acts that today might be called war crimes or ethnic cleansing, the Armenians were not completely innocent. Thus, genocide is not necessarily

the appropriate term to describe what occurred. Armenia has implicitly recognized this by agreeing to establish an historical commission to analyze these events, which my book does.

Michael M. Gunter
September 7, 2010

CHAPTER 1

The Historical Origins of the Turkish-Armenian Animosity

During the 1970s and 1980s, Armenian terrorists assassinated 30 Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families, including 4 in the United States. In addition more than 20 other Turks and non-Turks were killed, and over 300 other people around the world wounded because they happened to be in the terrorists' line of fire.¹

When the terrorists were apprehended, however, some Armenians implied that they did have a right to murder and should not be prosecuted. After Hampig Sassounian was found guilty of murdering Kemal Arıkan, the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles in 1982, for example, some Armenians in Boston announced: "What occurred throughout Hampig's trial was a mockery of justice, an attempt to stop the Armenian people from actively pursuing their cause. . . . We are outraged by the . . . guilty verdict." "Armenians protest misuse of judicial system," proclaimed another article in the same Armenian-American newspaper. Referring to the trial of two other Armenian terrorists, who had murdered the Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia in March 1983, the same publication declared: "To consider it a criminal act distorts the selfless struggles of the Armenian youth, who are pursuing the just cause of their people."²

What supposedly justified this recent Armenian terrorism? The declared rationale was to gain revenge for Turkish massacres of Armenians during World War I and to achieve what a number of Armenian publications have summed up as the "3 R's": (1) recognition of what happened; (2) reparations; and (3) restoration of the ancestral homeland.³

Given the magnitude of these terrorist acts and their proffered justification, it seems appropriate to analyze objectively the historical origins of the Armenian-Turkish enmity. To do so it is necessary to study the so-called Armenian Question as it developed in the latter part of the nineteenth

century and the deportations and massacres of Armenians that occurred during World War I. It is hoped that this process will throw some objective historical light on an important question that has all too often been the private game preserve of self-righteous apologists for one side or the other. From such an analysis, moreover, may come the understanding that will encourage those who presently support anti-Turkish positions and even diatribes to reconsider their point of view and realize that the unfortunate events so often described as “genocide” would be best seen otherwise.

The Armenian Question

Into the early nineteenth century, the unique millet system of self-government for the non-Muslim minorities of the Ottoman Empire apparently satisfied the Armenian population of the Empire to the degree that they were known by the Turks as the *Millet-i Sadika*, or “loyal nation.”⁴ The rise of nationalism and the decline of the multinational Ottoman Empire, however, began to change this situation as the nineteenth century progressed. One by one the various Christian nations on the Ottoman frontiers in the west broke away, while in the east the Russian conquests of the Caucasus, making large numbers of Armenians subjects of the Tsar, acted as a further catalyst.

The Armenian Position

To many Armenians, life in the decaying Ottoman Empire began to seem increasingly oppressive. According to A. O. Sarkissian, “there were four general causes of complaint: the non-acceptance of non-Mohammedan testimony in the courts; the abuses connected with the matter of taxation; oppressions and outrages committed by government officials, such as forced conversions, rapes, assaults, etc.; and oppressions and outrages committed by civilians and brigands.”⁵

Supporters of the Armenian position argue that non-Muslims, especially Christians, were derisively termed *giaours* (infidels) or *rayah* (flock) and denied equal protection of the laws. A Muslim who murdered a non-Muslim, for example, was not subject to the death penalty, while if the victim were a Muslim, capital punishment was enacted. In addition, the testimony of non-Muslims was not given the same weight in legal proceedings that also involved Muslims. As Christians, Armenians were ineligible for military service and not even allowed to bear arms, a situation filled with danger given the general breakdown of law and order in eastern Anatolia.

An unequal taxation system also burdened the Armenians.

The Kharadj, or the head-tax, the military exemption tax, the Kishlak, or the winter-quartering tax, . . . the Kurds' seemingly prescriptive right to free winter quarters in Armenian homes, . . . the hospitality tax, . . . which meant that the Christian was bound to offer free lodging and food for three days a year to all government officials or to all those who passed as such, . . . and many others were imposed and exacted from Armenians alone.⁶

Despite promised reforms, supporters of the Armenian position state that "life, property, and above all the honor of the family were always in jeopardy"⁷ due to the depredations of the Kurds, Circassians, and other nomadic tribes who lived alongside the Armenians. Given this overall situation, Armenians felt "thrown outside the pale of the law."⁸ As a result, some Armenians began to look to Europe as their savior and protector. Indeed, as early as the 1828–29 war between Russia and Turkey, some Ottoman Armenians supported the former, as occurred again during the Crimean War (1853–56).

The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78 proved a major step in the development and even internationalization of the Armenian Question. Armenian supporters maintain that Article 16 of the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano appeared to promise that Armenian reforms would be guaranteed by Russia, but the later Treaty of Berlin proffered only a watered-down Article 61 that was to be upheld by all the European powers and thus, it proved, it was upheld by none.

Indeed, the Armenian Question began to unfold against the backdrop of complicated European imperialist ambitions that often sought to play off the Turks and Armenians against each other. England, for example, at times tended to oppose Armenian aspirations because she feared their success would merely facilitate the Russian advance to the Mediterranean. Russia, for her part, at times sought to promote Armenian ambitions, while at other times she discouraged them, not wishing to encourage the aspirations of her own Armenian subjects. Neither, however, particularly cared when the pawns of their ambition suffered. Turks today give a great deal of weight to the influence of the European imperialists in stirring up Armenian aspirations, seeing the same sinister motives behind Armenian terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s. Even Lord Bryce, the great friend of the Armenians, scathingly denounced the foreign intervention:

Before the Treaty of Berlin the Sultan had no special enmity to the Armenians, nor had the Armenian nation any political aspirations. It was the stipulations then made for their protection that first marked them out for

suspicion and hatred, and that first roused in them hopes of deliverance whose expression increased the hatred of their rulers. . . . [T]his is what England and Russia between them have accomplished. Better it would have been for the Christians of the East if no diplomatist had ever signed a protocol or written a dispatch on their behalf.⁹

Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Refugees in the League of Nations and also a great friend of the Armenians, expressed similar sentiments. “For the Armenians in the Turkish Empire . . . it raised false hopes, and actually made things worse for them. It is the tragic truth that they would have been better off if the nations of Europe and their governments and diplomatists had never pleaded their cause at all.”¹⁰

Supporters of the Armenian cause state that conditions continued to grow worse as the newly aroused Armenians sought more, while a declining, reactionary Ottoman government offered less. Influenced by these circumstances, as well as the radical and revolutionary groups in Russia—some of them prone to violence—Armenian nationalism eventually manifested itself in the formation in 1887 of the Marxist Revolutionary Party, or Hunchaks (Bells), and in 1890 the more nationalistic *Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaksutiun* (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), or simply Dashnaks.

To better control his restive, eastern domains, Sultan Abdulhamid II organized a Kurdish cavalry called the *Hamidiye*. The nomadic Kurds had been the inveterate enemy of the sedentary Armenians. Deputized now as the Sultan’s agents in the guise of the *Hamidiye*, Armenian supporters argue that the Kurds repeatedly fell upon the defenseless Armenians who, as mentioned above, were not even allowed to possess firearms legally until early in the twentieth century.

Armed conflict began in earnest when in 1894 the Hunchaks persuaded the Armenians of Sassun not to pay the extortionary, but customary, protection tax (*hafir*) to the Kurds. What the Armenians considered to be self-defense, however, Abdulhamid viewed as rebellion. Supporters of the Armenian position state that with brutality, he put down the insurrection in Sassun and then sat by approvingly as widespread massacres spread throughout the Armenian *vilayets* (provinces).

Unlike their fellow Christian nations in the Balkans, however, the Armenians were concentrated in the heartland of the Ottoman Empire and constituted a minority in the very land they sought as their own autonomous or even independent state.¹¹ In addition, the final shrinkage of the Ottoman Empire from Europe to Anatolia tended to “isolate . . . the Armenians as the last of the great Christian minorities still under Ottoman rule.”¹² It also helped to produce “a crucial shift from Ottoman pluralism

to narrow Turkish nationalism,” both of which would have “serious consequences for the Armenians.”¹³ For the Turks, therefore, independence for the Armenians was a logical absurdity and a threat to their very existence. As Bernard Lewis concluded: “Now a desperate struggle between them began—a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland.”¹⁴ David Lang concluded that “the total death toll [of Armenians] over the years from 1894 to 1896 was not less than 200,000—some estimates put it as high as a quarter of million.”¹⁵

The Turkish Position

Others see what occurred as a justified Turkish response to Armenian and foreign provocations. The picture they paint is very different from the one depicted by the Armenians and largely accepted in the West.

In the first place various treaties and capitulations enjoyed by the Western Christian powers enabled them to exercise a virtual protectorate over the Porte’s non-Muslim subjects. Thus, the British Consul Palgrave was able to report from Trabzon in 1868 that

[t]he Mahometan population is absolutely “unrepresented,” at the central, irresponsible, and dissevered Government of Constantinople, where the Mahometan subjects of the Sultan have really no one to whom they can make known their interests or expose their wrongs. Meanwhile the Christians have at the capital and throughout the Empire as many Courts of Appeal and redress-demanding representatives as there are Consulates, Agencies, and, sometimes, Embassies, at hand. Indeed, not only are their complaints listened to when made, but even fabricated for them when not made.¹⁶

In addition, since only Muslims were permitted to serve in the Empire’s armed forces, non-Muslims were able to benefit financially. The British Consul at Izmir, Charles Blunt, who spent 40 years in Turkey and thus came to know the place well, explained that after the reform decree of Gulhane, issued by the Sultan in 1839:

The Christians then came forward as cultivators; their numbers increased by new-comers, for their lives were no longer at the mercy of every petty authority; the Turkish proprietors began to fall off; population visibly decreased; their lands were no longer profitable. All Turkish proprietors have to furnish their quota for the conscription, and many, very many, of the descendants of formerly large landed proprietors, after serving their time with the army, return home to find the whole feature of their native place changed; the predominant Turkish population replaced by Christians; their heritage uncultivated lands;

and if, by chance, any of them desire to resume their former agricultural pursuits, they usually fall into the meshes of some Christian usurious banker, to whom the whole property or estate is soon sacrificed. They who return without any taste for their old pursuits, dispose of their property for what they can get, and the purchasers are either Armenians or Greeks.¹⁷

For the Russian ambitions to reach the Mediterranean, the Christian Armenian population was a natural fifth column to exploit. The British Consul J. G. Taylor reported from Erzurum in 1869, for example, that “it is the policy of the Russian Government, and, therefore, of its Agents . . . to exaggerate real existing evils, or trump up imaginary complaints, in order to keep up that chronic dissatisfaction so suitable to the line of conduct it has always pursued in Eastern countries.”¹⁸ During each Russian invasion of the nineteenth century, Ottoman Armenians were accused of siding with the enemy. As Lord Bryce himself noted: “When foreign armies enter [the Ottoman Empire], whether it be Bulgaria or Armenia, they are welcomed as deliverers by the subject populations.”¹⁹ The commander of the invading Russian army in eastern Anatolia in 1877 was a Russian Armenian, General Mikhail Loris-Melikov. His original surname, “Melikian,” had simply been Russianized.

As the Russians advanced through the Balkans toward Constantinople in 1878, the Armenian Patriarch Nerses entered into secret negotiations with them. Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano, which the Russians dictated to the Turks in March of that year, was the result: “The Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians.”

During the same month the British Ambassador in Constantinople, A. H. Layard, reported

that the Armenians were determined, now that self-government was about to be given to the Christian communities in Europe, to demand the same privileges for themselves in Asia. . . . [I]f the Congress refused to listen to the just demands of the Armenians, they were resolved to agitate until they could obtain what they required, and if they could not succeed without foreign aid, they would place themselves completely in the hands of Russia, and even prefer annexation to her to remaining under Turkish rule.²⁰

Patriarch Nerses wrote in a Memorandum to the British government that the “coexistence” of Armenians and Muslims in Turkey was “impossible.” The only solution was the creation of an “autonomous Christian organization” similar to that in Lebanon.²¹ An Armenian delegation headed by

Archbishop Khirnian, the former Patriarch of Constantinople, pleaded its case at the capitals of the Western powers, and although it was not allowed to appear formally at the Congress of Berlin, submitted a letter to that body recommending an Armenian autonomous region in eastern Anatolia.

The outcome of this Armenian campaign was the inclusion of Article 61 in the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878. This Article reiterated the commitment made by the Sublime Porte in the aforementioned Treaty of San Stefano to introduce reforms in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians and provided a pretext to allow the European imperialist powers to use the Armenians as a pawn in their power struggles in Anatolia. Many Armenian leaders were not satisfied with this treatment, arguing that while the Christian nations in the Balkans had eaten from the “dish of liberty” at Berlin, the Armenians had been denied.

The self-government that began to work for the Christian nations in the Balkans was not appropriate for the Armenians, however, because nowhere did they constitute a majority. The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury, wrote to the British Ambassador in Constantinople, A. H. Layard, in August 1878, for example:

Whatever chance of success these experiments may have, they could not be safely imitated in the Asiatic provinces of the Empire. The Mohametan races, which there constitute an enormous majority of the population, are, for the present at least, unfitted for institutions of this kind, which are alien to their traditions and their habits of thought. The Christians, to whom a representative system might perhaps be suited, are not only a small minority, but (with the exception of those in the Lebanon, who are provided for) are so scattered and intermixed with the Mahometans that any separate machinery of Government, designed for them alone, would be attended with the gravest practical difficulties.²²

In spite of these demographic facts, the Armenians continued to bombard the foreign embassies and consulates in the Ottoman Empire with petitions that “have generally proved, on inquiry, to contain very exaggerated statements,”²³ according to the British Ambassador, Layard. Moreover, argue the Turks and their supporters, in a manner similar to what the Armenian terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s attempted to do, the Hunchaks and the Dashnaks began deliberately to use terror against the Turks to incite Turkish reprisals and massacres, which would then encourage broad Armenian support for revolution and finally great power intervention. “Europeans in Turkey were agreed that the immediate aim of the [Armenian] agitators was to incite disorders, bring about inhuman reprisals and so provoke the intervention of the powers.”²⁴

Indeed, this general interpretation of events has been largely verified by Louise Nalbandian who, although a confirmed Armenian patriot, wrote just before the modern wave of Armenian polemical tracts began in the 1970s. Thus, Nalbandian was able to describe in a matter-of-fact way the secret Armenian revolutionary activities against the Ottoman state from 1860 on. Included in her study were references to Armenian terrorist attacks carried out in order to incite reprisals that hopefully would lead to foreign intervention, plans to strike at the Ottoman state when it was at war and to seek help from foreign governments at such favorable opportunities, Armenian publications that exaggerated Turkish atrocities, and more.²⁵ All in all Nalbandian's study makes it clear that the Armenians were not solely innocent victims of murderous Turks.

On August 24, 1896, for example, 26 Dashnaks led by a 17-year-old named Babken Suni seized the Ottoman Bank building in Constantinople in an unsuccessful attempt to force the Western powers to intervene on their behalf. Demands for reform were made and a threat to blow up the premises and kill its staff was issued. The terrorists were eventually talked out of the bank and evacuated to France. In reaction, the Sultan ignorantly turned loose the mobs on the Armenians in the capital, and a massacre ensued. But the hoped-for European intervention did not materialize. In 1905 a Dashnak attempt on the Sultan's life failed. Kristapor Mikaelian, the leader of the conspirators, however, died when the bomb misfired.

The Deportations and Massacres in World War I

World War I brought the intermittent carnage of the nineteenth century to its frightful conclusion, resulting in the extinction of Turkish Armenia in a series of deaths through disease and famine, deportations, and massacres, which the Armenians and their supporters refer to as the twentieth century's first genocide. So much has been written so polemically on the subject, and its roots have become so entangled in mutual suspicions and hatreds that it is difficult to discern fact from fiction, or even where to start.

Following the Armenian terrorist attacks during the summer of 1983, for example, two different and reputable American newspapers each commissioned a three-part series on the origins of the problem. Their conclusions concerning the Armenian accusation of genocide by the Turks in 1915 were diametrically opposed. The *Wall Street Journal* series concluded that "three months of extensive research leave little doubt that a horrible crime certainly did occur. . . . Talaat and company probably did plan a genocide."²⁶ The *Washington Times*, however, declared that "the events of 1915

[were] distorted by fantasy into ‘genocide’ . . . [and] are today the subject of conjecture, hype, and myth.”²⁷

The Armenian Position

The Armenian contention is that the Ottoman government of the Committee of Union and Progress [*Ittihat ve Terakki*] meticulously planned and then executed a systematic genocide of some one and one-half million of its Armenian citizens both by outright massacres in situ and by forced marches into the Syrian deserts that resulted in massacres along the way for many, and ultimate death by starvation for most of the others.

Under the cover of wartime conditions and false charges of mass Armenian collaboration with the invading Russian enemy, the Turks believed that they could eliminate the Armenians who blocked their path to the east and their dreams of a greater Turan, or union of all Turkic peoples. Chief among the culprits are said to be Enver Pasha (Minister of War), Talaat Pasha (Minister of Interior), and Jemal Pasha (a military figure who held a variety of posts). Indeed, immediately after World War I, a Turkish court martial in Constantinople sentenced these three to death in *absentia*. (Subsequent Turkish governments, however, have repudiated these sentences, claiming they were handed down under duress from the allies who were then occupying Constantinople.)

“That the killings were deliberate none but dedicated Turkists deny. The horror . . . was too similar in each locality for the killings to have been spontaneous manifestations,”²⁸ one scholar has concluded. What are alleged to be official Ottoman documents ordering the genocide have even been published by Armenian sources.²⁹

Out of a plethora of pro-Armenian sources³⁰ two in particular are most frequently cited and stand in most damning condemnation of the Turks: (1) the Bryce-Toynbee compilation of more than 600 pages of mostly eyewitness accounts;³¹ and (2) the memoirs of Henry Morgenthau, the American Ambassador to Turkey at that time.³² In his preface, the distinguished British statesman and author, Lord James Bryce, stated that “these accounts described what seemed to be an effort to exterminate a whole nation, without distinction of age or sex.”³³ The following is typical of the accounts in the Blue Book:

Harpout [Kharpert] has become the cemetery of the Armenians; from all directions they have been brought to Harpout to be buried. There they lie, and the dogs and the vultures devour their bodies. Now and then some man throws some earth over the bodies. In Harpout and Mezre the people have

had to endure terrible tortures. They have had their eyebrows plucked out, their breasts cut off, their nails torn off; their torturers hew off their feet or else hammer nails into them just as they do in shoeing horses. This is all done at night time, and in order that the people may not hear their screams and know of their agony, soldiers are stationed round the prisons, beating drums and blowing whistles. It is needless to relate that many died of these tortures. When they die, the soldiers cry: "Now let your Christ help you."³⁴

Ambassador Morgenthau's accounts are equally damning, as the following typical passage indicates:

It is absurd for the Turkish government to assert that it ever seriously intended to "deport the Armenians to new homes"; the treatment which was given the convoys clearly shows that extermination was the real purpose of Enver and Talaat. How many exiled to the south under these revolting conditions, ever reached their destinations? The experiences of a single caravan show how completely this plan of deportation developed into one of annihilation. The details in question were furnished me directly by the American Consul at Aleppo, and are now on file in the State Department at Washington. . . . All the way to Ras-ul-Aln, the first station on the Baghdad line, the existence of these wretched travellers was one prolonged horror. The gendarmes went ahead, informing the half-savage tribes of the mountains that several thousand Armenian women and girls were approaching. The Arabs and Kurds began to carry off the girls, the mountaineers fell upon them repeatedly, violating and killing the women, and the gendarmes themselves joined in the orgy. . . . Finally the gendarmes, having robbed and beaten and violated and killed their charges for thirteen days, abandoned them altogether. . . . For another five days they did not have a morsel of bread or a drop of water. "Hundreds fell dead on the way," the report reads, "their tongues were turned to charcoal. . . ." On the seventieth day a few creatures reached Aleppo. Out of the combined convoy of 18,000 souls just 150 women and children reached their destination.³⁵

Propaganda or Truth?

How accurate are such reports? There is no question that Lord Bryce, Arnold Toynbee, and Ambassador Morgenthau believed them. In analyzing their veracity, for example, Lord Bryce declared:

[B]y far the larger part (almost all, indeed, of what is here published) does constitute historical evidence of the best kind, inasmuch as the statements come from those who saw the events they describe and recorded them in writing immediately afterwards. They corroborate one another, the narratives

given by different observers showing a substantial agreement, which becomes conclusive when we find the salient facts repeated with no more variations in detail than the various opportunities of the independent observers made natural.³⁶

The Turks, however, dismiss the Bryce/Toynbee Blue Book as false wartime propaganda by their enemies (the Allies), and Morgenthau's testimony as that of a hopelessly biased and misled person. Where then lies the truth? In a later study, Professor Toynbee, although not denying the accuracy of the Blue Book, did write that it had been "duly published and distributed as war-propaganda!"³⁷ Based on his personal observations and studies in Anatolia after World War I, Toynbee now wrote in a more balanced light: "In the redistribution of Near and Middle Eastern Territories, the atrocities which have accompanied it from the beginning have been revealed in their true light, as crimes incidental to an abnormal process, which all parties have committed in turn, and not as the peculiar practice of one denomination or nationality."³⁸ Indeed, more than a half century after he had edited the Blue Book with Bryce, Toynbee, in his final statement on the subject, declared: "These . . . Armenian political aspirations had not been legitimate. . . . Their aspirations did not merely threaten to break up the Turkish Empire; they could not be fulfilled without doing grave injustice to the Turkish people itself."³⁹

At the time he had compiled the Blue Book, wrote Toynbee, "I was unaware of the politics that lay behind this move of H. M. G.'s and I believe Lord Bryce was as innocent as I was. . . . [I]f our eyes had been opened, I hardly think that either Lord Bryce or I would have been able to do the job that H. M. G. had assigned to us in the complete good faith in which we did, in fact, carry it out."⁴⁰ Toynbee went on to explain that the purpose of the British government in publishing the Blue Book was to counter successful German propaganda concerning Russian barbarities against the Jews.

As for Lord Bryce's preconceptions on the subject of Armenians and Turks, his biographer, the famous historian H. A. L. Fisher, wrote that Bryce "had been ever since he voyaged in Transcaucasia in 1876, unremitting in his exertions for the relief and protection of the Armenian race."⁴¹ Bryce "became in fact the principal advocate of the Armenian nation in England, the founder and first President of the Anglo-Armenian Society, the member for Armenia in the British House of Commons. . . . He thought them the best race, in Asia Minor, superior in tenacity of will and capacity for moral and intellectual progress to their neighbors, Turks or Kurds, Tartars or Russians."⁴²

As for the Turks, Bryce's "conclusion held with tenacity and passion through the whole course of his public life was the hopelessness of the Turk."⁴³ He believed that "wherever the Turk had ruled, he had spread desolation. The provinces of Asia Minor, once the scene of a brilliant civilization, had been emptied . . . by the lethargy, the incompetence, and the caprices of a barbarous master."⁴⁴ Indeed, Bryce himself had written that "when once the dying [Turkish] tyranny that has cursed it [the Armenian race] is dead, it may fairly hope, with its industry, frugality, and quick intelligence, to restore prosperity to countries which war and oppression have made almost a desert."⁴⁵

Obviously Lord Bryce was hardly a disinterested compiler of the events of 1915. This however, as will be shown below, does not necessarily allow us to dismiss the Blue Book as completely false and misleading. First, however, it would be useful to examine, in his own words, Ambassador Morgenthau's preconceptions concerning the Turks.

They were, the Ambassador wrote "dull-witted and lazy."⁴⁶ He asserted: "Such abstractions as justice and decency form no part of their conception of things."⁴⁷ The author of the work so frequently cited by the Armenians and their sympathizers as definitive of their cause further opined: "Essentially the Turk is a bully and coward; he is brave as a lion when things are going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him."⁴⁸ "We must realize," wrote Morgenthau, "that the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter contempt for all other races. . . . The Turk may be obsequiously polite, but there is invariably an almost unconscious feeling that he is mentally shrinking from his Christian friend as something unclean."⁴⁹

Morgenthau too, then, was hardly a disinterested observer of the Turkish-Armenian animosities. On the other hand, one should not rush to dismiss the Armenian accusations as baseless simply because Bryce and Morgenthau were confirmed Turkophobes. Prejudices notwithstanding, their testimonies, when corroborated by the wealth of eyewitness accounts cited above, as well as contemporary press accounts, indicate that several hundred thousand Armenians did die during the deportations from various causes such as sickness, starvation, and outright massacre. Certainly no one can deny that after World War I, the traditional Armenian homeland in eastern Anatolia had been denuded of its Armenian population.

What is more, Toynbee himself, contrary to what the Turks and their sympathizers often would have us believe, never retracted the evidence he and Bryce presented in the Blue Book. In his final book, for example, he wrote: "After the Blue Book had been published, I could not dismiss its contents from my mind. . . . I was exercised by the question of how it could be possible for human beings to do what those perpetrators of genocide had

done.”⁵⁰ He declared that “[i]n the genocide of the Armenians the criminals had been members of the Committee of Union and Progress,”⁵¹ stated that “the leaders of the C.U.P. had apparently degenerated from being idealists into becoming ogres,”⁵² and concluded: “The Ottoman Armenian . . . deportations were deliberately conducted with a brutality that was calculated to take the maximum toll of lives en route. . . . My study of the genocide that had been committed in Turkey in 1915 brought home to me the reality of Original Sin.”⁵³

Although the Blue Book, in his own words, was “counter-propaganda ammunition,” Toynbee simply meant that it was intended to arouse public opinion against the Central Powers, not that it was untrue. His own testimony made this clear: “At the very time when the Russians had been committing barbarities against their Jews, the Turks had been committing considerably worse barbarities against their Armenians. If Russian barbarities were telling against Britain and France, would not Turkish barbarities tell against Germany and Austria-Hungary? This line of reasoning in Whitehall lay behind H.M.G.’s application to Lord Bryce to produce a Blue Book on what the Turks had been doing to the Armenians.”⁵⁴

In a letter written on March 16, 1966, Toynbee similarly stated that “[i]t is true the British Government’s motive in asking Lord Bryce to compile the Blue Book was propaganda. But Lord Bryce’s motive in undertaking it, and mine in working on it for him, was to make the truth known, and the evidence was good; the witnesses were all American missionaries with no political axes to grind. So the Blue Book, together with Lepsius’s book, does give a true account.”⁵⁵

Therefore, the Turkish assertion that “the Blue Book, this so-called document, contains nothing more than one-sided British propaganda, and hence is not worth dwelling upon”⁵⁶ is not warranted. Both it and the Morgenthau volume contain strong and valuable evidence of Turkish atrocities against the Armenians. On the other hand, the above analysis also indicates that both Bryce and Morgenthau held powerful and deep-rooted prejudices against the Turks that undoubtedly prevented them from seeing the entire situation. Although the Armenians did indeed suffer grievously, so too did their antagonists. It is to the Turkish position then that I must now turn before making any further attempt at arriving at a tentative synthesis.

The Turkish Position

The Turks deny that they committed genocide, arguing that the Armenian claims are a “vindictive propaganda campaign against modern Turkey . . . [and] contain gross distortions and omissions of historical facts.”⁵⁷ Rather, it is maintained that certain Armenians betrayed their country

(the Ottoman Empire) during wartime by joining the invading Russian armies and carrying out guerrilla activities behind the Turkish lines. "Within a few months after the war began, these Armenian guerrilla forces, operating in close coordination with the Russians, were savagely attacking Turkish cities, towns and villages in the East, massacring their inhabitants without mercy, while at the same time working to sabotage the Ottoman Army's war effort by destroying roads and bridges, raiding caravans, and doing whatever else they could to ease the Russian occupation."⁵⁸

Indeed, declare the Turks, even before the war began, Armenian groups were equipped and armed in Russia and then infiltrated across the border. Once the war started, Armenians served as guides and auxiliaries for the invading Russians. (Such units had aided the Russians in the three Russo-Turkish wars of the nineteenth century.⁵⁹) The most famous—or infamous, depending on one's interpretation—Armenian leaders were Andranik (Ozanian), Dro (Igdir Drasdamat Kanayan), and Armen Garo (Garegin Pasdermajian), the latter a member of the Ottoman parliament who had joined the Armenian volunteers serving under the Russian Army upon the outbreak of the hostilities. An Armenian critic of the Dashnaks has written that "[m]any Armenians believe that the fate of two million of their co-nationals in Turkey might not have proved so disastrous, if more prudence had been used by the Dashnak leaders during the war."⁶⁰

As soon as hostilities commenced, an Ottoman document stated, "the Russians have established guerillas by arming Russian and Turkish Armenians in the Caucasus and Greeks, and anticipate expanding these guerilla organizations by sending them into Turkish land. These reports are gradually being confirmed, and realized, and Armenian deserters from military units are increasing."⁶¹ Another document warned that "the enemy is seizing the weapons from local people in places which it has occupied, using these weapons to arm Armenians and form units."⁶² A coded message to the Ministry of Defense described how "a group of 40–50 Armenian army deserters with arms at Sironik village, 2.5 hours from Mush, attacked the gendarmerie cavalymen and police who went to the village to capture them. The clash lasted for two hours."⁶³ Still another message stated: "It was reported from the Province of Van yesterday that Armenians attacked several Islamic villages belonging to the aforementioned district on 22 March 1915; that the inhabitants of the villages initially resisted the bandits; the rebels could not hold out against the militia and gendarmerie detachments who came to help the villagers . . . and that the bandits were armed with Russian rifles, small and large calibre rifles, and automatic guns."⁶⁴

The Turks argue that as the Russian armies advanced into eastern Anatolia, they disarmed the Muslims and armed their Armenian allies who

then proceeded to commit outrages against the helpless Muslim population. Behind the Turkish lines, Armenian gangs carried out acts of sabotage, staged ambushes, and attacked security posts. Armenian revolts broke out in the regions of Van, Sivas, and Marash.⁶⁵ Another pertinent document concerning events in 1915 further illustrates the Turkish position.

Armenian gangs . . . resorted to every inhuman act and atrocity toward the Moslem villages, burning the villages to the ground, murdering the people. Armenian enlisted men in the Turkish army were taking this opportunity to flee to the Russian Army with their weapons. Officers and doctors were also joining the Russian Army, taking with them much information about the Turkish army. It was observed on many occasions that in the most critical moments of the battle, positions of ammunition, batteries or the reserve positions were shown to the Russians. In this context, Kirkor, son of Ohannes from Gumushane, was seen showing the Pazacur position to the Russians. He confessed his crime at a court-martial. Again during the most critical moments of the battle, some Armenian enlisted men were inciting Turkish enlisted men to flee, creating confusion in the battle lines. Armenian people behind the lines did not hesitate to murder wounded soldiers who were sent back for treatment. Further, they had constant communication with Armenians in the Russian Army, informing them of the position and state of the Turkish units, and deciding their stand and position accordingly.⁶⁶

“The Ottoman government had to secure its position by removing the Armenians from strategic points where they could assist the enemy,”⁶⁷ another Turkish source states. However, “great care was taken by the Ottoman government to prevent the Armenians from being harmed during these deportations.” Since “the deportations took place at a time of severe shortages of vehicles, food, fuel, clothing, and other supplies in the entire Empire . . . some 100,000 Armenians . . . may have died between 1915 and 1918, but this was no greater a percentage than that of the Turks and other Muslims who died as a result of the same conditions in the same places at the same time.” Indeed, “far from encouraging the massacres that did take place as a result, the Ottoman Interior Minister Talaat Pasha sent repeated orders that all measures be taken to uncover and punish such acts.” After the war, the British did detain several hundred Ottoman officials suspected of war crimes, but despite “large-scale searches . . . undertaken in the Ottoman archives to find proof of guilt . . . no evidence . . . was found to substantiate the accusations.” In conclusion, argue the Turks, “There was no genocide committed against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire before or during World War I.”⁶⁸

Indeed, the Turks recite atrocity stories equal to the most terrible told by the Armenians. The following testimony of Russian Lieutenant Colonel Toverdohleyov will suffice to illustrate the point.

The killings were organized by the doctors and the employers, and the act of killing was committed solely by the Armenian renegades. . . . More than eight hundred unarmed and defenseless Turks have been killed in Erzincan. Large holes were dug and the defenseless Turks were slaughtered like animals next to the holes. Later, the murdered Turks were thrown into the holes. The Armenian who stood near the hole would say when the hole was filled with the corpses: "Seventy dead bodies, well, this hole can take ten more." Thus ten more Turks would be cut into pieces, thrown into the hole, and when the hole was full it would be covered over with soil. The Armenians answered all the claims of infamy and rebukes for the murderings of Turks as follows: "Did not the Turks do the same thing to destroy the Armenians? Our deeds are nothing but the revenge for what took place in the past."⁶⁹

Many more such stories could be recited.⁷⁰ Indeed, according to the mother of the Turkish Vice Consul, Behadir Demir, who was murdered by an Armenian in Los Angeles in 1973, the Armenian cruelties are so ingrained in the Turkish mind that a Turkish expression for cruelty or injustice is "*Ermeni gibi*," or "like an Armenian."⁷¹ The point, therefore, has been made. Both the Armenians and the Turks suffered horribly at each other's hands. Neither had a monopoly on total innocence or evil. Both, however, continue to maintain grossly exaggerated positions highly favorable to themselves and react negatively to contrary suggestions with vehement self-righteousness.

Synthesis?

Can these two diametrically opposed interpretations be reconciled? Given the understandable passions they still evoke and the ossification of positions that has occurred, it will be very difficult. Gwynne Dyer, for example, concluded that most Turkish and Armenian scholars are unable to be objective on this issue and described the situation as one of "Turkish falsifiers and Armenian deceivers."⁷²

The disparity in the number of Armenians killed during 1915 is only one example. As cited above, the Turks would have us believe that only "some 100,000 Armenians may have died," while the figure of 1,500,000 is the one most frequently cited by the Armenians. Both are probably gross exaggerations. After a careful study and necessary adjustment of Ottoman census statistics, plus a consideration of the number of Ottoman Armenians

who safely reached exile, Justin McCarthy has concluded that approximately 600,000, or 40 percent of the Ottoman Armenians, perished due to starvation, disease, and outright murder.⁷³ Given the quality of McCarthy's work compared to other estimates, his figure is probably the most accurate accounting we have.

One Turkish analysis ludicrously claimed that the "documents show Armenians were almost treated like tourists during deportation."⁷⁴ Another Turkish publication declared that "[s]trict instructions were issued to ensure that the sick should be attended to by a physician once a day; and that the evacuee properties should be kept in careful custody so that the owners could take possession upon their eventual return to their homes at the end of the war."⁷⁵

When reading such statements, one is reminded of the distinction between the real and the pretend Ottoman Empire made by Sir Charles Eliot.

If one takes as a basis the laws, statistics and budgets as printed it is easy to prove that the Ottoman empire is in a state of unexampled prosperity. Life and property are secure; perfect liberty and toleration are enjoyed by all; taxation is light, balances large, trade flourishing. Those who have not an extensive personal acquaintance with Turkey may regard such accounts with suspicion and think them highly colored, but they find it difficult to realize that all this official literature is absolute fiction, and for practical purposes unworthy of a moment's attention.⁷⁶

Richard G. Hovannisian has commented: "The Ottoman archival material showing official plans for a humane deportation proves nothing . . . because the Committee for Union and Progress had a parallel party structure enabling it to telegraph secret orders for the genocide." He further argued that "the Turks and their supporters will go through the American . . . [and] the British archives for documents that support their position, and they will lift these and publish them and ignore 900 that have said the direct opposite."⁷⁷

The Turkish government has further maintained that "the territory in which the Armenians lived together for a time never was ruled by them as an independent, sovereign state."⁷⁸ The fact of the matter is, of course, that the Armenians lived in their historic homeland "for a time" that lasted more than 2,500 years until they were virtually eliminated during the tragic events of World War I. Furthermore, although the Armenians spent much of their history as a buffer or subjected nation, it is simply not true that the territory in which they lived "never was ruled by them as an independent, sovereign state." In the course of a 2,500-year history, independent

Armenian states existed in one form or another for several hundred years, ranging in size from the Armenian empire of Tigranes the Great (94–55c. BC) through the eras of the Arsacids (53–429 AD), the Bagratids of Ani (886–1045 AD), and the Artsruni principality of Van in the ninth century, among others. Even after the arrival of the Turks, a new (Cilician) Armenia lasted for nearly three centuries (1080–1375). Indeed, under the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey itself initially recognized the short-lived Armenian Republic (1918–1921) immediately after World War I. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, yet another Armenian state rose.

Certainly Turkish studies of the situation that describe Armenians as “robbers, deceivers and fools, . . . professional beggars, thieves and liars, . . . utterly debased, incapable of helping themselves, unwilling to help one another, and entirely lacking in gratitude,”⁷⁹ or claims that “Armenians, even if they are women, are the vilest and the wildest of people,”⁸⁰ are the product of passionately partisan polemics, not reasoned historical analyses. Finally, it should be noted that whether the Turkish atrocity stories about Armenian outrages at the end of World War I and afterwards are true or not, they are irrelevant to the accusation of genocide in 1915 because they occurred subsequently in time. (Such Armenian outrages against the Turks, however, would constitute the revenge Armenians apparently feel necessary for 1915 and, therefore, would obviate the need for further revenge in the form of further Armenian terrorism as occurred during the 1970s and 1980s.)

On the other hand, Armenian publications that explain how “out of the East came a foe unequalled in his barbarity—the slit-eyed, bow-legged Turkic nomads. . . . The Seljuks and Ottomans with their ferocious customs were determined to annihilate the whole Armenian race,”⁸¹ or vilify “the Mongol Turk terroristic state which acquired Armenia’s ancient land by genocide”⁸² similarly fail to master the requirements of historical accuracy. Such racist slanders stereotype an entire nation who even at its worse has usually been respected by its most bitter foes as tough, but honorable. The grudging respect the West granted Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) during the famous Gallipoli campaign in 1915 is an example.

What is more, Armenian diatribes against the Turks totally ignore the fact that under Ottoman rule Armenians lived peacefully and prosperously for hundreds of years and that for much of its history the Ottoman Empire itself was a haven for Europe’s persecuted minorities such as the Jews.⁸³ The so-called Mongol Turk terroristic state allowed the Armenians and other Christian minorities to exist and even flourish for hundreds of years within a multinational empire. Even today the fact that there is a Greek Christian *majority* on the island of Cyprus, which the Ottomans ruled for 300 years

until 1878, illustrates the racial and religious tolerance manifested by the Ottomans throughout most of their history. What, however, happened to the Muslims in Spain once the Christians reconquered the peninsula? Or for that matter, what happened to the large Muslim minorities that inhabited the Balkans into the nineteenth century?⁸⁴ When we ponder such questions it is not always clear who was “determined to annihilate” whom.

Several decades ago the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* published a rare and interesting exchange between Professors Richard G. Hovannisian and the late Stanford J. Shaw concerning the Armenian question.⁸⁵ Hovannisian, the Armenian protagonist, concluded that the publication of Shaw’s two-volume *History of the Ottoman Empire* in 1977 “by a highly reputable press causes deep consternation” and was “a disservice to scholarship in general and to the study of Armenian-Turkish relations in particular.”⁸⁶ Shaw, for his part, wrote: “It is unfortunate that in presenting his view Dr. Hovannisian argues more like a prosecuting attorney seeking to denigrate or suppress information unfavorable to his position than a historian dealing with particular issues within an academic context.”⁸⁷

Christopher J. Walker, the author of a study sympathetic to the Armenian position (*Armenia: The Survival of a Nation*, 1980), denounced Shaw’s work “as worthless as history as a document one is handed on a street corner during a demonstration,”⁸⁸ but saved even greater invective for an analysis by Norman Ravitch. Walker found Ravitch’s study to be “a most insidious and degenerate form of historical writing” that “ends up with the idiotic, ignorant; and illogical conclusion that the terrible events . . . should be blamed on nationalism.”⁸⁹ Ravitch had concluded that “the events of 1915 remain difficult to interpret and to resolve. . . . It is, in the last analysis, unprofitable to seek to decide whether the Armenian desire for freedom was the cause or the result of Turkish repression. It was probably both.”⁹⁰

In August 1982, the U.S. *Department of State Bulletin* published an article on Armenian terrorism. At the end of it, a footnote stated: “Because the historical record of the 1915 events in Asia Minor is ambiguous, the Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish government committed a genocide against the Armenian people.”⁹¹ Outraged protests from Armenian Americans, however, later forced the State Department partially to recant this statement by noting that it was “not intended as statements of policy of the United States.” Ambiguously, the new statement added: “Nor did they represent any change in U.S. policy.”⁹² This partial State Department recantation was reminiscent of the power of the so-called Greek lobby in forcing a US arms embargo against Turkey in the US Congress after Turkey successfully occupied northern Cyprus in 1974.

Where then lies the truth in this ancient and bitter dispute? Is it even possible to locate it after all these years and so many previous attempts? While recognizing the inherent difficulties, even impossibilities, here, I feel that I have an obligation to offer, at least, my tentative judgments. Admittedly I have not experienced these events firsthand, as have the Turks and Armenians. Precisely because I am removed from the immediate passions that would have thus arisen, however, I hopefully can view what happened with a more dispassionate and, therefore, accurate perspective. Without claiming a monopoly of definitive wisdom, based on the above, I see the truth to lie somewhere between the diametrically opposed positions of the two antagonists.

First of all, there is no doubt the Armenians suffered a great disaster. No matter what the Turkish apologists argue, the fact remains that an entire nation of people virtually ceased to exist in their ancient homeland after World War I. Although the numbers of Armenians who died at this time are greatly exaggerated by the Armenians and their supporters—and in addition many of the Armenians who were killed during this era died because the Armenians waged war against practically every nation they were physically able to come in contact with including not only the Turks and Kurds, but also the Russians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis—there is still no doubt that hundreds of thousands of Armenians perished during 1915. That even more Muslims also died during World War I is both true, but largely irrelevant to the argument here, because most of the many Turkish and other Muslim deaths resulted from the hostilities against the Allies, not the Armenians. Gallipoli, the Russian invasion in the East, and the English-Arab drive from the South were the main arenas in which the Turks died, and the fate of the Ottoman Empire was decided. Seen from the Turkish viewpoint, then, the great Armenian national catastrophe was but an unpleasant sideshow that would have been long forgotten if it were not for the continuing Armenian campaign accusing the Turks of genocide.

The Armenian claim that they were victims of a *premeditated and unprovoked genocide* does not ring true, however. Rather, what appears more likely is that there was an honest, but inaccurate belief among the Turkish leaders that they were faced with a widespread and coordinated Armenian uprising from within at the very time that their state was in mortal danger from without. Decades of what the Turks saw as Armenian provocations and even treason during previous wars, armed revolutionary activity between the wars, the creation of Russian-Armenian guerrilla groups in the invading Russian army during the present one, the defection of certain Ottoman Armenians to the enemy, the armed resistance to conscription on the part of Armenians in Zeitun, incidents of revolutionary acts and sabotage in the

countryside, and the Armenian uprising in Van in reaction to the unpardonable but probably unofficial policies of the local governor, Jevdet Bey—all led the Turks to conclude they were in real danger from a fifth column. (Similarly, a much better organized United States government unjustly interned its citizens of Japanese descent at the start of World War II.)

Indicative of the Turkish confusion here is a report at the start of the war in 1914 that “the Russians have provoked Armenians living in our country by promises that they will be granted independence in territories to be annexed from Ottoman land . . . that they have stored arms and ammunition in many places to be distributed to Armenians and moreover, the . . . Russian General Loris-Melikov went to the Van region for the same purpose.”⁹³ Turkish fear of the famous Russian-Armenian commander in the war of 1877–78 is understandable but misplaced, as Loris-Melikov had been dead since 1888.

In addition, of course, the Ottoman Empire in 1915 was a badly decaying institution nearing the end of its long existence. In the throes of fighting a losing war, it was pushed beyond its capacities and lost control of the situation. Much of the gendarmerie who implemented the deportation orders, for example, was simply a poorly trained substitute for the original force that was now enrolled in the regular army. Indeed, some of these replacements were probably nothing more than brigands themselves. Discipline among them was certainly lax. Furthermore, under such widespread conditions of wartime disorganization, the nomadic Kurds were able to attack the deportation columns with relative impunity or even connivance on the part of the gendarmerie. An unpopular minority whom the Muslim majority considered traitors, the Armenians received little sympathy from the local population that itself was suffering grievously from the wartime conditions. Given such circumstances then, it is understandable how the deportations led to widespread massacres, disease, and starvation, all of which together cost the lives of several hundred thousands of Armenians.

Certainly, it should be clear from the above analysis that there have been two sides to the question. It behooves us, therefore, to find a genuinely just solution, not one that will simply breed further hatred and violence.

Toward a Just Solution

If any minority on earth could legally claim a portion of some other state's territory on the basis of that minority's former ownership, every single state on earth would be dismembered. Furthermore, admittedly a less than perfect solution, sovereignty and independence in the form of statehood for any geographical area, can be granted only to the majority, because to do

so for a minority would deny the democratic ideal of majority rule. That even the Armenian apologists recognize this cardinal point is illustrated in their arguments on behalf of the Greek Cypriot majority in Cyprus against the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority.⁹⁴ Thus, Armenian attempts to give a superficial international legal gloss to their demands for eastern Turkey⁹⁵ fail egregiously to negate the fact that to create an independent Armenia out of a portion of Turkey in an area where today virtually no Armenians live would totally violate the international legal doctrines of the territorial integrity of states and self-determination of peoples. On the other hand, for one nation to brutally wipe out the native population of a portion of its territory and then to claim that the native people have no rights in the area because they no longer live there marks the height of hypocrisy and makes a mockery of international justice.

What is generally not known, however, is that, even before 1915, the Armenians were a minority in the very land they called Armenia. Turkish authorities stress this as an extremely important point, which, when fully established, reduces even further the legitimacy of any Armenian claim to an independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia.

Justin McCarthy has made a careful analysis of the official Ottoman census, incorporating into it the necessary adjustments to correct for undercounting and other problems. His work is clearly the best available on the subject and merits the close attention of any serious, disinterested scholar. What patently emerges from his study is that in 1911–1912, the Armenians constituted a minority in the six vilayets of what was historic Armenia.⁹⁶ As McCarthy concludes: “One fact is obvious. . . . [A]ll Anatolian provinces had overwhelming Muslim majorities, not simply pluralities. . . . In the centuries of Turkish rule Asia Minor had become thoroughly Islamicized.”⁹⁷ What McCarthy and other pro-Turkish writers fail to mention, however, is the fact that, because of the large Kurdish population, the Turkish population was also a minority in the Eastern Provinces at the time. By not distinguishing the Kurdish population from the Turkish, and by lumping the two together as “Muslims,” McCarthy ignores the complexity of the population in an area that was home to Armenians, Kurds, and Turks.⁹⁸

The Armenian claim to eastern Anatolia is a glaring anachronism. For almost a century practically none of them have lived there. Some twenty million Muslims do, however, and their right to do so has been internationally recognized since 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne. If at this late date the Armenians were to be granted legal possession to the territory, the Cherokee Indians might as well be allowed to assume sovereignty in middle Tennessee, the English in northwestern France, or for that matter the Turks in the Balkans from which they were evicted in the nineteenth century. It is clear,

therefore, that at this late date the Armenians have no valid international legal claim to eastern Anatolia. Nevertheless, as a people who suffered a wrong that has never been rectified, it behooves us to search for a possible solution to the current impasse.

In a thoughtful essay on just this question,⁹⁹ Richard Hovannisian pointed out that “there are various gradations in the . . . Armenian desiderata.” Demands for financial and territorial recompense would be regarded by many as “maximalist.” “Through discussion and compromise . . . intermediate positions” could be reached. However, “the one demand that is heard universally by Armenians of all walks of life and at all stages of acculturation is for an admission of wrong-doing” by Turkey. Such action would extend “recognition and dignity to the hundreds of thousands of victims whose very memory the Turkish authorities and the rationalizing revisionists would eliminate.”

Professor Hovannisian’s implication is that by doing this, Turkey would satisfy the vast majority of moderate, law-abiding Armenians around the world who would then disown and isolate the small group of hard-core maximalists. It would also initiate a “dialogue” through which an “ultimate resolution might be achieved.”

In making this suggestion, Hovannisian pointed out that “it is not a step without serious risks and it requires enormous courage.” Recognizing that the Turks are possessed of just such courage, however, Hovannisian then declared: “The Turkish government should be encouraged by its friends and allies to take the necessary first step toward the initiation of dialogue.” Many Turks, however, believe that any admission of guilt would constitute a slippery slope leading to further demands that Turkey admit to genocide directed by the state as well as financial and territorial compensations.

Nevertheless, I too concur with Hovannisian’s recommendation because not only do the Turks possess ample amounts of courage, but, as by far the stronger party to this ancient feud, they are also precisely the ones best situated to manifest magnanimity toward their antagonist. Certainly, an official statement that the Turkish government deeply regrets the tragedies suffered by the Armenians during World War 1 could be made without doing harm to the Turkish contention that they too suffered grievously during these years. In addition, since such a declaration would be made from a position of magnanimous strength, it could in no way be interpreted as giving in to hard-core nationalists.

Further dialogue should involve a more honest examination of the historical relationship between the two peoples on the part of each. Such an analysis hopefully would reveal the more positive sides of their past historical association, while admitting candidly the transgressions each had committed

against the other. In time, foreign Armenian visits to Turkey, which already occur without publicity, might increase. This could not only further a positive dialogue, but promote the Turkish tourist business. Eventually, it is conceivable that the inherent Armenian genius for business ventures might be channeled into certain Turkish investments with mutual benefits for both parties. Indeed, the possibilities are endless for two long-separated, but still interrelated peoples who finally have buried their ancient feud.

That my above suggestion does not represent an impossibility is made clear by a number of statements that have already been made by both parties. Thus, numerous Armenians have repeatedly stated that if only the present-day Turkish government would admit that the Armenians suffered unfairly, the past could be put aside and the contemporary Armenian radicals isolated. "We Armenians only request that the Turkish government admit to the atrocities committed circa World War I,"¹⁰⁰ wrote one in the United States. "I would like to forget and forgive, provided Turkey acknowledges that some 'Young Turks' and Ottomans wronged my people,"¹⁰¹ stated another. Former New Jersey State Assemblyman Charles (Garabed) Haytaian added: "To this day, the fact that the Turkish government is not admitting that those things happened truly upsets many Armenians. What I would like to see is the Turkish nation say, 'Look we admit that these atrocities occurred. We are sorry.'"¹⁰²

In an important interview with a Turkish correspondent, Charles (Chip) Pashayan, the former Armenian-American member of the US House of Representatives, also agreed:

I feel that Turkey must, sooner or later, realize that by recognizing her guilt, she will reveal her greatness. If Turkey undertakes such a change in its position, the matter will largely end. . . . The majority of the Armenian people is willing to accept such a solution. . . . Then there will remain no ground for the terrorists to continue their activities. . . . I can assure you that once that happens, wounds of the past will heal in no time, and the issue would resolve itself once and for all.¹⁰³

Regarding financial restitutions and the creation of an independent Armenian state on Turkish territory—two points that are unacceptable to the Turks but which they feel would inevitably arise once Turkey began to change her position—Representative Pashayan was also reasonable. (1) Financial claims "can simply be symbolic in nature. It would not become a heavy burden for the Turkish government." (2) An independent Armenian state in present-day Turkey is "simply a dream," although "most Armenians have such a dream."

For their part, a number of individual Turkish scholars have privately told me that they, as Turks, would be willing to admit that Armenians were massacred and that they regret what happened. Indeed, a Turkish group acknowledged wrongdoing by telling the King-Crane Commission shortly after World War I “that those who had been guilty of the massacres should be punished.”¹⁰⁴

In an amazing volume that has the ring of truth to it, the remnant of the Ottoman government itself, shortly after World War I, described what happened as “the immense wrong done to the Armenian people,” but claimed “extenuating circumstances.”¹⁰⁵ “The Turks massacred and murdered Armenians, plundered and devastated their homes. Yes. But did not the Armenians massacre and murder Turks, plunder and devastate their homes, and were they not the first to start the sinister game?”¹⁰⁶

Putting aside for the moment the assignment of the guilt for first causes, the willingness of the Turks to admit their share of the blame, at least, is commendable. Magnanimous is the declaration that “the Turkish people bows its head. It does so in grief for the Armenian people and in shame for itself.”¹⁰⁷

In succeeding years, of course, the new Turkish governments have disavowed such admissions on the grounds of Allied coercion. That such statements were not made by quislings or extracted forcibly by the victorious Allies becomes clear, however, as one reads through the volume cited immediately above. For the most part, it is a hard-hitting condemnatory analysis of the Armenian “Committees” who “in their feud with Turkey . . . raised falsehood and fraud to the rank of a science and art.”¹⁰⁸ Indeed, the accusations it made against Armenian treachery in World War I could come right out of a standard, contemporary Turkish government publication. This Turkish volume, then, might bear careful analysis in the attempt to synthesize the conflicting Turkish and Armenian interpretations of what occurred and thus help lead to an eventual resolution of the current impasse.

As stated above, therefore, I would agree with the proposal made by Professor Vazken L. Parsegian of Troy Hills, New York, “to renounce violence in all its forms between the Turkish and Armenian versions of the events of World War I through a cooperative restudy of these events.”¹⁰⁹ For such a study to be carried out successfully, however, “the effort must be of academic quality and objectivity, by a team of respected Turkish, Armenian and neutral historians.” These scholars “would need the guidance . . . of respected international leaders,” access “to national archives” and “funding . . . through an educational organization.” Their work should be supplemented by meetings and studies between other Turkish and Armenian “cultural and academic groups.” However, “the study cannot and must not attempt to

propose solutions to the political issues.” Still, such a “study, properly conducted and made available both to Armenian and Turkish readers and to the world at large can improve the historical perspective of both peoples.”

On the basis of such a joint study as advocated above, the Turks may in time find it possible to surrender their position of beleaguered innocence and admit that things got terribly out of hand in 1915, causing the unjustified deaths of hundreds of thousands of Armenians. The Armenians, on the other hand, may be able to bury their hoary image of the Turks as inhuman perpetrators of genocide and see their own actions leading up to and into 1915 as at times provocative and thus, themselves, as something less than wholly innocent victims. The Protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in Zurich, Switzerland, on October 10, 2009, provided, among numerous other things, for just such a historical commission to study the matter, but the ratification of these Protocols has been delayed, as discussed below in [Chapter 6](#).

The Armenians and Turks were able to live in peace together for hundreds of years in the past. Even today they share many common cultural attributes. Turks, for example, have expressed to me an obvious pleasure with the fact that Armenians can often speak the difficult Turkish language with them. The fact that some 60,000 Armenians live peacefully and in many cases quite prosperously in Turkey today—at least if the Turkish Armenians as distinguished from others are to be believed—also indicates that Turks and Armenians can live in peace.

Whether such positive steps as these can be achieved remains to be seen. Certainly, however, there is a need for both sides to reach out beyond the present sterile diatribes. As Enver Ziya Karal, a Turkish History Professor, has written: “We cannot forget those who have fallen dead both from the ranks of the Armenians and the Turks. . . . [W]e should reverently bow before their memory and wish for the reinstatement and continuance of the old ties of friendship between the Turks and the Armenians.”¹¹⁰ More recently, some 200 Turkish intellectuals supported by the signatures of some 29,500 others declared online: “My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with feelings and pain of my Armenian brother and sisters. I apologize to them.”¹¹¹ If the memory of those who have suffered and died so horribly is indeed to be honored, what better way than that these hallowed dead shall have sown the seeds for a future reconciliation that would allow their children to live in mutual peace, instead of reenacting their tragic past?

CHAPTER 2

What Is Genocide?

Literally, genocide means the killing of a race (*genos*, race; and *caedere*, to kill). As such, it is arguably the most heinous crime imaginable and, therefore, is a term that should not be bandied about lightly for propagandistic or political motives. The word was famously coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 to describe the Nazi attempt to exterminate the Jews during World War II.¹ Supposedly, however, the neologism was inspired by what Lemkin believed was the Ottoman attempt to destroy the Armenians during World War I.²

Reputed Hitler Quote

Indeed, the Armenians and their supporters are fond of assimilating these two events (and thus gaining sympathy and credibility) by citing Hitler's supposed declaration ("Who, after all, speaks today of the extermination of the Armenians?") to assure his followers that no one would hold them accountable for destroying Poland and thus setting the stage for the Nazi genocide of the Jews.³ Like the Armenian claim of genocide, however, the reputed Hitler quote is suspect.⁴

First, Hitler is far from being the most reliable source upon which to base an historical examination of history. That said, nearly every analysis of the quote written to date has attributed it to a November 24, 1945, article in *The Times* (London), "Nazi Germany's Road to War." The article's unnamed author cited the quote as having been included in an address given by Hitler to his commanders-in-chief on August 22, 1939, at Obersalzberg. *The Times* author claimed the speech was introduced as evidence during the November 23, 1945, session of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

The quote actually first appeared three years earlier in a book by Louis Lochner, the Associated Press's Berlin Bureau Chief before the war.⁵ But

Lochner, like the *The Times* author, never disclosed his source. At least four versions of the Obersalzberg speech were presented at Nuremberg for consideration as evidence. Yet, the Nuremberg transcripts do not contain the alleged quote. Indeed, the transcripts demonstrate that the tribunal examined and then rejected Lochner's undated, unsigned, third-hand version of Hitler's address, which was three pages in length. Lochner's version also included some phrases that rendered it suspicious, such as that upon hearing Hitler's words, Hermann Goering, (who weighed some 240 lbs.) "jumped on a table, thanked [*sic*] bloodthirstily and made bloodthirsty promises. He danced like a wild man." Other suspect phrases included: "Carol of Roumania is a thoroughly corrupt slave of his sexual desires," "The King of Belgium and the Nordic Kings are soft jumping jacks," and "Mussolini is threatened by a nit-wit of a king and the treasonable scoundrel of a crown prince." The Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., omitted these suspect citations from the Lochner version it displays on its walls.

Instead, the Nuremberg tribunal entered into evidence two official versions of the August 22, 1939, address found in captured German military records quoting those who were present at Obersalzberg. These bear document numbers US-29/789 PS and US-30/1014 PS. Tellingly, neither document contained any reference to the Armenians. In fact, neither document referred to the Jews. Hitler's address was an anti-Polish invective, delivered before he probably even conceived of the Final Solution. The authenticity of the alleged Hitler quote about the Armenians, therefore, is doubtful and its usage to tie the Jewish genocide to what happened to the Armenians is suspect.

Genocide Convention

Shortly after World War II, genocide was legally defined by the UN Genocide Convention, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and then entered into force on January 12, 1951.

UN Genocide Convention Adopted on 9 December 1948

Article 2

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 3

The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.⁶

Problems with this definition will be analyzed below.

In time an entirely new subfield of genocide studies arose complete with its own literature.⁷ From this academic discipline, Jacques Semelin has recently brought new and greater rigorous clarity by critically analyzing the concept without discarding it.⁸ Although bringing in numerous other specific examples, the following analysis owes much to Semelin.

The Ambiguity of Genocide

Given the difficulty in defining the term genocide, one might be tempted to paraphrase US Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart and simply declare that he knows it when he sees it. Such a semantic solution, however, would be legally untenable and might also tempt one with a grudge against some foe to cry “genocide” too easily and thus trivialize the concept. Recently, these very points have been analyzed skillfully by Jacques Semelin. Since his analysis throws considerable light on the main subject of this book, it would be most useful to explore Semelin’s reasoning at some length.

The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals at the end of World War II successfully prosecuted numerous Axis criminals for “Crimes against Humanity”⁹ and “War Crimes.”¹⁰ Given the enormity of what had occurred, however, Raphael Lemkin’s apt new term genocide soon came into usage to describe the Nazis’ most heinous crimes against the Jews. As noted above, the Genocide Convention (Treaty) of 1948 specifically defined the term legally. This has not, however, prevented journalists, activists, and even scholars from misusing the term in describing practically every subsequent conflict that has resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths: Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Chechnya, Columbia, Guatemala, Iraq, Sudan, and Rwanda are all examples.¹¹

Indeed, the concept of genocide has also been employed retrospectively (some might argue in an ex-post-facto manner) to describe the Athenian massacre of the inhabitants of Milos in 416 BC, the Roman destruction of Carthage in 146 BC, the Mongol sacking of Baghdad in 1258, the Vendee massacres during the French Revolution in 1793, the fate of the native Americans (Indians) of North America, the German suppression of the Herero uprising in Southwest Africa (Namibia) in 1904, the Armenians in 1915, Stalin's induced famine in the Ukraine during the early 1930s as well as the results of his various deportations, South Africa's apartheid policies, Israel's policies toward the Palestinians, Kosovar treatment of their Serb minority (and of course vice versa!), and even the US dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II as well as the actions of the former dictator of Chile Augusto Pinochet, and the collective suicide of Jim Jones and his 910 disciples in Guyana in 1978, among countless other such examples. Indeed, Lemkin himself thought that the populations of Luxembourg, the Eupen and Malmedy areas of Belgium, and the Alsace-Lorraine regions were also victims of genocide. During their fighting in August 2008, both Russia and Georgia accused each other of genocide.¹²

Obviously, applying the term genocide to all these very different historical events raises numerous semantic objections and stimulates even more heated controversies. Israel Charny offers little help by arguing that any massacre constitutes genocide, even the nuclear meltdown that occurred in Chernobyl in 1986.¹³ At the other end of the spectrum, Stephen Katz maintains that the Jewish genocide is the only example in history.¹⁴ In between these two definitional poles Ton Zwaan attempts to distinguish between “‘total’ and ‘complete’ genocide” and “‘partial’ genocides.”¹⁵

Even the UN Genocide Convention definition of genocide suffers from a certain amount of ambiguity due to its being the outcome of a compromise among all the signatory states. Thus, the Convention legally protects only “national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups,” not those defined politically, economically, or culturally. As Jacques Semelin queries: “To what extent is it legitimate to adopt an international legal norm resulting from a political compromise between states?”¹⁶ Nevertheless, despite this political compromise, it notoriously took the United States 40 years even to ratify the Genocide Convention. Moreover, during the twenty-first century, the United States has declined so far to participate in the new International Criminal Court (ICC) because it might return politically motivated findings against US military troops. Even more importantly, the requirement of “intent” for genocide to be proven under the Genocide Convention, as will be analyzed further below, adds further problems to the definition. Finally, the Convention's definition needs to be operationalized through specific

examples. Not all would agree with the emerging results of this process as evidenced by recent court cases dealing with Bosnia and Darfur. (These will be analyzed below.)

In attempts to help alleviate these problems, scholars have offered such additional detailed concepts as politicide to refer to mass murders of a political nature,¹⁷ democide to refer to any mass murder by a government resulting in at least one million dead, ethnocide, Judeocide, ecocide, feminicide, libricide (for the destruction of libraries), urbicide, elitocide, linguicide, and culturicide, among others. In addition, of course, we also now have such further concepts as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing.

Why so much semantic disarray? Henry Huttenbach has argued: "Too often has the accusation of genocide been made simply for the emotional effect or to make a political point, with the result that more and more events have been claimed to be genocide to the point that the term has lost its original meaning."¹⁸ Jacques Semelin has explained: "Whether use of the word 'genocide' is justified or not, the term aims to strike our imagination, awaken our moral conscience and mobilise public opinion on behalf of the victims."¹⁹ He adds: "Under these circumstances, anyone daring to suggest that what is going on is not 'really' genocide is immediately accused of weakness or sympathizing with the aggressors."²⁰ Thus,

The term genocide can be used as a propaganda tool by becoming the hinge for a venomous rhetoric against a sworn enemy. Given the powerful emotional charge the word genocide generates, it can be used and re-used in all sorts of hate talk to heap international opprobrium on whoever is accused of genocidal intent. . . . The obvious conclusion: the word is used as much as a symbolic shield to claim victim status for one's people, as a sword raised against one's deadly enemy.²¹

To further examine the ambiguity of the definition of genocide, it would be useful briefly to analyze Bosnia and then Darfur.

Bosnia

The disintegration of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s led to the first legally established case of genocide in Europe.²² As of August 2008, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had convicted seven Bosnian Serbs (including General Radislav Krstic) of genocide for their role in the Srebrenica massacre of some 8,000 Bosnian Muslims on and around July 11, 1995. Subsequently, on February 26, 2007, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concurred with this finding

of genocide (but only in regard to Srebrenica) in its judgment in *Bosnia vs. Serbia*.²³ These decisions have significantly lowered the legal definition of genocide, and in so doing added to its problematic nature.

When Judge Almiro Rodrigues sentenced Krstic on August 2, 2001, he declared:

General Krstic, the crimes of which you stand accused are based on events which occurred following the attack of the Serbian forces on the town of Srebrenica in July 1995. . . . Srebrenica—a name which conjures up images one would prefer not to see: women, children and old people forced to climb into buses leaving for destinations unknown; men separated from their families, stripped of their belongings, men fleeing, men taken prisoner, men never to be seen again, men who would be found—but not always—dead, corpses piled up in mass graves; corpses with their hands tied or their eyes blind-folded. . . . The Trial Chamber was presented with a great deal of evidence which could be called impressive. . . . In July 1995, General Krstic, you agreed to evil. This is why the Trial Chamber convicts you today and sentences you to 46 years in prison.²⁴

On April 19, 2004, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY reduced Krstic's sentence to 35 years, but reaffirmed its earlier decision that the Srebrenica massacre was an act of genocide.

By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the forty thousand Bosnian Muslims living in Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general. They stripped all the male Muslim prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and methodically killed them solely on the basis of their identity.²⁵

The Appeals Chamber justified this ruling of genocide by declaring that the proof of intent to commit genocide by destroying the group physically or biologically was met “by the disastrous consequences for the family structures on which the Srebrenica part of the Bosnian Muslim group was based.”²⁶

Moreover, in July 2008, the notorious Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was finally apprehended and quickly brought before the ICTY to face 11 separate charges, including 2 for genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide for masterminding the massacre at Srebrenica as well as the 3-year siege of Sarajevo that had left 10,000 more dead. The remaining 9 charges Karadzic faced were for crimes against humanity and war crimes. (Despite Karadzic's capture, however, Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic

(who had actually led the massacre in Srebrenica and had also been indicted for genocide and other crimes, as of August 2008, still remained at large.)

Although these international tribunal decisions have served to specifically define genocide, the reader may query whether the murder of some 8,000 people in Srebrenica amidst the overall violence that was occurring on all sides in former Yugoslavia has set the legal definition of genocide too low both as to numbers actually killed and the intent in so doing. The Serbs certainly carry a heavy burden of blame, but it is also interesting that Naser Oric, the leader of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, was sentenced to two years' imprisonment in June 2006 for neglecting to take steps to prevent the murder and cruel treatment of numerous Serb prisoners in Srebrenica.²⁷ Indeed, earlier Oric's "'sackers' (the 'Torbari') [had] freely pillaged and burned the surrounding Serbian villages . . . one of them even taking place on the Orthodox Christmas Day on 7 January 1993 in the village of Kravica."²⁸ For his part, the Bosnian Serb General Mladic, "taking control of the town [Srebrenica] on 11 July . . . seems in effect to have been convinced he was going to accomplish a historic feat that he situates within the secular lineage of wars between Serbs and Turks."²⁹

Are we finding too many genocides and thus trivializing the concept? Unless we are more careful, the term genocide might become "a hodgepodge concept"³⁰ that invites a "competition of victims."³¹ Thus, Jacques Semelin argues that "the ethnic violence in Bosnia had certain limits, whereas it apparently had none in Nazi Europe or Rwanda."³² He suggests, therefore, that:

[t]here is now in fact a considerable discrepancy between recognition of the crime of genocide for all massacres of Tutsis in Rwanda, which claimed some 800,000 victims in the space of three months throughout an entire country, and recognition of the same indictment for massacre of 8,000 men in the space of a few days in one city.³³

Thus, one may make the argument that there is a valid distinction between ethnic cleansing and genocide.³⁴ Although both terms are odious, ethnic cleansing may better describe operations in former Yugoslavia in which many people were killed, but others were relocated or allowed to flee. Genocide, however, describes the murder of all of those targeted. As the ICJ ruled in the *Bosnia vs. Serbia* case on February 26, 2007, ethnic cleansing was not enough on its own to establish that genocide had occurred.

The term 'ethnic cleansing' has frequently been employed to refer to the events in Bosnia. . . . It [ethnic cleansing] can only be a form of genocide

within the meaning of the (Genocide) Convention, if it corresponds to or falls within one of the categories of acts prohibited by Article II of the Convention. Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area 'ethnically homogeneous,' nor the operations that may be carried out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is 'to destroy, in whole or in part' a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of the displacement. . . . [A] clear distinction must be drawn between physical destruction and mere dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of a group does not in itself suffice for genocide.³⁵

Similarly, as Semelin argues, in genocide "a qualitative threshold is crossed."³⁶ Thus, he would define "genocide as that particular process of civilian destruction that is directed at the total eradication of a group."³⁷

Darfur

The ethnic violence in the western section of Sudan called Darfur³⁸ (literally the land of the Fur, the region's main ethnic group), has led to the death of maybe 300,000 people and the displacement of as many as 2,000,000 more as of August 2008. It has also led to a frustrating debate over whether or not these events constitute genocide, and thus once again serves as caveat against using the term genocide carelessly.

Although the violence is complicated, the main perpetrators are government-supported "Arab" militias called *janjaweed* (which means approximately "evil men on horseback"), while the main civilian victims are black "Africans" from three different tribes. Centuries of intermarriage, however, have lessened the physical differences between the Arabs and the black Africans, and both groups are Muslim. The Africans are largely sedentary farmers, while the Arabs are mostly seminomadic livestock herders. The present violence stems from several different but intertwining and long-running conflicts. In February 2003, however, African rebels in Darfur, angered by what they saw as economic and political discrimination by the central government in Khartoum, attacked a military airfield and destroyed several aircraft and kidnapped an air force general. Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir responded in April 2003 by ordering the militias to put the rebellion down. Their attacks, however, mainly targeted civilian tribal members seen as supporting the rebels. Although al-Bashir denied direct involvement in the attacks against civilians, he apparently believed that such action would not only punish the perpetrators, but also dry up future rebel recruitment.

The debate over whether or not these events constituted genocide largely began in March 2004, when Nicholas Kristof, a *New York Times* columnist, published a series of articles describing them as such. In July 2004, the US Congress passed a nonbinding resolution terming what was occurring in Darfur as a genocide, and the US Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., issued for the first time a “genocide emergency.” Secretary of State Colin Powell then used the term in September 2004, while President George W. Bush followed in a speech at the United Nations two weeks later. This was the first time such senior US government officials had ever called a current crisis genocide and invoked the Genocide Convention. This was particularly noteworthy given the US failure to act a decade earlier in Rwanda and Washington’s refusal to term the much more deadly events there genocide.

Powell characterized Darfur as genocide based on a US government-funded study,³⁹ which had surveyed 1,136 Darfur refugees in neighboring Chad. Their testimony had established that the violence against civilians in Darfur was widespread, ethnically oriented, and supported by the central government. Although it was difficult to prove the Sudanese government’s intent while also uncertain how much partial group destruction was necessary to satisfy the Genocide Convention, under the ICTY standards issued regarding the Srebrenica massacre, Darfur certainly would appear to be a case of genocide. Whether this was a justifiable finding, however, depended on one’s view of how legitimate and wise the ICTY’s Srebrenica decision had been. The purpose in using the explosive term genocide was to shock and thus awaken the international community so that a way might be found to halt the violence. Although no one can argue with the desire to stop the killing and dislocations, name-calling by usage of the “g-word” is not necessarily the method best calculated to effect such a commendable purpose.

Thus, a UN study commissioned by Secretary General Kofi Annan concluded that, while the events in Darfur should be referred to the ICC for alleged crimes against humanity, they did not amount to genocide.⁴⁰ Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also declined to characterize the violence in Darfur as genocide. Furthermore, the Arab League and the African Union took a similar position, emphasizing instead the civil-war aspect of the conflict. In addition, the European Union (EU), British, Canadian, and Chinese officials, among others, also shied away from calling it genocide. Samantha Power, the author of a Pulitzer Prize winning study on genocide, favored the term ethnic cleansing to describe what was occurring.⁴¹

Nevertheless, in July 2008, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the chief prosecutor of the ICC, accused the President of Sudan Omar al-Bashir of genocide and asked the court to issue an arrest warrant. According to the charge sheet, al-Bashir “masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial

part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups”⁴² in a campaign of genocide that had already cost the lives of some 300,000 since 2003. The Sudanese government responded to the indictment by staging anti-ICC rallies in Khartoum and elsewhere. Al-Bashir himself called the charges lies and declared that the ICC had no jurisdiction in his country.

At first the ICC only charged al-Bashir with war crimes and crimes against humanity, declining to add genocide to the list. However, in July 2010, the ICC finally did charge him with three counts of genocide: by killing, causing mental and physical harm, and by deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction.⁴³ However, many in the Arab League and African Union criticized the genocide charges as biased against their region. It remains to be seen, therefore, how wise the ICC has been in bringing such charges of genocide to this matter. Clearly, there was a lack of agreement on what did or did not constitute genocide in Darfur. Such a situation illustrates the political misuse and propagandistic purposes usage of the term genocide is subject to.

The Armenians

Based on the discussion so far about the possible ambiguities of what is genocide, it is now time to examine again the Armenian claims that Turkey was guilty of genocide for the massacres and deportations that occurred during World War I. The main point that I will try to make in this section is not to deny that Turks killed Armenians; indeed what happened might in today’s vocabulary be called war crimes or even crimes against humanity. To prove genocide, however, premeditation must be demonstrated, and in this case it has not been demonstrated. As Christopher de Ballaigue argues, therefore, “what is needed is a vaguer designation for the events of 1915, avoiding the G-word but clearly connoting criminal acts of slaughter, to which reasonable scholars can subscribe.”⁴⁴ In addition, of course, our understanding must also include that some Armenians were guilty of killing as many Turks as they could in their attempts to rebel.

As noted in [Chapter 1](#), Arnold Toynbee, the renowned historian who coedited the Blue Book compilation of Turkish atrocities during World War I, later wrote: “In the redistribution of Near and Middle Eastern Territories, the atrocities which have accompanied it from the beginning have been revealed in their true light, as crimes incidental to an abnormal process, which all parties have committed in turn, and not as the peculiar practice of one denomination or nationality.”⁴⁵ Indeed, in his final statement on the subject, Toynbee declared: “These . . . Armenian political aspirations had not been legitimate. . . . Their aspirations did not merely threaten to break up

the Turkish Empire; they could not be fulfilled without doing grave injustice to the Turkish people itself.”⁴⁶ In addition, Admiral Mark Bristol, the US High Commissioner and then Ambassador to Turkey following World War I, wrote in a long cable to the US State Department in 1920: “While the Turks were all that people said they were, the other side of the coin was obscured by the flood of Greek and Armenian propaganda painting the Turks as completely inhuman and undeserving of any consideration, while suppressing all facts in favor of the Turks and against the minorities.”⁴⁷

More recently, Edward J. Erickson, a military historian, concluded after a careful examination: “Nothing can justify the massacres of the Armenians nor can a case be made that the entire Armenian population of the six Anatolian provinces was an active and hostile threat to Ottoman national security.”⁴⁸ This said, however, Erickson added: “However, a case can be made that the Ottomans judged the Armenians to be a great threat to the 3rd and 4th [Ottoman] Armies and that genuine intelligence and security concerns drove that decision. It may also be stated that the Ottoman reaction was escalatory and responsive rather than premeditated and preplanned.”⁴⁹

On the other hand, Taner Akcam, a Turkish sociologist who has prominently broken with his country’s official position, concluded after compiling weighty evidence: “The Ottoman authorities’ genocidal intent becomes clear.”⁵⁰ However, a careful review by Erman Sahin painstakingly checked and compared the original sources Akcam utilized and found discrepancies between the texts preserved in the original sources and those presented by Akcam in his book. Thus, Sahin concluded that “Taner Akcam’s dishonesty—which manifests itself in the form of numerous deliberate alterations and distortions, misleading quotations and doctoring of data—casts doubt on the accuracy of his claims as well as his conclusions.”⁵¹ In a careful, nuanced study, Donald Bloxham struggled to call what happened premeditated.⁵² Indeed, in an earlier article Bloxham wrote “that there was no *a priori* blueprint for genocide, and that it emerged from a series of more limited regional measures in a process of cumulative policy radicalization.”⁵³ Rather, Bloxham seemed to use the term genocide because of the magnitude of what happened: “nowhere else during the First World War was revolutionary nationalism answered with total murder. That is the crux of the issue.”⁵⁴

Premeditation is all-important in defining genocide, however, “because it removes from consideration not only natural disasters but also those man-made disasters that took place without explicit planning. Many of the epidemics of communicable diseases that reached genocidal proportions, for example were caused by unwitting human actions.”⁵⁵ Although some would disagree, the fate of the North American Indians is a case in point as they died largely from disease, not premeditation. Therefore, a large loss of life

is not in itself proof of genocide. Ignoring premeditation creates a distorted scenario and may lead to incorrect conclusions as to what really occurred.

Before proceeding any further, however, one should first note that the Armenian claims of genocide are encumbered by initial legal and philosophical problems not faced by the already-problematic examples of Bosnia and Darfur. This is due to the fact that any finding of genocide at this late date in the Armenian case would constitute a legally untenable ex-post-facto proclamation, that is, make an action a crime that when it was originally committed was not a crime. As discussed above, the concept of genocide did not even exist until it was invented during World War II by Raphael Lemkin, while the Genocide Convention only entered into force in 1951. Philosophically, therefore, one might argue that to apply a finding of genocide in an ex-post-facto manner to what happened to the Armenians would violate a peremptory norm of general international law, otherwise known as *ius cogens*. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties declares in Article 53 that “a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.”⁵⁶ It must be admitted, however, that international law fails to agree on any specific examples of *ius cogens*. Therefore, its application to the Armenian case is only theoretical.

International law, however, specifically does prohibit ex-post-facto laws in Article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.⁵⁷

What is more, the US Constitution specifically states in Article 1/Section 9: “No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”

Furthermore, applying a finding of genocide to what happened to the Armenians would involve the problem of intertemporal law, that is, applying legal norms from one time period to another when they did not apply.⁵⁸ To apply laws out of their time period would not only patently be unfair, but also lead to chaotic legal situations, as one would not know what laws applied to the current situation. This could then lead to possible challenges to long-accepted legal situations such as the rights of current well established populations to live on land they conquered in previous time periods. Indeed, the Armenian declaration of sovereignty in 1990 might be interpreted as laying claims to large parts of eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia.” The

strategy of some Armenians is to follow up a successful finding of genocide with claims to these territories. Donald Bloxham, who largely supports the Armenian position, nevertheless has queried Armenian nationalists “whether recognition [of genocide] is really going to open the door to healing wounds and reconciliation, as we are often told, or whether it is a means of redressing nationalist grievances. Is it an issue of historical truth, morality and responsibility, or of unresolved political and material claims?”⁵⁹ Possible claims of long ago dispossessed Native Americans also come to mind when one considers the implications. Indeed the present legal rights of practically any people on earth might be challenged by the problem of intertemporal law. International law, therefore, clearly states that the validity of any given situation depends on the law in force at the time it occurred. The concept of genocide did not exist when the Armenian disaster occurred in 1915.

The Manifesto of Hovhannes Katchaznoui

At this point it would be most useful to turn to the testimony of Hovhannes Katchaznoui, the first Prime Minister of Armenia after World War I and thus an authority well placed to judge what had just occurred during that war. His testimony was given as an address to the Armenian revolutionary and nationalist Dashnak party congress in Bucharest, Romania, in April 1923. Although he did not gainsay what he termed “this unspeakable crime . . . the deportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during the Summer and Autumn of 1915,”⁶⁰ Katchaznoui’s statement constitutes a remarkable self-criticism of the Armenians by one of their top leaders. No wonder many Armenians have done their best to remove this telling document from libraries around the world. It is, therefore, for the purposes of this study, necessary to cite what Katchaznoui had to say at some length.

In the Fall of 1914 Armenian volunteer bands organized themselves and fought against the Turks because they could not refrain themselves from fighting. This was an inevitable result of psychology on which the Armenian people had nourished itself during an entire generation: that mentality should have found its expression and did so. . . . If the formation of bands was wrong, the root of that error must be sought much further and more deeply. At the present time it is important to register only the evidence that we did participate in that volunteer movement to the largest extent and we did that contrary to the decision and the will of the General Meeting of the [Dashnak] Party.

The Winter of 1914 and the Spring of 1915 were the periods of greatest enthusiasm and hope for all the Armenians in the Caucasus, including, of course, the Dashnagzoutiun [the Dashnaks]. We had no doubt the war

would end with the complete victory of the Allies; Turkey would be defeated and dismembered, and its Armenian population would at last be liberated.

We had embraced Russia wholeheartedly without any compunction. Without any positive basis of fact we believed that the Tzarist government would grant us a more-or-less broad self-government in the Caucasus and in the Armenian villayets liberated from Turkey as a reward for our loyalty, our efforts and assistance.

We had created a dense atmosphere of illusion in our minds. We had implanted our own desires into the minds of others; we had lost our sense of reality and were carried away with our dreams. From mouth to mouth, from ear to ear passed mysterious words purported to have been spoken in the palace of the [Russian] Viceroy; attention was called to some kind of a letter by [the Russian Viceroy of the Caucasus Count I. I.] Vorontzov-Dashkov to the Catholicos [the Armenian religious leader] as an important document in our hands to use in the presentation of our rights and claims—a cleverly composed letter with very indefinite sentences and generalities which might be interpreted in any manner, according to one's desire.

We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political and military power, and overestimated the extent and importance of the services our people rendered to the Russians. And by overestimating our very modest worth and merit was where we naturally exaggerated our hopes and expectations.

The deportations and mass exiles and massacres which took place during the Summer and Autumn of 1915 were mortal blows to the Armenian Cause. Half of historical Armenia—the same half where the foundations of our independence would be laid according to traditions inherited from the early eighties [1880s] and as the result of the course adopted by European diplomacy—that half was denuded of Armenians; the Armenian provinces of Turkey were without Armenians. The Turks knew what they were doing and have no reason to regret today. It was the most decisive method of extirpating the Armenian Question from Turkey.

Again, it would be useless to ask today to what extent the participation of volunteers in the war was a contributory cause of the Armenian calamity. No one can claim that the savage persecutions would not have taken place if our behavior on this side of the frontier was different, as no one can claim the contrary, that the persecutions would have been the same even if we had not shown hostility to the Turks. This is a matter about which it is possible to have many different opinions.

The proof is, however—and this is essential—that the struggle began decades ago [which] against the Turkish government brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia. This was the terrible fact!

Civilized humanity might very well be shaken with rage in the face of this unspeakable crime. Statesmen might utter menacing words against criminal Turkey. "Blue," "Yellow," "Orange" books and papers might be published

condemning them. Divine punishment against the criminals might be invoked in churches by clergymen of all denominations. The press of all countries might be filled with horrible descriptions and details and the testimony of eye-witnesses. . . . The Turks knew what they ought to do and did it.⁶¹

Katchaznoui then turned to examine the Armenian dealings with their erstwhile ally, Russia. Here he again criticized the Armenians for blaming someone else too much for their misfortunes:

The second half of 1915 and the entire year of 1916 were periods of hopelessness, desperation and mourning for us. The refugees, all those who had survived the holocaust, were filling Russian provinces by tens and hundreds of thousands. They were famished, naked, sick, horrified and desperate floods of humanity, flooding our villages and cities. They had come to a country which was itself ruined and famished. They piled upon each other, before our own eyes, on our thresholds, dying of famine and sickness.

And we were unable to save those precious lives. Angered and terrified, we sought the culprits and quickly found them; the deceitful politics of the Russian government. With the politically immature mind peculiar to inconsequential men, we fell from one extreme to another. Just as unfounded was our faith in the Russian government yesterday, our condemnation of them today was equally blind and groundless.

By an extraordinary mental aberration, we, a political party, were forgetting that our Cause was an incidental and trivial phase for the Russians, so trivial that if necessary, they would trample on our corpses without a moment's hesitation. . . .

In both cases we misunderstood the consequence and the purpose and intention. We sought proof of Russian treachery and of course we found them—exactly as we sought and found proofs of the same Russians' undeniable benevolence six months before. To complain bitterly about our bad luck and to seek external causes for our misfortune—that is one of the main aspects of our national psychology from which, of course, the Dashnagzoutiun is not free.

One might think we found a spiritual consolation in the conviction that the Russians behaved villainously towards us (later it would be the turn of the French, the Americans, the British, the Georgians, Bolsheviks—the whole world—to be blamed). One might think that, because we were so naïve and so lacking in foresight, we placed ourselves in such a position and considered it a great virtue to let anyone who so desired to betray us, massacre us and let others massacre us.⁶²

Katchaznoui also considered the renewed Armenian struggles against Turkey following World War I. Again he was willing to assume partial

blame, disdaining to fully blame the Turks for what many Armenians later would term a renewal of genocide against them.

The Armenian-Turkish war which broke our back began in the Fall of 1920. Would it have been possible to evade it? Probably not. . . . Despite these hypotheses there remains an irrefutable fact. That we had not done all that was necessary for us to have done to evade war. We ought to have used peaceful language with the Turks whether we succeeded or not and we did not do it. We did not do it for the simple reason—no less culpable—that we had no information about the real strength of the Turks and relied on ours. This was the fundamental error. We were not afraid of war because we thought we would win.⁶³

The Armenians, of course, did not win. In December 1920, they surrendered almost simultaneously to the Bolsheviks (who then Sovietized Armenia until it became independent again after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991) and to the Turks. The Alexandropol (Gumru) peace treaty between Turkey and Armenia signed on December 2, 1920, amounted to an Armenian surrender, but also contained clauses by which some Armenians actually hoped to use Turkey as an ally against the Soviet Union. This, of course, illustrated how some Armenians considered the Turks a better potential ally than the Russians, a far cry from today's refrain accusing the Turks of genocide during that period.

[Article] 8. Despite the great expenses which the Grand Assembly of Turkey incurred for its army during two years because of the urgency of the war it had to wage against Armenia, it renounces its right to demand lawful damages, and in the same manner the two parties forego their rights to ask for damages because of the changes which took place as a result of the general war [World War I].

[Article] 9. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey promises to render assistance in the most sincere manner for the complete formulation and defense of the Armenian Republic mentioned in the Second Article with utmost integrity.

[Article] 10. The Erivan [Armenian] Government . . . promises to keep away from government circles those pugnacious men who run after imperialist aims and play havoc with the peace of the two nations so that it may give proof of its sincerity for the maintenance of peace and tranquility and the rights of Turkey as a good neighbor.⁶⁴

Further illustrative of how some Armenians apparently considered Turkey a better ally than the Soviet Union was the secretive Prometheus Organization.⁶⁵ Incredibly, this was a plan to use Kemalist Turkey as an ally

for overthrowing the newly established Soviet rule in Armenia. Although the Prometheus Organization never amounted to anything practical, as mentioned above, it again illustrated how some Armenians considered the Turks a better potential ally than the Russians, a far cry from today's refrain accusing the Turks of genocide during that period.

K. S. Papazian's *Patriotism Perverted*

A decade after Hovhannes Katchaznouni's manifesto was published, but still much closer to the events of World War I than now, K[apriel] S[erope] Papazian produced a most revealing critique of the Dashnaks' perfidy, terrorism, and disastrous policies that had helped lead to the events in question. Written by an Armenian who bore no love for the Turks, but hushed up, ignored, and virtually forgotten by many because its self-critical revelations do not fit in with the usual received Armenian thesis of innocent victimization, Papazian's analysis calls for close scrutiny. Authored just after the notorious Dashnak murder of Armenian Archbishop Leon Tourian in New York city on Christmas Eve 1933, Papazian began by expressing disdain for the Dashnaks' "predatory inclinations"⁶⁶ in his preface. He then turned to an examination of the "terrorism in the [Dashnaks' early [1892] program," which listed: "To wage[,] fight, and to subject to terrorism the government officials, the traitors, the betrayers, the usurers, and the exploiters of all description."⁶⁷ Citing from M. Varandian, *History of the Dashnagtzoutune*, page 302, Papazian then wrote that "the purpose of the Armenian movement, has been . . . from the beginning, to organize as far as possible a long drawn-out fight against the Ottoman tyranny, to create in the country a continuous *revolutionary* state, always having before our eyes the intervention of the *third factor* . . . the European factor."⁶⁸

With this background of Armenian Dashnak provocation and terrorism, Papazian then turned to examine what actually had happened during World War I. These revelations are so revealing as to deserve extended mention.

The fact remains, however, that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnagtzoutune did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war. The Dashnagtzoutune in the Caucasus had the upper hand. They were swayed in their actions, by the interests of the Russian government, and disregarded, entirely, the political dangers that the war had created for the Armenians in Turkey. Prudence was thrown to the winds; even the decision of their own convention of Erzerum [to support the Turks, but not be responsible for the Russian-Armenians] was forgotten, and a call was sent for Armenian volunteers to fight the Turks on the Caucasian front.

Thousands of Armenians from all over the world, flocked to the standards of such famous fighters as Andranik, Kery, Dro, etc. The Armenian volunteer regiments rendered valuable services to the Russian Army in the years of 1914-15-16. However, the deeds of heroism and the blood they shed in the conquest of Turkish Armenia by Russia, did not help the Armenian cause. The Dashnag leaders declared, that the Russian government had promised freedom for Armenia. There was no foundation to this: and the deception was exposed finally. But thousands of Armenians had already answered the false call, and incidentally, millions were poured into the coffers of the Dashnag "National Bureau."

On the other hand, the methods used by the Dashnagzoutune in recruiting these regiments were so open and flagrant, that it could not escape the attention of the Turkish authorities. . . . Many Armenians believe, that the fate of two millions of their co-nationals in Turkey might not have proved so disastrous, if more prudence had been used by the Dashnag leaders during the war. In one instance, one Dashnag leader, Armen Garo, who was also a member of the Turkish Parliament, had fled to the Caucasus and had taken active part in the organization of volunteer regiments to fight the Turks. His picture, in uniform, was widely circulated in the Dashnag papers, and it was used by Talat Pasha, the arch assassin of the Armenians, as an excuse for his policy of extermination.

The fact remains that the real representatives of the Armenians in Turkey, the Patriarchate and its organs, were never consulted by the Caucasian leaders of the Dashnagzoutune in adopting their policies with regard to the Armenian people; yet, the disastrous consequences of these policies were suffered by the Armenians in Turkey.⁶⁹

Today the Armenians claim that once World War I was over, what they term the Turkish genocide against them continued. Papazian, however, in analyzing the subsequent Turkish-Armenian war, wrote:

Some Dashnag leaders did everything within their power to frustrate Antranik's efforts in Erzerum to organize a defense against Vehib Pasha's army. Antranik had opposed the corrupt methods and policies of the Dashnagzoutune, therefore he had to be punished somehow. That punishment cost the Armenians the strongholds of Erzerum, Kars and Alexandropol, and the lives of multitudes. . . . Being long used to underhanded and violent methods as a revolutionary party, they [the Dashnaks] failed to show any ability for governing and statesmanship. The [Armenian state] ministry and the Parliament were often overruled by the secret and powerful Dashnag Bureau; and the agencies of law and order were often flouted by Dashnag Mauserists [Dashnak henchmen as Papazian termed them for the mauser pistols they used]. . . . It [the Dashnak government] failed to organize the defenses of the country properly, because the trained and professional officers

of the general staff were overruled by Dashnag chieftains who knew little or nothing about military science. . . .

The Dashnag government waged three wars in two years and a half. The war on Georgia, in Dec. 1918, lasted only three weeks but caused untold calamity to Armenia. The war with Azerbaijan over Karabagh ended disastrously for the Armenians. Finally came the war with Turkey in the fall of 1920, which almost put an end to the republic and threatened the Armenian remnant with extermination.⁷⁰

As for the duplicitous Dashnak diplomacy, Papazian declared:

The Dashnag delegation led by A. Aharonian, instead of co-operating with the National Delegation [headed by Boghos Nubar Pasha] in the work of achieving the freedom of Western Armenia, . . . repeatedly sacrificed the interests and jeopardized the physical existence of the Western Armenians, in order to follow the policies and views of their leaders from the Caucasus. . . . Accordingly, on May 28, 1919, the government of Erivan, came out with a proclamation by which it declared the Armenian Provinces of Turkey . . . united with the existing republic [of Erivan]. . . . The immediate result of this act was the flaring up of an internal conflict among the Armenians, which made it impossible for the political factions to present a united front to the allies in the peace conference, which they had done up till then. . . . The cause of the freedom of Western Armenia was thus killed by Dashnag intolerance and intrigue.⁷¹

Then, with the Dashnak-led Armenian state in the Caucasus collapsing in 1921, wrote Papazian, “the Dashnag leaders seemed to prefer Turkish rather than Russian protectorate over what was left of the Armenian Republic.”⁷² Here Papazian was referring to Armenian premier Simon Vratzian’s appeal to Kemalist Turkey for military aid under the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol that the two states had just signed. Would such an appeal have been likely if the Turks were still engaging in what many Armenians today refer to as genocide against them? A few years later in 1928, continued Papazian, the Dashnaks “mulcted its credulous followers of thousands of dollars to support the Kurdish cause.” However, when the Kurds were defeated the “net result [was] . . . more oppressive measures by the Turkish government in dealing with the Armenian remnants in Turkey.”⁷³

What then should be made of Papazian’s *Patriotism Perverted*? Without denying that the Turks played a murderous role in the events analyzed, clearly, his long ignored and even suppressed revelations indicate that the Armenians were far from innocent victims in what ensued. Indeed, Papazian’s text makes it clear that incompetent but treacherous Armenians

themselves were also to blame for what had befallen their cause. It is unfair to fix unique blame upon the Turks.

Guenter Lewy's Book: A Disputed Genocide.⁷⁴

Guenter Lewy's book is a recent and very significant contribution to the long-standing debate over what happened to the Armenians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire. Was it a premeditated genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman officials, as most Armenian and other scholars believe, or the unfortunate result of wartime excesses, as the Turks and a few others argue? Lewy accepts neither interpretation. Instead, he finds that "both sides have used heavy-handed tactics to advance their cause and silence a full and impartial discussion of the issues in dispute" (p. 258). Although he might have mentioned that Raphael Lemkin actually coined the term genocide based on what he believed had happened to the Armenians (see above), Lewy does aptly declare that "the key issue in this quarrel . . . is not the extent of Armenian suffering, but rather the question of premeditation: that is, whether the Young Turk regime during the First World War intentionally organized the massacres that took place" (p. ix).

Lewy takes on what many who back the Armenian contentions consider to be some of the most damning evidences of a premeditated genocide and shows how they are "materials of highly questionable authenticity" (p. 250). These suspect documents include the so-called "Ten Commandments . . . issued by the Committee of Union and Progress [CUP] relative to their plan for massacring Armenians" (p. 47), "still another secret meeting that is said to substantiate the element of premeditation . . . described in memoirs written by a purported member of the central committee of the CUP, Mevlanzade Rifat" (p. 51), and the Naim Bey "telegrams allegedly sent out by minister of the interior Talaat Pasha, ordering the extermination of the Armenians" (p. 63) and published by a minor military censor at that time, Aram Andonian.

Lewy also questions the methods of arguably the current leading Armenian scholar-advocate for the premeditated genocide thesis, Vakhakn N. Dadrian.⁷⁵ Lewy points out Dadrian's "selective use of sources" (p. 282n3), how when "checking the references provided by Dadrian . . . it becomes clear that these sources do not always say what Dadrian alleges" (p. 83), Dadrian's "manipulating the statements of contemporary observers" (p. 84), how "only through shrewd juxtapositions of words and insertions (which he puts in square brackets) that Dadrian ends up with the desired result" (p. 85), and how "it is Dadrian's gloss and not the original text quoted that includes the incriminating words" (p. 86).

Lewy examines many other sources that help “establish the terrible suffering of the deported Armenians and the occurrences of massacres. But, contrary to Armenian claims, they do not prove the responsibility of the central government in Constantinople for these killings” (p. 135). These include the German missionary and Orientalist Johannes Lepsius,⁷⁶ the German poet Armin T. Wegner,⁷⁷ the famous British Blue Book edited by Lord James Bryce and a young Arnold Toynbee,⁷⁸ and Henry Morgenthau,⁷⁹ the US Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, Lewy finds “most valuable . . . the consular reports . . . of Leslie A. Davis,⁸⁰ the American consul in Harput. . . . Of special importance are accounts of his visits to several mass execution sites, one of the few such reports available from any source” (p. 139). Recently released Turkish publications “focus almost exclusively on Armenian rebellious activities. Hardly any documents are included on the relocations or the confiscation of Armenian property” (p. 132). In addition, “only a fraction of the massive Turkish archival holdings are available to researchers, and these are carefully controlled by the Turkish authorities” (p. 133). Lewy also accuses “the Turkish side, which seeks to dismiss the mass killings as ‘excesses’ or ‘intercommunal warfare’ and often speaks of ‘so-called massacres’” as “distorting the historical record” (p. 252).

As for the argument that “the large number of Armenian deaths—genocidal consequences—as proof that the massacres that took place must have been part of an overall plan to destroy the Armenian people” (p. 43), Lewy counters that it “rests on a logical fallacy and ignores the huge loss of life among Turkish civilians, soldiers, and prisoners-of-war due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease. All of these groups also experienced a huge death toll that surely cannot be explained in terms of a Young Turk plan of annihilation” (p. 250). Lewy further takes to task the recent French law punishing those who in effect do not agree with the premeditation thesis. In 1995, for example, a French court found the prominent scholar Bernard Lewis guilty of denying that the Armenians suffered a premeditated genocide and imposed a token fine.

So how does Lewy explain what happened to the Armenians? “The momentous task of relocating several hundred thousand people in a short span of time and over a highly primitive system of transportation was simply beyond the ability of the Ottoman bureaucracy. . . . Under conditions of Ottoman misrule, it was possible for the country to suffer an incredibly high death toll without a premeditated plan of annihilation” (p. 253).

There has long been a need for somebody with the academic objectivity and courage to take on this challenging issue. Although Lewy’s analysis is

certainly not going to constitute the definitive answer, there is no other comparable work that so objectively and thoroughly reviews and analyzes so many different sources on both sides of this bitterly divisive issue. Lewy's study also contains three maps, a very brief list of abbreviations and glossary, thorough notes, a lengthy list of works cited, and a good index.

I am not the only one who found merit in Lewy's analysis. His book was also reviewed prominently and positively in the two other arguably leading US journals of Middle East studies. Edward J. Erickson found that "Lewy maintains that both camps have created a flawed supporting historiography by using sources selectively, quoting them out of context, and/or ignoring 'inconvenient facts,'"⁸¹ and concluded that "simply having a large number of advocates affirming that the genocide is a historical fact does not make it so."⁸² Although Robert Betts declared that "for the Turkish government to deny Ottoman responsibility for the Armenian suffering makes no sense,"⁸³ he also declared that "what emerges from Lewy's study is the dire state of the empire and its population in 1915 and its inability to protect and feed its own Muslim citizenry, let alone the Armenians."⁸⁴ Betts then concluded that "Guenter Lewy deserves the highest praise for his sober and reasoned approach to this saga of horrors, which began on April 24, 1915, during the early stages of World War I."⁸⁵

Despite these positive receptions on the part of other scholars to Lewy's book, Joseph A. Kechichian and Keith David Watenpaugh, two advocates of the Armenian contentions, felt compelled to make a very scurrilous attack upon me for my approval of the book.⁸⁶ Their outburst against me is illustrative of the Armenian school's frequent unwillingness even to enter into a reasonable scholarly debate on this subject. Although I would have preferred not to have to reply to these abusive attempts at academic character assassination, not replying might have been misconstrued as somehow agreeing with them.⁸⁷

The main argument these two try to make against me is that I did not agree with their interpretation of what happened to the Armenians during World War I and that I did not even have a right to write my review of Guenter Lewy's book in the first place because I had praised it on its back cover. The two even declaim that by publishing my review the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (*IJMES*) "rendered a disservice to its readers" that has "undermined the credibility of *IJMES*" since I am guilty of "unethical behavior," "fraud," et cetera. They also lecture *IJMES* that while it should publish their 12 pages attacking Guenter Lewy and me, the journal should not publish any reply that I might choose to make. Perhaps noticing that I lived in Tennessee, the two even hurled the proverbial kitchen sink my way by accusing me of using "lazy and antiintellectual techniques"

employed “by fundamentalist proponents of ‘Intelligent Design’ who advocate the inclusion of the supernatural.”

In the first place, there is no academic rule that someone who pens a few words of praise for the back of a book cannot later write a review of it. If there were, a number of good reviews never would have been written. Clearly, my review should stand or fall on its merits, not some alleged rule invented by my two detractors.

Much more importantly, neither Guenter Lewy nor I deny the terrible suffering imposed upon the Armenians. Any objective reading of Guenter Lewy’s book and my review will make this obvious. What we do not agree with is the interpretation many Armenians and others have that what befell the Armenians constituted premeditated genocide as defined by the Armenians and their many supporters. My two critics notwithstanding, Guenter Lewy and I are not alone in this contention. Indeed, as noted already, Edward J. Erickson’s review of Guenter Lewy’s book in the *Middle East Journal* 60 (Spring 2006), pp. 377–79 finds much to praise about it and concludes: “I highly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in the question of what really happened to the Ottoman Armenians in 1915.” Writing in the prestigious *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on March 23, 2006, the distinguished German scholar of comparative genocide, Eberhard Jackel, also praised Lewy’s book. A number of years ago *IJMES* too published a heated exchange between Richard G. Hovannisian and the late Stanford J. Shaw,⁸⁸ “Forum: The Armenian Question,” 9 (1978), pp. 379–400. Such distinguished scholars of Ottoman history as Bernard Lewis,⁸⁹ Roderic Davison,⁹⁰ J. C. Hurewitz,⁹¹ and Andrew Mango,⁹² among others, have all rejected the appropriateness of the genocide label for what occurred. Does this make these other major scholars and publications also guilty of “fraud” and other related sins by daring to publish such thoughts?

Joseph Kechichian furthermore incorrectly opines that “Gunter, the reviewer, occupies a central place in the massive campaign—ardently promoted by successive Turkish governments—to deny the Armenian genocide . . . even though he has not produced a single work with a focus on this subject.” Joseph Kechichian notwithstanding, in fact I have often taken critical stands against the Turkish government, as anyone who knows my work on the Kurdish and Armenian questions knows. On the other hand, Joseph Kechichian and Keith Watenpugh clearly are spokespersons for the longtime massive campaign by the Armenians to trash any scholars who dare to disagree with their own particular version of history. Indeed, in France, the Armenians have even succeeded in making it a crime to criticize them. In 1995, the highly respected scholar of Turkish studies Bernard Lewis was actually fined for questioning the Armenian version of history.

Despite their pious denials, it is clear that my two critics would like to extend the French system to the United States.

As for Joseph Kechichian's erroneous assertion that I never "produced a single work with a focus on this subject," I would like to call to his attention a lengthy article I wrote (in an Armenian journal no less) on "The Historical Origins of the Armenian-Turkish Enmity" in a special issue of the *Journal of Armenian Studies* entitled "Genocide and Human Rights" vol. IV, nos. 1 and 2 (1992), pp. 257–288; and a shorter, slightly different version in the *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 9 (Fall 1985), pp. 77–96, entitled "The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism." He might also note my short piece published in the leading German journal for politics and economics of the Middle East, "Why Do the Turks Deny They Committed Genocide against the Armenians?" *Orient* 30 (September 1989), pp. 490–493.

What is more, over the years my being asked to write five separate reviews in the two leading journals of Middle Eastern studies in the United States has further testified to my objectivity on this subject. In *IJMES*, I reviewed (1) Merrill D. Peterson, "Starving Armenians": *America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1930 and after* in the issue of May 2005, pp. 296–297; and (2) Richard Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*; and Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question 1915–1923* in the issue of August 1989, pp. 419–422. In the *Middle East Journal*, I reviewed (3) Vahakn N. Dadrian, *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide* in the issue of Autumn 1998, pp. 622–624; (4) Jacques Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations*; and Ephraim K. Jernazian, *Judgment unto Truth: Witnessing the Armenian Genocide* in the issue of Spring 1991, pp. 343–344; and (5) Kamuran Gurun, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed*, in the issue of Winter 1987, pp. 102–104.

Furthermore, my book "Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People": *A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986) opened with an entire chapter comparing the differing Armenian and Turkish positions on what happened in 1915 and received some of the following positive reviews. "This is in every respect a splendid book, which every university library and individual interested in the contemporary Middle East ought to purchase." *Middle East Studies Bulletin*, 21 (December 1987), p. 206. "Professor Michael Gunter's study of contemporary Armenian terrorism is . . . carefully chronicled, and there is much material which helps to explain subsequent developments. . . . Well documented. . . . Gunter has made a notable contribution." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 25 (October 1989), pp. 539–541. "The book is an important one for anyone requiring a

systematic account of a terrorist movement that began attacking Turkish officials and offices.” *Christian Science Monitor*, March 10, 1987, p. 24. Illustrating the egregiously shocking way he interprets facts, however, Joseph Kechichian pontificates that my book simply deals with “alleged Armenian ‘terrorism.’” Alleged? If this is how Mr. Kechichian views recent Armenian terrorism, how can one trust his version of earlier events?

Finally surfeiting themselves with their badly conceived ad hominem attacks on my academic ethics and qualifications, these two Armenian gentlemen next turn their self-righteous diatribes against the accuracy of Guenter Lewy’s book. Although they make some valid points regarding the Armenian massacres that neither Guenter Lewy nor I deny, the two also commit several blunders and possibly outright falsifications in their haste to preach to the choir. For example, they maintain “that a host of Turkish historians” are now agreeing with the Armenian version of history. Joseph Kechichian manages, however, to name only five. Although their position provides food for thought, it hardly amounts to a mass conversion of Turkish scholars to the Armenian line. Indeed, the claim by one of the five (Taner Akcam) that Kemal Ataturk accepted the Armenian version of history is simply not true. Rather, Ataturk criticized the incompetence of the Ottoman government for not alleviating the sufferings of both the Armenians as well as ethnic Turks, who also suffered grievously during these times.

Joseph Kechichian further faults Guenter Lewy for not being able to read Ottoman and Turkish, and relying on two anonymous Turkish-speaking persons and others for translating important documents for him. Seeking to draw negative implications from this anonymity, Joseph Kechichian declaims that their names have been “suspiciously withheld.” This, of course, is simply another red herring because the translations will stand or fall on their accuracy, not on who made them. What probably really bothered Joseph Kechichian here is that Guenter Lewy illustrates several times how pro-Armenian sources cite Turkish sources out of context or simply juxtapose them with ellipses to create different meanings. As previously noted, Vahakn N. Dadrian, often cited as one of the leading contemporary Armenian scholars of these events, is listed by Guenter Lewy as one of those who sometimes engages in these practices.

It is also interesting that inability to read Turkish does not prevent Joseph Kechichian from praising as genocide experts Donald Bloxham,⁹³ Robert Melson,⁹⁴ and Leo Kuper,⁹⁵ among others, who also do not know Turkish. In addition, if Joseph Kechichian and his supporters understand Ottoman so well, why do some of them continue to tout as genocide evidence such obvious forgeries as the so-called Naim-Andonian documents and the supposed secret Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) meeting

of February 1915 described by Mevlanzade Rifat? They weaken their own case by adding such spurious sources.

Joseph Kechichian makes Esref Kuscubasi's statement that he was "a man who had assumed a secret assignment" read to be a confession of genocidal guilt, but as a head of the Special Organization, Kuscubasi naturally dealt with secret assignments. Taking that as a genocidal confession is the real distortion. General Mehmet Vehip's statements are hardly decisive. If the Ottoman government had been behind an extermination plan, Vehip was not in a position to know as he was not part of the inner circles of power. At the most, Vehip was simply providing his own opinion, as he also did when he foolishly opined that Atatürk's war of independence was ruinous for the country. Leslie Davis⁹⁶ was "not a rare eyewitness to mass murder." What he saw were corpses. How they died and who killed them are matters open to debate. Leslie Davis relied entirely on his Armenian assistants and missionaries for his information. When he wrote that convicts were released for the purpose of murdering Armenians, that was his opinion. There was a severe shortage of manpower during a desperate war and making use of convicts is not an unusual practice. Guenter Lewy's lamenting of missing originals would be a concern of any objective scholar. If the postwar puppet Ottoman government was corrupt, the fact that some trial material was reproduced in the official newspaper of that government is not what one would necessarily call reliable evidence.

If Guenter Lewy's book may have been distributed free to a few libraries, it does not demonstrate that his book is somehow illegitimate. The fact that Guenter Lewy was presented with an award by the Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM), a Turkish think tank, does not prove that he is lying and in the service of the Turkish government. An author does not control such matters. Joseph Kechichian's claim that ASAM's "mission includes . . . propagandistic and partisan research and publication" is an apt description of the Armenian Zoryan Institute that has published some of Taner Akcam's work. Erik Jan Zürcher received the Medal of High Distinction from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs although he concluded, "while the Ottoman government as such was not involved in genocide . . . there was a centrally controlled policy of extermination, instigated by the CUP" (*Turkey: A Modern History*, 1993, p. 121.)

These problems, of course—and overly pious Turkish denials of any wrongdoing—do not prove or disprove what really occurred. Thirty years ago, Gwynne Dyer aptly expressed the state of the disorderly discourse between most Armenian and Turkish exponents when he titled a revealing short analysis: "Turkish 'Falsifiers' and Armenian 'Deceivers': Historiography and the Armenian Massacres," *Middle Eastern Studies* 12 (January 1976),

pp. 99–107. Similarly, Nesim Seker recently bemoaned “the politicization of this issue” and identified “the essence of [the] controversy as emanating from the approach of both the Turkish and Armenian historians.”⁹⁷ Guenter Lewy too finds that “both sides have used heavy-handed tactics to advance their cause and silence a full and impartial discussion of the issues in dispute.” Yet his attempt to demonstrate this is denounced as a “fraud” by his Armenian critics.

Why then do most scholars accept uncritically the Armenian version of these events and demonize those who object? Why do the Turks continue to maintain their innocence in the face of so much evidence? First of all, one must realize that the Armenian massacres in 1915 did not just suddenly occur out of the blue, but followed decades of Armenian violence and revolutionary activity that then elicited Turkish counterviolence. There are a plethora of Turkish sources documenting these unfortunate events. However, much more accessible to Western audiences are the studies by such eminent scholars as William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism: 1890–1902*, 2 vols. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1935) and Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*, 2nd ed. (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970, originally published in 1922), among others.

Armenians too have documented copiously that they sometimes gave as well as they received. See, for example, Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963); *Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben der Minasian*, ed. and trans. James G. Mandalian (Boston: Hairenik Association, 1963); and Garegin Pasdermadjian (Armen Garo), *Bank Ottoman: Memoirs of Armen Garo*, trans. Haig T. Partizian (Detroit, MI: Armen Topouzian, 1990), among others. The Armenians, of course, present themselves as freedom fighters in these earlier events, but the objective scholar can understand how the Turks saw them as revolutionary and treasonous and thus hesitate to characterize their response in 1915 as “genocide.”

Moreover, throughout all these events, the Armenians were never more than a large minority even in their historic provinces they inhabited. Yet they exaggerated their numbers before World War I and their losses during the war. Indeed, if the Armenian figures for those who died were correct, there would have been few left at the end of the war. Instead, the Armenians managed to fight another war against the emerging Turkish Republic for mastery in eastern Anatolia following World War I. After they lost, many Armenians in time came to claim that what had occurred after World War I was simply renewed genocide. The Turks, on the other hand, saw it as

part of their War of Independence and understandably hesitate to admit sole guilt for all these events.

Furthermore, as Christians, the Armenians naturally found a sympathetic audience in the West. The Muslim Turks, on the other hand, were the historic enemy of the Christian West. In addition, the Armenians were much more adept in foreign languages than the Turks and thus able to present their case more readily to the rest of the world. When the events in question occurred, the Turks were again the enemy of the West and the object of Western propaganda. Of course, none of this excuses the horrible abuses that occurred, but these facts put what happened into a more accurate context and begin to explain why the Turks feel that the term “premeditated genocide” is unfair to describe what occurred, especially when the Armenians deny any guilt.

Moreover, Armenian willingness to employ unwise violence continued into more recent times despite the attempt by Joseph Kechichian to term the murder of numerous Turkish diplomats in the 1970s and 1980s as merely “alleged Armenian terrorism.” Several of these murders occurred in the United States. Moreover, Armenian activists demanded that Cambridge University Press somehow withdraw Stanford Shaw’s *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, 1977, because they did not agree with some of its findings, threatened him, and even bombed his house in Los Angeles. The late Stanford Shaw was a noted Professor of History at UCLA. Furthermore, one of the first things the newly independent Armenia did upon winning its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 was to attack Turkic Azerbaijan and conquer some 16 percent of its territory. The Armenian declaration of independence from the Soviet Union can be interpreted to claim large sections of eastern Turkey as “Western Armenia.” Yet those who point out such inconvenient facts are denounced as “genocide deniers” who should not even have the right to express themselves or worse. No wonder the Turks are hesitant to confess to genocide as defined by their enemies.

Conclusion

Without denying the tragic massacres the Armenians suffered during World War I, it is also important to place them in their proper context. When this is done, the application of the term “genocide” to these tragic events is inappropriate because the Turkish actions were neither unilateral nor premeditated. As the testimony of Hovhannes Katchaznoui, the first Prime Minister of Armenia after World War I, makes clear, some Armenians killed as many Turks as they could in a misguided attempt to strike for

independence. Additional Armenian writers such as Louise Nalbandian, James Mandalian, and Armen Garo, among others, have also detailed how some Armenians had long fought against the Turks in the lead-up to the massacres of World War I. Furthermore, such distinguished Western scholars as William Langer, Arnold Toynbee, and Walter Laqueur, among others, have also concurred with this judgment. Their positions along with others have been detailed in this chapter with again the conclusion that the Turkish actions were not unilateral, that the Armenians were not always innocent victims, and that what befell them was not entirely unprovoked.

As for the necessary attribute of premeditation to demonstrate genocide, there are no authentic documents that prove guilt. Although there are countless descriptions of the depravations suffered by the Armenians, they do not prove premeditation. The so-called Andonian documents that purport to demonstrate premeditation are almost certain fabrications. As for the Armenian contention that the huge loss of Armenian lives illustrates premeditation, what then should be said about the enormous loss of Turkish lives among civilians, soldiers, and prisoners of war? Were these Turkish deaths also genocide or rather due to sheer incompetence, neglect, starvation, and disease? And if the latter were true of the ethnic Turkish population, all the more were they the fate of an ethnic group that had incurred upon itself suspicion of acting as a fifth column in a time of war. Even so Armenian communities in such large western cities as Constantinople and Smyrna were spared deportation probably because they were not in a position to aid the invading Russians. Is it possible to imagine Hitler sparing any Jews in Berlin, Munich, or Cologne from his genocidal rampage for similar reasons? If, as the Armenians allege, the Turkish intent was to subject their Armenian victims to a premeditated forced march until they died of exhaustion, why was this tactic not imposed on all of the Armenians?

In January 2009, Murat Bardakci, a Turkish author and columnist, published population figures of Armenians from a long-lost handwritten “black book”⁹⁸ that had belonged to Talaat Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of the Interior often accused by many as being one of the main architects of premeditated genocide against them. Talaat’s book lists some 1,256,000 Armenians living within the Ottoman Empire before 1915, but only 284,157 living there two years later. The obvious implication that many would draw initially is that the missing numbers in 1917 had been killed or died during the deportations. Ara Sarafian, a leading Armenian scholar usually careful about his sources, proclaimed that Talaat’s book “is probably the single most important document ever uncovered describing the destruction of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915–17.”⁹⁹ Hilmar Kaiser, a historian who supports the Armenian position, declared that “the records published in the book

were conclusive proof from the Ottoman authority itself that it had pursued a calculated policy to eliminate the Armenians.”¹⁰⁰

Once again, however, these figures do not necessarily prove what those who support the Armenian claims argue. As the Turkish scholar Erman Sahin points out, Talaat’s figures fail to consider that “a very significant portion of the Armenians in the provinces of Van, Bitlis, and Erzurum were actually never relocated by the Ottoman authorities, but fled to Caucasia.”¹⁰¹ Estimates of these numbers range “from 250 to 400 thousand.”¹⁰² Furthermore, even to the extent that Talaat’s figures represent Armenians who perished—whatever that number might be—they still do not prove premeditation. As argued above, one might instead conclude that the huge task of relocating hundreds of thousands of Armenians in a short period of time and over a highly primitive system of transportation proved simply beyond the capacity of the Ottoman government and resulted in many deaths. In addition, Bardakci himself, the one responsible for originally publishing the figures, strongly denied that they indicated the Armenian death total or genocide. Rather, he maintained that the figures documented the decline of the Armenian population after deportation, which was necessary given the Armenian support of the Russian invaders. Finally, these figures also fail to consider the hundreds of thousands of Muslims (Turks and Kurds) who also died from various causes including violence at the hands of the Armenians. Therefore, without denying outright murders and massacres that today might qualify as war crimes, based on the analysis in this chapter, it seems reasonable to question the validity of referring to the Armenian tragedy as genocide.

CHAPTER 3

Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century

tacitly supported by many Armenians and others throughout the world as legitimate revenge for what most observers viewed as genocide¹ in World War I, Armenian terrorism in the twentieth century was an excellent example of how one person's terrorist can be viewed by some as another's freedom fighter. In seeking revenge for past perceived wrongs and eventual independence, Armenian terrorism also shared common characteristics with such other ethnic-based terrorist movements as the Irish and Palestinian, among others. In another sense, however, Armenian terrorism, as well as its support in the larger Armenian community, was unique in its visceral hatred of its Turkish enemy. Also unique was how Armenian terrorism manifested two separate periods of activity separated by almost half a century: (1) The period immediately after World War I when a secretive Armenian organization called Operation Nemesis assassinated several former Ottoman officials, and (2) the period from approximately 1973–1985 when the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and its more right-wing, Dashnak, nationalist rival the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), after July 1983, the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) assassinated numerous Turkish diplomats as well as a number of third parties.²

This chapter will seek to reappraise the strategic impact of Armenian terrorism in the twentieth century. What forces drove this particular terrorism, and what led to its demise? What was its strategic impact if any? With the perspective of time, what role did Armenian terrorism play in the twentieth century's overall explosion of terrorism as a means by which the weak could achieve their strategic goals they could not achieve in more conventional ways? Alternatively, was Armenian terrorism more *sui generis*, a unique phenomenon that had no lasting achievement?

Causes

Terrorism is a phenomenon that usually stems from the failure of its perpetrators to develop sufficient political or military strength to present their case in a more conventional manner. The inability of the victims to stem it, on the other hand, often flows from what the well-known cliché explains as, “One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” During the 1984 trial in Paris, France, of the four ASALA agents who seized the Turkish Consulate and killed its Turkish guard in 1981, for example, the President of the French Court ruled that referring to the defendants as “terrorists” would not be allowed, since anyone participating in a struggle can be called a terrorist by someone who opposes that struggle.³ Clearly, one of the background causes of Armenian terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s was that too many states and individuals were too lenient on the matter, condemning it in one breath but apologizing for it in the next by saying, “but we have to understand the motives.” Although Operation Nemesis, the Armenian terrorist organization that assassinated Ottoman officials immediately after World War I, disappeared in the early 1920s, “there have existed for many decades those organizations internationally . . . that are pursuing quite seriously the Armenian struggle for liberation in every peaceful method available.”⁴ Eventually some Armenians became frustrated with what they saw as the unsuccessful peaceful approach and turned to violence.

The deletion of Paragraph 30 from a report of the United Nations in 1973–74 is one example of the failure of the peaceful method given by some Armenians. This paragraph specifically mentioned the Armenian massacres in 1915 “as the first case of genocide in the 20th century,” and was included in a progress report to a study entitled “Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” When Turkey objected during the UN commission on Human Rights, however, paragraph 30 was deleted, and the Armenians were frustrated.⁵ Gerard J. Libaridian, a prominent Armenian scholar, concluded that “the unwillingness of the Turkish state and major world powers to recognize Armenian aspirations after 60 years of peaceful efforts has resulted in a decade of terrorism.”⁶ Similarly, the leader of the Marxist Armenian terrorist group ASALA explained the wave of Armenian terrorism that occurred in the 1970s, in part, as the result of “the general discovery as to the failure of the policy of the traditional Armenian parties.”⁷

In 1965, anti-Turkish demonstrations were organized in Beirut, Lebanon, by the Lebanese Armenians to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the 1915 Armenian deportations and massacres by the Ottoman Empire. At this

time, the Lebanese Armenians proclaimed April 24 as “Commemoration Day.”⁸ On the same day in 1965, thousands of Armenians illegally demonstrated in Yerevan, the capital of what was then Soviet Armenia. The protest became disorderly as rocks were thrown, and calm was finally restored only with difficulty. Since that date, Armenians around the world have commemorated April 24 as Genocide Day.⁹

Another event seminal to the genesis of organized Armenian terrorism occurred on January 27, 1973. In an individual act of revenge, a 78-year-old Californian of Armenian descent, Gourgen Yanikian, lured Mehmet Baydar and Behadir Demir, the Turkish Consul General and Vice Consul in Los Angeles, to a hotel room on the pretext of presenting them two rare paintings. When the two Turkish diplomats arrived, Yanikian, who had lost members of his family in Turkey during World War I, launched into a tirade and then shot both Turks to death. Many feel that this double murder served as a catalyst for the ensuing decade of Armenian terrorism by ASALA and JCAG. Indeed, after Yanikian died in 1984, a respected Armenian newspaper in the United States went so far as to declare that he had “opened [a] new era of political struggle” and “changed the course of Armenian history.”¹⁰

Armenian terrorists themselves proclaimed that their campaign began in 1975. In an interview with the Arab-language periodical *Al-Majallah* in August 1982, an ASALA representative stated that his organization’s first operation had been in 1975 against an office in Beirut “run by the World Council of Churches, for promoting the emigration of Armenians to the United States.”¹¹ A miniscule breakaway ASALA group headed by American-born Monte Melkonian agreed that “the January 20, 1975 bombing of the Beirut office of the World Council of Churches . . . became known as the act which defined the birth of ASALA.”¹² After one of its agents murdered Kemal Arikan, the new Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles on January 28, 1982, the other Armenian terrorist organization JCAG claimed the deed in a recorded message over the telephone to the Washington Bureau of the Associated Press, adding: “our revolutionary struggle began in 1975,”¹³ apparently referring to its assassination of Danis Tunaligil, the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna, Austria, on October 22, 1975.

Lebanese-Palestinian Catalyst

The Lebanese Civil War of the mid-1970s acted as another catalyst for organized Armenian terrorism. As a result of the upheavals of World War I, Lebanon had come to serve as the host for the largest group of displaced Armenians in the Middle East. In time, they numbered some 200,000 or

approximately 6 percent of that country's population.¹⁴ Many lived in Bourj Hammoud, the teeming Armenian quarter of east Beirut, while the Cilician See of the Armenian apostolic church was headquartered nearby in Antelias. During the 1970s, some Lebanese-Armenians gradually fell into the internecine power struggles that were to turn Lebanon into a byword for violence. The nationalist Dashnaks (see below) formed close alliances with the right-wing Christian Phalangists of Pierre Gemayel and the National Liberals of Camille Chamoun. Leftist Armenians drew close to Kemal Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist (Druze) Party and various factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had become a state within a state in Lebanon by the early 1970s.

Given the support of their Palestinian allies, radical Armenian leftists created ASALA by 1975. In reaction to these developments, the right-wing Dashnaks created their own terrorist organization JCAG to keep their young party members from abandoning the ranks and files to join ASALA.¹⁵ The dissident ASALA group headed by Monte Melkonian agreed that "the most important and active center of such political experimentation during this period [1965–75] was Lebanon,"¹⁶ and the editor's preface to Melkonian's posthumously published writings concurred that "during this time several Palestinian resistance organizations provided their Armenian comrade with extensive military training."¹⁷

Jose Antonio Gurriaran, a Spanish journalist who had come to know the Armenian terrorists after being maimed by one of their bombs, wrote that the "Black September chief Abu Iyad"¹⁸ had helped ASALA leader Hagop Hagopian form ASALA in 1975. A dissident ASALA source stated that soon after joining the Palestinians, Hagopian "found himself within the ranks of Wadi Haddad's splinter PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine],"¹⁹ which was George Habbash's faction in the PLO. "It was during his activity with Wadi Haddad that he [Hagopian] gained most of his experience, developed many personal friendships with Palestinian leaders, and began to mimic the organizational and military tactics of Wadi Haddad," which according to the same dissident ASALA source cited above, "intentionally caused innocent victims harm, and thus served to discredit the Palestinian Resistance in general as 'terrorist.'"

The Lebanese catalyst of Armenian terrorism was further illustrated by the fact that so many of the known terrorists hailed from that country. As Hrand Simonian, a leader of the Armenian community in Los Angeles, explained, "Many of the terrorists are newcomers from Lebanon who learned how to do violent things" in the many years of civil violence there.²⁰ Similarly, Martin Halabian, the Director of Information of the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts,

stated: “Armenians recently arrived from Lebanon and other Mideast countries . . . are more used to militancy as a way of life.”²¹ With this background, this chapter will now turn to an analysis of the two main Armenian terrorist groups that operated from approximately 1975–85.

The Dashnaks

Background

The *Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaksuthium* or the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), commonly referred to as the Dashnaks, was founded in Tiflis, Russia, in 1890.²² Until Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, the Dashnaks were arguably the preeminent Armenian political organization. The ARF’s Manifesto issued in 1891 “sounded like a declaration of war against the Turkish authorities,” declared a modern Dashnak writer.²³ “To attain its aims by means of revolution, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation shall organize revolutionary bands which shall wage an incessant fight against the [Ottoman] Government,”²⁴ wrote Simon Vratzian, the Dashnak leader who briefly became the Premier of the independent Republic of Armenia created after World War I, but incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1921. The resulting *fedayeen* movement, claims another Armenian writer, “was a forerunner of the freedom fighters from Iran to Algeria in the 20th century Muslim world.”²⁵

From its inception in 1890, the ARF resorted to terrorism because of what it perceived as the necessity of self-defense in the absence of any legal means of protection. According to Mikayel Varandian, an early party historian: “Perhaps there has never been a revolutionary party—not even the Russian *Narodovolets*, or the Italian *Carbonaris*—with such rich experiences in the road of terrorist acts, as the AR Federation, which in its difficult environment, has developed the most frenzied types of terrorists, and given hundreds of masters of the pistol, the bomb and the dagger, for acts of revenge.”²⁶ According to yet another Armenian source, “terrorism became an act of courage to clandestine organizations—populists or Dashnaks—a primary response in self-defense, comparable to war for a Westerner.”²⁷

Other scholars, while not condoning the massacres which did occur, point out that since they were the weaker party, the Dashnaks and other Armenian groups began deliberately to use terror against the Turks to incite Turkish reprisals and massacres, which would then encourage broad Armenian support for revolution and finally great power intervention. According to the well-known historian William Langer, “Europeans in Turkey were agreed that the immediate aim of the [Armenian] agitators was

to incite disorders, bring about inhuman reprisals, and so provoke the intervention of the powers.”²⁸ Walter Laqueur, a noted authority on terrorism, has concurred: “Since they [the Armenian terrorists] could not possibly hope to overthrow the government, their strategy had to be based on provocation. They assumed, in all probability, that their attacks on the Turks would provoke savage retaliation, and that as a result the Armenian population would be radicalized; more decisive yet, the Western powers, appalled by the massacres, would intervene on their behalf as they did for the Bulgarians two decades earlier.”²⁹ This terrorism, which was well developed by the beginning of the twentieth century, was used not only against Ottoman officials, but also other Armenians who had run afoul of the Dashnaks’ interests. This pattern continued during the wave of Armenian terrorism that began in the 1970s, as will be illustrated below.

Operation Nemesis

For a few years in the early 1920s, a secret Dashnak network known as Operation Nemesis (named for the Greek god of retributive justice) relentlessly pursued and murdered several former Ottoman officials living in exile in Western Europe. Armen Garo—a former member of the Ottoman parliament who had deflected to the Russians at the start of World War I to join the Armenian volunteers fighting against the Ottoman Empire and whose real name was Garegin Pasdermadjian—was “the overall boss of Operation Nemesis.”³⁰ Shahan Natali (an Armenian-American from Turkey whose real name was Hagop Der Hagopian) was the operational coordinator and Aaron Sachaklian was responsible for finances, logistics, and training.³¹

Talaat Pasha, probably the most important Ottoman leader in World War I, was gunned down in Berlin on March 15, 1921, by Soghomon Tehlirian. The assassin had lost most of his family in Turkey during World War I. The German court found Tehlirian innocent, a precedent frequently cited by Armenian activists as a moral justification for murdering Turkish diplomats during the 1970s and 1980s.³² A Dashnak newspaper, for example, proclaimed that the trial of the two Armenian terrorists who had killed Galip Balkar, the Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia on March 9, 1983, was “becoming like the Tehlirian trial” in the sense that the accused terrorists could and were justifying their actions in terms of their political demands against Turkey.³³ Arshavir Shirakian, another Nemesis operative, assassinated Said Halim, the former Ottoman Foreign Minister, in Rome on December 6, 1921, as well as two other leading Ottoman officials—Bahaeddin Shakir and Djemal Azmi—in Berlin on April 17, 1922. Shirakian then managed to escape to the United States where he finally died in 1973.³⁴

By the summer of 1922, however, the independent Republic of Armenia had fallen to the Soviet Union. The Dashnaks decided that Operation Nemesis had served its purpose. Shahan Natali was criticized for the exorbitant expenses that had been incurred and was eventually expelled from the party in 1929. The so-called Prometheus plan now sought to use Kemalist Turkey against the Soviet Union, which had become the new main enemy.

New Terrorism

As noted above, the Dashnaks apparently decided to create a new terrorist arm, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)—after July 1983 called the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)—because they were losing their young, activist members to what was perceived as the new, more dynamic ASALA terrorist organization. On October 22, 1975, as noted above, JCAG carried out its first operation when it assassinated the Turkish Ambassador to Austria, Danis Tunaligil. Throughout 1984, when the diplomatic assassinations stopped, JCAG-ARA killed 20 Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families, while ASALA, in spite of its much greater claims, was responsible for only 8 diplomatic murders.³⁵ In March 1985, ARA made one last attack when it killed a Canadian security guard during an attack on the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa.

Unlike ASALA, the Dashnak terrorist groups shunned other international terrorist connections and struck only at Turkish targets. After it murdered the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles in 1982, for example, JCAG announced: “Our sole targets are Turkish diplomats and Turkish institutions.”³⁶ In pointed contrast to ASALA, ARA also made clear its intention to campaign against only the Turkish enemy, while leaving others alone: “Our target is the Turkish reactionary government through all its official representatives.”³⁷ In another “Communique,” ARA noted that its activities “will conclude when, taking note of the legality of the Armenian Cause, the Turkish government begins negotiations with the representatives of the Armenian people.”³⁸

The “Political Platform” ratified by the twenty-third World Congress of the ARF in 1985, made the ultimate goal of the party explicit: “The principal political aim of the ARF remains the realization of a free, independent and integral Armenia encompassing the Wilsonian boundaries, Nakhichevan, Gharabagh [Nagorno Karabakh], and Akhalkalak.”³⁹ The Platform also declared that “on the road to the resolution of the Armenian Cause, our enemy is Turkey.” Placing perhaps impossible barriers before any possibility of accommodation, the Dashnaks proclaimed that “the continuing existence

of the Turkish empire is fundamentally in opposition with the Armenian Cause,” and concluded that ‘the Armenian people had no choice but to resort to self defense to insure their physical existence and right to self-determination.’” Indeed, 20 years after gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, Armenia still arguably claims in Article 11 of its declaration of independence parts of eastern Turkey⁴⁰ while occupying Nagorno Karabakh, which constitutes some 16 percent of Azerbaijan. As a result, Turkey maintains an economic blockade against Armenia and continues not to maintain diplomatic relations with it. This unfortunate situation is clearly the result of these initial aggressive Armenian actions.

In a further theoretical justification of terrorism, the Dashnak press declared that “the acts of the Armenian Army and the Justice Commandos against Turkish officials are supported by a mass of the Armenian people since the Oppressor [Turkey] is being defied.”⁴¹ Armenians “could only be excited by these acts of violence, as ‘acts of creation’ since the destruction of any representative of the Oppressor, Turkey, means the assertion of Armenian dignity.” Claiming a unique right to engage in such actions and denying that they constituted terrorism, the Dashnaks argued: “our Cause—no matter how militant at times—is not and never was part of ‘International Terrorism.’”⁴²

Similarly, after the JCAG operative Hampig Sassounian was found guilty of assassinating Kemal Arikan, the Turkish Consul General, in Los Angeles on January 28, 1982, some Armenians in Boston announced: “What occurred throughout Hampig’s trial was a mockery of justice, an attempt to stop the Armenian people from actively pursuing their cause. . . . We are outraged by the . . . guilty verdict.”⁴³ In 2004, an active campaign within the Armenian community to gain Sassounian’s release on parole failed, partially on the grounds that he still refused to express any remorse for what he had done.

Despite this passionate defense of violence, Dashnak-sponsored terrorism against Turkey ceased after 1985. In part, this was probably because the ARF had calculated that such action had served its purpose of preventing ASALA from winning over the Armenian youth, helped win the Armenian Cause international attention, but was now creating negative publicity.⁴⁴ In addition, the Dashnak-sponsored terrorism probably stopped because the reputed leaders of the two Dashnak terrorist organizations had themselves been assassinated during vicious spasms of intra-Armenian bloodletting in Lebanon. In December 1982, for example, Apo Ashjian, the head of JCAG and a member of the ARF’s Central Committee in Lebanon, was apparently killed by his Dashnak associates because he advocated Dashnak cooperation with ASALA and sought to disregard a reputed deal with the United States

Central Intelligence Agency to cease activities in the United States. After Ashjian's death, the Dashnaks created ARA, which was active until shortly before its head, Sarkis Aznavourian, also a member of the ARF Central Committee in Lebanon, was gunned down in Beirut, apparently by ASALA.⁴⁵

ASALA

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was born in January 1975 as a distinct alternative to the traditional Armenian political parties, especially the Dashnaks. As ASALA later explained in its journal *Armenia*: "International imperialism had almost completely spread its dominance on our people in the Diaspora through the rightist Dashnag Party which is a tool in the hands of imperialism and Zionism."⁴⁶ Thus, although "the main target of the New National Liberation Struggle launched in 1975 by ASALA is the liberation of the Turkish-occupied Armenian lands . . . another main aim of the . . . [s]truggle is the political and national awakening of the Armenian people which was led to a dangerous 'deep sleep' by the treacherous policy of the Dashnag Party."⁴⁷ Sarcastically, ASALA declared that "even the name given to their armed group 'Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide' reveals the deliberate indifference of the Dashnag leadership vis-à-vis the Armenian Territorial Question."⁴⁸

Thus, although the world ironically saw ASALA as a Marxist, anti-Western terrorist organization seeking to join eastern Turkey to Soviet Armenia (goals and characteristics that indeed were true), ASALA first and foremost was created, in its own words, to "become today the representing power of the Armenian people."⁴⁹ Again, in the organization's own words: "We came from different Armenian currents and circles, and united in ASALA, putting aside all inter-communal conflicts to serve the principal aim . . . to liberate Western Armenia [Turkey] and join it to today's liberated Soviet Armenia, forming an integral, revolutionary Armenia."⁵⁰

In its attempt to appropriate the leadership of the Armenian diaspora, ASALA tried to coopt historical Armenian heroes and deeds. Gourgen Yanikian, whose murder of two Turkish consuls in California in 1973 anticipated the terrorism that began in 1975, was adopted as "the spiritual leader" of the organization and operations named for him and such other historical Armenian heroes and places as Andranik (Ozanian)—an Armenian military hero in the early twentieth century—Shahan Natali, Erzurum, and Van, among others. Andranik's portrait sometimes appeared with a fictional one representing ASALA's leader, Hagop Hagopian, alongside the masthead

of the organization's organ, *Armenia*. Even Vatche Daghlilian, the leader of the Dashnak's "Lisbon Five," was usurped as an ASALA "martyr" who had been killed "during a mission in Lisbon, following a Dashnag-international conspiracy."⁵¹ Further tapping the Armenian historic roots, "the words of our great [Soviet Armenian] poet Yeghishe Tcharentz 'O Armenian people/ Your sole salvation is/in your collective force,'"⁵² were cited as a call for unity under ASALA.

It is noteworthy that ASALA's birth, as mentioned above, was announced by a bombing attack against the Beirut office of the World Council of Churches on January 20, 1975. Hagop Hagopian, the founder and leader of ASALA, later wrote: "I chose it because the above mentioned organization was conspiring with the United States, with the Tashnag's co-operation, to send the Armenian youth away from the Middle East and socialist countries."⁵³ ASALA was going to challenge the existing Armenian elites led by the Dashnaks who were allowing the emigration and thus assimilation to occur.

By 1980, Hagopian boasted: "In five years we managed to win for ourselves the support of the Armenian masses and the democratic and revolutionary forces throughout the world."⁵⁴ He even claimed that "some of the leaders of Tashnag and Henshang [another Armenian party] have secretly joined ELA [ASALA]."

On September 24, 1981, four ASALA agents seized the Turkish consulate in Paris. They killed its Turkish guard, wounded the consul, and held 56 people hostage for 16 hours. According to Monte Melkonian, at that time a member of ASALA, this so-called Van Operation by the "Yeghia Keshishian Suicidal Commando" marked "ASALA's historic peak. It became the greatest single military/propaganda success ever achieved in the history of the diaspora. . . . Summed up, this was a tremendous achievement which created a previously unequalled atmosphere of patriotic enthusiasm and which made ASALA the hope in the eyes of a vast number of Armenians for the realization of our national aspirations."⁵⁵

After his release from a French prison in the summer of 1986, Kevork Guzelian, one of the four participants in the Van Operation, discussed it at length.⁵⁶ "The essential aim . . . was to gain on political ground and to turn the attention of international public opinion on Turkey." In addition, ASALA wanted to "shake the Armenian community in France, which until 1981 was in a slumber." Indeed while they were occupying the consulate, said Guzelian, "we immediately made an appeal to the Armenians through a phone call . . . to organize a demonstration around the Consulate and back us up." Since "about 3,000 Turks had surrounded the Consulate in a demonstration . . . clashes took place between the Turks and the Armenians in the streets."

Guzelian claimed that “in one word, after our operation we noticed an awakening of national awareness in the Armenians in France.” French Armenians who did not speak Armenian started to learn the language. Before 1981, the April 24 Genocide Day demonstrations in France had brought out no more than 150, but after the Van Operation the figure rose to 10,000. “This was not due to the activities of the other [Armenian] organizations . . . found in France but came as a result of ASALA’s national and revolutionary sacrifices.”

At the end of 1981, ASALA published an eight-point political program that was described as “the political line that the Popular Movement of ASALA will support.”⁵⁷ The program was apparently the result of long discussions with the leaders of various “popular movements” with a view to forming eventually a united organization covering a broad spectrum from left to right.

In the program, ASALA identified its enemies as “Turkish imperialism” supported by “local reaction” and “international imperialism.” “Revolutionary violence” was said to be “the principal means” to achieve the liberation of Armenian territories. ASALA would support those who “reject the authority of the oppressing classes” and would endeavor to “strengthen and expand” coalitions within the “international revolutionary movement.” The final goal was a united Armenia with a “democratic, socialistic and revolutionary government.” The Soviet Union and other socialist governments were to be called upon for help and Soviet Armenia itself turned into a base for “the long people’s war.”

ASALA’s hope to become the leader of a broad, united front of all Armenian groups, however, foundered in general upon the increasingly obvious failure of terrorism to unite the Armenian community, but more immediately upon the frequent Armenian tendency toward divisive factionalism. The latter problem involved Hagopian’s willingness, even apparent eagerness, to employ indiscriminate terrorism against noninvolved third-party civilians and non-Turkish targets. “In the name of the Armenian revolution, inhuman operations (i.e., atrocities) were being committed due to which dozens of innocent people were dying and hundreds of others had been wounded,”⁵⁸ declared Monte Melkonian.

The deadly attacks on the Ankara and Paris Orly airports in 1982 and 1983 respectively, and the Istanbul Covered Bazaar in 1983, were three egregious examples. As Monte Melkonian explained in an interview: “Orly claimed innocent lives. It debases our struggle.”⁵⁹ The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, and the resulting expulsion of ASALA from its base in west Beirut to the relative isolation of the Bekaa Valley, where the organization fell under increasing Syrian control, also helped lead to the subsequent splintering of ASALA.

ASALA violently split into two factions following the assassination of Khachig Havarian and Vicken Ayzanian, two of Hagopian's closest allies, on July 15–16, 1983. Hagopian blamed Melkonian for the deed—which Melkonian denied—and reciprocated by killing two of Melkonian's closest friends, Garlen Ananian and Aram Vartanian. Amid bitter mutual recriminations that are too byzantine to go into here, as well as deadly infighting against the Dashnaks analyzed above, ASALA quickly shrunk into insignificance. Hagopian's ASALA lost its allies and contacts outside Lebanon and, as mentioned above, fell increasingly under Syrian control.

Melkonian's hopes for a more humane ASALA under his leadership in the West were dashed by his sudden arrest and imprisonment in November 1985 in France for three years. A series of deadly bombings in Paris in September 1986 were at first blamed by many on ASALA in an attempt to win the release of Varoujan Garabedian, the perpetrator of the deadly Orly bombing in 1983, but the eventual arrest of the actual perpetrators in March 1987 proved this to be untrue. ASALA had been reduced merely to issuing proclamations and threats.

Then on April 28, 1988, Hagop Hagopian himself was assassinated in Athens, Greece.⁶⁰ It was said that he ironically had been expelled from the then Syrian-controlled ASALA at the end of 1987.⁶¹ A subsequent report claimed that the Syrians had been behind these events because Hagopian had refused to follow their orders, which, among other things, involved driving booby-trapped trucks into Christian east Beirut for later explosion.⁶² The Syrians were also displeased with Hagopian's close relations with such Palestinians as Abu Cherif, Abu Iyad, and Fouad Bitar who operated independently of Syrian influence. A partial rapprochement between Syria and Turkey at that time also played a role in Syria's actions.

Monte Melkonian was released from the French prison early in 1989 and eventually found his way to the newly independent Armenia. There he became a noted military leader in the war against Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh, which he saw "as crucial for the long-term security of the entire Armenian nation."⁶³ He was killed in a minor skirmish on June 12, 1993, and given a funeral with full military honors in Yerevan.

Financial Matters

Financial matters, of course, constitute an important issue in studying terrorist organizations. On this point, ASALA's Hagopian declared: "Our strength is the Armenian people; that is where we get our support from. And from robberies."⁶⁴ Monte Melkonian concurred when he wrote that after the "Van Operation" on September 24, 1981, Hagopian "went to

France to collect money. . . . Due to the atmosphere, collecting money was not difficult and considerable sums were acquired.”⁶⁵ After Hagopian moved to Damascus to escape the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982, added Melkonian, “the collection of money . . . [there] within the Armenian community” also occurred.

The amply publicized fact that the Dashnaks in the United States were able to raise over \$250,000 in small donations for Sassounian’s legal defense,⁶⁶ as well as some \$160,000 in Canada for the defense of the so-called LA-5,⁶⁷ indicates that these claims of broad-based Armenian financial support are not empty. For the legal defense of the accused murderers of the Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia, “fundraising committees have visited Armenian homes” in Europe and “everyone has been very generous with their donations,”⁶⁸ claimed another Dashnak report.

Other reports, however, indicate that the terrorists also extorted funds from fellow, nonviolent Armenians.⁶⁹ Further such evidence regarding ASALA emerged during the trial of three young ASALA agents, charged with conspiring to bomb the freight terminal of Air Canada in Los Angeles in May 1982 to gain freedom for four Armenians held in Canada, and with conspiracy to extort money from wealthy Canadian-Armenians in Toronto.⁷⁰ Vicken Tcharkhutian—who was apparently involved with the three Armenians on trial, but who managed to escape to France where the government refused to extradite him back to the United States—was also charged on a separate count of attempting to extort \$150,000 from the Haserjian brothers, the owners of a chain of carpet stores throughout the Los Angeles area.

In addition, according to Monte Melkonian, ASALA was apparently able to acquire money from “Abu Nidal and certain governments” by performing “operations as gestures of revolutionary solidarity.”⁷¹ Thus is explained the bizarre ASALA attempt to bomb the Kuwait Airlines office in Athens from a motorcycle on December 8, 1982. The plot failed, causing the death of one ASALA agent, Karnik Vahradian, and the imprisonment of the other, Vahe Khutavardian. Nevertheless, Hagopian “used Karnik’s death to extract even more financial aid and other ‘favors’ out of Abu Nidal and/or some governments.” The Athens operation was “portrayed . . . as proof of the willingness of Armenian revolutionaries to struggle to the death in cooperation with Arab revolutionaries against imperialism.” ASALA, concluded Melkonian, “had become a mercenary for [other] governments and organizations.”

Further reports indicate ASALA was probably also running a “drug ring”⁷² and “the huge revenue generated from this trafficking was being directed for use by the underground radical group.” Three Armenians were convicted for this operation in Sweden and incarcerated. Testifying before

the US Senate's Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, Nathan M. Adams, a senior Editor of *Reader's Digest*, who stated he had been investigating "the connection between drug trafficking and international terrorism . . . over the past several years," declared: "Armenian terrorist groups of both the left and the right were estimated a year ago to be 90 percent financed through the sale or barter of narcotics."⁷³ Adams then elaborated on "the case of Noubar Soufoyon, a notorious Armenian drug trafficker now believed sheltering in Lebanon."

In June of 1981, Soufoyon "was indicted in New York for importing heroin" and Interpol alerted. The Greek authorities that arrested him, however, rejected a US application for extradition and chose instead to send him to Lebanon, where he was promptly released. Soufoyon, testified Adams, "is capable of dealing as much as 100 kilos of heroin at a single time [and] . . . has helped finance both Armenian terrorist factions with the profits from drug sales." Adams added that Soufoyon "was convicted in Switzerland of the financing of a series of bomb attacks against Turkish financial and cultural establishments in Zurich the year before." The Swiss authorities, however, merely banned him from their country for five years. Similarly, Francis M. Mullen, Jr., the administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the US Department of Justice, added: "Documented heroin and hashish trafficker Noubar Soufoyon was connected with the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. . . . He remains a fugitive from US justice and his current whereabouts are unknown."⁷⁴

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Armenian terrorism was one of the classic examples of how one person's terrorist could be viewed by some as another's freedom fighter. From approximately 1973–1985, Armenian terrorists earned a deadly and infamous international reputation by murdering 30 different Turkish diplomats or members of their immediate families. In addition, many other noninvolved third parties were killed in the crossfire. Some 188 terrorist operations occurred on four different continents including Western Europe, southwest Asia, North America, and even Australia. Nevertheless, some among the Armenian public tacitly sympathized with the terrorists because of what they saw as past wrongs committed by Turkey. As Michael J. Arlen, Jr., a measured Armenian critic of the terrorism, explained: "It was as if a particular poison had entered the Armenian system several generations back, and had remained within it: a poison that one might up to a point live with but that caused the limbs suddenly to twitch, or the mouth—perhaps in mid-sentence—to grimace grotesquely."⁷⁵

By the mid-1980s, however, Armenian terrorists had fallen into mindless but deadly internal fighting that resulted in the deaths of several of their leading members. Tacit Armenian public support for the terrorism dried up, while shortly afterwards Armenia's independence from the Soviet Union gave a new generation of Armenian militants a more reputable cause to support. Indeed, Monte Melkonian, a former ASALA leader, became a noted fighter in the Armenian war for Nagorno Karabakh and was killed in battle fighting for his cause.

From the hindsight of more than 20 years, it remains difficult to assess definitively the strategic influence Armenian terrorism had. There were a number of factors that helped to determine its success or failure. Since Armenians tend to be a closely knit group, who in their own language distinguish themselves from the *odar* or non-Armenian, the Armenian diaspora around the world provided a unique, transnational system of contacts and support. Given the fact that Armenians tend to be more successful in the professions than many others, they often possess a political clout that exceeds their relatively small numbers. In addition, during the cold war, the fact that the two largest concentrations of Armenians in the world lived in the Soviet Union and the United States probably gave them more of an input into the policies of the two superpowers than one would otherwise have suspected.

On the other hand, of course, the Turkic population in the Soviet Union was much larger than the Armenian. It was unlikely, therefore, that the Soviet Union would have wanted to be identified by its Turkic populations as being too pro-Armenian. The hesitancy in acceding to the Armenian demands on Nagorno Karabakh was a case in point. On the other hand, although the Armenian population in the United States was much larger than the Turkish, the strategic importance of Turkey to the NATO alliance prevented the United States from taking as strong a stand on behalf of the Armenians as they would have desired. The failure of the Armenian activists in the United States to pass a "Genocide Resolution" in the US Congress over the years illustrated this point. Indeed, as recently as April 2005, US President George W. Bush angered many Armenian-Americans by declining to use the word "genocide" in commemorating the ninetieth anniversary of the tragedy that occurred in 1915. US President Barack Obama also declined to use the g-word when he addressed the Turkish Parliament in April 2009.

Returning again to inherent Armenian strengths, it should also be noted that Armenian terrorism against Turkey tended to elicit a certain amount of implicit sympathy and even tacit support both from Armenians and non-Armenians because of the widespread belief, referred to above, that the

Ottoman Turks ruthlessly massacred tens of thousands of Armenians in the latter part of the nineteenth century and then committed genocide against them during World War I. Add to these damning accusation that the Islamic Ottoman Empire was one of the leading historical enemies of Christian Europe, while the Christian Armenians were usually viewed much more sympathetically—as well as the fact that the Armenians were more fluent in languages than the Turks and thus able to get their view across to the rest of the world better—and one can readily appreciate another implicit advantage possessed by the terrorists. Indeed, more than 25 years after Armenian terrorism stopped, this author often finds sheer disbelief on the part of the general non-Armenian public that the phenomenon even ever existed, that somehow any mention of it is simply part of the continuing Turkish attempt to blacken the Armenian reputation and deny the genocide.

The tacit sympathy some Greeks showed for Armenian terrorism stemmed from the traditional Hellenic hatred of the Turks. The special requiem service held in Athens in December 1986 for Karnik Vahradian—the ASALA agent, referred to above, who was accidentally killed during an attempt to bomb the Kuwait Airlines office in Athens in 1982—further illustrated the situation. At the requiem, Rev. Spiros Tsakalos of the Greek Orthodox Church delivered a eulogy in which he declared: “The Turkish fascist regime understands only the language of armed struggle carried out by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia.”⁷⁶

The situation regarding France was similar, although to a lesser extent, since the Turks did not conquer and rule that country for 400 years as they did Greece. A number of French politicians supported Armenian activists because of their electoral power in certain areas where they were concentrated. On April 24, 1982, for example, Gaston Defferre, the Minister of Interior and the Mayor of Marseille—which had a relatively large Armenian population—told them: “France will assist you to triumph in the pursuit of your just cause.”⁷⁷ Even more tacitly condoning the terrorism that was occurring at that time, Charles Hernu, the Minister of Defense, told a large Armenian rally in his home city of Villeurbanne on October 10, 1982: “Whenever there are aggressions, we must raise the question as to who the real aggressor is. Are the aggressors people that survived a genocide committed by the Turks or the Turks themselves?”

Syrian support for the Armenian terrorists also stemmed from traditional animosities and especially contemporary political ambitions. The Turkish annexation of Hatay (Alexandretta) province in 1939, current problems dealing with the waters of the Euphrates River, and the long-term ambitions of the late President Hafez Assad all motivated the Syrians to support the terrorists surreptitiously.

In the end, however, the Armenian terrorists also suffered from many problems as detailed above. In addition, during the period of modern Armenian terrorism, the entire Armenian population in the world numbered no more than 6 million, while the Turks counted more than 50 million. During this time period, the Armenians also lacked the institutional framework of a state, while Turkey was a geostrategically important NATO ally of the United States. Although by practically all conventional standards its ultimate strategic impact was virtually nil, some might still argue that Armenian terrorism did help preserve the memory of what many would call the twentieth century's first or forgotten genocide.

CHAPTER 4

Politicizing History

In recent decades various Armenian groups have made strenuous attempts to have numerous legislatures and various other bodies around the world pass resolutions recognizing the Armenian massacres during World War I as a genocide perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire. These attempts, of course, have been bitterly opposed by Turkey and have led to frequent crises between it and the state considering the passage of such resolutions. On August 15, 2007, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia published on the Internet “a brief list of those states and organizations which have acknowledged the Armenian Genocide.”

Although most Armenians feel very strongly about these events, one might query why they have gone to such lengths, in effect, to legislate their version of history after so many years. Certainly Turkey’s failure to admit culpability for these events as well as their relative obscurity to the extent that they have become in the opinion of many a forgotten genocide, has helped lead to this campaign of legislating history. In his recent doctoral dissertation, however, Brendon Cannon posits that “to have these events recognized as genocide . . . [is] the only bond strong enough to bind the otherwise territorially, linguistic and religiously diverse Diaspora communities together.”¹ Cannon argues that the “Armenian Diaspora communities, in large part rely on and gain succor from the traumatic events of 1915 because they provide the only glue that binds these disparate linguistic, religious and geographically atomized communities together.”² He maintains that “the trauma that was 1915 for Armenians is now *the* bond that unites the Diaspora community.”³ Thus, “the campaign for Armenian genocide recognition issue is the single, most unifying theme that mobilizes the heterogeneous Armenian Diaspora.”⁴ There is considerable merit to Cannon’s position, and the Armenian lobbying infrastructure that implements this campaign to legislate history will be analyzed below. First, however, it would be useful to illustrate some of the specifics of the Armenian attempt to legislate and thus politicize history.

US Congress

As noted above, on April 9, 1975, the US House of Representatives passed Joint Resolution 148 designating April 24 as a “National Day of Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man.” The Resolution commemorated the victims of genocide, “especially those of Armenian ancestry who succumbed to the genocide perpetrated in 1915,” but omitted the original final two words “in Turkey.” This omission was due to US President Gerald R. Ford’s strong opposition to what would have been perceived by Turkey as a gratuitous insult that would have also threatened the two states’ strategic NATO unity.⁵ As a result, the Resolution also failed to pass muster in the US Senate Judiciary Committee. Indeed, the entire history of these Armenian attempts to legislate history in the United States has been one of Congress’s willingness to support Armenian contentions due to its piecemeal view toward US foreign policy, but the president’s hesitancy to go along due to his overall view toward furthering US foreign policy interests. Thus, the US State Department, which is the executive department responsible for implementing US foreign policy, has concluded that “because the historical record of the 1915 events is ambiguous, the Department of State does not endorse allegations that the Turkish government committed a genocide against the Armenian people.”⁶ Illustrating their strength, however, when a number of Armenian-American groups criticized this statement, the same publication then claimed that its original statement was “not intended as statements of policy of the United States.” Even more ambiguously, the new statement added: “Nor did they represent any change in U.S. policy.”⁷ As evidenced by subsequent US refusals to pass any Armenian genocide resolutions, this new statement, of course, was not true, but necessary given the perceived strength of the Armenian lobbies.

In addition to the incalculable harm it might do to strategic US foreign policy interests, there are other more compelling reasons why politicians should not politicize history by trying to legislate it. These reasons were listed in an Open Letter signed by 69 academics (including such eminent authorities as Bernard Lewis, J. C. Hurewitz, and Roderic Davison) and who, in addressing the US House of Representatives, described themselves as specialists “in Turkish, Ottoman, and Middle Eastern studies.” The occasion was yet another Armenian attempt to pass a Congressional resolution, which in this case would have singled out for special attention “the one and one half million people of Armenian ancestry who were victims of genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923.”⁸

Much more remains to be discovered before historians will be able to sort out precise responsibility between warring and innocent, and to identify the

causes for the events which resulted in the death or removal of large numbers of the eastern population, Christians and Muslims alike.

Statesmen and politicians make history, and scholars write it. For this process to work scholars must be given access to the written records of the statesmen and politicians of the past. To date, the relevant archives in the Soviet Union, Syria, Bulgaria, and Turkey all remain, for the most part, closed to dispassionate historians. Until they become available the history of the Ottoman Empire in the period encompassed by H. J. Resolution 192 (1915–1923) cannot be adequately known.

We believe that the proper position for the United States Congress to take on this and related issues, is to encourage full and open access to all historical archives, and not to make charges on historical events before they are fully understood. Such charges as those contained in H. J. Res. 192 would inevitably reflect unjustly upon the people of Turkey, and perhaps set back irreparably progress historians are just now beginning to achieve in understanding these tragic events.

As the above comments illustrate, the history of the Ottoman-Armenians is much debated among scholars, many of whom do not agree with the historical assumptions embodied in the wording of H. J. Res. 192. By passing the resolution Congress will be attempting to determine by legislation which side of a historical question is correct. Such a resolution, based on historically questionable assumptions, can only damage the cause of honest historical enquiry, and damage the credibility of the American legislative process.⁹

The Armenian supporters of course simply denounced such questioning of their tactics to legislate history as the work of pseudo-scholars and genocide deniers. However, the scholars who signed the Open Letter included some of the most prestigious experts in the area of Ottoman and Turkish studies and thus cannot be dismissed simply as being irrelevant. What this episode once again illustrates, therefore, is that pontificating on what happened historically between the Turks and Armenians is not the business of the US Congress, but rather work best suited to scholars.

France and the Bernard Lewis Case

As noted in [Chapter 2](#), Bernard Lewis is one of the best-known and most respected scholars dealing with Turkish and Middle Eastern history and politics.¹⁰ In his famous book on the emergence of modern Turkey, Professor Lewis had this to say about what happened to the Armenians.

Most tragic was the case of the Armenians, who at the beginning of the nineteenth century were still known as the *Millet-i Sadika*, the loyal community. . . . The change began with the Russian conquest of the Caucasus

in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. . . . The political and cultural impact of Russian Armenia on the one hand, and the new national and liberal ideas coming from Europe on the other, powerfully affected the Ottoman Armenians, especially the rising middle class, and stimulated the growth of an ardent and active Armenian nationalist movement.

For the Turks, the Armenian movement was the deadliest of all threats. From the conquered lands of the Serbs, Bulgars, Albanians, and Greeks, they could, however reluctantly, withdraw, abandoning distant provinces and bringing the Imperial frontier nearer home. But the Armenians, stretching across Turkey-in-Asia from the Caucasian frontier to the Mediterranean coast, lay in the very heart of the Turkish homeland—and to renounce these lands would have meant not the truncation, but the dissolution of the Turkish state. Turkish and Armenian villages, inextricably mixed, had for centuries lived in neighbourly association. Now a desperate struggle between them began—a struggle between two nations for the possession of a single homeland, that ended with the terrible holocaust of 1915, when a million and half Armenians perished.¹¹

On a visit to Paris in November 1993 to promote the publication of two of his books recently translated into French, Lewis ran afoul of French laws that could be used to criminalize anyone who verbally disagreed with the Armenian version of history. Article 1382 of the French Civil Code declares: “Whoever is guilty of causing harm must make reparation for it.” In addition, the Gayssot Act provided that punishment should be enacted upon anyone who called into question the very existence of crimes against humanity.¹² The willingness to employ these legal provisions against Professor Lewis was largely the result of a relatively large and politically active Armenian diaspora in France.

In an interview, *Le Monde* asked Professor Lewis why the Turks still continued to deny the Armenian genocide. The eminent scholar replied that “if we talk of genocide, it implies there was a deliberate policy, a decision to blot out systematically the Armenian nation. That is quite doubtful. Turkish documents prove an intent to banish, not to exterminate.”¹³ Professor Lewis repeated his contention in a subsequent letter to *Le Monde*: “There is no serious proof of a plan of the Ottoman government aimed at the extermination of the Armenian nation.”¹⁴ The Forum of the Armenian Associations of France pounced on the opportunity and took the eminent scholar to court for expressing his scholarly opinions based on a lifetime of studies.

On June 21, 1995, the French court found Professor Lewis guilty and imposed a token fine for violating Article 1382 of the French Civil Code. However, another suit brought against the professor by the Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause under the Gayssot Act failed because

the court ruled that this law only applied to crimes committed by the Nazi regime during World War II. Nevertheless, the guilty verdict in the first case should be strongly condemned. The *Washington Post* declared in an editorial that when a court punishes a scholar “for expressing an ‘insulting’ opinion on a historical matter, even when debate on the point in question has been raging worldwide for years, the absurdity and perniciousness of such laws is on full display.”¹⁵ Nevertheless, Armenian supporters replied that anyone who denied their position was a party to genocide and became an agent of the Turkish state.¹⁶ Indeed, one pro-Armenian supporter went so far as to argue that supporting the Turkish position constituted hate speech and should be made illegal in the United States.¹⁷ Ironically, the Armenian attempt to foreclose debate about what happened to them in World War I amounts to the very prevention of scholarly analysis for which they denounce Turkey! Professor Lewis himself, however, has not been intimidated by this affair, continuing to maintain his position that the Armenian massacres were neither unilateral nor premeditated and therefore not comparable to the Nazi genocide of the Jews.

Further French Action

On October 12, 2006, the French National Assembly passed a new bill that would have provided for a one-year prison sentence and a fine of 45,000 euros, for anyone committing what it termed “negationism of the Armenian Genocide.”¹⁸ This would have been the same punishment for anyone denying the Nazi genocide against the Jews in World War II. The new French bill was proposed by the Socialist Party (PS) in an apparent attempt, in part, to curry favor with the estimated 500,000 voters of Armenian descent in the upcoming French presidential and legislative elections. The bill was opposed by the conservative government of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), which, however, gave its deputies in the National Assembly a free vote. After most of the deputies had walked out of the National Assembly to protest the proceedings, the bill had passed by a paltry vote of 106-19.¹⁹

Catherine Colonna, the French minister dealing with European affairs, criticized the National Assembly’s actions by declaring that “[i]t’s the task, first and foremost, of historians and not of lawmakers to clarify history.”²⁰ The French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin agreed by stating that it was “not a good thing to legislate on issues of history and of memory.”²¹ The European Commission added that if the bill would be passed into law, it would “prohibit dialogue which is necessary for reconciliation”²² between the parties involved. The EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn termed

the bill “counterproductive.”²³ He warned that its adoption would have severe consequences for the discussion of the Armenian question and “instead of opening, it will lock the debate in Turkey.”²⁴ Rehn also declared that Turkish recognition of the Armenian massacres as “genocide” was not a condition for its entry into the EU.

Such recognition has been labeled the “Chirac criterion” after the former French President Jacques Chirac, a sometime supporter of the Armenian cause, as is the current French President, Nicolas Sarkozy. Many observers attributed their support for the Armenians on this issue as a way to prevent Turkey from entering into the EU. Perceptibly, the Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan criticized the pro-Armenian bill by declaring: “This is violating one of the core principles of the European Union, which is freedom of expression.”²⁵ Despite these heated exchanges and the obvious delight of the bill’s Armenian supporters and their Turcophobic colleagues, the French bill eventually failed to win final approval as law. Once again, however, the inherent problems involved in trying to politicize and legislate history were made manifest. As a result, in 2008 France began to reverse its position on legislating history and instead urge a cessation of such attempts: “The government [and] parliament should not legislate about history, something that is up to historians to write and interpret.”²⁶

The United Kingdom has also declined to attempt a contemporary hand at legislating history: “Neither this Government nor previous British Governments have judged that the evidence is sufficiently unequivocal to persuade us that these events should be categorized as genocide as defined by the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide.”²⁷ Bulgaria, Denmark, Sweden, and Israel, among others, have also explicitly rejected terming the events of 1915 genocide, and agree with Turkey that the question should be left to the historians to settle. For example, Shimon Peres, then Foreign Minister but now President of Israel, declared in 2001: “We reject attempts to create a similarity between the Holocaust and the Armenian allegations. Nothing similar to the Holocaust occurred. It is a tragedy what the Armenians went through but not a genocide.”²⁸

Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh)

As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in 1991, war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh (known as Artsakh by the Armenians), a part of Azerbaijan mostly inhabited by Armenians.²⁹ This new development represented a specific example of the perennial conflict between the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity.³⁰ It also resulted in a new battle between historians and authors on both sides

who fired polemical missiles at each other, denigrating and even seeking to obliterate the other's history and identity. During the ensuing struggle, Monte Melkonian, a well-known former ASALA terrorist from the 1980s who had been born in California, reemerged to lead some of the Armenian attacks on Azeris only to be killed on June 12, 1993.³¹ Despite Melkonian's death, the Armenians quickly wrestled control away from the Azeris and have since continued to hold approximately 16 percent of Azeri territory.

The result is a *de facto* independent and second Armenian state complete with its own capital in Stepanakert, a president—currently Bako Sahakian, a legislature, foreign ministry, et cetera.³² The *de facto* state is supported by Armenia to its immediate west and the Armenian diaspora throughout the world. These supporters are seemingly oblivious to the hypocritical fact that seizing Turkic lands on the basis that they contained a majority Armenian population was analogous to what Armenians claim Turkey has done to what Armenians claim are their historic lands in eastern Turkey.³³ In their continuing self-righteous damnation of the Turks and their Azeri cousins, the Armenians and their supporters also hypocritically ignore the Khojali massacre by Armenian militants of 683 Azeri civilians on February 25–26, 1992.

So-called Control Chambers in Armenia and Artsakh signed a joint agreement in Stepanakert, which “envisaged cooperation between these bodies and provided the necessary legal framework for further logistical and technological assistance to the local control agency by its Armenian counterpart.”³⁴ Artsakh's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) supposedly increased by 8 percent in the first half of 2008, while its non-adjusted growth rate was 13.6 percent. Government authorities expected to exceed the budget in revenues, and strong macroeconomic trends were also projected to continue.

In the United States, “The Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Artsakh in the United States” is based in Washington, D.C.³⁵ It seeks to lobby the US government, academia, and the general public in favor of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. In addition, Armenians for Artsakh (AFA)³⁶ is a Washington-based NGO that has conducted a pioneer executive training course in Artsakh. The Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU)—a longtime Armenian NGO that will be discussed further below—has funded Business English for Artsakh diplomats, which was taught by a professional ESL (English as a Second Language) instructor. The AFA plans on organizing regular training courses for Artsakh government employees in such disciplines as international law, diplomacy, public administration, economics, and management.

As an initial response to these developments, Turkey—in support of its ethnic Azeri kin—imposed a blockade on landlocked Armenia and Nagorno

Karabakh that continues to this day. These events renewed the perennial Turkish-Armenian enmity with new hatreds and problems. This Turkish embargo against Armenia presented the Armenians in the United States with yet another opportunity to legislate against their Turkish enemy.

Section 907

In 1992, the US Congress passed the Freedom Support Act (Public Law 102-511) to provide financial and technical aid to former Soviet republics that had subsequently become independent. Illustrating their political clout in the US Congress, the Armenian lobbies in the United States were able to amend this law with Section 907 specifically prohibiting Azerbaijan from receiving any US aid as long as the Azeri hostility and blockade against Armenia continued. Once again the Armenians were employing the very political tactics for which they so often excoriated the Turks. First the Turks were being accused of occupying historic Armenian lands in southeastern Turkey, but now the Azeris and their Turkish allies were being damned for fighting to keep part of their territory (Nagorno Karabakh). It seemed that whatever the Turks did was by definition wrong, while whatever the Armenians did was justified. Although such tactics are understandable in the rough and tumble of raw politics, the struggle over Nagorno Karabakh and Section 907 should readily illustrate to the objective viewer that the Armenians have no monopoly along the innocent highroad in their ancient conflict.

Section 907 remained in place throughout the 1990s despite repeated attempts to implement the Brownback Amendment or so-called Silk Road Strategy (HR 2867). This would have provided support to Azerbaijan and the newly independent neighboring central Asian states to develop their economies as a way to stand up against Iran, China, and growing Islamic terrorism. Instead, the McConnell Amendment managed to keep Section 907 alive in the Senate till as recently as 1999.

The al-Qaeda terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, however, dramatically altered this situation and once again dashed Armenian hopes and tactics against the realities of US national security. In October 2001, the US Senate passed by a nearly unanimous vote a bill (S. 1521) that would have allowed the US to waive the restriction of assistance for Azerbaijan if the president determined that it was in the US national security interest to do so. The Foreign Aid Bill for the fiscal year of 2003 gave the president the authority to waive Section 907 indefinitely if he so chose, an option he finally exercised in January 2002 (Public Law 107-115). This presidential determination was extended on January 13, 2005, when President Bush declared that extending the waiver of Section 907 was

necessary to support US efforts to counter international terrorism, support the operational readiness of US armed forces or coalition partners to counter international terrorism, important to Azerbaijan's border security, and would not undermine ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia (Presidential Determination No. 2005-18 of January 13, 2005).

US Congress Redux

In 2007, the Armenians tried yet again to pass a genocide resolution in the US Congress. The effort was spearheaded in the US House of Representatives by that body's Speaker Nancy Pelosi,³⁷ who also gratuitously added that "genocide is taking place now in Darfur."³⁸ For a while the Armenians and their supporters actually seemed close to achieving their goal. Indeed, on October 10, 2007, the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs by a vote of 27-21 actually recommended that the plenary (full) House declare that "the Armenian Genocide was conceived and carried out by the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923, resulting in the deportation of nearly 2,000,000 Armenians, of whom, 1,500,000 men, women, and children were killed."³⁹ The proposed resolution went on to call upon the president "to ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide."

Once again, of course, the Turkish government reacted strongly, calling the resolution "irresponsible"⁴⁰ and declaring that it could damage the US-Turkish strategic partnership at a sensitive time. "Our government regrets and condemns this decision. It is unacceptable that the Turkish nation has been accused of something that never happened in history." The daily *Vatan* spoke on its front page of "twenty-seven foolish Americans," while *Hurriyet* called the resolution a "bill of hatred."

At this point, as occurred before, the American President stepped in to block the resolution's passage, arguing: "We all deeply regret the tragic suffering of the Armenian people that began in 1915. But this resolution is not the right response to these historic mass killings and its passage would do great harm to relations with a key ally in NATO, and to the war on terror."⁴¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor in the Carter administration, declared sarcastically on CNN:

As far as a resolution is concerned, I never realized that the House of Representatives was some sort of an academy of learning that passes judgment on historical events. History's full of terrible crimes, and there is no doubt

that many Armenians were massacred in World War I. But whether the House of Representatives should be passing resolutions whether that should be classified as genocide or a huge massacre is I don't think any of its business. It has nothing to do with passing laws, [and] how to run the United States. That's where the constitution created the House of Representatives for.⁴²

Even former US President Jimmy Carter (who so often takes what some might characterize as overly idealistic or even naïve human rights approaches to complicated political-historical issues) in this case stated: "I think if I was in Congress I would not vote for it [the resolution]."⁴³

In addition, eight former US Secretaries of State, both Republican and Democratic, signed a petition calling for the resolution to be blocked.⁴⁴ The Turkish government added in full-page declarations published in major US newspapers that the resolution was "a biased interpretation."⁴⁵ Soner Cagaptay, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute, pointed out further negative consequences for American foreign policy if the resolution actually passed. Not only might it lead to general diplomatic tensions, but it might also jeopardize US goals in Iraq and Afghanistan, force Turkey to enter northern Iraq, and increase the possibility of a Turkish-Iranian rapprochement. Turkish public opinion, for example, might lead the government to deny the Incirlik base in the country's southeast to US cargo and troop rotation into Iraq.⁴⁶

Given the belated but powerful reaction to the new Armenian resolution, the US House of Representatives finally shelved it. It was clear, however, that further attempts would occur in the future and indeed soon did. Once again, however, this new House Resolution 252 of March 17, 2009, failed, quickly this time given opposition to such legislating of history by the new US President Barack Obama.⁴⁷ On March 4, 2010, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US House of Representatives did approve H. Res. 252 by a 23-22 vote, but the plenary House failed to consider it and once again the measure died. The wisdom of such nonaction not only allowed discreet contacts between Turkey and Armenia to continue, but also illustrated how this latest attempt to legislate history would have specifically done injustice by naming the Ottoman leader Jemal Pasha as "a chief organizer of the genocide." A number of independent historians, including such noted Armenian scholars as Ara Sarafian, actually credit Jemal with saving as many as 200,000 Armenians exiled to western Syria.⁴⁸

To many this entire Congressional replay might have reminded one of Yogi Berra's famous quip about *deja vu* all over again. On the other hand, this latest effort to pontificate upon historical matters best left to historians probably served a cathartic purpose for its Armenian proponents, while

again reminding the Turks of their continuing public relations problem in world politics. It also suggested, however, that leaving it to the historians would not necessarily solve the problem as clearly they too would have a difficult time agreeing on where the truth lay, especially since most of them made some of their living from disagreeing with each other. Thus, unless someone discovers the smoking-pistol document, any final agreement of historians will also have to be a political compromise. In the meanwhile, Turkish-Armenian historical initiatives should endeavor to include contributions from both sides as well as third-party experts. Such broad-based scholarship might improve the credibility of their work to the other side as well as to disinterested third parties.

United Nations

The Armenians and their many supporters have also carried their campaign to politicize history into the United Nations. In 1973, for example, Paragraph 30 in a report of the special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council specifically mentioned the Armenian massacres in 1915 as “the first case of genocide in the 20th century.”⁴⁹ This assertion was also included in a progress report to a study entitled “Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” When Turkey objected during the following discussion of the UN Commission on Human Rights, however, Paragraph 30 was omitted. On August 29, 1985, the same UN Sub-Commission adopted a new report, paragraph 24 of which declared that “the Ottoman massacre of Armenians in 1915–1916” was “genocide.”⁵⁰ Once again, however, Turkey’s prompt objection led to the deletion of this Armenian-inspired claim of genocide. Some Armenians later claimed that their frustration over the failure to pursue such peaceful goals led certain Armenians to turn to violence and terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, Gerard J. Libaridian, the Director of the Zoryan Institute for Contemporary Armenian Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Editor of the *Armenian Review*, argued that “the unwillingness of the Turkish state and major world powers to recognize Armenian aspirations after 60 years of peaceful efforts has resulted in a decade of terrorism.”⁵¹

In 2007, the Aegis Trust, an NGO concerned with genocide awareness in general, was initially authorized by the UN Department of Public Information to set up an exhibit on “Lessons from Rwanda” in the Organization’s visitors’ lobby.⁵² The exhibit listed the Jewish Holocaust, Cambodia, Bosnia, East Timor, and Sudan as examples of genocide, but also included a section

on “What is genocide?” that declared: “Following World War One, during which 1 million Armenians were murdered in Turkey, Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin urged the League of Nations to recognize crimes of barbarity as international crimes.”

Baki Ihin, the Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations, objected to how the Armenian reference sought to draw a parallel with the Rwanda genocide. A UN spokesperson admitted that the usual review process that takes into account “all positions” had not been followed in this particular case and the exhibit was dismantled. Once again, an Armenian attempt to politicize history had been turned aside. The *New York Times*, however, had obviously bought into the Armenian line and called the actions of the United Nations a “cover up.”⁵³ Coming from the supposed American newspaper of record, this declaration amply illustrated the enormous public relations problem Turkey still suffered from on the Armenian issue.

In 2008, the title of an Armenian press release sought to piggyback the customary Armenian mantra of genocide upon a claim that was much more than what had actually been accomplished. The heading of this press release read, “UN Human Rights Council Adopts Armenian Resolution Prevention of Genocide.”⁵⁴ Upon actually reading the press release, however, it quickly became clear that the Resolution in question only dealt with an Armenian-backed move to prevent genocide in general, but had nothing to do with the usual Armenian diatribes against Turkey.

Armenian attempts to politicize history have been less successful in the United Nations than in many individual states because the United Nations is an international organization of states each of which usually has the power to block the organization’s action it does not approve. Indeed, Turkey’s successful candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UN’s Security Council for the term 2009–2010 gave it the opportunity to showcase its many positive accomplishments before that world body.⁵⁵ As a founding member of the United Nations, for example, Turkey has actively participated in many efforts to preserve peace and stability at both the regional and international levels. This has been accomplished through the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and European Union (EU), among others. Turkey has provided troops, civilian police officers and observers to international peacekeeping missions in Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey has been an integral element of international efforts concerning arms control, including adherence to the relevant international agreements.

Increasingly, Turkey has also played an important role in convening neighbors and regional states in various formats with the object of bringing

about peace, security, and cooperation. Specific examples include: (1) sponsoring indirect talks between Syria and Israel, (2) establishing the Ankara Forum bringing Israel and the Palestinian Authority together to promote economic development projects in the West Bank, (3) initiating and hosting the Neighboring Countries Process that brings together Iraq and its neighbors for ministerial consultations and which includes P-5 and G-8 countries, as well as the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Arab League, and the European Commission, and (4) launching the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) to bring together five countries in the region including Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and even Armenia to discuss common issues. Additional Turkish regional initiatives include the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization based in Turkey, the Black Sea Naval Task Force, the Southeast Europe Cooperation Process, and the Southeast Europe Brigade, among others.

Turkey has also provided significant humanitarian and technical aid throughout the world and contributes to numerous international and bilateral aid programs. Indeed, Turkey is rapidly emerging as a major donor state with international Official Development Assistance in the range of \$714 million for the year 2007. When supplemented with the aid provided by the Turkish private sector, this figure more than doubles to \$1.7 billion and corresponds to 0.18 percent of its GNP. In 2007, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), operating through its branch officers in approximately 25 different states, was actively involved in various development projects in more than a hundred states. In addition, Turkey has increased its voluntary contributions to various UN funds, programs, and affiliated organizations. During the period 2005–2007, these contributions amounted to more than \$43 million. Turkey has also been sensitive to the social and economic problems faced by the developing countries, such as poverty and social inequality, and has taken a balanced approach with regard to issues preventing progress in the free trade negotiations under the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Furthermore, Turkey has contributed to the field of human rights, children's issues, and the status of women. It remains dedicated to the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, the achievement of sustainable development, and strong cooperation with other UN member states in the goals established by the 2005 World Summit Outcome. Turkey has also played a leading role in efforts to strengthen energy security both regionally and internationally. In addition, she has assumed an important role in the struggle against terrorism, drug trafficking, and corruption. Along with Spain, Turkey is also a cosponsor of the Alliance of Civilizations launched in 2005 to emphasize the common values of different cultures and

religions and now a full-fledged and comprehensive UN process. Clearly, Turkey is playing a very positive role in international political, economic, social, and cultural relations that stands in marked contrast to the politicized caricature painted by many Armenians and their supporters. As the *New York Times* concluded after Turkey was elected to the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member on October 17, 2008: Turkey “has been seen by other [UN] members as working hard to establish peace in a difficult region—it has been the liaison between Israel and Syria, for example.”⁵⁶

European Union (EU)

Ever since Atatürk himself proclaimed modern Turkey’s goal to be the achievement of the level of contemporary civilization, Turkey has sought to join the West. In recent decades this has ultimately meant membership in what has now become the European Union (EU).⁵⁷ Thus, in 1959, Turkey applied to become an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC), and in 1963 signed an association agreement with it. Finally after many vicissitudes, on October 3, 2005, the EU formally initiated accession negotiations with Turkey when it decided that Turkey had met the Copenhagen Criteria’s political prerequisites: the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and protection of minority rights.

A host of landmines, however, littered Turkey’s EU road. The continuing Armenian vendetta to politicize their version of history was one of them. Indeed, as far back as June 18, 1987, the Armenians and their supporters had managed to have the European Parliament (EP) pass a nonbinding “Political Resolution to the Armenian Question” declaring that it “believes that the tragic events in 1915–1917 involving the Armenians living in the territory of the Ottoman Empire constitute genocide within the meaning of the convention on the prevention and the punishment of the crime of genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly on 9 December 1948.”⁵⁸ Accordingly, the EP “calls on the Council [of Ministers] to obtain from the present Turkish Government an acknowledgment of the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians in 1915–1917 and promote the establishment of a political dialogue between Turkey and the representatives of the Armenians.” The EP Resolution then reached its probable real intention of trying to force Turkey to confess to “genocide against the Armenian people” as a condition for joining the EU, as well as a number of other partisan positions advocated by Turkey’s enemies, by declaring it “believes that the refusal by the present Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide against the Armenian people committed by the Young Turk government . . . [constitutes]

insurmountable obstacles to consideration of the possibility of Turkey's accession to the Community."

In an apparent attempt to appear less contentious, the Resolution did condemn "strongly any violence and any form of terrorism carried out by isolated groupings unrepresentative of the Armenian people." It also disappointed Armenian irredentists by recognizing "that the present Turkey cannot be held responsible for the tragedy experienced by the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire and stresses that neither political nor legal or material claims against present-day Turkey can be derived from the recognition of this historical event as an act of genocide." Despite these sops to Turkey, it is clear that such attempts to force her to recognize an Armenian genocide as a requirement for joining the EU constitute an additional requirement to those listed in the Copenhagen Criteria mentioned above for initiating EU accession negotiations and are thus null and void.

Further such nonbinding resolutions followed the end of the Cold War and the Armenian declaration of independence from the Soviet Union on September 21, 1991.⁵⁹ During a meeting of the EU-Armenia Parliamentary Cooperation Commission held in Brussels, Belgium, on November 19–21, 2001, the Armenian delegation mentioned the impact of the Turkish blockade on their state. As a result, the EU members called on Turkey to lift it and declared that Turkey would face new difficulties in seeking to join the EU unless she did. The European delegates added that if the EP continued to be committed to the Resolution on the Armenian genocide it had approved in June 1987 (and analyzed above) further problems would occur.

In 1999, the European Parliament Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy Committee prepared a "Report on the Progress of Turkey towards Accession" that was adopted by the EP in plenary session on November 15, 2000. This Report included the statement that "the European Parliament calls on the Turkish Government . . . to give fresh support to the Armenian minority . . . in particular by public recognition of the genocide which the minority suffered." Subsequently, Per Farhtor, a member of the Swedish Greens Group, prepared another contentious report entitled "The European Union's Relations with the South Caucasus under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements." This new Report referred to and confirmed the EP Armenian Resolution of June 1987, and was accepted on February 28, 2002.

In its Report of December 15, 2004, on Turkey, the EP specifically referred to the following clauses of its previous Resolutions referred to above: Article 39 of this new Report called "on Turkey to promote the process of reconciliation with the Armenian people by acknowledging the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians as expressed in the European

Parliament's earlier resolutions with regard to Turkey's candidate status." Article 40 requested "the Turkish Government to re-open the borders with Armenia as soon as possible." Finally, Article 41 called "on the Commission and the Council to demand that the Turkish authorities formally acknowledge the historic reality of the genocide perpetrated against the Armenians in 1915 . . . in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament between 1987 and 2004."

On September 4, 2006, the EP Foreign Relations Committee voted yet again by a broad majority to include a clause asking Turkey "to recognize the Armenian genocide as a condition for its EU accession."⁶⁰ This non-binding clause was dropped, three weeks later in the plenary EP by a vote of 429-71 with 125 abstentions. However, in doing so, the EP declared: "MEPs nevertheless stress that, although the recognition of the Armenian genocide as such is formally not one of the Copenhagen criteria, it is indispensable for a country on the road to membership to come to terms with and recognize its past."⁶¹ Thus, although the Armenians and their supporters have not been able to force Turkey to confess to their version of history as a prerequisite for Turkey's EU accession, they have succeeded in embarrassing Turkey by imprinting their anti-Turkish agenda onto numerous EU documents.

How have the Armenians and their supporters been able to accomplish such ends? The European-Armenia Forum, an interest group active in these matters, has provided coordination and facilitated cooperation among Armenian diaspora organizations in Europe. Successfully implemented interest group activity then is one important factor to explain this situation. Thus, the present analysis logically turns now to a study of this Armenian lobbying process.

Armenian Interest Groups in the United States

To implement their campaign to politicize history, the Armenian diaspora (especially in the United States) has successfully "hypermobilized" vis-à-vis other ethnic groups."⁶² In other words, due to their intercommunity differences, the Armenians in the United States are represented by two separate lobbies plus the recently created US-Armenia Public Affairs Committee (USAPAC), which will be discussed separately below. Instead of weakening their agenda, "their different approaches to lobbying have mobilized more Armenians than one organization alone and doubled outreach projects and resources on Armenian issues, magnifying the Armenian presence in the US."⁶³ Brendon Cannon explains this resulting situation in considerable detail: "Compared to other Diaspora and ethnic groups in America, France,

Sweden and elsewhere, Armenian Diaspora communities are highly mobilized, exhibiting a high degree of interest, vocal support and financial support for certain issues over long periods of time.”⁶⁴ Ironically, one lone Armenian interest group speaking with a unified voice would not have had the same successful result as this multiplicity of competing voices and so would have achieved mere mobilization, instead of hypermobilization.⁶⁵ Further explaining their success, these Armenian lobbies have successfully forged alliances with influential members of the US Congress and other interest groups.

Broadly speaking, the mobilized Armenian diaspora in the United States is divided in two by its allegiance for or against the Dashnak Party.⁶⁶ Numerous parallel organizations such as churches, schools, newspapers, charities, social clubs, et cetera have formed around these two opposing positions.⁶⁷ In the United States, the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) is affiliated with the Dashnaks,⁶⁸ while the Armenian Assembly of America (The Assembly)⁶⁹ is associated with non-Dashnak organizations.⁷⁰

The Armenian apostolic church dates from 301 when the Armenians became the first people in the world to adopt Christianity as their official state religion.⁷¹ The existence of two separate Armenian Catholicoses (Armenian Popes) partially reflects the contemporary Dashnak-inspired division.⁷² Non-Dashnaks support the Mother See in Etchmiadzin, Armenia, while the Dashnaks pay allegiance to the Catholicosate of Cilicia in Antelias, Lebanon. Continuing tensions between these two churches in the United States largely stem from a notorious murder in 1933. While leading a Christmas Eve procession down the aisle of the Armenian Church of the Holy Cross in New York, Archbishop Ghevond Tourian was gunned down by Dashnak “hit men” in full presence of his congregation. The motive was the Archbishop’s support of what was then the Mother See’s home in Soviet Armenia, a concept that the nationalistic Dashnaks did not accept.⁷³

Differing histories, goals, structure, and mobilization strategies notwithstanding, the ANCA and The Assembly lobbying efforts are united in Washington, D.C., by two important factors: a bipartisan Congressional Caucus on Armenian affairs and similar policy goals.⁷⁴ Congressmen Frank Pallone of New Jersey (Dem.) and Edward Porter of Illinois (Rep.) initiated the bipartisan Armenian Caucus in January 1995. Since then, Joe Knollenberg of Michigan (Rep.) has succeeded Porter as the Caucus cochair. This Caucus functions to promote Armenian issues within the US Congress. In addition, both the Democratic and Republican Parties have Councils that seek to facilitate Armenian initiatives. Furthermore, for many years Senator Robert Dole of Kansas (who served as the Senate Majority Leader and was the unsuccessful Republican candidate for the US presidency against President Bill Clinton in 1996) was a consistent supporter of

Armenian issues because an Armenian doctor saved his life during World War II. The ANCA even presented Dole with its Lifetime Achievement Award in 2001 for his dedication to the Armenian cause.

In recent years the similar policy goals of the ANCA and The Assembly cover six major areas.

- (1) US Recognition of the Armenian Genocide. Although both lobbies treat this as a primary goal, the ANCA has been more vocal about demands for territory and reparations from Turkey. In addition to its international campaigns in other countries and the EU, the ANCA employs a more grassroots strategy by also pressuring state and city levels in the United States. The ANCA has even criticized Israel for its lack of support for the Armenian cause.⁷⁵ The Assembly complements its Congressional lobbying efforts by trying to publicize documents concerning the genocide. Thus, it sponsors the Armenian National Institute (ANI), which not only holds conferences but also works to further legal action that would require insurance companies to reimburse survivors of the 1915 events. Furthermore, the ANI has developed a curriculum on these events, which it is seeking to include in US public schools. In 2000, the Assembly also began attempts to construct an Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial in Washington, D.C., that would complement the US Holocaust Museum.
- (2) Nagorno Karabakh. Although both the ANCA and The Assembly lobby for the United States to recognize the independence of this enclave (discussed above) and to increase aid for it, the ANCA has taken a much more active role in this endeavor. Indeed, Nagorno Karabakh was a Dashnak stronghold during the early 1990s when the party failed to win initial elections in Armenia. The Dashnaks even sent fighters and supplies to help the military struggle. On the other hand, The Assembly has adopted a more conciliatory approach to the issue by emphasizing confidence-building measures between Armenia and Azerbaijan including studies of energy and transportation routes as well as humanitarian proposals.
- (3) Section 907. Both Armenian lobbies actively sought to continue Section 907 restrictions prohibiting Azerbaijan from receiving any US aid due to the struggle over Nagorno Karabakh. As analyzed above, the Armenian lobbying efforts on this issue proved one of their most striking successes in the US political process. Only after the emergency following the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on September

11, 2001, were these blatantly biased restrictions against Azerbaijan removed.

- (4) **Aid to Armenia.** The devastating Armenian earthquake that killed more than 25,000 while injuring some 19,000 in December 1988 helped jumpstart both of the Armenian interest groups into pressuring the US Congress to funnel financial and technical aid to the homeland. This need was reemphasized following the Turkish and Azeri blockades imposed on Armenia due to its aggression against Nagorno Karabakh. The ANCA and The Assembly both took credit for obtaining more than \$90 million annually for both Armenian entities. Their efforts earned Armenia the epithet of “Israel of the Caucasus.” In 2001, both Armenian lobbies claimed credit for convincing the US Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations to maintain the annual \$90 million allotment. Indeed, for fiscal year 2003, \$4 million for military aid was added for the first time. In pursuing its cause, the ANCA also used a grassroots approach encouraging Armenians throughout the United States to contact members of Congress and urge them to support the effort.

For its part, The Assembly claimed that it was able to obtain an additional \$15 million as a start-up fund for a Synchrotron Light Source Particle Accelerator (SESAME). The AGBU (which is associated with The Assembly) also received a federal grant of \$9 million to help endow the American University of Armenia in Yerevan.

- (5) **Blocking Arms Sales to Turkey.** As a US-NATO ally, Turkey receives a considerable amount of military and economic aid from the United States. Along with the Greek and Kurdish lobbies, the ANCA has lobbied for the cessation of such support under the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act, which attempts to block aid to any state that supposedly obstructs US aid to a third state. Turkey and Azerbaijan supposedly fall under this category because of their blockade against Armenia. The ANCA also argues that Turkish denial of the genocide and blockade of Armenia makes that state fall under the provisions of the Code of Conduct legislation that restricts arms sales based on human rights abuses.
- (6) **Caspian Pipeline Project.** For several years, the ANCA also sought to block US aid to construct an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea through Azerbaijan to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The ANCA opposed this pipeline because it bypassed Armenian territory and therefore denied Armenia transport fees, while enriching Turkey and Azerbaijan. Eventually, however, economic reality prevailed and the

pipeline began pumping in May 2005. This event, therefore, proved to be a notable failure for the Armenian lobbies.

USAPAC

In 2006, a new, third Armenian lobby was created in the United States. The U.S.-Armenia Public Affairs Committee (USAPAC) was established by the Armenian-American philanthropist Gerard Cafesjian to express differences concerning lobbying policies and procedures as well as strong personal distinctions. On the other hand, the new lobby still hoped to complement the existing Armenian lobbies' stress on the importance of making the public aware of what they all referred to as the Armenian genocide and ending the Turkish and Azeri blockade of Armenia.⁷⁶ Ross Vartian and Rob Mosher, former senior executives for the Armenian Assembly of America (the anti-Dashnak Armenian lobby), were named to run the new lobby, but Mosher soon quit it for unknown reasons.

Vartian explained that although the other two Armenian lobbies had achieved notable successes, some of their members had been arguing against fundamental US interests. Thus, USAPAC's main function would be to serve the US constituency, not the state of Armenia. The new Armenian lobby would take an Ameri-centric viewpoint and cast Armenia as the Israel of the Caucasus, that is, the lone US ally in the region. Vartian elaborated how the United States and Armenia possessed shared values so that success for Armenia would be synonymous with the success of long-term US regional interests. More specifically, USAPAC planned to take a softer line on Turkish membership in the EU because as an EU member, Turkey would become more friendly toward Armenia. USAPAC's break with the traditional hard-line Armenian lobbies on this issue recognized that their position might have been counterproductive for Armenia given its continuing geographical and economic isolation. Regarding genocide recognition, Vartian indicated that after achieving Congressional approval, his lobby would work toward Executive and thus State Department recognition as well. Once this was accomplished, USAPAC would then try to get the United States to engage Turkey and Armenia directly regarding genocide recognition. This would then lead to the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.

However, personal differences also seemed to have motivated the creation of the new lobby. Earlier, Gerard Cafesjian and the Cafesjian Family Foundation had agreed to help fund the Armenian Assembly's Armenian Genocide Museum and Memorial project. Now, however, Cafesjian and his Foundation have decided to rescind their offer so that they might build

their own museum. As a result, a legal battle has ensued and Cafesjian has decided to create his new lobby.⁷⁷

Conclusion

The ability of the Armenian lobbies in the United States to politicize their version of history offers a case study in how a relatively small ethnic minority has been able to achieve many of its policy goals. Indeed, it has been estimated that since Armenia became independent in 1991, the United States has poured more than \$1.7 billion into its coffers.⁷⁸ How has this been accomplished? First of all, it should be noted that the usual tactic of financial contributions has not been particularly instrumental. Pro-Turkish oil companies have contributed much more to Congressional members than have the Armenian lobbies.⁷⁹ Second, the relatively small size of the Armenian population in the United States (while greater than the minuscule Turkish population) also has not prevented Armenian successes. Third, Armenian success has not been based on that state's actual democratic practices despite the Armenian ability to criticize Turkey heavily on this issue. Since becoming independent in 1991, Armenia has jailed political dissidents, invaded neighboring Azerbaijan, and suffered considerable corruption problems, again some of the very problems for which the Armenian lobbies hypocritically yet successfully criticize Turkey. As a result, *The Economist* yearly democracy index, which ranks states according to their political freedoms and civil liberties, listed Armenia only a hundred and tenth in its survey, just behind Haiti and right before Kyrgyzstan and Iraq.⁸⁰ Turkey ranked eighty-eighth, while Sweden was first and the United States seventeenth. North Korea was listed last at a hundred and sixty-seventh. In addition, Armenia's continuing strategic relationship with its former colonizer and ruler Russia belied its claims to fully share the strategic values of the United States.

The success of the Armenian lobbies, therefore, appears in part at least to be based on their high degree of organization. Alliances created through the Congressional Armenian Caucus as well as networking with other lobbies appear to have been more important than the factors listed above. Furthermore, the Armenian ability in capitalizing on hypermobilizing through two (now three) separate lobbies has contributed to their success. In addition, of course, the Armenian lobbies benefit from the historical view that the Armenians were an innocent Christian minority that suffered horrific genocide at the hands of their Turkish oppressors. Thus, the US public is predisposed to view Armenian-supported proposals favorably and Turkish replies unfavorably. Until historians can create a more balanced viewpoint

of Turkey on these questions, only Turkey's considerable geopolitical position and its value to the United States manage to keep Turkey from being completely overwhelmed by this Armenian game of politicizing history.

Turkish Lobbying Response

In belated response to the Armenian interest group activity in the United States, Turkey has begun to take several steps. The Armenian assessment of these Turkish actions is one good indicator of how successful they have been.⁸¹ As indicated above, the strategic Turkish geopolitical position has been crucial: "Since the end of World War II, regardless of the political party in the White House, the situation in the Middle East has given Turkey immense leverage over the United States and more so now with our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan."⁸² Moreover, "the monetary aid granted to Turkey since 1947 made it possible for Ankara to set aside funds to employ American public relations firms to lobby the Congress and the White House."⁸³

Specific organizations that have represented Turkey include Hill & Knowlton, Inc., International Advisors, Inc., Thompson & Co. jointly with McCauliff, Kelly, Rafaelli & Siemens, and Doremus, Inc. During the past decade, the Turkish-Azeri lobbies in Washington have also been successful in retaining the services of several former US Secretaries of State including Lawrence Eagleburger, the late Alexander Haig, and James Baker. Several former US Congressional senators and representatives have also been recruited including former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker, former Senator Don Riegle, and former Representatives Stephen Solarz and Greg Laughlin. In addition, two other very prominent former US Congressional representatives now lobbying Congress on behalf of Turkey are Robert Livingston (who was briefly Republican Party Speaker-designate of the US House of Representatives in 1998) and Richard Gephardt (a Democratic Party presidential candidate in the 1980s and 1990s). The Livingston Group enjoyed a two-year contract for \$600,000 with Azerbaijan to further political and economic ties. As "Turkey's top lobbyist,"⁸⁴ Livingston accused the Armenian Americans of trying to impose a "tyranny of the minority" for urging the US House of Representatives to pass the Armenian Resolution in 2005. According to the Armenians, the Livingston Group has received over \$10 million from Turkey and was also important in helping Turkey obtain \$1 billion in US government loans.

Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor and now the Chairman of the American Turkish Council (ATC), has also played an important role in denouncing the Armenian resolutions in Congress. In

September 2005, the ANCA claimed that officials from both the ATC and the Assembly of Turkish American Associations (ATAA) were engaging in illegal efforts to defeat these resolutions. After the Democratic Party regained control of Congress in the November 2006 elections, Turkey signed a new agreement with the Glover Park Group. Joe Lockhart, former President Bill Clinton's Press Secretary, was one of several former Clinton administration members in this organization.

CHAPTER 5

Turkish Counterterror and Harassment?

Counterterror?

Armenian terrorism against Turks during the 1970s and 1980s inevitably gave rise to speculation concerning possible Turkish countermeasures continuing into the present. Even earlier, a former Turkish intelligence officer published a proposal to organize antiterrorist groups abroad to seek out those who were killing Turks and take action “on the Israeli model.” Sadi Kocas, a former military official and Turkish senator, reported as well that other Turks had asked him to “organize the anarchists who are killing each other and direct them to Armenian targets.” He declined the offer.¹

Some two years later the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ilter Turkmen, declared in an interview that “it should be remembered that terror inevitably leads to counterterror.”² After the bloody ASALA attack on the Ankara airport that summer and the murder of another Turkish diplomat in Canada, the Turkish President, Kenan Evren, bluntly declared: “The Turkish nation is patient. But there is a limit to patience. . . . From now on, the Turkish state, the Turkish nation will feel free to take retaliatory measures.”³ Speaking immediately after the Orly bombing in July 1983, Turkmen vowed: “The Turkish nation’s retaliation will be as heavy as its patience has been great.”⁴ Still another report at that time stated that “the situation may ultimately require Turkey’s sending ‘death squads’ to pursue individual members of the Secret Army [ASALA].”⁵ After a Turkish UN official, Enver Ergun, was assassinated by the Dashnak’s Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA) on November 21, 1984, Salali Umer, a young Turkish doctor, was quoted as saying, “I have never had anything against Armenians before, but after the last attack, I met an Armenian in Cairo and I could scarcely control myself from—from doing something to him.”⁶

Other reports, however, indicated that “Turkish officials—rather than planning a counterattack—admit to a ‘fatalistic’ attitude in regard to Armenian terrorism.”⁷ A Turkish diplomat about to go abroad, for example, declared: “Turks are generally not cowards, though they would be wiser if they were. . . . If they [assassins] can kill a President of the United States, they can kill anybody.”⁸ A Turkish news editor gave another reason that counterterror was not necessarily in the offing: “Our long history as a state and as an empire gives Turkey a psychological security. . . . We don’t feel the need to hit back like the Israelis.”⁹ The same article in which this statement was carried added that Turkey “probably lacks the ability to carry out commando-style operations with the surgical accuracy of the Israelis.”¹⁰ In addition, “a highly informed” Turkish source added that Turkish press reports that “hit teams were ready for action” were misleading. “Such teams are already deployed by the security forces but their mission is to combat any guerrilla attack within Turkey and not any operation outside the country.”¹¹ Similarly, Turkish President Kenan Evren stated in 1983: “We must be calm. It is they [the Armenian terrorists] who are barbarians. Let the world know that Turkey will have no part in irrational revenge.”¹²

It would seem unlikely, therefore, that Turkey ever seriously contemplated counterterrorist strikes against Armenian terrorists. Unfounded and inaccurate claims on the part of certain Armenian sources and others concerning “Turkish terrorism,” however, obfuscated reality here. The false charges of Turkish conspiracy concerning the attempted assassination and abduction of a number of prominent Armenians are an excellent example of this tendency. Without any proof, Armenian sources have indignantly proclaimed: “Several Armenian centers and monuments have been bombed by Turkish agents in Paris and Beirut. Some young Armenians were assassinated in Holland, Greece, Lebanon and Iran.”¹³ A similar statement denounced “Turkey’s . . . murder of four alleged ASALA members in parts of Europe.”¹⁴

The French press attributed a number of hostile incidents against Armenians in that country to Turkish groups. In one such case a so-called Islamic Turkish Revolutionary Army claimed credit.¹⁵ Following the bombing of an Armenian memorial in Alfortville, France, on May 3, 1984, a man with “an oriental accent” calling from The Hague claimed responsibility on behalf of the “Anti-Armenian Organization.”¹⁶ Earlier in 1984 a caller claiming to represent the Turkish Organization for Armed Struggle threatened to bomb the French Film Society during the screening of two Armenian movies in Paris. The threat forced the movies to be rescheduled.¹⁷

Menacing letters signed by a so-called Third Generation of Black Sea Turks Massacred by Armenian Guerrillas were received by the Armenian Cultural Center in London.¹⁸ In the summer of 1983 William Lau

Richardson, who professed to be a former CIA agent, claimed that a Turkish group in Canada offered him money to kill an Armenian woman in that country as a reprisal for the rash of Armenian terrorist attacks against Turks, but added that he had turned them down.¹⁹ Given Richardson's checkered career, however, it is likely his story was bogus. On October 21, 1984, Levon Ouzounian, one of the wealthiest Armenians living in Cyprus and reputed "to have provided substantial financial assistance to ASALA,"²⁰ was killed by a hit-and-run driver. The report of the incident "speculated that he [Ouzounian] could have been killed by Turks for his support of ASALA."

More substantial, but still unverified, reports claimed that Dursun Aksoy, the Turkish diplomat assassinated in Brussels, Belgium, in July 1983 was "a member of [a] special unit created by Turkish security agencies to track down and kill Armenians suspected of fighting for the underground organization [ASALA]."²¹ In addition, ASALA claimed that one of its members, Noubar Yelemian, had been killed in Holland on November 5, 1982, by "Turkish special units assigned to hunting down and killing Armenian terrorists or ASALA members."²²

The two ASALA members killed by Monte Melkonian's ASALA-RM faction in July 1983 were initially reported by Hagopian's ASALA faction as having been "killed by Turks as the result of a tip off by two ASALA informers."²³ Another ASALA report blamed agents of the United States CIA and the Turkish Intelligence Agency (MIT) for the deed. Both agencies were said successfully to have infiltrated anti-Turkish Kurdish groups to carry out the operation.²⁴

After he was apprehended for an attempt to bomb the Kuwaiti Airlines office in Athens that instead resulted in the accidental death of his accomplice (Karnik Sarkis Vahradian), Vahe Khudaverdian "insisted that he and his friend were actually targeted by Turkish agents for an assassination."²⁵ The "ASALA-RM History" (see endnote 29), however, declared that "Mujahed [Hagopian] fabricated the lie that Karnik and Vahe were the targets of an MIT plot so as to cover-up the real nature of the event." In this case, ASALA-RM's interpretation of ASALA's accusation concerning Turkish counterterror was similar to that of the Greek court, because Khudaverdian was found guilty and sentenced to fourteen years in prison.

After thus revealing how ASALA at times deliberately "fabricated . . . lie[s]" about Turkish counterterror, however, the "ASALA-RM History" did claim that Minnas Simonian and Garabed Pashabedian "were most probably the victims of true MIT sponsored plots." Simonian apparently was killed with a silenced pistol in late December of 1982 as he was driving in Beirut, and Pashabedian was killed in March 1983 in his Beirut home. According

to the “ASALA-RM History,” the identity of both had been revealed by Levon Ekmekjian, the perpetrator of the Ankara airport attack, “as those who helped introduce him to ASALA during his ruthless interrogation and torture by Turkish police before he was hung.” In addition, Pashabezian’s photo had frequently appeared in ASALA’s Beirut organ, *Armenia*, and he had also made public statements on behalf of ASALA.

The Armenian tendency to exaggerate their innocence and the Turks’ guilt was also illustrated by the disappearance of Apo Ashjian, a Dashnak leader in Beirut, Lebanon, on December 29, 1982. On the first anniversary of this occurrence, a Dashnak publication carried a front-page article about the matter and included a copy of a telegram sent to President Reagan that charged that Ashjian “was abducted under mysterious circumstances which lead us to believe this unconscionable act was perpetrated by Turkish agents.”²⁶ Another Armenian publication in the United States quickly picked up this issue, also blaming Turkish agents for attempts on the lives of Ara Toranian, an Armenian activist in Paris, France, and Melkon Eblighatian, an Armenian member of the Lebanese parliament. It then declared: “The most prominent example of these Turkish attacks against Armenians took place in Beirut, Dec. 29, 1982 . . . when Abraham Ashjian . . . was abducted . . . while on his way to work.”²⁷

Shortly afterward, however, a more responsible Armenian publication revealed that Ashjian probably “was a victim of a power struggle between a left- and a right-wing grouping within the Dashnag party in Lebanon,” and added: “Later the [Dashnak] party made the most of the incident to exploit it for itself and successfully portrayed him [Ashjian] as a victim of Turkish counter terror.” The report also indicated that Eblighatian, the Lebanese-Armenian parliamentarian, probably had been involved in similar intramural Dashnak violence.²⁸

What is more, Monte Melkonian, the ASALA-RM leader referred to above, stated in an interview with a French journalist that the attempts to kill the French-Armenian leader, Ara Toranian, had been made by ASALA itself. “Hagopian has liquidated several of our comrades who opposed him. For example, the car of Ara Toranian . . . was rigged with a bomb by Hagopian’s people.”²⁹

ASALA, however, countered that it was Toranian himself who had bombed the Armenian memorial in Alfortville (see discussion above) in May 1984, not the Turks as was generally believed.³⁰ Similarly, an explosion that resulted in minor injuries at the Marie-Nubar Armenian Student Center in Paris on June 23, 1984, was supposedly claimed by “a Turkish underground group.”³¹ The report of this bombing, however, also revealed that the bombing might also have been the work of “radical [Armenian]

students who have openly supported Armenian terrorism” and have had past disputes with the management of the student center. The claim that the Turks were guilty is thus questionable.

On November 29, 1984, a powerful bomb exploded in front of the Salle Pleyel in Paris, an hour before more than 2000 Armenians were expected to attend a celebration honoring the anniversary of Soviet Armenia.³² Six Armenians were wounded, two seriously. The Turks, of course, were blamed for the deed. An elderly Armenian, who was in a nearby coffee house, for example, claimed he saw “two suspicious individuals . . . [who] looked like two young Turkish men . . . [drop] a package and immediately take off.” The French police quoted the elderly Armenian as stating, “I am certain they were Turks. I can tell a Turk when I see one.” A young Armenian likewise exclaimed: “They definitely are Turks. They killed in the past and they are still murdering.”

Since the perpetrators of this bombing have not been apprehended, however, other theories of who did it are equally as plausible. The anti-Soviet Dashnaks, for example, were one of the few Armenian groups in Paris who were not planning to participate in the event. Given the spate of intramural Armenian violence analyzed above, the possibility certainly exists that the Dashnaks or some other Armenian group were responsible for the bombing, not the Turks. It would certainly not be the first time that such a scenario of blaming the Turks for intramural Armenian violence had occurred. Turkish military forces, with the permission of Iraq, did strike at Kurdish and ASALA units in northern Iraq in June 1983. At that time, ASALA claimed: “22 of our revolutionaries, including one leading militant, have been lost.”³³

Although official details have never been released, this author understands, through reliable sources in Turkey, that the problem was this. ASALA, operating with the indulgence of the Kurds, who for all practical purposes were running their own areas in northern Iraq (the Baghdad government being too preoccupied with fighting the war against Iran), tried to establish a base for operating into Turkey. When the Turks discovered what was happening, they took the issue up with the Iraqis and received a “no objections” to their suggestion that they move in and clean ASALA out, at the same time helping the Iraqis control their Kurdish dissidents.³⁴ With Iraqi permission again, a similar Turkish incursion into northern Iraq occurred in October 1984. Published reports indicated that some “250 Armenian men, all members of ASALA . . . [were] fighting with these Kurdish forces.”³⁵

With the exception of these two military incursions, however, no definite proof of Turkish counterterrorist activities abroad against Armenians exists.

Although the hand of individual, private Turks, embittered by years of contemporary Armenian terrorism, or the acts of official Turkish agents cannot categorically be ruled out in some of these other cases reported previously, without any further proof it must be concluded these incidents are just as likely the result of Armenian agents provocateurs, Armenian intra-mural violence, or some other unexplained causes such as groups that might be seeking to perpetuate and/or provoke Turkish-Armenian animosities for their own reasons.

Harassment?

Armenian accusations from outside of Turkey that the Turkish government today harasses, persecutes, and even terrorizes its few (c. 60,000) remaining Armenian citizens, pose a somewhat similar, but analytically distinct problem. As with the question of premeditated genocide during World War I, one is again presented with two so diametrically opposed positions that it is difficult to believe they purport to describe the same situation. In this case, however, the question concerns what is happening now, not what occurred almost a hundred years ago; so presumably the facts can be more readily discerned.

The case against Turkey is broadly based: It is asserted that Turkish Armenians suffer from cultural, educational, legal, and religious persecution. Armenians and those sympathetic to their cause fill their publications with examples. A few will suffice to illustrate the point. In a wide-ranging analysis Professor Dickran Kouymjian of California State University, Fresno, claimed that contemporary Turkish policy to eliminate Armenian historical monuments takes a number of different forms, including (1) use of churches as "convenient targets for artillery practice during maneuvers by the Turkish army in the East," (2) employment of "finely cut stones used on the facades of Armenian churches" by Turkish peasants "in the construction of village dwellings," (3) "conversion of Armenian churches into mosques, prisons, granaries, stables, farms, and museums," (4) "destruction by failure to provide maintenance," (5) "demolition for the construction of roads or public works," and (6) "neutralization of a monument's Armenian identity by the effacing of Armenian inscriptions."³⁶

A weekly commentator in one American-Armenian newspaper declared that "restrictions on Armenian church properties were endless and ultimately aimed to disappropriate the Armenian community."³⁷ The late Armenian Patriarch in Istanbul, Shnork Kaloustyan, was quoted by a well-known American periodical as stating, "There are bureaucratic discriminations. . . . We cannot build new churches or repair old ones. . . . But the

Turks can build new mosques. . . . Our church properties are unfairly taxed. . . . We are second-class citizens.”³⁸ A young American-Armenian law student who visited Turkey related how Kaloustyan grew so tired of requesting permission from the Turkish government to paint the building that houses the Armenian patriarchate of Istanbul that “in an act of desperation, he climbed a ladder and tried to paint it himself. He was stopped by Turkish authorities.”³⁹ Another report told how the patriarch was prevented from visiting “an Armenian children’s camp on the island of Kenali [Kinali] . . . only a few steps from his own summer residence.”⁴⁰ Yet another account stated that “Armenian churches and institutions are frequent targets for bomb attacks” and claimed that “many other churches have been converted to barns or museums.”⁴¹

Discussing the contemporary plight of Turkish Armenians, “a . . . returnee from Turkey” declared: “If they are to live in Turkey, they are forced to change their names. . . . Their language is forbidden as the language of instruction; the headmaster has to be a Turk.”⁴² Yet another report explained that the reason “Turks are appointed sub-directors of all Armenian schools . . . is to ‘turkify’ the schools as soon as possible.”⁴³ “Armenian students are not allowed to enter Armenian schools on the pretext that the students are not really Armenians,”⁴⁴ affirmed an additional account.

A lengthy article on another situation in Turkey declared that “during the summer of 1980, a group of Turkish students debarked on the island [of Kinali] shouting insults to the Armenians who were sunbathing there. Witnesses reported that the students threatened and harassed the Armenians who, filled with fright, fled the area. No action was taken against the group of students.”⁴⁵ Continuing, the same report related that “although few Turks like to admit it . . . popular opinion would like to see reprisals against the Armenian leaders for the killing of . . . Turkish diplomatic personnel. ‘The Armenians should pack up and get out of Turkey,’ one well-known, Ankara journalist said.”⁴⁶ An eminent American Armenian author, who visited Turkey in the 1970s, claimed that two Armenians were hanged in Erzurum in eastern Turkey after Gourgen Yanikian murdered the two Turkish Consuls in Los Angeles in 1973. He added that “perhaps a dozen more were beaten in Istanbul, one so savagely he no longer could see.”⁴⁷ As the *National Geographic* article cited previously summed it up, “It is the old hatred.”⁴⁸

In June 1982, it is claimed, Turkey threatened reprisals against Turkish Jews because Armenian scholars were invited to an international conference in Israel on the Holocaust and other genocides. The Turkish pressure, it is claimed, forced the Israeli government to withdraw its official support from the conference and led to nearly one-third of the 400 registered participants

not attending.⁴⁹ At the end of 1984 another report asserted that “the Turkish government resorted without success to extensive measures of pressure, including threats and blackmail [against Turkish Jews], attempting to force the cancellation of several recent lectures sponsored by American Jewish organizations on the Armenian Genocide.”⁵⁰

The case of the Turkish Armenian priest, Father Manuel Yergatian (also known as Haig Eldemir), declared one Armenian source in the United States, “is typical of the Turkish government’s . . . oppression of Armenians in Turkey.”⁵¹ Yergatian was born in Istanbul in 1954. When he was only 14 he went to Jerusalem for theological studies at its Armenian patriarchal seminary. In 1973 he returned to Turkey to serve his required military obligation. Upon its completion he was ordained a celibate priest in Istanbul in 1976. The following year he joined the St. James Brotherhood (Sourp Hagop) in Jerusalem.

On October 10, 1980, Father Yergatian was arrested while boarding a plane in Istanbul for Jerusalem. With him were four young Turkish Armenian boys he was taking to Jerusalem to study at its Armenian patriarchal seminary. The Turkish authorities charged Yergatian with involvement in activities against the integrity and security of the state. At the time of his arrest he was supposedly carrying cassette tapes of Armenian folk music, a map of historical Armenia, and the address of a well-known terrorist. He was also accused of currency violations and naming one of his dogs Ataturk. More to the point, the Turkish authorities believed Yergatian was taking the four young students to Jerusalem to have them trained as terrorists. (Sonner Nayir, one of two Turkish Armenian terrorists convicted of the Orly bombing in 1983, had spent eight years at the same seminary. The other, Ohannes Semerci, had also studied there.)

During his trial one of the Jerusalem seminary students testified that Yergatian had taught that eastern Turkey belonged to the Armenians who had been mistreated in 1915 and should have their lands returned. The testimony also indicated that Yergatian had helped decorate the seminary hall for observation of Martyrs Day on April 24, 1980. Armenian sources claimed that the charges against Yergatian were trumped up. The “subversive materials” in his possession were simply the autobiography of Father Shigaher, who had described the massacres of 1915, while the map of Armenia was one published by the Mekhitarist fathers of Venice in 1888. The excess money he was charged with carrying simply belonged to the children he was escorting.

The real reason for Yergatian’s arrest, felt the Armenians, was his participation in the April 24, 1980, commemoration in Jerusalem. Also, added the same sources, the Turkish authorities were displeased he was rescuing

Turkish Armenian “descendants of the survivors of the genocide from Turkification and giving them an opportunity to receive [an] Armenian education in Jerusalem.” During his trial Yergatian himself denied any connection with Armenian terrorism, professed his loyalty to Turkey, and claimed that his imprisonment was in retaliation for Armenian terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomats.

During his long pretrial incarceration, charged Armenian sources, Yergatian was “reportedly tortured by having his fingernails and toenails pulled out.” Finally, after a nine-month-long trial, he was sentenced on March 19, 1983, by the Istanbul Martial Law Command Court to fourteen years’ imprisonment and five years of internal exile. Further reports stated that Yergatian’s health had deteriorated in prison and a representative of the Armenian patriarchate of Istanbul had been refused permission to visit him.

During his visit to the United States in the fall of 1984, Shnork Kaloustyan, the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, who usually assumed a pro-Turkish position, stated that “Father Yergatian unfortunately had a lot of bad luck during his trials. First of all, he was the victim of baseless accusations by one of his students.”⁵² In addition, “when Armenian ‘terrorists’ captured the Turkish consulate in Paris [ASALA’s ‘Van’ operation in September 1981] one of their demands was the release of Father Yergatian, which naturally resulted in his case being subjected to further investigation . . . to see if he belongs to ‘ASALA.’ This made his case worse.” Finally, added the patriarch, “during his trial, the notorious grave incident took place in Yugoslavia during which a Turkish diplomat [Galip Balkar, March 9, 1983] was assassinated.” Thus, concluded Kaloustyan, “his only proven guilt is that as a Turkish-Armenian, he had participated in an anti-Turkish rally for which he may have been sentenced to a few years in jail. However, the aforementioned and other incidents, unfortunately, directly or indirectly aggravated his situation.”

In May 1983 the famous and highly respected private international organization Amnesty International (AI) adopted Yergatian as a prisoner of conscience. At that time, AI pointed out that the facts of Yergatian’s detention and trial made it clear that he had not been convicted of any involvement in violence, but was imprisoned because of his Armenian ethnic origin. In addition, it should be added, an AI country report stated, about human rights in general in Turkey: “Throughout the year Amnesty International continued to receive allegations that prisoners charged with political offenses had been tortured and that in some cases death had resulted.”⁵³

Such reports might lend credence to the accusations of Hrant Guzelian, a Turkish Armenian who was one of many witnesses for the defense allowed to testify at the trial of the ASALA group convicted in January 1984 of

seizing the Turkish Consulate in Paris. Guzelian testified he had been arrested in Turkey on charges he had been forcing Turkish boys to become Armenian. (Guzelian himself claimed that he was simply operating a youth center where Armenian boys brought from the interior of Turkey could be cared for and given educational facilities.) In prison “he was tortured for a period of 22 days before being transferred.”⁵⁴ Although he was found innocent for lack of evidence, he claimed “he was once again subjected to extensive beatings, five times within a 24-hour period.” This was because, before his release from prison, a soldier recognized him from a news story in a Turkish newspaper, which identified him as “an Armenian enemy of Turkey.” Only because of the inefficient Turkish bureaucracy, which had not notified the passport authorities of his situation, was he able to leave Turkey, Guzelian claimed.

Turkish Response

Turks, most Turkish Armenians, and their government paint a very different picture.⁵⁵ One study of more than 50 Turkish Armenians found that they were “content, prosperous and patriotic to Turkey.” Repeatedly, Turkish Armenians emphasized—as did Lucika Martayan, a member of a wealthy industrial family—that “it is the outsiders, those living out of our country, who cause the only trouble we know—whether terrorists or those who don’t know the situation here.”

The position of Arman Manukyan was also of interest. He was the President of a hardware and tool company, a full Professor of Accounting at the University of the Bosphorus in Istanbul, and a member of the Turkish Foreign Minister’s Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations. In 1958 he received a two-year Fulbright Scholarship to study in the United States, where his first child was born. His wife, Alis, was a leading soprano in the Istanbul State Opera. Some 20 other Armenians sang in the opera chorus. All were trained, free, at Turkish state conservatories.

Manukyan himself visited the United States annually. “I could live anywhere in the world,” he declared, but “I want to live here. Why shouldn’t I? It is my home country. And I think my son will return to live here, too, after he finishes his American education.” Concerning the Muslim Turks, Manukyan stated that “we live as brothers without separation or difference. . . . Christians and Muslims are not so different in our basic morals. We have the same life patterns and the same values here.” Regarding the Armenian terrorists, Manukyan declared that they “could not have come out of our life here, which is peaceful and happy.” He added that “we have 33 of our own churches, 30 schools, our own sport and cultural clubs

and halls, our own alumni associations. Life is liberal and free here. We don't feel any pressures. If we did, most of us would leave."

Karabet Arman, the chief physician at the Yedikule Armenian Hospital in Istanbul, said the Muslim Turks and Turkish Armenians were "*kardes gibi*," or "like brothers." He told how he had been trained in the Istanbul University Medical School. "In the 30 years since, I have been the head of three university clinics as well as the medical director of several prominent businesses." He added that "the Armenian doctors are given full scholarships in Turkey and also all expenses to study in Germany, England, and the United States, like the Turks." Although he often visits his brother in the United States, Arman declared that he did not want to emigrate. He also affirmed that Armenian churches were open every day, that Armenians felt equal and safe in the midst of the Muslim majority, and that during the religious festivals "the bells of our churches ring so loud that even the voices of the *muezzin* [the Muslim cleric who calls the faithful to prayer] will be drowned in it."

Ara Kuyumcuyan headed large iron, steel, and concrete companies. Hundreds of Turks worked for him. In an interview he declared: "My father was born in Istanbul. We Armenians have a very good life in Turkey. . . . We live in peace." Another wealthy businessman, who said terrorists had threatened and blackmailed Armenians in foreign countries, asked that his name not be used. He stated that "all people are equal here. . . . There is no attempt to discriminate. . . . Life is *cok, cok iyi* very, very good here." Still another Armenian, studying electronic engineering in Switzerland, was home for the summer. He too had friends who had been threatened by terrorists in Switzerland, but declared: "I definitely plan to return to Turkey to live and work. . . . I feel that I have a great future in Turkey in computers." Even Calouste Gulbenkian, the famous oil magnate, was once quoted as saying, "Today in Turkey no distinction whatsoever is made between the Turks and the Armenians. The Turkish Armenians live peacefully and in prosperity." Krikor Gunbeyan, a shoemaker, stated: "There is no discrimination among the citizens of the Republic of Turkey because of difference in language, religion and race."

In reply to the foreign Armenian accusation that Turkish Armenians are afraid to tell the truth, the writer Torkom Istepanyan declared: "I may be accused of being a 'hireling' by some persons outside the country. Let them understand clearly that the blood in my veins is at least as much Armenian as theirs. In fact, it is the very purity of my blood that compels me to be faithful to the truth, and the truth is that we Turkish Armenians with our independent churches and community schools, live here in an atmosphere of complete freedom, far removed from futile vendettas."

Ironically, the Armenian patriarch in Istanbul, who was quoted above as criticizing the situation in Turkey, stated that “the young people, the terrorists, have been exposed to misrepresentations. They have been fed distorted views on what happened in 1915.” He went on to tell how under the Turkish Republic the Armenians, like the other minorities in Turkey, had all the freedoms and responsibilities of citizenship. He even volunteered that the Turkish Armenians had rebuilt the handsome, new cathedral of St. Gregory the Illuminator in the heart of Istanbul’s business district.

During his visit to the United States in 1984, the Armenian patriarch similarly stated: “Our government insures our freedom and safety and gone are some of the restrictions that had existed in the past relative to the day-to-day life of our community organizations.”⁵⁶ When Armenian terrorists killed Turkish diplomats abroad, added Kaloustyan, “the Turkish government immediately takes measures to provide protection for us by posting policemen at Armenian institutions to prevent any retaliation.”

During the trial for the Orly bombers in March 1985, Professor Simon A. Hatchinlian, a Turkish Armenian lecturer at the University of the Bosphorus, testified for the prosecution. He was reported to have “noted that as an Armenian living in Turkey, he has never been discriminated against from the time he served in the Turkish Army to the present.”⁵⁷ Hatchinlian was reported as adding that “he uses an Armenian name without anyone telling him to change it, enjoys all types of privileges granted to all Turkish citizens and that he has the respect of all his Turkish colleagues.”

Synthesis

What, then, is the actual position of the Armenians in Turkey today? It is true that Republican Turkish policies toward minorities have not always achieved the laical ideal. (What country has?) The claim in the 1920s that the Kurds were simply “mountain Turks”; the notorious *Varlik Vergisi* (Capital Levy) of 1942–43, which blatantly discriminated against minorities; the anti-Greek riots over Cyprus in September 1955; and the continuing Kurdish unrest in Turkey are illustrative. What is more, of course, Republican Turkey only arose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire after a desperate war against the Greeks in the West, and a lesser but still serious war against the Armenians in the East. Indeed, their deaths from this latter conflict are counted by the Armenians today when they number their losses for the period they claim was the Turkish genocide against them.

Turkish sensitivities about minorities and a desire to have a Turkey for the Turks is understandable, however, given the former empire’s loss of vast amounts of territory in the past, the resulting forced migrations of Muslims

from these lands to Anatolia, and the attempts by the Greeks and the Armenians—as well as the Allies—after World War I to carve out large sections of Anatolia for themselves. Turks came late to the idea of a nation-state, but after it had helped to destroy their multinational empire and threatened the very existence of their Anatolian heartland, they too learned to value one for themselves.

Certainly, it would not be reasonable to expect the residue of attitudes in Turkish society, which in the past resulted in de facto discrimination and sometimes hostile behavior, to be eradicated overnight any more than it proved possible to eliminate racial prejudices in the United States after the Civil War. In the Turkish case, as in that of the United States, however, practice has come to conform with law over time. There have been no outbreaks of antiminority violence on any significant scale in Turkey for more than 50 years despite the actions of Armenian terrorists and others who have tried to foment it. Given the history of Armenian-Turkish relations in the past, especially as viewed from the Turkish perspective, the position of the Armenians in Turkey today is probably much better than could otherwise be expected.

Unofficial pressures to conform culturally and religiously undoubtedly exist in Turkey today, but how are they different than in any other country? The situation in Turkey is certainly not unique. In actual practice, despite the protestations of Armenians abroad, those in Turkey are probably better off than their coethnics in such other Middle Eastern countries as Iran and Syria.

As for the numerous bureaucratic problems Armenians face in Turkey today, these are often difficulties from which Muslim Turks too suffer. As anyone—native or foreign—who has dealt with it can attest, the Turkish bureaucracy is far from being the most efficient. This is regrettable, but in most cases probably not a valid criticism as far as the Armenian minority goes. Indeed, in the case of Hrant Guzelian, the Turkish Armenian who testified at the 1984 trial of the four ASALA agents in Paris, the inefficiencies of the Turkish bureaucracy apparently came to his aid. In short, therefore, these bureaucratic problems (which may often appear to be harassment to outsiders) are endemic in the country, not peculiarly aimed at just one minority grouping. The solution lies in education and reform, not in biased diatribes.

Contemporary Armenian Ruins

What about the charges that ancient Armenian churches and other historical monuments are being allowed to fall into ruin or being otherwise mistreated? Although it is true that contemporary Turkish studies downplay the historical Armenian presence in eastern Anatolia, the government of Republican Turkey

has made efforts to preserve the vast archeological heritage. Anyone who has visited the country can attest to this fact. While isolated incidents of vandalism may occur and adequate funds for preservation are not always available, there is no evidence that the Turkish government is destroying historical Armenian churches and monuments as an official policy. On the contrary, as even foreign Armenians who visit Turkey can testify, historical Armenian sites in eastern Anatolia and ancient Cilicia are being preserved and protected better than might be expected for a country that is not yet blessed with all the necessary required means the more fortunate might possess.

At Aghtamar, for example, the famous island in Lake Van that once was the center of an independent Armenian Catholicosate, efforts have been made at maintenance and landscaping.⁵⁸ Numerous tourists come to see the magnificent Armenian church, built more than 1000 years ago. The Turkish military has even built a helicopter pad on the island to facilitate VIP visits. The ancient Armenian capital of Ani, right on the Russian border, is also accessible, and the military, who control the area, provide permits and escorts for visitors when the situation permits. A number of French Armenians, among others, have visited the site. The Armenian cathedral in Kars has also been cleaned up and restored.

On the other hand, some Armenian churches are still used for storing hay or firewood, and as stables. The complex on Mt. Varag east of Van is a case in point. The great Armenian cathedral in Diyarbakir remains in ruins. But this is no different from the condition of numerous former Christian churches of denominations other than Armenian in many parts of Anatolia. In addition, one does not have to search far to find abandoned mosques, caravanserais, and great complexes of Muslim tombs, such as the ones at Ahlat on the northwestern shore of Lake Van, which are also in a sad state of neglect. Turkey has so many historical monuments that the entire national budget could be spent in any given year on their restoration and maintenance. Given the poor state of overall Turkish-Armenian relations during the past century and the economic problems of Turkey in recent years, the wonder is that so many historical monuments, including Armenian ones, have been preserved and maintained. Armenian allegations to the contrary are often specious, but they feed on themselves. Armenians living abroad believe them because they are fed a steady diet of misinformation, distortion, and outright falsehoods.

Reprisals against Jews?

How about the accusation that the Turkish government threatened reprisals against Turkish Jews if Jewish organizations in the United States or an Israeli

conference in Tel Aviv permitted Armenians to present lectures and papers on the Armenian genocide? According to an apparently reliable Turkish source,⁵⁹ the charges concerning such events in the United States are baseless. All the Turks attempted to do here was to request that Jewish organizations not permit Armenians to participate in conferences about the Jewish Holocaust or genocide in general. No threats, either overt or implied, were made. Regarding the conference in Israel in 1982, however, a certain Turkish official did make unauthorized pronouncements that might have been construed as threats. When this was discovered the Turkish government disowned the statements.

Indeed, in general Jewish organizations have tended to support the Turkish position against the Armenians for a number of reasons. (1) Many Jewish groups feel that the Armenian position is inaccurate and their experiences not similar to their own Holocaust. (2) Historically, the Turks and Jews have shared friendly relations. (3) There is now a strong Turkish-Israeli military alliance. (4) Turkey was the first Islamic state to recognize Israeli independence in 1948. (5) There remains an important Jewish-Turkish community whose ties to Israel and Turkey are strong. (6) Important Israeli-Turkish business connections exist. As a result, Jewish interest groups have played important roles in defeating pro-Armenian resolutions in the US Congress.

However, it is true that during a recent debate over the Armenian genocide resolution in the US Congress during 2007, most Jewish interest groups in the United States remained more neutral. As a result, elements of the Turkish press partially blamed them for the initial Armenian successes analyzed above in [Chapter 4](#). Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan even declared that “Armenian and Jewish lobbies unite forces against Turks,” and added that “we have told them [the Jewish groups] that we cannot explain it to the public in Turkey if a road accident happens.”⁶⁰ Although this unfortunate statement might have been construed as a threat, no violent attacks against either Armenians or Jews occurred in Turkey.

On May 31, 2010, Israeli troops boarded a so-called Peace Flotilla bringing supplies to Gaza and killed nine activists who were also Turkish nationals. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan bitterly denounced Israel, and some feared that the small Jewish community in Turkey might suffer violent reprisals. However, no violence against Jews in Turkey occurred.

Jews in Armenia have also been blamed for Armenian problems due to the perceived Jewish support of Turkey. A recent Armenian publication claimed that Jews had aided Ottoman officials in perpetrating the Armenian massacres in 1915. This anti-Semitic book presented by the Armenian Writers Union elicited no condemnation from the authorities. Subsequently,

a Holocaust memorial in Yerevan was desecrated on the final day of Jewish New Year celebrations.⁶¹

Lowry Incident

Further illustrative of Armenian hypersensitivities is their reaction to how Turkey has channeled funds into research organizations that at times have taken a pro-Turkish position regarding the Armenian issue.⁶² The Turkish government has also created academic chairs that have had occasion to take a pro-Turkish position. The Institute of Turkish Studies, now located at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and the Atatürk Chair in Turkish Studies at Princeton University are two cases in point. However, how are these Turkish tactics any different from what the Armenians already have been doing for years and for which they still remain far ahead of the Turks? When these facts are considered, the Armenian criticism of Turkey on these points appears hypocritical.

Dr. Heath W. Lowry was the first Executive Director of the Institute of Turkish Studies and later became the first holder of the Atatürk Chair at Princeton University. In 1990, Robert J. Lifton, a pro-Armenian scholar, received a letter from Nuzhet Kandemir, the Turkish Ambassador to the United States, along with two other documents written by Lowry and apparently inadvertently added recommending how the Turkish government should proceed in replying to Armenian charges of genocide. When this became public knowledge, the Armenians reacted with outrage. However, how was Lowry acting in any way different from how Armenian scholars and their supporters have in their long-running campaign against Turkey? When looked upon in such light, the Armenian reactions to the Lowry memorandums appear petty and hypocritical.

Musa Dag

Over the years the Turkish pressure on the US State Department and Hollywood filmmakers to cancel plans to film Franz Werfel's *The Forty Days of Musa Dag* has been cited as one of the most glaring examples of Turkish harassment. Werfel's famous novel is a fictionalized account of how some 5,000 Armenians actually did refuse to comply with Ottoman deportation orders in July 1915, and instead fortified themselves at the top of Musa Dag (the Mountain of Moses), a promontory on the southeastern coast of modern-day Hatay province in Turkey. After some 53 days of desperate fighting, the Armenians were rescued by a French-British naval convoy and relocated to Port Said, Egypt. For Armenians the episode has assumed

almost Biblically heroic proportions on the level of Masada for the Jews. Werfel's famous novel became an instant best seller in Europe and the United States in 1934, and the controversy has continued ever since because the Turks correctly argue that it is an inflammatory, one-sided version of the overall situation. In attempting to present the Armenian point of view, a recent pro-Armenian analysis of this situation aptly illustrates these Turkish arguments.⁶³

Edward Minasian, the author in question, specifically states that in addition to French records on the Armenian massacres, Werfel's main sources were gathered at the Mekhitarist Library, an Armenian Roman Catholic monastic order in Vienna, Austria, and "the voluminous writings of the Armenophile German missionary Dr. Johannes Lepsius."⁶⁴ In Vienna, "Werfel's most important *Musa Dagh* source at the Mekhitarist Library was a translation of the Reverend Dikran Andreasian's (Antreassian) eyewitness report of the events at Musa Dagh . . . and an article in *The Outlook* magazine."⁶⁵ Although an author is free to use what sources he pleases, the objective scholar rightfully should question the historical accuracy of such a fictionalized account based on obviously tendentious Armenian accounts.

Even more disturbing for those who might seek a balanced retelling of events, are the Biblical references Minasian repeatedly makes when describing Werfel's novel.⁶⁶ "In parallels to the Old and New Testaments, Gabriel [Bagradian, Werfel's fictionalized main hero] fulfills his divine mission as father and as son, from Moses figure to Christ. . . . He realizes that God has used him to fulfill a mission." To further drive home the point, Minasian tells his readers that "as Christ died on the Cross for the sins of man and offered salvation, Gabriel Bagradian, the last martyr of Musa Dagh, is sacrificed so that his compatriots may live. . . . Others may see it as an allegory on the Bible." Continuing, Minasian declares that "although the actual siege atop Musa Dagh lasted fifty-three days, Werfel chose to phrase the title and theme of his novel in biblical terms. Those who are versed in the Bible and the Christian religion should recognize the obvious references to the number forty in the Old and New Testaments." He then cites as specific examples the story of how it rained upon the earth for 40 days and nights in the story of Noah and the Ark, Christ's 40 days of temptation and fasting in the wilderness, and how Ascension Day marks Christ's appearance before his Apostles 40 days after his resurrection. Warming to his task, Minasian reveals further Biblical allusions in Werfel's novel: (1) Stephan, Gabriel's son, personifies Stephen, the first Christian martyr, and dies of 40 wounds; (2) the very name Gabriel conjures up images of the archangel Gabriel, the messenger of God, and (3) throughout

the novel's three books there are quotations from the *New Testament's Revelation of St. John the Divine*.

No wonder the Turks have objected to making a movie out of this novel. Although it may be good storytelling, it is an inflammatory, narrowly focused, one-sided version of events calculated to present the Armenians as saintly victims of diabolical Turks. Indeed Minasian cites favorably a review of Werfel's novel that "it is concerned . . . with two races whose enmity has become such a byword—the subtler hate on the Turks' part for a race of superior culture."⁶⁷ Furthermore, how has Turkish opposition to filming *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh* been any different from recent Armenian opposition to Hollywood basing a film on the life of Kemal Atatürk?

Hrant Dink

In once again drawing the world's attention to reputed Turkish harassment of Armenians, the assassination of the noted Turkish-Armenian editor of the bilingual weekly *Agos* [ploughed furrow] Hrant Dink in Istanbul on January 19, 2007, deserves special consideration.⁶⁸ Hrant Dink was well-known in Turkey for his sincere but forceful calls to debate the Armenian issue in Turkey. In 2006, he was given a suspended six-month sentence for "insulting Turkishness" under the provisions of the notorious Article 301 of the Turkish penal code. Dink had written about how Armenians had the ideal of ethnic purity without Turkish blood. In other words, Dink supposedly had insulted Turkish blood. Dink's writings drew the wrath of ultra Turkish nationalists, and he had received numerous death threats, which, however, had failed to elicit any special police protection. His quickly apprehended assassin Ogun Samast (17) apparently had been recruited for the murder by shadowy ultra right-wing figures loosely known in Turkey as *Derin Devlet* or the Deep State.⁶⁹ More recently, this reputed group has also come to be known as Ergenekon in reference to the Turks' supposed ancestral Asian homeland. More than three years later, however, the details of exactly who had been behind Samast remained unclear. Even more shocking perhaps, was how the Samsun police, who originally had apprehended Samast, took photos of themselves with him in front of a Turkish flag, actions obviously portraying Samast as some kind of a hero. Thus, on initial appearances at least, Dink's murder might have appeared a clear example of Turkish terror against and harassment of their country's few remaining Armenians.

To the credit of Turkey, however, Dink's murder was immediately denounced by many of the country's top officials and institutions. In addition, the Ministry of Interior immediately removed the Governor of

Samsun and Chief of Police the very same day of the flag incident referred to above.⁷⁰ President Ahmet Sezer, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Speaker of the Grand National Assembly Bulent Arinc, and Chief of Staff General Yasar Buyukanit all strongly condemned the murder. They also extended their condolences to Dink's family, close associates, and the entire Armenian community in Turkey.⁷¹ Prime Minister Erdogan, whose AK Party roots were in political Islam, stated: "A bullet was fired to free thought and our democratic life with the bloody attack against Dink." Although he was well-known as an emphatic Turkish nationalist, General Buyukanit declared in his message that "we strongly condemn [the] hateful attack against Hrant Dink," adding that "bullets fired at Dink were also fired at Turkey." The mass circulation newspaper *Hurriyet* proclaimed on page 1 that "the murderer is a traitor," while the popular *Sabah* ran a headline: "The Greatest Treason."

Mourners gathered to light candles and lay flowers at a portrait of the slain Turkish-Armenian the following day at the spot where Dink had been murdered after being lured outside his office by a phone call. Moreover, tens of thousands of Turks marched in Dink's funeral procession, many carrying placards proclaiming, "We are all Armenians" or "We are all Hrant Dinks." Taha Akyol, the Deputy Chairman of the executive board of CNN-Turk and a columnist at the daily *Milliyet* did not carry such a banner while he marched, but explained one year later: "I condemned the murder with my Turkish-Muslim identity."⁷²

This spontaneous outburst coming from Muslim Turks supposedly programmed to hate and want to kill Armenians put the lie to the claim that Turks as a nation today harass and terrorize Armenians. Clearly, many Muslim Turks were remembering and honoring Dink as a representative of what was good and democratic in their country. In addition, it was clear that Dink was not the only Turkish citizen who had ever drawn the ire of ultra Turkish nationalists supposedly represented at times by the Deep State or even assassinated for their political views. Numerous other Muslim Turkish writers had also run afoul of Article 301 including Nobel Prize winning author Orhan Pamuk and Elif Shafak, both of whom had also written about the Armenian massacres. Even more, the notorious murders of such other prominent Turkish journalists as Abdi Ipekci (by Mehmet Ali Agca, who then went on to make the attempt on the Pope) on February 1, 1979, and Ugur Mumcu (still unsolved) on January 24, 1993, illustrate that Armenians are not uniquely singled out for murder in Turkey. Thus, Hrant Dink's murder, while clearly showing ugly anti-Armenian attitudes remaining in the minds and deeds of some in Turkey, also illustrated in the sincere spontaneous remorse it drew, the good in many Turks.

Article 301

While still a problem, Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code was amended on April 30, 2008, in an attempt to prevent further misuse in high-profile cases. Under these new provisions it now will be necessary to obtain the approval of the Minister of Justice to file a case. Even if such permission occurred, the prosecutor would have the discretionary power not to proceed. In addition, the more explicit phrase insulting the “Turkish nation” replaced insulting “Turkishness” as a crime. Finally, the maximum penalty for violating Article 301 was reduced from three to two years. Although Article 301 still represented a problem to civil liberties, these amendments represented progress toward reform. On the other hand, in the first quarter of 2010, a total of 216 people were on trial in Turkey concerning their freedom of thought and expression; 69 of them were journalists.⁷³ Nevertheless, as noted in [Chapter 4](#), *The Economist* yearly democracy index for 2007 rated Turkey 22 states higher for democracy than it did Armenia.

CHAPTER 6

Rapprochement?

This book has sought to present the Turkish position regarding the Armenian claims of genocide during World War I. No systematic attempt has been made to present the Armenian position as there are countless accounts already available. Nevertheless, I have offered an equal examination of each side's historical position in [Chapter 1](#), and conclude that neither side was completely innocent or guilty. More than 30 years ago, for example, Gwynne Dyer concluded that most Turkish and Armenian scholars are unable to be objective on this issue and described the resulting situation as one of "Turkish falsifiers and Armenian deceivers."¹ This does not mean that the Armenians did not suffer a horrific wrong. No matter what Turkish apologists argue, the fact remains that an entire nation of people virtually ceased to exist in their ancestral homeland after World War I. The Armenian claim that they were victims of a premeditated and unprovoked genocide, however, does not ring true when one considers the decades of Armenian provocations followed by some Armenians supporting the Russian enemy at the start of World War I.

Thus, [Chapter 2](#) asks what is genocide? Here I illustrate that although this is a useful concept to describe such evil events as the Jewish Holocaust in World War II and Rwanda in the 1990s, the term has also been overused, misused, and therefore trivialized by many different groups seeking to demonize their antagonists and win sympathetic approbation for themselves. I include the Armenians in this category because, although maybe as many as 600,000 of them died during World War I, it was neither a premeditated policy perpetrated by the Ottoman Turkish government nor an event unilaterally implemented without cause. In so concluding I must stress and reiterate that hundreds of thousands of Armenians were massacred, and for these dastardly deeds the Turkish perpetrators and their associates should hang their heads in shame. However, there are also Armenians who should also hang their heads in shame for provoking this unjustified Turkish response.

In arguing thus, I have given special attention to a recent study by the French scholar Jacques Semelin who explains, “whether use of the word ‘genocide’ is justified or not, the term aims to strike our imagination, awaken our moral conscience and mobilise public opinion on behalf of the victims.”² He adds that “under these circumstances, anyone daring to suggest that what is going on is not ‘really’ genocide is immediately accused of weakness or sympathizing with the aggressors.”³ Thus, “given the powerful emotional charge the word genocide generates, it can be used and re-used in all sorts of hate talk to heap international opprobrium on whoever is accused of genocidal intent.”⁴

The testimony of Hovhannes Katchaznoui, the first Prime Minister of Armenia after World War I and thus an authority well-placed to judge what had just occurred, constitutes a most important document illustrating what really happened, and I allot it special emphasis in [Chapter 2](#). “We overestimated the ability of the Armenian people, its political and military power, and overestimated the extent and importance of the services our people rendered to the Russians.”⁵ Katchaznoui then stated that “the proof is, however—and this is essential—that the struggle began decades ago [which] against the Turkish government brought about the deportation or extermination of the Armenian people in Turkey and the desolation of Turkish Armenia.”⁶

In [Chapter 2](#), I also closely examine K[apriel] S[erape] Papazian’s long-ignored and even suppressed study *Patriotism Perverted* for what it reveals about the events of World War I, which the Armenians today argue constituted genocide. Papazian, however, wrote that “the fact remains . . . that the leaders of the Turkish-Armenian section of the Dashnagtzoutune did not carry out their promise of loyalty to the Turkish cause when the Turks entered the war.”⁷ He also told how “thousands of Armenians from all over the world, flocked to the standards of such famous fighters as Andranik, Kery, Dro, etc.,” and that “the Armenian volunteer regiments rendered valuable services to the Russian Army in the years of 1914-15-16.”⁸

[Chapter 2](#) then turns to Guenter Lewy’s recent and very significant contribution to the long-standing debate over what happened to the Armenians during the last days of the Ottoman Empire. He correctly declares that “the key issue in this quarrel . . . is not the extent of Armenian suffering, but rather the question of premeditation: that is, whether the Young Turk regime during the First World War intentionally organized the massacres that took place.”⁹ After debunking the validity of documents purporting to show Turkish premeditation, Lewy also questions the methods of arguably the current leading Armenian scholar-advocate for the premeditated genocide thesis, Vakhakn N. Dadrian. Lewy points out Dadrian’s “selective use of sources” (p. 282n3), how when “checking the references provided by Dadrian . . . it

becomes clear that these sources do not always say what Dadrian alleges” (p. 83), Dadrian’s “manipulating the statements of contemporary observers” (p. 84), how “only through shrewd juxtapositions of words and insertions (which he puts in square brackets) that Dadrian ends up with the desired result” (p. 85), and how “it is Dadrian’s gloss and not the original text quoted that includes the incriminating words” (p. 86). For questioning the Armenian mantra of genocide, however, Lewy has been unfairly vilified or worse by his Armenian detractors and their supporters.

In [Chapter 3](#), I reexamine contemporary Armenian terrorism to illustrate that the Armenians are not totally innocent victims of the Turks, that indeed in the 1970s and 1980s some Armenians actually justified murdering Turkish diplomats and innocent third parties caught up in their fire because Turkey would not agree to the one-sided Armenian version of history.

In [Chapter 4](#), I illustrate how today Armenians have sought to politicize and legislate their version of history in parliamentary and other governmental bodies around the world, damning their opponents as genocide deniers and perpetrators of hate speech. The case of the renowned scholar Bernard Lewis is a prime example of this Armenian misuse and distortion of their politicized history. In this chapter, I also analyze the hypermobilized Armenian lobbying tactics that have achieved considerable success in politicizing their version of history.

On this point it should be noted that there is an academic literature that argues that such ethnic interest group activity in the United States may present a threat to its national interest. For example, the noted scholar Samuel Huntington has written how during the Cold War the American people were united by the threat posed by communism. The end of the Cold War, however, led to the end of this unity and the rise of “the cult of multiculturalism,” the purpose of which was to “deny the existence of a common culture in the United States, denounce assimilation, and promote the primacy of racial, ethnic, and other subnational cultural identities and groupings.”¹⁰ Although democracy implies the right of such ethnic minorities to lobby for their causes, “diasporas can influence the actions and policies of their host country and co-opt its resources and influence to serve the interests of their homeland.”¹¹ I have shown how the activities of the Armenian lobbies in the United States have presented a case study of Huntington’s thesis. Indeed, Huntington concluded that “Armenian-Americans send enough to earn Armenia the sobriquet of ‘the Israel of the Caucasus.’”¹² This line of reasoning was also analyzed by the distinguished historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who reminded his readers of Theodore Roosevelt’s warning: “The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing

all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities.”¹³

Finally, in [Chapter 5](#), I analyze whether the Armenians are correct when they argue that Turkey continues today to harass and even use terror against them. When so doing, I find that with few exceptions the Armenians again have either exaggerated or simply prevaricated. I also give special attention to the long-running Armenian attempts to film Franz Werfel’s novel, *The Forty Days of Musa Dagh* and Turkey’s successful opposition. I find that the Werfel novel is replete with inflammatory, tendentious diatribes against the Turks that at times even seek to identify the Armenians with Biblical references to righteous Christianity, while damning the Turks implicitly with opposite characteristics. Objective, fair-minded observers would certainly hear bells ringing when they consider such claims, take umbrage, and seek a fairer accounting.

In addition, I examine the recent assassination of the noted Turkish-Armenian Editor Hrant Dink in Istanbul on January 19, 2007, apparently by ultra Turkish nationalists who objected to his forceful calls to debate the Armenian issue in Turkey. To the credit of Turkey, however, Dink’s murder was immediately denounced by many of the country’s top officials and institutions including the President, Prime Minister, and Military Chief of Staff. Moreover, tens of thousands of Turks marched in Dink’s funeral procession, many carrying placards proclaiming: “We are all Armenians” or “We are all Hrant Dinks.”

Where To Now?

Turkey and Armenia have no diplomatic relations, and the border between them has been closed since 1993 due to the fighting that had occurred in Nagorno Karabakh. However, in 1992 Turkey did not oppose Armenia joining the then newly established Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) based in Istanbul. Since 2001, Armenia has maintained a senior Ambassador accredited to the BSCE in that city. This connection has facilitated a steady flow of visiting foreign, transport, and energy ministers, among others, between the two states despite their formal lack of diplomatic relations.

Nevertheless, the hopes that have risen for the normalization of relations have proven premature. Both sides must take blame for this situation. For example, in September 2005, a Turkish court ruled that a controversial conference on the Armenian question should be suspended.¹⁴ The academic conference had been scheduled to examine critically the official Turkish approach to what had happened during World War I. It was the second time

the conference had been called off. The first attempt to hold it had been postponed in May 2005 when Turkey's Minister of Justice had called it an attempt to stab Turkey in the back. However, while the opposition to the conference had been spearheaded by a group of nationalistic lawyers, the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the court decision undemocratic.

A little more than a year later, however, the Turkish government invited Armenian officials and representatives of the Armenian diaspora to participate in Hrant Dink's funeral ceremony in January 2007, but no visible reconciliatory developments ensued. The attitude of Harut Sassounian, the publisher of the *California Courier*, is instructive. In a recent interview, Sassounian took umbrage over the *Los Angeles Times* publishing the transcript of a meeting with the Assembly of Turkish American Associations in which that Turkish group questioned the validity of Armenian claims about genocide: "Any group, no matter who they are, that denies any genocide or holocaust, I can not with a clear conscience call them a respectable group. They lose respectability when they deny genocide."¹⁵ In reply to a query about establishing a fact-finding mission to determine what actually happened, Sassounian replied: "I'm not the one who needs fact-finding. . . . I don't need to find out what happened. I know what happened."¹⁶ With such a self-righteous attitude, no wonder reconciliation efforts have proved so difficult.

TARC

Nevertheless, in recent years there have been several very tentative attempts to bring representatives of the two sides together. On July 9, 2001, for example, the US Department of State helped establish the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC) to employ track-two or civil society, nongovernmental, person-to-person diplomacy in an attempt to initiate a dialogue between Turks and Armenians. TARC's terms of reference were:

Terms of Reference are agreed to on this 9th day of July 2001 between Armenians and Turks from civil society who, working in an individual capacity, agree to establish the *Reconciliation Commission*.

The *Reconciliation Commission* grew out of meetings held at the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna.

The *Reconciliation Commission* seeks to promote mutual understanding and good will between Turks and Armenians and to encourage improved relations between Armenia and Turkey.

The *Reconciliation Commission* hopes, through its efforts, to build on the increasing readiness for reconciliation among Turkish and Armenian civil societies including members of Diaspora communities.

The *Reconciliation Commission* supports contact, dialogue and cooperation between Armenian and Turkish civil societies in order to create public awareness about the need for reconciliation and to derive practical benefits.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will directly undertake activities and catalyze projects by other organizations.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will develop recommendations to be submitted to concerned governments.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will support collaborative Track Two activities in the fields of business, tourism, culture, education and research, environment, media, confidence building, and other areas which are to be determined.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will secure expertise based on project requirements, and may include specialists on historical, psychological and legal matters, as well as other topics.

The *Reconciliation Commission* will review progress after one year.¹⁷

David L. Phillips, a senior conflict-solving facilitator, served as TARC's neutral Chairman. Founding members from the Turkish side included Ilter Turkmen, a former Turkish Foreign Minister; Gunduz Aktan, a former Turkish Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva; and Ozdem Sanberk, a former Turkish Ambassador to the United Kingdom, among others. Founding members for the Armenian side included Van Z. Krikorian, a New York attorney and representative of the Armenian Assembly of America since 1977; David Hovhanissian, a former Armenian Ambassador to Syria and Minister-at-Large for regional issues; and Alexander Arzoumanian, a former Armenian Foreign Minister and Ambassador to the United Nations.

According to David L. Phillips, TARC's Chairman:

TARC's detractors accused it of negotiating whether the Armenian genocide actually occurred. They also maintained that TARC's existence was used to deter international criticism of Turkey. In addition, TARC was attacked as a pawn of the U.S. government, and TARC members were labeled traitors. [Armenian] President [Robert] Kocharian's political opponents used TARC to impugn his leadership. Instead of standing by its commitments [to support TARC] the Kocharian government ran for cover.¹⁸

The Dashnaks opposed TARC because "first and foremost Dashnaks use genocide recognition to solicit money from the Armenian Diaspora. . . . To Dashnaks, TARC was an insidious devise undermining their reason for being. . . . If reconciliation occurs, they have no reason to exist."¹⁹ Phillips also noted the "Diaspora members are typically more hard-line. Having reaped the benefits from peace and prosperity, they have the luxury to assert uncompromising positions."²⁰

TARC tried to focus initially on culture in an attempt to “personalize Turkish-Armenian relations.”²¹ Indeed, according to Phillips “cultural events had the desired effect by generating positive media coverage and helping to reduce negative stereotypes.”²² Indeed, “prior to TARC, Armenian issues were virtually taboo in Turkey. TARC helped break the ice and a plethora of civil society initiatives ensued.”²³

However, problems soon arose. Although the Turks thought that normalizing the visa regime between Turkey and Armenia was a major achievement, TARC’s Armenian members did not agree. TARC also failed to establish a policy-working group. While Armenians wanted to see more results, the Turks wished to go slower. Thus, an expectation gap existed between the two sides that hindered positive momentum. The lack of a secretariat slowed any progress. Merely documenting discussions provided problems, as did negotiating the text of joint or chairman’s statements. Some TARC members made premature statements to the press, which were seen as breaches in confidentiality that dissipated goodwill. Other TARC members tended to put aside their unofficial capacities and began to act like state officials. “As criticism intensified, TARC’s inability to address the genocide issue raised doubts about the usefulness of continuing the process.”²⁴

Nevertheless, TARC’s Chairman felt that “significant . . . advances have been more visible in the field of civil society, where the most difficult barriers to direct contact are no longer present and the reconciliation process is not only underway but has assumed courses independent of TARC and official relations . . . exactly what TARC was designed to achieve.”²⁵ Upon its conclusion in 2004, TARC’s Chairman listed the following recommendations: (1) Official contacts should be further improved. (2) Opening of the Turkish Armenian border should be announced and implemented. (3) The two governments should publicly support civil society programs focused on education, science, culture, and tourism. (4) Standing mechanisms for cooperation on humanitarian disaster assistance and health care should be established. (5) Security and confidence-building measures between Turkey and Armenia should be enhanced. (6) Religious understanding should be encouraged. (7) More confidence should be developed between the Turkish and Armenian people.. Despite these apparent beginnings, it remains to be seen how successful TARC will come to be seen.

Joint Committees of Experts

In 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sent a letter to Armenian President Robert Kocharian in which Erdogan proposed a joint committee of Turkish and Armenian experts to study the Armenian

allegations of genocide.²⁶ The Armenians, however, hesitated, replying the committee should instead be composed of governmental officials. In a speech in Baku, Erdogan reiterated his position that conducting historical research was not an issue for politicians: "Let historians, political scientists, archeologists, lawyers and historians of art study this issue."²⁷ He then speculated that the Armenians were not replying because then they would have to answer for the Khojali massacre in which 683 Azeri civilians were killed by Armenians on February 25–26, 1992, during the fighting over Nagorno Karabakh: "There is still no answer because then they will have to face the Hocali [Khojali] massacre." However, the Turkish Prime Minister then declared that "if it is eventually understood that there is a grievance, then we will do what we're supposed to do." In other words, Erdogan seemed to be saying that Turkey would admit wrongdoing if the evidence so proved. This then was truly an amazing declaration that should encourage the Armenians to put aside their pretense of complete innocence and refusal even to discuss anything but a Turkish admittance of guilt.

At the same time, however, a related possibility of joint Turkish-Armenian research on the issue fell through. In February 2005, Ara Sarafian, the founding Director of the Gomidas Institute²⁸ in London, originally had accepted the proposal of Yusuf Halacoglu,²⁹ the Chairman of the Turkish Historical Society, to discuss what had happened on the Harput Plain (where many Armenians had lived in eastern Anatolia) and how many people had died there during the Armenian deportations. Soon afterwards, however, Sarafian indicated that he was not willing to proceed with such a study since certain Ottoman records would not be available. The Armenian scholar was apparently referring to Halacoglu's remarks during a television interview in which he said that Sarafian might not be able to discover what he was seeking in the Ottoman archives. Halacoglu asked Sarafian to reveal exactly what he was looking for and then added that he thought the Armenian scholar had come under heavy criticism from the Armenian diaspora because of his initial willingness to work with Turkish scholars. The Turkish scholar also indicated that Sarafian was disturbed by the Turkish request to study the Dashnak archives.

In reply, Sarafian stated:

Primary sources outside of Turkey indicate that the 1915 deportation of Armenians and the liquidation of their properties were regulated by Ottoman state authorities. Armenians were deported under the auspices of Ottoman officials. And most deportees were killed through privations and outright massacres on their way or in their places of exile (most notably Der Zor). Our sources indicate that there never was a resettlement program as historians

defending the official Turkish thesis suggest. . . . [Sarafian then asked Halacoglu to] explain why he thinks that the Ottoman deportation and resettlement registers the Gomidas Institute requested do not exist—especially those on Harput and its environs.³⁰

On a related matter, Halacoglu also announced that he had agreed with David Gaunt, a historian from Soderntorn University in Sweden, to conduct joint research on opening recently discovered mass graves in Nusaybin in the southeastern Anatolian province of Mardin. Armenian historians have said that these graves might contain the remains of victims from the massacres in 1915. Halacoglu declared that he was confident that these graves were from ancient times and not related to the Armenian accusations.

In addition, there have been five Workshops for Armenian/Turkish Scholarship (WATS) held at the University of Chicago in 2000, the University of Michigan in 2002, the University of Minnesota in 2004, Salzburg in 2005, and New York University in 2006. These Workshops have been directed by Professors Muge Gocsek of the University of Michigan, Gerard J. Libaridian of the University of Michigan, and Ronald Grigor Suny of the University of Chicago. They have sought to investigate through scholarship the history and politics of the deportations and massacres of Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire and related questions, but consisted mainly of Armenian and pro-Armenian scholars joined by a few Turkish ones. Thus, these Workshops were not neutral venues in which both sides were given equal opportunities to make their case.

In May 2007, Ragmar Naess, a wealthy Scandinavian, invited nine or ten Turkish and Armenian scholars to Oslo, Norway, to unofficially discuss the situation.³¹ Hilmar Kaiser read an interesting paper for the Armenians, while Garabed Moumjian, who knows Ottoman Turkish, and Khatchig Mouradian, the current editor of the Dashnak newspaper in the United States *The Armenian Weekly*, also made substantive contributions. Dennis Papazian, a retired Professor and reasonable interlocutor, announced on arrival that he was not interested in discussing whether or not there had been an Armenian genocide but would be pleased to discuss any other aspects of Armenian-Turkish relations. On the Turkish side, Justin McCarthy, an American Professor of Turkish studies known for his pro-Turkish position, was a prominent participant. Baskin Oran, a noted Turkish Professor who has studied ethnic identities in Turkey, read a good paper, which did not please the more conservative Turks. Kemal Cicek, a member of the Turkish Historical Society, presented the Turkish point of view but with a pleasant demeanor. Yavuz Baydar also made a favorable impression. The conference participants agreed not to discuss specifics in public, but did issue a joint statement that said little besides

announcing their meeting, discussion of important things, and agreement to meet again. One Armenian participant said that he did not hold out much hope for the Oslo meeting at present because the issue of genocide was now a political issue between Armenia and Turkey. Once a governmental agreement would be reached, however, academics would be called upon to vouch for its accuracy. At the present time, no Turkish scholar wanted to stick his neck out, but unless there would be good representation from Turkey, further talks would be difficult.

Nevertheless, some 200 Turkish intellectuals used the phrase *Buyuk Felaket* [Great Catastrophe] in an apology issued in December 2008, and also signed online by about 29,500 others: "My conscience does not accept the insensitivity showed to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Armenians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathize with the feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologize to them."³² Although this apology was criticized to varying degrees by the Turkish Prime Minister, President, armed forces general staff, conservative retired diplomats, and nationalist newspapers, the reaction was much less than would have occurred only a few years earlier. Indeed, the Ankara Chief Prosecutor's Office decided not to prosecute the signers, which in the past would have been unthinkable. Thus, the "Great Apology" demonstrated how some modern Turkish opinion was willing to move beyond the earlier sterile denials of any wrongdoing.

Similarly, in January 2009, Murat Bardakci, a Turkish scholar, published Armenian population figures in Turkey from a long-lost record left by Talaat Pasha, indicating that nearly a million Armenians who had been living in the Ottoman Empire before 1915 had disappeared by 1917.³³ Although few in the Turkish media commented about this finding, it was still a token of Turkey's growing democratic maturity that these figures could even be revealed. Bardakci himself stated that "I could never have published this book 10 years ago. I would have been called a traitor. The mentality has changed."³⁴

In addition, following the groundbreaking work of the TARC in 2001–2002, more than a dozen other track-two projects have tried to ameliorate relations including joint concerts in Istanbul and Yerevan, art exhibitions, student exchanges, a youth summit, a Turkish-Armenian women's magazine, reciprocal visits between think tank officials, and photography exhibits. On March 17, 2009, approximately 40 Turkish and Armenian NGO activists met in a large conference in Yerevan and agreed on the necessity for an unconditional normalization of links.³⁵ Although these track-two initiatives have had only mixed results, they still manifest a momentum that would have been impossible to even conceive of earlier.

Thus, over the past decade, a new, more liberal Turkey has been emerging. Under the stewardship of the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (AKP) government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey has sought greater democratization, while its European Union (EU) accession bid has led to the harmonization of many of its laws with those of the EU.³⁶ This process of democratization has led to more emphasis on Turkey's soft power³⁷ and the desire to pursue a new foreign policy of zero problems with its neighbors.³⁸ The AKP's massive electoral victory over determined military and Kemalist opposition in July 2007, on-going Ergenekon investigation of reputed military coup attempts, large sympathy demonstration in Istanbul for Hrant Dink, (a Turkish-Armenian Editor assassinated in January 2007 by apparent ultranationalist Turks), and removal of hard-line Yusuf Halacoglu as the Chairman of the Turkish Historical Society, among numerous other developments, further indicates this new current of thought.

The Swiss Role

After two years of closed talks in Switzerland, Turkey, Armenia, and Switzerland announced on April 22, 2009, that they had reached a road map to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations:

Turkey and Armenia, together with Switzerland as mediator, have been working intensively with a view to normalizing their bilateral relations and developing them in a spirit of good-neighbourliness, and mutual respect, and thus to promoting peace, security and stability in the whole region.

The two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road map has been identified. This agreed basis provides a positive prospect for the on-going process.³⁹

This road map then led quickly to further negotiations and the signing of two Protocols before the year was out.

Soccer Diplomacy

The Five-Day War between Russia and Georgia that began on August 8, 2008, also contributed to the momentum by showing Turkey how vulnerable its communication and energy routes through Georgia were. New incentives had been created for opening the border with Armenia as a way to construct necessary alternative routes. In addition, Russia now looked more favorably upon a Turkish-Armenian rapprochement given its reasserted

prominence in the region. The United States and the EU were already on board as approving, and Turkey was willing to satisfy them in return for being seen as willing to mend fences with Armenia.⁴⁰

Thus, on September 6, 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gul accepted an invitation from his Armenian counterpart Serzh (Serge) Sarkisyan (Sarkisian) and journeyed to Yerevan, Armenia, to watch Turkey and Armenia play against each other in a World Cup qualifying soccer match. Gul's visit was the first ever by a Turkish President and sparked speculation that "soccer diplomacy" might initiate reconciliation between the two historical enemies as "ping-pong diplomacy" had 35 years earlier between the United States and China. In addition to the Turkish President, some 5,000 Turkish fans also traveled to the soccer match on special visas issued by the Armenian government. For its part, Turkey already had permitted free travel for Armenians to Turkey since 1995. Indeed, as many as 40,000 Armenian passport-holders are now believed to be working in Istanbul without official permits, but with the tacit approval of Turkish authorities.⁴¹ In the case of Gul's visit to Armenia, Sarkisyan had invited him the previous July and at that time had expressed a desire for "a new phase of dialogue with the government and people of Turkey, with the goal of normalizing relations and opening our common border."⁴²

For their part senior Turkish Foreign Ministry officials revealed that they had been meeting secretly with their Armenian counterparts in Switzerland for some time to arrange further initiatives.⁴³ Despite the Armenian parliament referring to Turkey's eastern provinces as "western Armenia" in its declaration of sovereignty on August 23, 1990, Turkey had recognized Armenian independence earlier than most other states and had also invited Armenia to join the BSEC Organization as a founding member in 1992 even though it did not have any border on that body of water.⁴⁴ Turkey had also been providing energy to Armenia when it faced serious energy shortages during the 1990s, as well as donating 100,000 tons of wheat to it then. In addition, flights between Yerevan and Istanbul continue to run despite the closed border. Turkey even allows in thousands of illegal Armenian workers. In the wake of the brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, Turkey offered Armenia membership in its new project, The Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform. Apropos to the initiation of soccer diplomacy, Turkey had also been permitting Armenian soccer (football) teams to organize preparation camps in Antalya, a large Turkish city on the Mediterranean Sea.

Gul's office stated that his visit "will be an opportunity to overcome obstacles and prepare a new ground to bring the two people together."⁴⁵ Sarkisyan declared that "without forgetting the past, we must look to the future. If there is a dialogue, we can discuss any, even the most difficult

questions. We must shape a mutually beneficial agenda and begin contacts without preconditions.”⁴⁶ Mark Parris, the former US Ambassador to Turkey and currently a scholar at the Brookings Institution, said: “Both capitals have wanted to find a solution for some time, but third parties—including Azerbaijan, in the case of Turkey, and the Armenian diaspora, in the case of Yerevan—have militated against one.”⁴⁷

Nevertheless, in Yerevan, Gul’s motorcade passed hundreds of protesters calling for Turkey to admit its role in the Armenian massacres. His visit, however, enabled him to confer with Sarkisyan, talks that Gul characterized as heralding a breakthrough in relations: “Everything will move forward and normalize if this climate continues. I believe my visit has destroyed a psychological barrier in the Caucasus.”⁴⁸ Suren Sureniants, a senior Republic Party member in Armenia, seemingly concurred by stating: “The visit of the Turkish president is the most important political event for Armenia. The visit will have an indirect influence not only on our foreign, but also on domestic policy and will lead to the start of new relations.”⁴⁹ Levon Ter-Petrosian, the former Armenian President and current opposition leader, agreed: “We should establish normal, good-neighborly relations with Turkey without preconditions.”⁵⁰ Ter-Petrosian elaborated that “when I said this [earlier], they [Armenian government officials] would say what treachery it is. And now, they keep repeating it [positively what Ter-Petrosian had said] night and day.”⁵¹ Alexander Iskandarian, a political analyst at the Caucasus Media Center in Yerevan, said that there was strong political support in Armenia for détente with Turkey for economic reasons. He explained that Armenia’s hope was that better relations would lead to a permanent reopening of the Turkish-Armenian border. Currently, Armenia has no rail links to the West despite the fact that some 70 percent of its trade balance is with Europe.⁵²

Elmar Mammadyarov, the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan, added that Azeris “welcome this initiative positively.”⁵³ Most centrist Turkish media outlets were also supportive of Gul’s trip, while EU officials declared that it had enhanced political stability in the region. Important too was the support of Professor Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief advisor on foreign policy to the Turkish Prime Minister and subsequently the Turkish Foreign Minister. Mustafa Akyol, the Deputy Editor of the *Turkish Daily News*, felt it significant that the politically influential Turkish military was not objecting to Gul’s initiative: “Right now, the nationalist parties in the parliament are more nationalist than the military on some issues. And probably on this one, I think the military is not disturbed because the military understands that Turkey needs to secure its Caucasus borders and needs to have good relations. So probably the military is not a big obstacle on this issue.”⁵⁴

Following Gul's visit, the Foreign Ministers of the two states held additional talks. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Armenian President Sarkisian then met briefly at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2009. Sizing up the results of Gul's visit and its aftermath, The International Crisis Group concluded: "Since then, barely a week goes by without senior officials meeting. Armenia and Turkey 'have never been closer' to normalising relations."⁵⁵

Not all parties, however, were as pleased with these sudden developments. The Dashnaks vowed to carry out protests against Gul's visit. Ruben Safrastian, the Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies at the Armenian National Academy of Sciences, felt that Turkey would not deviate in any meaningful way from its current policy toward Armenia. Gul had come to Armenia due to regional tensions connected to Russia's war against Georgia and because of a possible upcoming debate in the US Congress over yet another pro-Armenian resolution: "There may be some small change that will result in some thaw between the two countries, however, Gul will try to use the visit to strengthen his positions in the region. The Turks will use this visit to prove their goodwill. However, in reality, they will do everything to use it in their interest."⁵⁶

Nationalistic Turkish leaders felt that the trip bordered on the betrayal of their country; the opposition leader of the Republican Peoples' Party in Turkey Deniz Baykal sarcastically opined that Gul should lay a wreath at the Yerevan genocide monument.⁵⁷ Devlet Bahcheli's Nationalist Action Party also criticized Gul's initiative.⁵⁸ The genocide issue had not even been directly broached. A careful Turkish think-tank study concluded: "There is not much change in the Armenian attitude overall." Despite Sarkisyan's "mild tone, . . . it is doubtful . . . whether such an approach alone will solve the direct problems between Turkey and Armenia."⁵⁹

Zurich Protocols

Following the soccer diplomacy initiative, the confidential talks alluded to above between Turkey and Armenia in Switzerland gained new impetus. On April 22, 2009, the parties arrived at a "roadmap" document toward establishing diplomatic relations. At first, however, the road map seemed to founder as both sides renewed hard-line positions. Turkey's desire to promote its "zero-problems" policy in the Middle East and further its EU candidacy, especially while its supporter Sweden held the rotating presidency, however, encouraged it toward an accommodation. For its part, Armenia, badly in need of economic stimuli and a breakout from its geographic isolation, finally agreed to two major concessions: the establishment of an historical commission to analyze the events of 1915 and acceptance of the present borders. The perception that

Armenian President Sarkisyan would not be able to reciprocate Turkish President Gul's attendance at the World Cup qualifying soccer match between the two on October 14, 2009, unless progress had been made served as an immediate catalyst.⁶⁰

Finally, on August 31, 2009, the two sides issued a joint statement that they had agreed "to start political negotiations aimed at establishing diplomatic relations."⁶¹ After six more weeks of internal political negotiations and with the Swiss government's assistance, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian finally signed two separate protocols at Zurich University in Zurich, Switzerland: (1) Protocol on Development of Relations; and (2) Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. However, what UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon termed an "historic decision"⁶² only occurred after a last-minute dispute over the final statements each would make was solved by agreeing that there would be no oral statements that might be construed as deal-breaking reservations. US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, US diplomat for Europe Philip Gordon, and Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey aided in clearing this last-minute hurdle.

When the problem regarding statements first arose, Clinton abruptly left the ceremony venue where the signing was to occur. She spoke from a sedan in her hotel parking lot three times with the Armenians and four times with the Turks. Escorted by a Swiss police car with lights and siren blazing, a Turkish diplomat finally arrived with a new draft of his state's statement. Clinton and Nalbandian then met in person at the hotel and drove back to Zurich University where the signing finally took place three hours later than originally scheduled. Along with the individuals already mentioned, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner, the EU high representative for common foreign and security policy Javier Solana, and Slovenian Foreign Minister Samuel Zbogar also attended the signing. Significantly perhaps for Turkey's EU hopes, Solana thanked Turkey and declared: "This is an important cooperation, no doubt, of Turkey, to solve one issue that pertains to a region which is in our neighborhood."⁶³ In Turkey, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared that Turkey was demonstrating its "goodwill" and added that it was also keen on seeing Armenian troops withdrawn from Nagorno Karabakh. He added: "[W]e are trying to boost our relations with Armenia in a way that will cause no hard feelings for Azerbaijan." Armenian President Serge Sarkisyan said that his state was taking a "responsible decision" in normalizing relations with Turkey, despite what he maintained were "the unhealable wounds of genocide." He added that "there is no alternative to the establishment of relations with Turkey without any precondition. It is the dictate of time."

Four days later, the Armenian President journeyed to Turkey where the Turkish President hosted him in the ancient Ottoman capital of Bursa for a final round of soccer diplomacy. There Sarkisyan specifically explained that his recent meeting with representatives of the powerful but skeptical Armenian diaspora was merely a briefing process, and that he was not “seeking permission”⁶⁴ from them to reconcile with Turkey. Turkish President Gul declared: “We’re not writing history, we’re making history.”

In the first protocol on the “Development of Relations,” the two sides agreed to open their “common border within 2 months after the entry into force of this Protocol.”⁶⁵ They also agreed to establish an “intergovernmental commission and various sub-commissions at ministerial level” on political consultations; transport, communications and energy infrastructure and networks; legal matters; science and education; trade, tourism, and economic cooperation; environmental issues; and historical dimension “in which Turkish, Armenian as well as Swiss and other international experts shall take place.” A working group headed by the foreign ministers of the two parties was tasked “to prepare the working modalities” of these different bodies. Specific time-tables of one, two, and three months were established for their implementation. Both protocols had to be ratified by the respective parliaments of the two new partners/parties.

Conclusion

Given the ancient history of bad will between Turks and Armenians, the Zurich Protocols they signed on October 10, 2009, held the distinct possibility of being of major historic significance. However, it would be premature to pronounce their problems solved. Indeed, Jennifer Lind has shown how attempts at apologies sometimes can be a risky tool for well-meaning peacemakers, causing more harm than good.⁶⁶ For example, post–World War II attempts at Japanese contrition have triggered domestic backlash resulting in conservative politicians, intellectuals, and patriots either justifying or denying past Japanese atrocities. Apologies can impugn wartime leaders, veterans, and those who died fighting for their country. Even in Britain, proposed apologies for former actions in Ireland as well as complicity in the slave trade sparked backlash. In the United States, a proposed Smithsonian exhibit to discuss the horrors of Hiroshima and question the necessity of using the atomic bomb triggered widespread backlash from Congress, veterans’ groups, and the media.

On the other hand, both Britain and the United States established close relations with West Germany without apologizing for firebombing German cities. Japan and the United States built a positive postwar relationship despite

neither side apologizing for their wartime actions. West Germany and France reconciled soon after World War II despite very little initial apologies from the former. Bonn's fulsome expressions of contrition only came later. German apologies did not provoke much backlash largely because of the unique strategic circumstances in which Germany found herself regarding her need to reassure NATO and the West and thus earn their protection from the Soviet Union.

The West German-French approach offers a non-accusatory strategy of shared catastrophes. Instead of singling out German brutality, the Franco-German memorial at Rheims cathedral and cemetery at Verdun highlight the suffering that militarism and ultranationalism brought both sides and thus emphasized their need for unity. Such multilateral approaches focus beyond blaming only one side by considering atrocities committed by many states in numerous wars. Since such multilateral themes do not accuse just one side, they are less likely to elicit backlash. Of course, if one side continues to see itself as uniquely innocent and requiring retributive justice, such multilateral approaches remain premature.

In the matter of the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement, several problems remain. First, as already mentioned, their agreements in Zurich need to be ratified by their respective parliaments before they can take effect. By the summer of 2010 it had become clear that strong nationalist opposition in both states had scuttled the Zurich Protocols, at least for the time being. On January 12, 2010, for example, the Armenian Constitutional Court struck a blow at the rapprochement by ruling that the Protocols signed in October 2009 could not override the 1990 Armenian declaration of sovereignty, which had declared that Armenia would seek international recognition of the genocide. Some would interpret this court ruling as preventing any further discussion with Turkey over this issue, one of the main reasons Turkey signed the Protocols in the first place and whose discussion Turkey argues is guaranteed by the Protocols.⁶⁷ In addition, the Armenian court implied that the Protocols could not have any bearing on the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Nagorno Karabakh. The Turkish Foreign Ministry immediately released a statement that Armenia was creating unacceptable preconditions that undermined the very reason for negotiating the Protocols.⁶⁸ Although certainly a problem, the Armenian Court's decision does not necessarily preclude mere discussion of the genocide issue. Indeed, the Armenian Court specifically ruled that the Protocols were in accord with the Constitution and thus could be ratified.

Nevertheless, Turkey seriously miscalculated the Azeri reaction to the Protocols as the seemingly intractable Nagorno Karabakh issue has led Azerbaijan to pressure Turkey against ratification.⁶⁹ Indeed, Azerbaijan even

hinted that it might reconsider its earlier commitment to deliver gas to Turkey. Rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia might drive Azerbaijan into the Russian hands.⁷⁰ By not dealing with the Nagorno Karabakh issue, Turkish nationalists also see the Protocols as betraying their Azeri kin.⁷¹ Finally, even if an historical commission is to be established to study what happened in 1915, it is difficult to see how it will be able to convince both sides whether genocide occurred. The on-going dispute simply will move to this commission. However, once both sides have to listen to the other's position instead of simply preaching to the choir, it is possible that some type of agreement will gradually emerge.⁷² As mentioned above, the two sides might be able to forego employing the g-word, in favor of the term *Buyuk Felaket/Mets Yeghern* or Great Catastrophe. Finally, some have suggested that Armenia could turn to Iran for the economic support it needs and which drives it to accept the rapprochement with Turkey.⁷³ However, given Iran's own economic malaise and escalating problems with the West, it is questionable how much the Islamic Republic can help Armenia.

Given this seeming impasse, there are some who now argue that the supposed rapprochement has actually made matters worse between Turkey and Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan, and even Turkey and the United States. In addition, Turkey's attempt to assume the role of a regional problem-solver has been botched, while Armenia remains economically isolated. Washington's hopes to revive its deteriorating relationship with Ankara have been frayed, while US calculations that the Protocols could reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia dashed. Only Russia would seem to have benefited by continuing its delicate balancing strategy in the region: Armenia remains tied to Russia, Russian ties with Azerbaijan have been fostered while Turkish and Azeri relations soured, relations with Turkey over regional and energy issues continued, and the United States prevented from becoming too successful in its initiatives.⁷⁴

On the other hand, the very fact that Turkey and Armenia signed the Protocols to establish diplomatic relations, open their borders, and create a Historical Commission illustrates that progress is being made even if ratification is not presently possible. Important governmental precedents have been set and institutions created. As soon as the diplomatic winds shift, as they usually do, the basis to pick up and continue to the finishing line already will have been established. What is more, track-two diplomacy between the two ancient enemies continues and is clearly beyond the point of no return. Turks and Armenians will continue to work through civil society contacts and exchanges that will lessen negative stereotypes and construct new confidences. Of course, only time will tell whether the present rapprochement will lead to a cordial peace or only to a cold peace as

has existed between Israel and Egypt since their peace treaty was signed in 1979.

Recommendations

Given the breakthrough and rapprochement in Turkish-Armenian relations that occurred in October 2009 but the impasse currently reached, what roads should Turkey now take? This, of course, is a most difficult question and surely there are behind-the-scenes contacts occurring of which this author is unaware. Nevertheless, based on what this book in general and this chapter in specific have shown, the following might be considered besides simply waiting for the diplomatic winds to shift in favor of ratification of the Protocols. If denial fuels continuing fear and revenge, while unilateral contrition risks backlash and subsequent demands for reparations, how can peacemakers confront the past?

In such a situation, Turkey should differentiate between the independent state of Armenia and the Armenian diaspora.⁷⁵ There are more opportunities for progress with Armenia because it needs to deal immediately with its severe economic problems, and Turkey is in a strong position to help. The more affluent Armenian diaspora, on the other hand, does not need any economic aid. Rather, it remains concerned primarily with its allegations of genocide, which has the effect of disengaging it from the immediate economic reality of Armenia. Indeed, one study found that diaspora communities in general tend to be more radical concerning the foreign policy of their homeland and associated conflicts than their kin who actually live in the homeland.⁷⁶ By helping Armenia with its economic problems, Turkey may begin to split the two Armenian actors.⁷⁷ According to an estimate from Kaan Soyak, the Director of the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council (TABC), opening the border could more than double Turkish-Armenian trade.⁷⁸ Such action could also boost foreign direct investment in Armenia by reducing the perception of its risk and isolation. In addition, open borders would appreciatively reduce Armenian transport costs now dependent on expensive, low-capacity, and vulnerable rail and road links through Georgia and its Black Sea ports. Although the much larger Turkish economy does not stand to gain nearly as much, open borders still would help develop such isolated Turkish towns as Kars, Igdir, Trabzon, and Erzurum, among others.

As for the genocide allegations, Turkey should continue to advocate a joint commission of historians to undertake an objective analysis. Since much of the Armenian diaspora opposes this approach as questioning the authenticity of its version of history, once again Turkey is presented with an opportunity to portray the Armenian diaspora as obstructionist, take a

constructive diplomatic stance that will please the West, while dividing the diaspora from the state of Armenia. Such a proactive instead of defensive approach would also strengthen Turkey's regional profile in the Caucasus, opening new possibilities for it to pursue roles as a mediator and facilitator in keeping with its recent position as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.

At the same time, however, Turkey should remain sensitive to Azeri concerns regarding Nagorno Karabakh. This remains a very emotional issue, for which the OSCE Minsk initiative and UN-authored attempts have not produced any solution. Once again, Turkey's Caucasian initiatives involving Armenia might offer new possibilities. Russia and to some extent even Iran, of course, will be key actors in all this, and must be convinced that the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will not threaten their interests. Although Russia may subtly benefit if the rapprochement falters, it is not likely that Russia will actively attempt to hamstring its revival as Moscow too could benefit by increased political and economic stability in the Caucasus. Iran's position is not as clear, but certainly not hostile. Finally, Turkey should remain susceptible to continuing track-two, civil society dialogues. As documented above, even in the Armenian diaspora there are those who should be willing to discuss discreetly all contentious matters. This will not be an easy process, and there is no guarantee of success. However, the long, arduous journey has already begun, and many Turks and Armenians have committed themselves to it.⁷⁹

Notes

Chapter 1

1. For analysis of the major Armenian terrorist groups, see my two studies: *"Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People": A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986); and *Transnational Armenian Activism*, Conflict Study No. 229 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990). Due to its negative repercussions for their cause, Armenian terrorism against Turkish diplomats ceased during the mid-1980s. For further analysis of Armenian terrorism, see Chapter 3 below. The Turkish-Armenian animosities, however, continue in the guise of the current struggle over Nagorno Karabagh (Artsakh) between the newly independent states of Armenia and (Turkic) Azerbaijan, the lack of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia, the Turkish and Azeri blockade of Armenia, and the continuing debate over whether the Ottoman Empire committed genocide against its Armenian citizens during World War I. I published an earlier version of this chapter as "The Historical Origins of the Armenian-Turkish Enmity," 4 (Nos. 1 & 2; 1992) *Journal of Armenian Studies* (special issue entitled "Genocide and Human Rights"), pp. 257–88.
2. Cited in *Armenian Weekly*, Jan. 14, 1984, pp. 1, 6, and 7. In 2002, Sassounian was denied parole because he remained unrepentant for murdering the Turkish Consul General. Shortly before this incident, *Haytoug*—the official publication of the Armenian Youth Federation and located in Glendale, California—declared: "The likes of Hampig Sassounian . . . for us are not terrorists, and are not killers, they are martyrs, and heroes, the souls of a forgotten past." *Haytoug*, November/December 2000, p. 9.
3. See, for example, *Armenian Weekly*, Dec. 10, 1983, p. 3.
4. On this point, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 356; and Avedis K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 274.
5. A. O. Sarkissian, *History of the Armenian Question to 1885* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1938), p. 37. Sarkissian based his study on *The Records of the National Assembly* (in Armenian), which from 1860 to 1914 was "the principal Armenian deliberative body" in the Ottoman Empire. "In some 30 quarto

- volumes these constitute a true mine of information on Armenian affairs in Turkey." Ibid., p. 36n.
6. Ibid., pp. 33–34.
 7. Ibid., p. 33.
 8. Ibid., p. 18.
 9. James Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1896), pp. 523–24.
 10. Fridtjof Nansen, *Armenia and the Near East* (New York: Daffield & Company, 1928), p. 283.
 11. On this very important point, see Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), pp. 46–88, 109–16, 121–30, and especially the summary tables on pp. 110–12. For a different interpretation of the population data, see Levon Marashlian, "Population Statistics on Ottoman Armenians in the Context of Turkish Historiography," *Armenian Review* 40 (Winter 1987), pp. 1–59.
 12. Robert Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of 1915," (Paper presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Chicago, Nov. 4, 1983), p. 18.
 13. Ibid.
 14. Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 356.
 15. David Lang, *The Armenians: A People in Exile* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 10.
 16. Bilal N. Simsir, ed., *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians. Volume I (1856–1880)* (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1982), p. 52.
 17. Ibid., p. 16.
 18. Ibid., p. 65.
 19. Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, p. 425.
 20. Simsir, *British Documents*, pp. 161–62.
 21. Ibid., pp. xviii.
 22. Ibid., p. 191.
 23. Ibid., p. 267.
 24. William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902* (Boston: Knopf, 1951), p. 157. Similarly, see William Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 44.
 25. Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), especially pp. 97–99, 109–12, 119, 127–28, and 168.
 26. James Ring Adams, "Facing Up to an Armenian Genocide," *Wall Street Journal*, August 12, 1983, p. 20.
 27. Russell Warren Howe, "Exaggeration of a Tragic Past Provides Rationale for Terrorism," *Washington Times*, August 2, 1983, p. 7A.
 28. Christopher Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 201.

29. See Aram Andonian, ed., *The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians* (London, 1920, reprinted, Newtown Square, PA: Armenian Historical Research Association, 1964). The Turks claim that these documents are obvious forgeries. See Sinasi Orel and Sureyya Yuca, *The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?* (Nicosia: K. Rustem and Bro., 1986). For a defense of the authenticity of the telegrams, see Vahakn D. Dadrian, "The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (August 1986), pp. 311–60. For a critique of Dadrian's position, see Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), pp. 63–73; and "Gunter Response to Dadrian Article," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19 (November 1987), pp. 523–24.
30. For a listing of sources, see Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915–1923* (Cambridge, MA: Armenian Heritage Press, 1978). See also, Vahakn N. Dadrian, "Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications," *Yale Journal of International Law* 14 (Summer 1989), pp. 221–334.
31. James Bryce, compiler, *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16*, Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous no. 31 (London: Joseph Cavston, 1916).
32. Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, 1919). Morgenthau also published virtually the same account as *Secrets of the Bosphorus* (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1918).
33. Bryce, *Treatment of Armenians*, pp. xxi.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 90 (German eyewitness).
35. Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, pp. 318–21.
36. Bryce, *Treatment of Armenians*, p. xxvii.
37. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), p. 50.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. vii–viii.
39. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 241.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 149.
41. H. A. L. Fisher, *James Bryce*, Vol. II (New York: Macmillan Company, 1927), p. 143.
42. *Ibid.*, pp. 183–84.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 181.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Bryce, *Transcaucasia and Ararat*, p. 345.
46. Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*, p. 337.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 334.

48. Ibid., p. 275.
49. Ibid., pp. 276–77. For a further critique of Morgenthau, see Heath W. Lowry, *The Story behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990).
50. Toynbee, *Acquaintances*, p. 240.
51. Ibid., p. 241.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., p. 242.
54. Ibid., p. 151.
55. Letter to Lillian K. Etmekjian, reproduced in “The Evidence for the Armenian Genocide in the Writings of Two Prominent Turks,” *Armenian Review* 35 (Summer 1982), p. 184.
56. Enver Ziya Karal, *Armenian Question* (Ankara: Gunduz, 1975), p. 18.
57. “Let Us Speak the Truth” (Statement published by the Federation of Turkish American Societies, Inc.), *New York Times*, May 18, 1975. More recently, see the massive compilation of different essays by Sukru Server Aya, *The Genocide of Truth* (Istanbul: Istanbul Commerce University, 2008). For further Turkish studies in English, see Kamuran Gurun, *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); and Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, *The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy* (London: K. Rustem & Bro., 1987). In addition, the lengthy Turkish study by Esat Uras, first published in 1950, has been published in English as *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question* (Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988). Also see Lewy, *Disputed Genocide*.
58. *Turkish Daily News*, Sept. 9, 1982, p. 2.
59. See W. E. D. Allen and Paul Muratoff, *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1928–1921* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 43, 51, 84.
60. K[apriel] S[erope] Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune* (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934), p. 39. Also see, Hovhannes Katchaznouni, *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Anymore* (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955, edited reprint of 1923 original).
61. *Documents* (Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, 1982), p. 18. In citing the Turkish translation into English of these Ottoman documents, I have reproduced the wording as it appears whenever the meaning was clear. To add editorial “*sics*” seemed pedantic.
62. Ibid., p. 26.
63. Ibid., p. 30.
64. Ibid., p. 50.
65. Ibid., p. xv.
66. *Documents*, Vol. II (Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, 1983), pp. 49–52.
67. “Armenian Allegations and Some Facts,” *ATA-USA: Bulletin of the Assembly of American Turkish Associations* (April, 1980), p. 4.

68. This and the preceding citations were taken from *Setting the Record Straight on Armenian Propaganda against Turkey* (booklet published by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, 1982).
69. *Documents*, pp. 257–59.
70. See, for example, even more lurid descriptions in *ibid.*, pp. 130–31, 208, 227.
71. Neside Kerem Demir, *The Armenian Question in Turkey* (1980), p. 78.
72. See Gwynne Dyer, “Turkish ‘Falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘Deceivers’: Historiography and the Armenian Massacres,” *Middle East Studies* 12 (January 1976), pp. 99–107. Also see his letters to *ibid.*, 9 (1973), pp. 129–30 and 377–85.
73. McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*, p. 130.
74. *NewsSpot: Turkish Digest* (published on behalf of the Directorate General of Press and Information, Ankara, Turkey), September 17, 1982, p. 4.
75. *Facts from the Turkish Armenians* (Istanbul: Jamanak [Armenian Daily], 1980), p. 6.
76. Cited in Walker, *Armenia: Survival of a Nation*, p. 202n.
77. Cited in Adams, “Facing Up to an Armenian Genocide.”
78. *The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1982), p. 3.
79. Salahi R. Sonyel, “quoting with approval a selection of American relief experts who had low opinions of the Armenians,” in Dyer, “Turkish ‘Falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘Deceivers,’” pp. 100–1.
80. Demir, *Armenian Question in Turkey*, p. 83.
81. *Armenian Weekly* (special issue) June 1, 1983, p. 42.
82. *Armenian Reporter*, June 30, 1983, p. 2.
83. See Werner Keller, *Diaspora: The Post-Biblical History of the Jews* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969), pp. 269–77.
84. On these points, see in general, Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus* (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monograph, 1982).
85. “Forum: The Armenian Question,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9 (1978), pp. 379–400.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 387. An editor at the Cambridge University Press told me how certain Americans of Armenian descent tried to pressure and even threaten his press against publishing the Shaw study.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
88. Christopher J. Walker, “The Armenian Holocaust in Its Modern Historical Context,” *Ararat* 24 (Spring 1983), p. 45.
89. *Ibid.*
90. Norman Ravitch, “The Armenian Catastrophe: Of History, Murder and Sin,” *Encounter* (December 1981), pp. 72, 77.
91. Andrew Corsun, “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile,” *US Department of State Bulletin*, August 1982, p. 35.
92. *US Department of State Bulletin*, April 1983. See also, *ibid.*, September 1982.
93. *Documents*, p. 1.

94. For a much fuller development of these important points, see my "Self-Determination in the Recent Practice of the United Nations," *World Affairs* 137 (Fall 1974), pp. 150–65; "Self-Determination or Territorial Integrity: The United Nations in Confusion," *World Affairs* 141 (Winter 1979), pp. 203–16; and the many citations to other scholarly analyses therein.
95. See, for example, Shavarsh Toriguian, *The Armenian Question and International Law* (Beirut: Hamaskaine Press, 1973), pp. 74–86.
96. McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*, pp. 46–88, 109–16, 121–30. For a different interpretation of the population data, see Levon Marashlian, "Population Statistics on Ottoman Armenians in the Context of Turkish Historiography," *Armenian Review* 40 (Winter 1987), pp. 1–59.
97. McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities*, p. 115.
98. Levon Marashlian, *Politics and Demography: Armenians, Turks and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1991).
99. The following discussion is based on Richard Hovannisian, "The Armenian Case: Toward a Just Solution," *The California [Armenian] Courier*, December 1, 1983, p. 9.
100. Edward Hatchadourian of Pompano Beach, Florida, letter to the editor, *Christian Science Monitor*, September 12, 1983, p. 22.
101. Levon K. Topouzian, *Chicago Tribune*, reprinted in *Armenian Weekly*, September 17, 1983, p. 3.
102. Cited in *The California [Armenian] Courier*, October 20, 1983, p. 3.
103. This and the following citations are taken from the transcript of the interview that appeared in *Armenian Reporter*, October 11, 1984, pp. 1, 12.
104. Cited in Harry N. Howard, *An American Inquiry in the Middle East: The King-Crane Commission* (Beirut: Khayats, 1963), p.165.
105. *The Turco-Armenian Question: The Turkish Point of View* (Constantinople: National Congress of Turkey 1919 [reprinted]), pp. 83, 85.
106. *Ibid.*, pp. 117–18.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
109. Vazken L. Parsegian, "April 24, 1985—A Time for Change," *Armenian Reporter*, October 4, 1984, p. 3. The following citations are taken from this article.
110. Enver Ziya Karal, *Armenian Question* (Ankara: Gunduz, 1975), p. 26.
111. See Ozur Diliyorum, accessed August 18, 2009, www.ozurdiliyorus.com.

Chapter 2

1. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).
2. See, for example, the brief discussion in Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell": *America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 17–20.

3. See Kevork B. Bardakjian, *Hitler and the Armenian Genocide* (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1985), p. 28; and Jacques Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. 195. Many others have also cited this reputed statement by Hitler.
4. The following discussion is largely based on Heath W. Lowry, "The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians," *Political Communication and Persuasion: An International Journal* Vol. 3, No. 2 (1985), pp. 111–40.
5. Louis P. Lochner, *What about Germany?* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1942).
6. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 277, entered into force on January 12, 1951.
7. For a small sample, see Alex Alvarez, *Governments, Citizens and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001); Gary Jonathan Bass, *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Donald Bloxham, *Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin Books, 1981); Eric Markusen and David Kope, *The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993); Manus Midlarsky, *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Rudolf J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994); Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Colin M. Tatz, *With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide* (London: Verso, 2003); and Benjamin A. Valentino, *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Periodicals dealing with the subject include the *Journal of Genocide Research* and *Holocaust and Genocide Studies: An International Journal*.
8. Jacques Semelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide*, trans. from the French by Cynthia Schoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
9. Crimes against Humanity, as defined by the Nuremberg precedent after World War II and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, include: the crimes of murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds; and other inhumane acts, when committed in an armed conflict,

- whether international or national in character, and directed against any civilian population. See Peter Malanczuk, *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*, revised 7th ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 356.
10. War Crimes, as defined by the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Nuremberg Tribunal following World War II, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, among others, include: the use of weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, the wanton destruction of cities not justified by military necessity, the attack or bombardment of undefended towns, the seizure of or destruction and damage to institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, historic monuments or works of art or science, and the plunder of public or private property, depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of a fair and regular trial, unlawful deprivation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian, and the taking of civilians as hostages, among others. See *ibid.*
 11. This partial listing, of course, is not to reject genocide as an accurate description for what occurred in some of these states. See below.
 12. Sabrina Tavernise and Matt Siegel, "In Areas under Russian Control, Limits for Western Media," *New York Times*, August 10, 2008, p. A10; and Robert Marquand, "Russia Exploits Division in Europe," *Christian Science Monitor*, September 3, 2008.
 13. Israel W. Charny, "Towards a Generic Definition of Genocide," in *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions*, ed. George J. Andreopoulos (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), pp. 64–94.
 14. Stephen Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context*, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
 15. Ton Zwaan, "On the Aetiology and Genesis of Genocides and Other Mass Crimes Targeting Specific Groups," Report written at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, University of Amsterdam/Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, November 2003, p. 12.
 16. Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 321.
 17. This term was coined by Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945," *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 32 (1988), pp. 369–81. The following "cides" also have authors, which may be consulted in Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, pp. 319–20.
 18. Henry R. Huttenbach, "Locating the Holocaust under the Genocide Spectrum: Toward a Methodology of Definition and Categorization," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* Vol. 3, No. 3 (1988), p. 297; as cited in Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 423/no. 11.
 19. Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 312.
 20. *Ibid.*
 21. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
 22. For background on Bosnia, see Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime* (New York: Penguin, 1997); Human Rights Watch,

- Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); Samantha Power, *"A Problem from Hell": American and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 247–327 and 391–441; David Rohde, *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997); Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, pp. 34–35, 65–66, 138–39, 195–98, 213–20, and 245–46; and United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica*, UN Doc. No. A/54/549, Nov. 15, 1999.
23. International Court of Justice, *The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro)*, case 91, The Hague, 26 February 2007. On the other hand, the ICJ was widely viewed as compromising on the matter of genocide when it ruled that Serbia was not directly involved in genocide during the Bosnian War. Rather, Serbia had only breached international law by failing to prevent the Srebrenica genocide and failing to try to transfer those accused of genocide to the ICTY. Thus, "the Court's findings in those paragraphs constitute appropriate satisfaction, and that the case is not one in which an order for payment of compensation . . . would be appropriate." *Ibid.*
 24. "Srebrenica Genocide: Questions and Answers," accessed July 23, 2008, <http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com/2007/07>, July 7, 2007, p. 5.
 25. *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
 27. Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 412/n72.
 28. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
 29. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
 30. Maxime Steinberg, "Le genocide. Historie d'un imbroglio juridique," in *Genocide*, ed. Kathia Boustany and Daniel Dormoy (Bruxelles: Ed. De l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1999), p. 161, as cited in Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 423/n16.
 31. Jean-Michel Chaumont, *La concurrence des victims* (Paris: La Decouverte, 1997), as cited in Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 424/n20.
 32. Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 345.
 33. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
 34. See, for example, Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001).
 35. International Court of Justice, *Bosnia vs. Serbia*, Feb. 26, 2007.
 36. Semelin, *Purify and Destroy*, p. 346.
 37. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
 38. For a few analyses of Darfur, see M. W. Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Julie

- Flint and Alex de Waal, *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2005); Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Brian Steidle and Gretchen Steidle Wallace, *The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur* (New York: Public Affairs, 2007); and *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan*, ed. Samuel Totten and Eric Markusen (New York: Routledge, 2006).
39. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and Bureau of Intelligence and Research, *Documenting the Atrocities in Darfur*, September 2004. See also, Daly, *Darfur's Sorrow*, pp. 270–316.
 40. Ewen MacAskill, "Sudan's Darfur Crimes Not Genocide, Says UN Report," *The Guardian*, Feb. 1, 2005.
 41. See Scott Straus, "Darfur and the Genocide Debate," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January/February 2005), pp. 128 and 130.
 42. Cited in Times.online, "Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, Charged with Genocide," accessed July 20, 2008, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article4330605.ece>.
 43. News.com, "New Charges against Sudan's President a Help or a Hindrance?" accessed July 22, 2010, [http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/New-Charges-Against-Sudans-President . . .](http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/east/New-Charges-Against-Sudans-President...); and Press TV, "Chad Accuses ICC of Bias against Africa," accessed July 22, 2010, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=135871§ionid=351020506>.
 44. Christopher de Ballaigue, *Rebel Land: Among Turkey's Forgotten Peoples* (London: Bloomsbury, 2009), p. 104.
 45. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations* (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922), pp. vii–viii.
 46. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Acquaintances* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 241.
 47. Mark L. Bristol, as cited in Laurence Evans, *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey 1914–1924* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 272.
 48. Edward J. Erickson, "The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy, 1915," *War in History* 15 (No. 2, 2008), p. 167. See also, Edward J. Erickson, "Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame," *Middle East Quarterly* 13 (Summer 2006); and Justin McCarthy, *The Armenian Rebellion in Van* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). For a massive recent Turkish compilation of numerous different essays in English, see Sukru Server Aya, *The Genocide of Truth* (Istanbul: Istanbul Commerce University, 2008).
 49. Erickson, "Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy," p. 167.
 50. Taner Akcam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006), p. 187. For two more recent studies that found genocide, see Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003); and Desmond Fernandes, *The Armenian, Assyrian, Greek,*

- Kurdish and Greek Cypriot Genocides and the Politics of Denialism* (Stockholm: Apec Press, 2008), both of whom saw a plethora of genocides committed by the Turks.
51. Erman Sahin, "Review Essay: A Scrutiny of Akcam's Version of History and the Armenian Genocide," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 28 (August 2008), p. 316. In a later critique of Akcam's subsequent work, Sahin concluded: "These are substantive matters that raise serious concerns as to the author's theses, which appear to be based on a selective and distorted presentation of Ottoman archival materials and other sources. . . . Such errors seriously undermine the author's and the book's credibility." Erman Sahin, "Review Essay: The Armenian Question," *Middle East Policy* 17 (Spring 2010), p. 157.
 52. Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 53. Donald Bloxham, "The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy," *Past and Present*, No. 181 (November 2003), p. 143.
 54. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
 55. Kurt Jonassohn, "What is Genocide?" in *Genocide Watch*, ed. Helen Fein (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 21.
 56. On the principle of *ius cogens*, see Malanczuk, *Modern Introduction to International Law*, p. 57. This treaty was written in 1969 and came into effect in 1980, but mainly codifies already existing customary international law.
 57. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 217, UN Doc. A/810, p. 71 (1948). Although the UDHR was originally only a recommendation, today it is recognized as international law through custom as well as codification through the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both Covenants came into force in 1976. See Malanczuk, *Modern Introduction to International Law*, pp. 212–13 and 215.
 58. The classic case in international law dealing with the problem of intertemporal law is the celebrated Island of Palmas case in 1928 when the famous Swiss jurist Max Huber, acting as the arbitrator, pronounced on the subject. See Malanczuk, *Modern Introduction to International Law*, pp. 155–56. Of course, as Malanczuk notes, the problem of intertemporal law is "really nothing more than an example of the general principle that laws should not be applied retroactively." *Ibid.*, p. 155.
 59. Bloxham, *Great Game of Genocide*, p. 232.
 60. *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Anymore* (Reprint), trans. from the original by Matthew A. Callender and ed. John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian) (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955), p. 2. This version of Katchaznouni's address, which I have used, omitted some text about Armenian dealings with the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s. For a complete e-version of Katchaznouni's testimony, see Lale Akalin,

- Dashnagtzountiun Has Nothing To Do Anymore—Hovhannes Katchaznoui Manifesto*, 2006. Accessed July 15, 2008, <http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2006/05/679-dashnagtzoutin-has-nothing-to-do.thml>. As noted in Chapter 1, the Dashnaks were founded in 1890 as a revolutionary Armenian nationalist party and took a leading role in the bloody battles against the Turks, a struggle that still continues politically.
61. Ibid., pp. 2–3.
 62. Ibid., p. 3.
 63. Ibid., p. 4.
 64. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 16.
 65. For further details, see Christopher J. Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), p. 353.
 66. K[apriel] S[erop] Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune* (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934), p. 7.
 67. Ibid., pp. 13, 15.
 68. Ibid., p. 21.
 69. Ibid., pp. 38–39.
 70. Ibid., pp. 40–41, 43, and 44.
 71. Ibid., p. 47–48.
 72. Ibid., p. 50.
 73. Ibid., pp. 52–53.
 74. Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2005). My following discussion of Lewy's book largely and originally appeared as a review I published in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38 (November 2006), pp. 598–600. The page numerals in the text referred to the pages in Lewy's book.
 75. Vahakn N. Dadrian has produced an enormous amount of scholarly work. For a sample of some of it that Lewy criticizes, see *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity* (Cambridge, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1996); *The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification* (Toronto: Zoryan Institute, 1999); "The Role of the Special Organization in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War," in *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars*, ed. Panikos Panayi (Oxford: Berg, 1993), pp. 50–82; and "The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 1 (1986), pp. 169–92.
 76. Johannes Lepsius, *Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei* (Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1916).
 77. Armin T. Wegner, *Der Weg ohne Heimkehr: Ein Martyrium in Briefen*, 2nd ed. (Dresden: Sibyllen, 1920).
 78. *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16, Great Britain*, Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous, No. 31 (London: Joseph Cavston, 1916).

79. Henry Morgenthau, *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, 1919).
80. See Leslie A. Davis, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917*, ed. Susan K. Blair (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989).
81. *Middle East Journal* 60 (Spring 2006), p. 378.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 379.
83. *Middle East Policy* 15 (Spring 2008), p. 177.
84. *Ibid.*
85. *Ibid.*, p. 176.
86. "A Response to Michael Gunter's Review of *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (IJMES 38 [2006]: 598–601," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (August 2007), pp. 509–14.
87. I originally largely published the following as "A Reply to Joseph Kechichian and Keith Watenpaugh," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (August 2007), pp. 514–18. The following textual material in quotation marks was taken from Kechichian's and Watenpaugh's response to my original review of Lewy's book. I have cited their response in the immediately preceding endnote.
88. For a representative example of Shaw's work, see Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1805–1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
89. One of Lewis's best-known works is Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). On May 19, 1985, 69 prominent academics in Turkish Ottoman and Middle Eastern Studies (including Bernard Lewis) published a large advertisement in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* that criticized the US Congress for considering the passage of a resolution that would have singled out for special recognition "the one and one half million people of Armenian ancestry who were victims of genocide perpetrated in Turkey between 1915 and 1923." Instead, these academics lucidly argued that such questions should be left for the scholarly community to decide.
90. See, for example, Roderic Davison, *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990).
91. For an example of this scholar's work, see J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*, 2 Vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956).
92. For a representative example of this scholar's work, see Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000).
93. See Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).

94. See Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
95. See Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin Books, 1981).
96. Leslie Davis, *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat's Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917*, ed. Susan K. Blair (New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989).
97. Nesim Seker, "Demographic Engineering in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43 (May 2007), p. 473n24.
98. Murat Bardakci, ed., *Talat Pasanın Evrak-i Metrukesi* [The Papers Talat Pasha Left Behind] (Istanbul: Everest Yayinlari, 2009).
99. Ara Sarafian, "Talat's Black Book Documents His Campaign of Race Extermination in 1915–17," *Armenian Reporter*, March 13, 2009.
100. Cited in Sabrina Tavernise, "Nearly a Million Victims, Covered in a Cloak of Amnesia," *New York Times*, March 8, 2009.
101. Erman Sahin, "On Talat Pasha's Black Book by Murat Bardakci," e-mail correspondence dated March 25, 2009.
102. Ibid. For a fuller analysis of the number of Ottoman Armenian refugees who fled to the Caucasus, see McCarthy, *Armenian Rebellion in Van*, Appendix 3, pp. 273–75.

Chapter 3

1. There is an enormous literature on what most observers would call the Armenian Genocide, but which Turkey still argues is a term that is too one-sided to characterize fairly what actually occurred. For the most part this continuing debate is beyond the scope of this chapter. For a recent analysis along with documentation of what many would call the Armenian Genocide but which this book would not so characterize, see Chapters 1 and 2 above. I published an earlier version of the present chapter as "Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 27 (Winter 2007), pp. 109–128.
2. For previous studies of Armenian terrorism, see by Michael M. Gunter, *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986); *Transnational Armenian Activism* Conflict Studies No. 229 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990); "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism," *Terrorism: An International Journal* 8 (No. 3; 1986), pp. 213–52; and "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign against Turkey," *Orbis* 27 (Summer 1983), pp. 447–77. In addition, see Anat Kurz and Ariel Merari, *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool* (Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); and Franics P. Hyland, *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991).
3. *Armenian Reporter* (New York), February 9, 1984, p. 2.
4. Armenian National Committee, Los Angeles, letter to the editor published in *Christian Science Monitor*, April 3, 1981, p. 22.

5. Paragraph 30 appeared in a report of the Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/L. 583, June 25, 1973. For a scholarly analysis, see Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 219–20.
6. Cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, October 20, 1983, p. 21.
7. Cited in “Armenian Terrorist Leader Hagopian Interviewed: *Milan Panorama* in Italian, 1 Sept. 80, pp. 62–65,” in *Joint Publications Research Service: Western Europe*, No. 1628, September 24, 1980, pp. 1–6, hereafter *Panorama Interview*.
8. See Pierre Terzian, “La question armenienne aujourd’hui,” in the special issue of *Critique Socialiste* 55 (No. 4, 1982) entitled “Armenie du genocide a l’explosion,” p. 51. Armenians mark April 24, 1915, as symbolic of the beginning of the deportations and massacres. On that date, several hundred Armenian civic, political, and intellectual leaders in Constantinople were arrested, deported, and eventually executed.
9. For further details, see Ronald Grigor Suny, *Armenia in the Twentieth Century* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983), p. 78.
10. See *Armenian Reporter*, March 8, 1984, p. 1. Yanikian was convicted on two counts of murder and sentenced to a life term in prison. He was released from prison and died less than a month later on February 26, at the age of 88.
11. “Nadim Nasir Report: *Al-Majallah* Visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon,” in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, Daily Report (Middle East and Africa), September 1, 1982, p. G8.
12. “Booklet Giving History of ASALA’s Existence Gives New Insight into the Revolutionary Movement,” *Armenian Reporter*, January 10, 1985, pp. 3 and 10; and the eight subsequent issues. Monte Melkonian—an Armenian-American born in California on November 25, 1957—became an important member of ASALA before breaking away from the group in an attempt to form a more effective organization. He was probably the author of this most revealing document that was originally published in France under the title “The Reality” in response to allegations made against it by Hagopian’s ASALA group. Melkonian spoke several different languages fluently and was eventually killed while leading Armenian troops against Azeris in Nagorno Karabakh [Mountainous Black Garden] (also referred to as Karabagh) on July 12, 1993.
13. *New York Times*, January 29, 1982, p. A1.
14. See Christopher Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), pp. 363–67. The following analysis is based on this source and Andrew Corsun, “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile,” *US Department of State Bulletin*, August 1982, pp. 32 ff.; Sato Papazian, “Sept annes de lutte armee,” *Hay Baykar* (published in Paris, France, by the Mouvement National Armenien Pour L’ASALA), December 22, 1982, pp. 8–9; Terzian, “La question armenienne aujourd’hui,” pp. 51–58; and “Booklet Giving History of ASALA’s Existence.”
15. On this point, see *Armenian Reporter*, January 5, 1984, p. 1 and its subsequent issue of February 2, 1984, p. 2.

16. "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence."
17. Markar Melkonian, ed., *The Right to Survive: Selected Writings of Monte Melkonian on the Armenian National Question*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Sardarabad Collective, 1993), p. xiii.
18. Robert I. Friedman, "Spanish Journalist, Victim of ASALA Bombing, Becomes Expert on Armenian Cause," *Armenian Reporter*, November 15, 1984, p. 2.
19. "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence."
20. Cited in *[Armenian] California Courier*, July 28, 1983, p. 7.
21. Cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, May 6, 1982, p. 5.
22. For a thorough analysis, see Louise Nalbandian, *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963). For further background on the Dashnaks, see the following two Armenian sources: Hratch Dasnabedian, *History of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation—Dashnaksutium, 1890–1924* (Milan: Oemme Ediziuni, 1990); and Mikael Vartanian (Mikayel Varandian), *History of the A. R. Federation* (Paris: Navarre, 1932). Dashnak is a shortened term for the Armenian word for Federation (*Dashnaksutium*).
23. Manuel S. Hassassian, *ARF as a Revolutionary Party, 1890–1921* (Jerusalem: Hai Tad Publications, 1983), p. 4.
24. Simon Vratzian, "The Armenian Revolution and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation," *Armenian Review* 3 (Autumn 1950), p. 19.
25. Anaide Ter Minassian, *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887–1912)* (Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1984), p. 19. In addition, see James G. Mandalian, *Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben Der Minasian* (Boston: Hairenik Association, 1963). The term *fedayee* refers to freedom fighters in the Middle East, organized as irregulars or guerrillas and comes from an Arab word meaning "those who sacrifice themselves." Thus, the term has an almost mystical ring to it redolent of the word martyr.
26. Mikayel Varandian, as cited in K[apriel] S[erope] Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune* (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934), p. 18.
27. Sarkis Atamian, *The Armenian Community* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 277.
28. William Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Knopf, 1951), p. 157.
29. Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), p. 44.
30. Jacques Derogy, *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1990), p. xxvii. Derogy's book was originally published in French as *Operation Nemesis*, in 1986 by Librairie Artheme Fayard.
31. *Ibid.*, p. xiv. For further details, see Yves Ternon, *The Armenian Cause* (Delmar, NY: Carvan Books, 1985), pp. 98–101.

32. For what purports to be Tehlirian's own story, see Lindy V. Avakian, *The Cross and the Crescent* (Los Angeles: De Vorss & Co., 1965). In addition, see Oliver Baldwin, *The Questing Beast* (London: Grayson and Grayson, 1932), pp. 201–204; and Sarkis Atamian, "Portrait of Immortality, Part II: 'The Hunt,'" *Armenian Review* 13 (February 1961), pp. 11–21. Tehlirian finally died in the United States in 1960.
33. "The Belgrade 2 Trial: Becoming Like Tehlirian Trial," *Armenian Weekly*, December 24, 1983, p. 1.
34. Arshavir Shiragian, *The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot* (Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976).
35. For a list of the assassinations and who was responsible, see Gunter, "Pursuing the Just Cause," pp. 68–69. ASALA, however, was responsible for a number of civilian, third party deaths, particularly during bloody airport attacks in Ankara in 1982 and Paris in 1983.
36. Cited in Robert Lindsey, "Turkish Diplomat Is Slain on Coast: Armenian Terror Group Takes Responsibility in Shooting," *New York Times*, January 29, 1982, p. A12.
37. "Communique," dated October 12, 1984, and published in the Dashnak newspaper *Armenian Weekly*, November 3, 1984, p. 2.
38. "Communique," dated November 19, 1984, and published in *Armenian Weekly*, December 29, 1984, p. 2.
39. This and the following citations were taken from "Political Platform of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Ratified by the 23rd World Congress," *Armenian Weekly*, August 16, 1986, pp. 1, 7; and August 30, 1986, p. 1. Nakhichevan and Gharabagh (Nagorno Karabakh) were then part of Soviet Azerbaijan, while Akhalkalak was part of Soviet Georgia. Soon after gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Armenia conquered Nagorno Karabakh and as of the summer of 2011 still occupies it.
40. The Dashnaks are among the most vehement Armenian groups still maintaining claims on parts of eastern Turkey and opposed to any rapprochement with it. In April 2009, the Dashnaks, who had been a junior partner in the Armenian government, withdrew in protest of the roadmap for normalizing Turkish-Armenian relations that had just been announced and which led to the signing of two Protocols between the two on October 10, 2009. See Chapter 6 for a full discussion of these Protocols.
41. This and the following citation were taken from Aram Khaligian, "The Necessities of Violence and National Culture in the Liberation Struggle," *Armenian Weekly*, December 31, 1986, p. 15.
42. This and the following citation were taken from Tatul Sonentz-Papazian, "The ARF Legacy—Are We Ready?" *Armenian Weekly*, December 31, 1986, p. 3.
43. Cited in *Armenian Weekly*, January 14, 1984, pp. 6, 7.
44. For a fuller analysis of these causes, see Khachig Tololyan, "Conflict and Decline in Armenian Terrorism," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29, 1986.

45. For an analysis of this Dashnak-ASALA fratricide in Lebanon during the early and especially the mid-1980s, see Michael M. Gunter, "The Armenian Dashnak Party in Crisis," *Crossroads* (No. 26; 1987), pp. 75–88.
46. *Armenia*, No. 131/13, 1986, p. 10.
47. *Moush* (Organ of the Armenian Popular Movement or political arm of ASALA in Greece), No. 13, Autumn 1987, p. 3.
48. *Armenia*, No. 127–128/11–12, 1986, p. 18.
49. *Armenia*, No. 105–106/7–8, 1985, p. 29.
50. *Armenia*, No. 131/13, 1986, p. 7.
51. *Armenia*, No. 127–128/11–12, 1986, p. 7.
52. *Armenia*, No. 131/13, 1986, p. 7. For further analysis of such symbolism, see Khachig Tololyan, "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora," in *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart (Aberdeen, UK: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), pp. 96 ff.
53. *Armenia*, No. 89–90/5–6, 1984, p. 5. I have taken the liberty of correcting typographical errors in this citation from ASALA's journal without in any way changing the meaning of the text. ASALA's journal in Armenian at first also suffered from grammatical errors, but eventually the late Simon Simonian, an authority on classical Armenian who wrote the language perfectly, began to edit it. The result was that the quality of the written Armenian radically improved. I am indebted to Professor Khachig Tololyan for this information. A picture of Simonian and a trim, youthful-looking Hagop Hagopian appears in the *Armenian Observer*, August 31, 1988, p. 12.
54. This and the following citation were taken from *Panorama Interview*. See note 7 for the full citation to this source.
55. "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence."
56. This and the following citations were taken from *Armenia*, No. 131/13, 1986, pp. 18–19.
57. This and the following citations were translated from "ASALA'nim Siyasal Programi," [ASALA's Political Program] *Hay Baykar* (Paris) (No. 1; 1982). *Hay Baykar* [Armenian Struggle] was the organ of the Armenian Popular Movement of ASALA in France.
58. "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence."
59. "Monte Melkonian Explains His Break with ASALA: Interview," *Armenian Reporter*, January 12, 1984, p. 4.
60. "Hagop Hagopian, Legendary Leader of ASALA, Gunned Down in Athens, Greece," *Armenian Reporter*, April 28, 1988, p. 1.
61. "Assassination of ASALA Leader Is Queried by Greek Authorities," *Armenian Reporter*, May 5, 1988, p. 1.
62. This and the following data were taken from "Syria Said to Have Caused New Split within ASALA," *Armenian Reporter*, August 4, 1988, pp. 1, 2.
63. Melkonian, ed. *Selective Writings of Monte Melkonian*, p. xiv.
64. *Panorama Interview*.

65. This and the following citation were taken from "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence."
66. See the reports in the *[Armenian] California Courier*, September 22, 1983, p. 2; and December 8, 1983, p. 9.
67. *Armenian Weekly*, November 19, 1983, p. 1 and December 10, 1983, p. 5.
68. *Armenian Weekly*, October 1, 1983, p. 1.
69. See "UnArmenian Activities," *Economist*, February 6, 1980, p. 20; *New York Times*, April 17, 1983, Sec. 1, p. 20; July 31, 1983, p. E2; August 1, 1983, p. A6; and *Los Angeles Times*, November 12, 1982, part 1-B, p. 9.
70. See the report on this case in the *Armenian Reporter*, August 18, 1983, p. 1. The three tried in Los Angeles were convicted.
71. This and the following citations were taken from "Booklet Giving the History of ASALA's Existence."
72. For details, see the account in *Armenian Reporter*, August 25, 1983, p. 1. For further general background, see Tarik Somer, "Armenian Terrorism and the Narcotic Traffic," in *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection* (Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984), pp. 19–27.
73. This and the following citations were taken from the "Statement of Nathan M. Adams Senior Editor of Reader's Digest August 2, 1984; Room 428 Dirksen Senate Office Building Before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse," (mimeographed), pp. 3–5.
74. "Statement of Francis M. Mullen, Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration US Department of Justice on Drug-Related Terrorism Before the United States Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, Paula Hawkins, Chairman, August 2, 1984," (mimeographed), p. 6.
75. Michael J. Arlen, Jr., *Passage to Ararat* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1975), p. 186.
76. "Requiem Service in Athens, Greece Remembers Youth Said To Have Been Killed by Turkish Agents, 2 December 1982," *Armenian Reporter*, January 8, 1987, p. 15. ASALA falsely claimed that Vahradian was a victim of the MIT, the Turkish intelligence agency, when in reality he was simply killed in a bungled attempt to bomb the Kuwait Airlines office.
77. This and the following citation were taken from "Four French Ministers Friendly to Armenian Cause Severely Criticized," *Armenian Reporter*, July 23, 1983, p. 7.

Chapter 4

1. Brendon Cannon, "Politicizing History and Legislating Reality: History, Memory, and Identity as Explanations for Armenian Claims of Genocide," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 2009, p. 7. In her study of such other diasporas as the Jewish, Irish, Polish, Sikh, and Tamil, among others, C. Christine Fair has found that they tend to be more radical than their kin still living in the homeland on foreign policy and ethno-political conflict issues. "Diaspora Involvement in

- Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (April 2005), pp. 125–56.
2. Cannon, *Politicizing History and Legislating Reality*, p. 6.
 3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 228. Similarly, an insightful Turkish study concludes that “the allegation that Turks had subjected the Armenians to genocide thus helped rebuild the Armenian consciousness. The Diaspora Armenians were unified but not on the basis of their common cultural values. They were unified against an artificially created enemy, that is, modern Turkey.” Omer Engin Lutem, “Armenian Question in a Historical Context: The Armenian Question from Lausanne until Today,” Institute for Armenian Center for Eurasian Studies (ASAM) [2005], accessed April 19, 2008 at http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankasi/en/index1_1_3.htm, p. 3.
 5. For background analysis, see Michael M. Gunter, “United States-Turkish Intelligence Liaison since World War II,” *Journal of Intelligence History* 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 33–46.
 6. Andrew Corsun, “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile,” *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* 82 (August 1982), p. 35n.
 7. *US Department of State Bulletin*, April 1983.
 8. US House of Representative Joint Resolution 192 (1985), which failed to be passed.
 9. “Attention Members of the US House of Representatives,” *New York Times*, May 19, 1985.
 10. See, for example, Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), among many other noted works.
 11. *Ibid.*, p. 356.
 12. These legal provisions, of course, mainly had been enacted to counter those who would deny the Nazi genocide against the Jews during World War II. The Armenians, however, have attempted to piggyback upon the Jewish genocidal tragedy to make their own partisan case.
 13. Cited in Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), p. 266.
 14. *Ibid.*
 15. *Washington Post*, September 9, 1995.
 16. See Yves Ternon, “Freedom and Responsibility of the Historian: The ‘Lewis’ Affair,” in *Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999), pp. 240 and 242.
 17. Henry C. Theriault, “Denial and Free Speech: The Case of the Armenian Genocide,” in *Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2003), pp. 231–61.
 18. Cited in “French Parliament Approves Bill on Armenian Genocide Denial,” *Wikinews*, accessed September 15, 2008, http://news.en.wikinews.org/wiki/French_parliament_approves_bill_on_Armenain_%22genocid...

19. The French National Assembly consists of 577 deputies.
20. Cited in "French Parliament Approves Bill on Armenian Genocide Denial."
21. Cited in "French in Armenia 'Genocide' Row," *BBC News*, accessed September 15, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6043730.stm>.
22. Cited in *Ibid.*
23. Cited in "France Warned over 'Genocide' Law," *BBC News*, accessed September 15, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6033713.stm>.
24. Cited in *ibid.*
25. Cited in "French in Armenia 'Genocide' Row."
26. Statement by the French Interior Minister Alain Marleix, December 2, 2008; as cited in International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Armenia," International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders," Report No. 199 (Istanbul, Yerevan, Baku, Brussels, April 14, 2009), p.15n132.
27. Cited in www.number10.gov.uk/Page13999, as cited in *ibid.*, p.15n127.
28. Shimon Peres, cited by the *Turkish Daily News*, April 10, 2001; as cited in *ibid.*, p. 15n128.
29. For background, see Thomas Goltz, *Azerbaijan Dairy: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic* (Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); and Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York: New York University Press, 2004). Also see, Svante Cornell, "Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance," *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (January 1998), pp. 51–72; International Crisis Group, "Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace," Report No. 167 (Tbilisi/Brussels, October 11, 2005); and International Crisis Group, "Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War," Report No. 187 (Tbilisi/Brussels, November 14, 2007).
30. Indeed, adding to this imbroglio, in 2008 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group—established to seek a resolution of this conflict—in the name of compromise paradoxically called for a settlement based on the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. See Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the United States, *Artsakh Newsletter*, December 2008–January 2009, email: info@nkrusa.org, received February 13, 2009. This, of course, is precisely what the conflict is about! Analogous situations in the past included Western Sahara, East Timor, Belize, the Falkland Islands, and Gibraltar. While East Timor and Belize have subsequently become independent, the other three situations still continue. In general, see Michael M. Gunter, "Self-Determination or Territorial Integrity: The United Nations in Confusion," *World Affairs* 141 (Winter 1979), pp. 203–216. The brief war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 over the breakaway Georgian territories of different ethnic makeup, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, represent two current examples. Kosovo, which is also an example, became independent in 2008.
31. Markar Melkonian, ed., *The Right to Struggle: Selected Writings of Monte Melkonian on the Armenian National Question*, 2nd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Sardarabad Collective, 1993). See also, David Rieff, "Case Study in Ethnic Strife: Nagorno-Karabakh," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1997), pp. 118–26.

32. Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the United States, *Artsakh Newsletter*, July-August 2008, email: info@nkrusa.org, received September 8, 2008.
33. As noted in Chapter 1, the Armenians were actually a minority in their historic homeland of eastern Anatolia on the eve of World War I.
34. *Artsakh Newsletter*, p. 2.
35. This Office is located on 1140 19th Street, NW/Suite 600, Washington, D.C., 20036. Telephone: (202) 223-4330; Email: info@nkrusa.org; Web: www.nkrusa.org.
36. The AFA maintains a website at <http://www.americansforartsakh.org>.
37. As Speaker of the US House of Representative, Nancy Pelosi (Democrat-California) constitutionally was next in for the presidency after the Vice President.
38. "US House Speaker: Armenian Genocide Measure Will Go Forward," accessed September 9, 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_resolution_on_Armenian_genocide. Speaker Pelosi's declamation notwithstanding, there remains considerable debate concerning the proper designation of the killing that has occurred in Darfur and whether or not it constitutes genocide. See, for example, Ewen MacAskill, "Sudan's Darfur Crimes Not Genocide, Says UN Report," *The Guardian*, February 1, 2005; and Scott Straus, "Darfur and the Genocide Debate," *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January/February 2005), pp. 128 and 130. Also see, Chapter 2.
39. This and the following citation appeared in H. Res. 106 (2007).
40. This and the following citations were taken from Mark Tran and Fred Attewill, "Turkish Ambassador Recalled from US in Armenian Genocide Row," *Guardian* (UK), October 11, 2007.
41. Cited in Brian Knowlton, "Bush Urges Congress to Reject Armenian Genocide Resolution," *International Herald Tribune*, October 10, 2007.
42. Cited during CNN, "Late Edition" with Wolf Blitzer, aired October 14, 2007.
43. Cited in Brian Knowlton, "U.S. House Speaker vows Debate on Armenian Genocide Resolution," *International Herald Tribune*, October 14, 2007.
44. "Stirring Up the Past, Jeopardising the Future," as cited in Times.online, accessed September 9, 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_resolution_on_Armenian_genocide.
45. Cited in Dan Robinson, "US Congressional Committee Approves Armenian Genocide Resolution," Voice of America, accessed September 9, 2008, <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-10/2007-10-10-voa50.cfm?CFID=3710903...>
46. Soner Cagaptay, "The PKK and the Armenian Genocide Resolution: U.S.-Turkish Relations at a Critical Juncture," Policy Watch No. 1293, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2007.
47. Although he did not wish to foist his opinions into legislation, Obama did make it clear that he still personally believed that the events in question constituted genocide.

48. See International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Armenia," p. 17n142. In September 2008, Hasan Cemal, Jamal's grandson and a leading Turkish journalist, laid a wreath at the genocide memorial in Yerevan and expressed deep regret for the tragedy of 1915.
49. UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/L. 583, June 25, 1973. Also see, Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 219–20.
50. UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/1985/L. 15, August 29, 1985. Also see, "U.N. Sub-Commission Approves Report on Genocide Containing Reference to Massacres: Armenians Score Major Victory in Geneva Deliberations," *The Armenian Reporter*, September 5, 1985, p. 1.
51. Cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, October 20, 1983, p. 21.
52. The following discussion is largely based on "Prevention and Punishment of Genocide," United Nations Department of Public Information (Press Release), April 9, 2007; Warren Hoge, "UN Genocide Exhibit Dismantled after Turkey Complains," *International Herald Tribune*, April 10, 2007; and Edith M. Lederer, "Rwanda Genocide Show Postponed over Turkish Objection to Reference to Armenian Murders," *Turkish Daily News*, April 11, 2007.
53. "Turkey and the U.N.'s Cover-Up," *New York Times*, April 13, 2007.
54. MFA Press and Information Department, March 28, 2008.
55. The following discussion is mostly based on "Turkey's Candidacy for the United Nations Security Council," *Embassy Notes: From the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington, D.C.*, September 18, 2008.
56. Neil Macfarquhar, "3 Nations Win Security Council Seats," *New York Times*, October 18, 2008.
57. For background analyses of Turkey's EU candidacy, see Harun Arikan, *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006); *The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone?* Ed. Michael Lake (London: The Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005); Sedat Laciner, Mehmet Ozcan, and Ihsan Bal, *European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union* (Ankara: ISRO Publication, 2005); and *Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and Extended Challenges*, ed. Joseph S. Joseph (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
58. This and the following citations were taken from "European Parliament Resolution on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question," Doc. A2-33/87, June 18, 1987.
59. The following discussion is based largely on Erhan Akdemir (EU Centre Association), "Turkey's EU Bid and the Armenian Problem," accessed August 15, 2008, <http://www.abmerkezi.org.tr/article.php>.
60. Cited in Lucia Kubosova, "MEPs Back Armenia Genocide Clause in Turkey Report," *EU Observer*, September 5, 2006.
61. Cited in "Recognition of the Armenian Genocide," accessed September 18, 2008. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recognition_of_the_Armenian_Genocide.

62. Brendon Cannon, "Politicizing History and Legislating Reality: History, Memory, and Identity as Explanations for Armenian Claims of Genocide," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 2009, p. 16.
63. Heather S. Gregg, "Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States," Working Paper No. 13 (Cambridge, MA: Inter-University Committee on International Migration, 2002), p. 2. For more on Armenian lobbies, see Rachel Anderson Paul, "Grassroots Mobilization and Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6 (Spring 2000), pp. 24–47.
64. Cannon, "Politicizing History," p. 17.
65. For further analysis of Armenian interest group hypermobilization in the United States, see Benjamin F. Alexander, "Armenian and American: The Changing Face of Ethnic Identity and Diasporic Nationalism, 1915–1955," Ph.D. dissertation, The City University of New York, 2005.
66. For further analysis of Armenian diasporic divisions, see Jenny Phillips, *Symbol, Myth, and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American Population* (New York: AMS Press, 1989), p. 119; and Anny Bakalian, *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993), p. 94. For further background, see Sarkis Atamian, *The Armenian Community* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955). The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF or Dashnak Party) was discussed above in Chapters 1, 2, and 3. It maintains a website at www.arf.am.
67. Of course, not all Armenian-Americans identify themselves with this Dashnak divide. These so-called *chezoks* or neutrals are also referred to as shish kebabs, which means that their only Armenian identity probably deals with their culinary preferences. Nevertheless, virtually all members of the Armenian diaspora know the date 1915 and what it symbolizes.
68. The ANCA website is www.anca.org.
69. The Armenian Assembly of America website is www.aaainc.org. On the organization structure of the ANCA and The Assembly, see Gregg, "Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States," pp. 10–13.
70. For background on such other historical Armenian groups as the Hunchaks formed in 1887, the Ramgavars (Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (ADL) created in 1921, and the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) established in 1906 by the wealthy Armenian-Egyptian Boghos Nubar Pasha, among many others, see Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915–1923* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 18; and Robert Mirak, *Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 173–74.
71. During the nineteenth century, missionaries converted some Armenians to the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches. Although there are no definitive statistics, Anny Bakalian estimates that in the United States some 64 percent of the Armenians affiliate with the Apostolic church, while less than 10 percent are Protestant, and less than 4 percent are Roman Catholic. Bakalian, *Being to Feeling Armenian*, pp. 64–65.

72. In addition, one might note the existence of Armenian patriarchates in Istanbul and Jerusalem, each one of which has been in existence for hundreds of years and owes allegiance to the Mother See in Etchmiadzin, Armenia.
73. For a fuller analysis of this event, see Christopher Walker, *Armenia: The Survival of A Nation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 354; and Maggie Lewis, "Armenian-Americans," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 18, 1980, p. B19. Also see, K[apriel] S[erape] Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune* (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934).
74. The following analysis is largely based on Gregg, "Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States," pp.18–26.
75. Yair Auron, "Foreign Minister's Comments Are Israeli Shift to Active Denial," *The Armenian Weekly Online*, May 2001, accessed July 22, 2001, <http://free.freespeech.org/armenian/weekly>, as cited in *ibid.*, p.19/n. 128.
76. The following discussion is largely based on information gathered from the website of the USAPAC accessed July 28, 2008 at: <http://www.usa-pac.org/>.
77. "Irony of Genocide Museum: A Sore Point for Armenians, Bliss for Turks," *Armenian Mirror-Spectator*, March 8, 2008.
78. Maria Danilova, "Armenian PM Sarkisian Wins Presidency," *Washington Post*, February 20, 2008.
79. See the striking statistics in Gregg, "Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States," pp. 29–30.
80. "The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy," *The Economist: The World in 2007*, accessed September 18, 2008, [http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007\)v3.pdf](http://www.economist.com/media/pdf/DEMOCRACY_INDEX_2007)v3.pdf).
81. The following discussion and citations were taken from Edward Minasian, *Musa Dagb: A Chronicle of the Armenian Genocide Factor in the Subsequent Suppression, by the Intervention of the United States Government, of the Movie Based on Franz Werfel's The Forty Days of Musa Dagb* (Nashville, TN: Cold Tree Press, 2007), pp. 321–24.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
84. This and the following quote were taken from *ibid.*, p. 323.

Chapter 5

1. See the *New York Times*, February 28, 1980, p. A3. Kocas has also written a book in Turkish on Turkish-Armenian relations. See Sadi Kocas, *Tarih Boyunca Ermeniler ve Turk-Ermeni Iliskileri* (Ankara: Altinok Matbaasi, 1967). I published an earlier version of this chapter in Michael M. Gunter, "Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People": A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), pp. 123–45.
2. Cited in *Christian Science Monitor*, May 7, 1982, p. 5.
3. Cited in *Turkish Daily News*, August 30, 1982, p. 3.

4. Cited in *Los Angeles Times*, July 16, 1983, part 1, p. 17.
5. "Report on Armenian Conference in Lausanne: London *Al-Dustur* in Arabic, August 8, 1983, p. 35," in *Joint Publications Research Service: Armenian Affairs*, No. 2831, October 3, 1983, p. 16.
6. Thomas C. Goltz, "Armenian Terror Rouses Turkish Liberal Anger," *The Daily Star* (Beirut, Lebanon), December 5, 1984, as cited in *The Armenian Weekly*, January 12, 1985, p. 2.
7. Robert Kaplan, "Armenian Terrorists Find New Bases from Which to Wage Their Battle for a Homeland," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1983, p. 12.
8. Cited in *New York Times*, February 28, 1980, p. A3.
9. Cited in Kaplan, "Armenian Terrorists Find New Bases."
10. *Ibid.*
11. Cited in *Turkish Daily News*, August 30, 1982, p. 1.
12. Cited in Goltz, "Armenian Terror Rouses Turkish Anger."
13. *The [Armenian] California Courier*, November 16, 1983, p. 4.
14. Aram H. Kailian, "Is Anyone Listening?" *The Armenian Weekly*, September 3, 1983, p. 2. On the other hand, Philip Robbins recently wrote that "after the September 1980 [Turkish] military coup, a group of [Turkish] ultra-nationalists . . . had been unleashed against ASALA, resulting in the killing of some of its members and the disruption of its activities." "Back from the Brink: Turkey's Ambivalent Approaches to the Hard Drugs Issue," *Middle East Journal* 62 (Autumn 2008), p. 639. Robbins cited a report on the notorious Susurluk affair in 1996 summarized in *Hurriyet* and translated in the *Turkish Daily News*, January 14, 1998. If this report is true, of course, Turkey could point to its inherent right of self-defense as codified in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations."
15. See *The Armenian Reporter*, May 10, 1984, p. 14.
16. *The Armenian Weekly*, May 12, 1984, p. 1. In 2008, Armenian "genocide" monuments were desecrated in Cardiff, Wales, and Budapest, Hungary, by persons unknown. If the vandals were Turkish, however, this would not prove that there was an official or even unofficial policy of Turkey to commit such acts. The Turkish government cannot be expected to control the acts of all disgruntled persons around the world.
17. "Turkish Terror," *The [Armenian] California Courier*, February 16, 1984, p. 2.
18. "Turkish Threats," in *ibid.*, March 1, 1984, p. 2.
19. See the reports in *The Armenian Reporter*, August 11, 1983, p. 11; and *The [Armenian] California Courier*, August 25, 1983, p. 8.
20. For this and the following citation in the text, see "ASALA Supporter Said To Have Been Killed by Hit & Run Car on Cyprus," *The Armenian Reporter*, December 6, 1984, p. 12.
21. "Dutch Consent to Extradite Armenian Suspect to Belgium," in *ibid.*, September 8, 1983, p. 13. Also see, "Dutch to Extradite Armenian Suspect," in *ibid.*, January 5, 1984, p. 1.

22. "Belgium Calls on Holland to Extradite Suspect in Assassination of Diplomat," in *ibid.*, August 11, 1983, p. 14.
23. "ASALA Executes Two Accused Traitors," in *ibid.*, September 8, 1983, p. 16.
24. "ASALA Provides New Details on the Killing of Two Leaders by Turkish Agents: Accuses CIA of Complicity," in *ibid.*, September 22, 1983, p. 8.
25. See "ASALA Man Given 14 Years for Attack on Kuwait Airways in Athens," in *ibid.*, January 31, 1985, p. 1.
26. *The Armenian Weekly*, January 7, 1984, p. 1.
27. Harut Sassounian, "Turkish Anti-Hye Threats Should Not Be Ignored," *The [Armenian] California Courier*, January 19, 1984, p. 4.
28. "New Light Shed on Kidnapping of ARF Leader in December of 1982," *The Armenian Reporter*, January 26, 1984, pp. 1 and 8. Also see, "Cypriot Paper Implies Apo Ashjian Has Been Killed by Other A.R.F. Leaders," in *ibid.*, June 7, 1984, p. 1. For additional examples of intramural Armenian violence over the years, see Robert Mirak, *Torn between Two Lands: Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 231–32, 240, and 245–47; and K[apriel] S[erope] Papazian, *Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune* (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934), pp. 15–16, 60–65, and 68–73.
29. Cited in *The Armenian Reporter*, January 12, 1984, p. 4. See also, the similar claims in "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence Gives New Insight into the Revolutionary Movement," in nine consecutive issues of *The Armenian Reporter*, January 10, 1985–March 7, 1985, and referred to in the text above as the "ASALA-RM History."
30. For this claim, see "ASALA Discloses Names of Former Members Involved in Various Acts," *The Armenian Reporter*, September 13, 1984, p. 12.
31. For the details of this event, see "Armenian Students' Center in Paris Is Target of Bombing by Turkish Group," *ibid.*, August 9, 1984, p. 13.
32. This and the following details and citations were mostly taken from the report in "Bomb Blast Rocks Hall in Paris Where Armenians Were Gathering: Passerby Hurt," in *ibid.*, November 29, 1984, p. 1.
33. "Secret Army Indicates a Loss of 22 Members in Border Skirmish," in *ibid.*, June 16, 1983, p. 1. Also see Sam Cohen, "Turkey's Mysterious Strike in Iraq Underlines Ongoing Effort to Uproot Kurdish Nationalism," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 14, 1983, p. 12.
34. The following explanation, which dovetails with media reports at the time, comes from reliable Turkish sources that prefer not to be cited directly.
35. See the reports on this Turkish military strike in *The Armenian Reporter*, October 25, 1984, p. 1; and *The Armenian Weekly*, November 3, 1984, pp. 1 and 12.
36. *The [Armenian] California Courier*, May 31, 1984, p. 1.
37. Harut Sassounian, "Turkish-Armenians Live Deprived of Their Rights," in *ibid.*, December 8, 1983, p. 4.

38. Robert Paul Jordan, "The Proud Armenians," *National Geographic* 153 (June 1978), p. 851.
39. *The Armenian Weekly*, November 5, 1983, p. 2.
40. *The Armenian Reporter*, January 19, 1984, p. 2.
41. *The [Armenian] California Courier*, December 8, 1983, pp. 4–5.
42. Cited in *The Armenian Weekly*, July 16, 1983, p. 10.
43. Cited in *ibid.*, December 17, 1983, p. 11.
44. *The [Armenian] California Courier*, December 8, 1983, p. 4.
45. Cited in *The Armenian Weekly*, December 31, 1983, p. 7.
46. *Ibid.*
47. Michael Arlen, *Passage to Ararat* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1975), p. 285.
48. Jordan, "The Proud Armenians," p. 847.
49. See the accounts in the *New York Times*, June 3, 1982, p. A1; and *The Armenian Reporter*, October 11, 1984, p. 12. See also, however, the Turkish reply in the *New York Times*, June 5, 1982, p. 3.
50. See "Turkey Pressures Jews to Silence Armenians," *The [Armenian] California Courier*, January 31, 1985, pp. 1 and 11.
51. *The Armenian Reporter*, November 3, 1983, p. 15. Unless otherwise stated, the following discussion is based on the lengthy report in *The [Armenian] California Courier*, January 26, 1984, pp. 1 and 11; *ibid.*, April 26, 1984, p. 4; *The Armenian Reporter*, November 24, 1983, p. 10; *ibid.*, November 17, 1983, p. 14; and *ibid.*, October 4, 1984, pp. 16–17.
52. The following citations are taken from "Patriarch of Turkey Calls Father Yergatian a Victim," *The [Armenian] California Courier*, November 7, 1984, pp. 1 and 10.
53. *Amnesty International Report 1983* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1983), pp. 81–82. Also see *Torture in the Eighties* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1984), pp. 217–20; and various other AI bulletins and reports concerning human rights violations in Turkey. In addition, see, by Helsinki Watch, "Human Rights in Turkey's 'Transition to Democracy,'" (New York and Washington, D.C.: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1983); and "Straws in the Wind: Prospects for Human Rights and Democracy in Turkey," (New York and Washington, D.C.: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1984); as well as the following MERIP Reports: "Turkey: The Generals Take Over," (No. 93, January 1981); "State Terror in Turkey," (No. 121 February 1984); and "Turkey under Military Rule," (No. 122, March/April 1984). More recently, see Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document, *Turkey 2007 Progress Report* {COM (2007) 663 final} Brussels, November 6, 2007; as well as the EU's *Turkey 2008 Progress Report* published on November 5, 2008.
54. This citation and the following information were taken from *The Armenian Reporter*, February 16, 1984, p. 14.
55. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion is based largely on "Armenians Attest to Happy and Prosperous Life in Turkey, Speak Out against Terrorism,"

- Los Angeles Times*, November 12, 1982, Part 1-B, pp. 8 and 9; and also on Ralph J. Kaplan, "In Turkey, Armenians Put the Past Behind Them," *Los Angeles Herald Examiner*, November 23, 1983, p. A11; and *Facts from the Turkish Armenians* (Istanbul: Jamanak, 1980).
56. This and the following citation were taken from *The Armenian Reporter*, November 15, 1984, p. 1.
 57. This and the following citation were taken from "Istanbul Armenian Testifies for the Prosecution in Paris," in *ibid.*, March 14, 1985, p. 17.
 58. I would like to thank Paul B. Henze, who has traveled widely and frequently throughout Turkey for a number of years and was the CIA Station Chief in Ankara during the 1970s, for much of the information upon which my following discussion is based. In addition, it should be noted that in March 2007, the Turkish government invited both Armenian officials and Armenian diaspora representatives to attend ceremonies marking the renovation of the 1,000-year old Aghtamar Church. See *Briefing* (Ankara), March 19, 2007, p. 3.
 59. The source of this information appears reliable but prefers to remain anonymous.
 60. Vegal Schleifer, "Turkey Blames US Jews for Genocide Bill," *Los Angeles Times*, October 23, 2007, as cited in Bruce Cannon, "History, Memory, Identity and Armenian Claims of Genocide," Ph. D. dissertation, University of Utah, 2008, p. 34.
 61. Emil Danielyan, "Armenia: Country's Jews Alarmed over Nascent Anti-Semitism," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 26, 2005, as cited in Cannon, "History, Memory, Identity," p. 35.
 62. The following discussion is largely based on Roger W. Smith, Eric Markusen, and Robert Jay Lifton, "Professional Ethics and the Denial of Armenian Genocide," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 9 (Spring 1995), pp. 1–22.
 63. Edward Minasian, *Musa Dagb: A Chronicle of the Armenian Genocide Factor in the Subsequent Suppression, by the Intervention of the United States Government, of the Movie Based on Franz Werfel's The Forty Days of Musa Dagb* (Nashville, TN: Cold Tree Press, 2007).
 64. *Ibid.*, p. 55.
 65. *Ibid.*, pp. 54–55. According to Minasian, "the evidence is conclusive that both [of the following] sources provided Werfel the vital information for the basic structure of *The Forty Days of Musa Dagb*," *ibid.*, p. 55. Dikran Andreasian, *Zeituni Antsnadvituin yev Suedia Inkabashbanatuin* [*The Surrender of Zeitun and the Self-Defence of Suedia*], Cairo, 1915, 68 pages, English translation by Knarik O. Meneshian, Armenian Missionary Association of America, 1993; and Dikran Andreasian, "A Red Cross Flag That Saved Four Thousand," *The Outlook*, translated by Stephen Trowbridge, CXI, 12/1/15, pp. 790. 799–803.
 66. The following citations were taken from Minasian, *Musa Dagb*, pp. 59–60.
 67. Louis Kronenberger, "Franz Werfel's Heroic Novel," *New York Times Book Review*, December 2, 1934, Section 5, p. 1, as cited in Minasian, *Musa Dagb*, p. 68.

68. The following discussion is largely based on “Hrant Dink’s Assassination Shocks Turkey and the World: A True Martyr for Freedom of Expression,” *Briefing* (Ankara), January 22, 2007, pp. 2–5.
69. Michael M. Gunter, “Deep State: The Arcane Parallel State in Turkey,” *Orient* 47 (no. 3; 2006), pp. 334–48.
70. “The Changing Face of Turkey,” *Briefing*, January 29, 2007, p. 2.
71. The following citations were taken from “Hrant Dink’s Assassination Shocks Turkey.”
72. Cited in Verchiyan Ziflioglu, “Darkness to Reunite with the Hope of Light,” *Turkish Daily News*, January 19, 2008.
73. BIA Media Monitoring Desk, “First Quarterly Media Monitoring Report 2010—Full Text,” Istanbul, BIA News Center, July 8, 2010, accessed July 13, 2010, <http://www.bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/123318-first-quarterly-media-monito>.

Chapter 6

1. Gwynne Dyer, “Turkish ‘Falsifiers’ and Armenian ‘Deceivers’: Historiography and the Armenian Massacres,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 12 (January 1976), 99–107. Similarly but less biting, Donald Bloxham has referred to “both the determinist ‘Armenian’ historiography and the Turkish apologist literature.” “The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy,” *Past and Present*, No. 181 (November 2003), p. 153.
2. Jacques Semelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide*, trans. from the French by Cynthia Schoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 312.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 313.
5. Hovhannes Katchaznoui, *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagtzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Anymore* (Reprint), trans. from the original by Matthew A. Callender and ed. John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian) (New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955).
6. Ibid.
7. K[apriel] S[erape], *Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutiun* (Boston: Baikar Press, 1934), p. 38.
8. Ibid.
9. Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005), p. ix. The page references to the following citations are placed in parentheses within the text above.
10. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Erosion of National Interests,” *Foreign Affairs* 76 (September/October 1997), pp. 32, 33.
11. Ibid., p. 39.

12. Ibid.
13. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992), p. 118.
14. Sarah Rainsford, "Turkey Bans 'Genocide' Conference," *BBC News*, September 22, 2005, accessed September 15, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4273602.stm>.
15. Cited in "The Armenian Question, 2008: Harut Sassounian on Realpolitik and Genocide," *Los Angeles Times*, April 24, 2008.
16. Ibid.
17. Cited in David L. Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005), pp. 57–58. See also, Douglas Frantz, "Unofficial Commission Acts to Ease Turkish-Armenian Enmity," *New York Times*, July 10, 2001; and "A Historical Step for Turks and Armenians," *Turkish Daily News*, July 12, 2001.
18. Phillips, *Unsilencing the Past*, p. 61.
19. Ibid., pp. 61–62.
20. Ibid., p. 79.
21. Ibid., p. 75.
22. Ibid., p. 77.
23. Ibid., p. 107.
24. Ibid., p. 108.
25. Ibid., p. 151.
26. The following discussion is largely based on "PM Erdogan Attends Turkish Diaspora Meeting in Baku," *Briefing* (Ankara), March 12, 2007, pp. 4–5.
27. This and the following citations were taken from *ibid.*, p. 4.
28. The Gomidas Institute republishes English translations of Armenian texts related to the events of World War I that would not otherwise be readily available. Turkish institutes have carried out similar roles in recent years. During the 1990s, Sarafian, along with Hilmar Kaiser, had conducted demographic research in the Turkish Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives.
29. Yusuf Halacoglu is the author of *The Story of 1915: What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?* (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2008).
30. Cited in *Briefing* (Ankara), March 12, 2007, p. 5.
31. The following discussion is largely based on information I obtained from an Armenian participant in the Oslo meeting who preferred to be anonymous.
32. See Ozur Diliyorum, accessed August 18, 2009, www.ozurdiliyorus.com. This Turkish term for Great Catastrophe is a virtual translation of the frequently used Armenian phrase employed to describe the events of 1915, *Mets Yeghern*.
33. Murat Bardakci, ed., *Talat Pashanin Evrak-i Metrukesi* [The Papers Talat Pasha Left Behind] (Istanbul: Everest Yayinlari, 2009). See my discussion at the end of Chapter 2 for the pro-Turkish response to these figures.
34. Cited in Sabrina Tavernise, "Nearly a Million Genocide Victims, Covered in a Cloak of Amnesia," *New York Times*, March 8, 2009.
35. See Civil Society Institute, accessed August 18, 2009, www.csi.am.

36. For a cogent analysis of the AKP and its groundbreaking attempts at reform, see M. Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
37. Meliha Benli Altunisik, "The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey's Soft Power in the Middle East," *Insight Turkey* 10 (April 2008), pp. 41–54.
38. Bulent Aras, "The Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Insight Turkey* 11 (Summer 2009), pp. 127–42.
39. "Joint Statement of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Armenia and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs," Press Release No. 56, April 22, 2009, accessed October 5, 2009, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no-56-22april-2009-press-release-regarding-the-turkish-armenian-relations.en.mfa>.
40. For further analysis, see Alexander Iskandaryan and Sergey Minasyan, "Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations," Caucasus Institute Research Papers #1, Yerevan, Armenia, January 2010.
41. *Today's Zaman*, January 29, 2009.
42. Cited in "We Are Ready to Talk to Turkey," *Wall Street Journal*, July 8, 2008.
43. Jeremy Bransten and Charles Rechnagel, "The Outbreak of 'Football Diplomacy,'" Radio Free Europe, September 5, 2008, accessed October 9, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/content/Outbreak_Football_Diplomacy/1196718.html.
44. The following discussion is based on Bulent Aras and Fatih Ozbay, "Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work?" No. 24, *SETA Policy Brief* (Ankara), September 2008, pp. 2, 4.
45. Cited in Andrew Purvis, "Can Soccer Heal Turkey-Armenian Rift?" *Time* (in partnership with CNN), September 5, 2008, accessed September 10, 2008, <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1839199,00.html>.
46. Cited in *ibid.*
47. Cited in *ibid.*
48. Cited in Mark Bentley, "Turkey Says Armenia May Re-establish Relations, Trade," Bloomberg.com, September 10, 2008, accessed September 10, 2008, <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=aFUwZ222syYc&refer=>.
49. Cited in Marianna Grigoryan, "Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside for Soccer," *Eurasia Insight*, October 9, 2008, accessed October 9, 2008, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav090508.shtml>.
50. Cited in *ibid.*
51. Cited in *ibid.*
52. Bransten and Rechnagel, "Outbreak of 'Football Diplomacy.'"
53. Cited in Grigoryan, "Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside for Soccer." On the other hand, I have been told by many Azeris that they were very wary of any understanding between Turkey and Armenia that would sacrifice Azeri interests.
54. Cited in Bransten and Rechnagel, "Outbreak of 'Football Diplomacy.'"
55. International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders," Europe Report No. 199 (Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, April 14, 2009), p. 1. For further background, see Aybars Gorgulu, "Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?" *Insight Turkey* 11 (Spring 2009), pp. 19–29.

56. Cited in Grigoryan, "Armenia, Turkey Put Differences Aside."
57. "Turkish-Armenian Soccer Diplomacy," Reuters, September 5, 2008, accessed October 9, 2008, <http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2008/09/05/turkish-armenian-soccer-diplomacy/>.
58. Aras and Ozbay, "Will Football Diplomacy Work?"
59. Ibid.
60. For background, see Gallia Lindenstrauss, "The Historic Accord between Turkey and Armenia: What Lies Ahead?" *INSS Insight* No. 136, October 12, 2009.
61. Sebnem Arsu, "Armenians and Turks Agree on Ties," *New York Times*, September 1, 2009.
62. Cited in Matthew Lee, "Turkey and Armenia Sign Historic Accord Establishing Diplomatic Relations," October 10, 2009, accessed October 17, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com. The following discussion is largely based on this source.
63. This and the following citations were taken from ibid.
64. This and the following citation were taken from Suzan Fraser, "Armenia, Turkey Pursue 'Soccer Diplomacy,'" October 15, 2009, accessed October 16, 2009, ArmeniaDiaspora.com.
65. The following data and citations were gleaned from "Protocol on Development of Relations between the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Armenia," Turkish Embassy, Washington, D.C., October 11, 2009, accessed October 16, 2009, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/protocol-on-development>.
66. The following discussion is largely based on Jennifer Lind, *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
67. See Semih Idiz, "The Turkish-Armenian Debacle," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), p. 14; and Sergey Minasyan, "Prospects for Normalization between Armenia and Turkey: A View from Yerevan," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), p. 28.
68. Emil Danielyan, "Turkish-Armenian Deal Threatens to Unravel," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (January 27, 2010); and Barcin Yinanc, "Turkey Asks for Guarantee from Bern, Washington on Behalf of Armenia," *Hurriyet* (Turkey), January 27, 2010.
69. Elhan Mehtiyev, "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: An Azerbaijani Perspective," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 41–47.
70. Piotr Zalewski, "Abnormalisation: The Bumpy Road to Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement," Centre for European Policy Studies, (Brussels, December 17, 2009).
71. Elhan Mehtiyev, "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: An Azerbaijani Perspective," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 41–47.
72. See, for example, the recent discussion in Ronald Grigor Suny, "Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians," *American Historical Review* 114 (October 2009), pp. 935ff.
73. Emil Danielyan, "Armenia Showcases Iran Ties, as Talks with Azerbaijan and Turkey Falter," *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 7 (February 11, 2010).
74. For background, see Igor Torbakov, "Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus," *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 31–39.

75. The following recommendations are largely based on the discussion in Aras and Ozbay, "Will Football Diplomacy Work?" pp. 5–7.
76. C. Christine Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (April 2005), pp. 125–56.
77. In a mirror image of this splitting strategy, however, Armenia undoubtedly would like to separate Turkey and Azerbaijan by convincing Turkey to open its borders to Armenia, an increasingly possible demarche given the perceived sterility of keeping the borders closed. Armenia would also like to split Turkey and Azerbaijan on the Nagorno Karabakh issue.
78. *Today's Zaman*, February 16, 2009.
79. For a series of further even-handed and cogently reasoned recommendations on how the parties might proceed, see International Crisis Group, "Turkey and Armenia," pp. ii–iii. These proposals were released in April 2009. For additional policy proposals and recommendations, see Aybars Gorgulu, Alexander Iskandaryan, and Sergey Minasyan, "Turkey-Armenian Dialogue Series: Assessing the Rapprochement Process," TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), Istanbul, May 2010, pp. 22–23. Finally, see on the website maintained by the European Stability Initiative (ESI) in Berlin accessed September 4, 2010, www.esiweb.org "Turkey-Armenia: The Great Debate," August 2009; and "Turkey-Armenia Manual: Information and Contacts to Persons and Institutions Working on Turkey-Armenia Relations," August 2010.

Selected Bibliography

- Akcam, Taner. *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006.
- Akdemir Erhan. (EU Centre Association). "Turkey's EU Bid and the Armenian Problem." Accessed August 15, 2008, <http://www.abmerkezi.org.tr/article.php>.
- Alexander, Benjamin F. "Armenian and American: The Changing Face of Ethnic Identity and Diasporic Nationalism, 1915–1955." Ph.D. dissertation, The City University of New York, 2005.
- Allen, W. E. D., and Paul Muratoff. *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1928–1921*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953.
- Alvarez, Alex. *Governments, Citizens and Genocide: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary Approach*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2001.
- Amnesty International Report 1983*. London: Amnesty International Publications, 1983.
- Andonian, Aram, ed. *The Memoirs of Naim Bey: Turkish Official Documents Relating to the Deportations and Massacres of Armenians*. London, 1920, reprinted, Newtown Square, PA: Armenian Historical Research Association, 1964.
- Aras, Bulent, and Fatih Ozbay. "Turkish-Armenian Relations: Will Football Diplomacy Work?" No. 24. *SETA Policy Brief* (Ankara), September 2008.
- Arikan, Harun. *Turkey and the EU: An Awkward Candidate for EU Membership?* Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006.
- Arlen, Jr. Michael J. *Passage to Ararat*. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1975.
- "Armenian Allegations and Some Facts." *ATA-USA: Bulletin of the Assembly of American Turkish Associations*, (April, 1980).
- The Armenian Issue in Nine Questions and Answers*. Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1982.
- "Armenian Terrorist Leader Hagopian Interviewed: *Milan Panorama* in Italian, 1 Sept. 80, pp. 62–65." In *Joint Publications Research Service: Western Europe*. No. 1628, September 24, 1980, pp. 1–6, referred to in the text as *Panorama Interview*.
- Atamian, Sarkis. *The Armenian Community*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955.
- . "Portrait of Immortality, Part II: 'The Hunt.'" *Armenian Review* 13 (February 1961), pp. 11–21.

- Avakian, Lindy V. *The Cross and the Crescent*. Los Angeles: De Vorss & Co., 1965.
- Aya, Sukru Server. *The Genocide of Truth*. Istanbul: Istanbul Commerce University, 2008.
- Bakalian, Anny. *Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993.
- Balakian, Peter. *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*. New York: HarperCollins, 2003.
- Baldwin, Oliver. *The Questing Beast*. London: Grayson and Grayson, 1932.
- Bardakci, Murat, ed. *Talat Pasa'nin Evrak-i Metrukesi* [The Papers Talaat Pasha Left Behind]. Istanbul: Everest Yayinlari, 2009.
- Bardakjian, Kevork B. *Hitler and the Armenian Genocide*. Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1985.
- Barkey, Karen. *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Barnett, Michael. *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2002.
- Bass, Gary Jonathan. *Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Bellaigue, Christopher de. *Rebel Land: Among Turkey's Forgotten Peoples*. London: Bloomsbury, 2009.
- Betts, Robert. Review of Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*. In *Middle East Policy* 15 (Spring 2008), p. 176–77.
- Bloxham, Donald. "The Armenian Genocide of 1915–1916: Cumulative Radicalization and the Development of a Destruction Policy." *Past & Present*, No. 181 (November 2003), pp. 141–91.
- . *Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- . *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Bryce, James. *Transcaucasia and Ararat*. London: Macmillan, 1896.
- , compiler. *The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16*. Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers Miscellaneous No. 31. London: Joseph Cavston, 1916.
- Cagaptay, Soner. "The PKK and the Armenian Genocide Resolution: U.S.-Turkish Relations at a Critical Juncture." Policy Watch No. 1293. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 23, 2007.
- Cannon, Brendon. "Politicizing History and Legislating Reality: History, Memory, and Identity as Explanations for Armenian Claims of Genocide." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 2009.
- Charny, Israel W. "Towards a Generic Definition of Genocide." In *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions*, ed. George J. Andreopoulos. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994, pp. 64–94.
- Chaumont, Jean-Michel. *La concurrence des victimes*. Paris: La Decouverte, 1997.

- Chiorot, Daniel, and Clark McCauley. *Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
- Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Document. *Turkey 2007 Progress Report*. {COM (2007) 663 final} Brussels, November 6, 2007.
- . *Turkey 2008 Progress Report*. {COM (2008) 674} Brussels, November 5, 2008.
- “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 78 United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) 277, entered into force on January 12, 1951.
- Cornell, Svante. “Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 34 (January 1998), pp. 51–72.
- Corsun, Andrew. “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile.” *U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, August 1982, pp. 31–35.
- Dadrian, Vahagn N. “Genocide as a Problem of National and International Law: The World War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications.” *Yale Journal of International Law* 14 (Summer 1989), pp. 221–334.
- . *German Responsibility in the Armenian Genocide: A Review of the Historical Evidence of German Complicity*. Cambridge, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1996.
- . *The Key Elements in the Turkish Denial of the Armenian Genocide: A Case Study of Distortion and Falsification*. Toronto: Zoryan Institute, 1999.
- . “The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide.” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 18 (August 1986), pp. 311–60.
- . “The Role of the Special Organization in the Armenian Genocide during the First World War.” In *Minorities in Wartime: National and Racial Groupings in Europe, North America and Australia during the Two World Wars*, ed. Panikos Panayi. Oxford: Berg, 1993, pp. 50–82.
- . “The Role of Turkish Physicians in the World War I Genocide of Ottoman Armenians.” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 1 (1986), pp. 169–92.
- Daly, M. W. *Darfur’s Sorrow: A History of Destruction and Genocide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Davis, Leslie A. *The Slaughterhouse Province: An American Diplomat’s Report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917*, ed. Susan K. Blair. New Rochelle, NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1989.
- Davison, Roderic. *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990.
- Demir, Neside Kerim. *The Armenian Question in Turkey. 1980*. (No other information provided.)
- Derogy, Jacques. *Resistance and Revenge: The Armenian Assassination of the Turkish Leaders Responsible for the 1915 Massacres and Deportations*. New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 1990.

- Documents*. Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, 1982.
- Documents*. Vol. II. Ankara: Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information, 1983.
- Dundar, Fuat. "Has the Armenian Issue Been Settled? The Issue of Massacring Down to 10%." Translated from the Turkish original. *Toplumsal Tarih* No. 174 (June 2008), pp. 79–83.
- Dyer, Gwynne. "Turkish 'Falsifiers' and Armenian 'Deceivers': Historiography and the Armenian Massacres." *Middle East Studies* 12 (January 1976), pp. 99–107.
- Erickson, Edward J. "Armenian Massacres: New Records Undercut Old Blame (Reexamining History)." *Middle East Quarterly* 13 (Summer 2006).
- . "The Armenians and Ottoman Military Policy, 1915." *War in History* 15 (No. 2; 2008), pp. 141–67.
- . Review of Guenter Lewy, "The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide." *Middle East Journal* 60 (Spring 2006), pp. 378–79.
- "European Parliament Resolution on a Political Solution to the Armenian Question." Doc. A2-33/87, June 18, 1987.
- European Stability Initiative. "Noah's Dove Returns: Armenia, Turkey and the Debate on Genocide." *Berlin*, April 21, 2009.
- . "Turkey-Armenia: The Great Debate." Accessed September 4, 2010, www.esiweb.org. *Berlin*, August 2009.
- . "Turkey-Armenia Manual: Information and Contacts to Persons and Institutions Working on Turkey-Armenia Relations." Accessed September 4, 2010, www.esiweb.org. *Berlin*, August 2010.
- Evans, Laurence. *United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914–1924*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965.
- Fair, C. Christine. "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 11 (Spring 2005), pp. 125–56.
- Fein, Helen. *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*. London: Sage Publications, 1990.
- Fernandes, Desmond. *The Armenian, Assyrian, Greek, Kurdish and Greek Cypriot Genocides and the Politics of Denialism*. Stockholm: Apec Press, 2008.
- Findley, Carter Vaughn. *Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789–2007*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.
- Fisher, H. A. L. *James Bryce*. Vol. II. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927.
- Flint, Julie, and Alex de Waal. *Darfur: A Short History of a Long War*. London and New York: Zed Books, 2005.
- "Forum: The Armenian Question." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 9 (1978), pp. 379–400.
- Goltz, Thomas. *Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter's Adventures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, Post-Soviet Republic*. Armonk, NY, and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1998.
- Gorgulu, Aybars. "Towards a Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement?" *Insight Turkey* 11 (Spring 2009), pp. 19–29.

- Gorgulu, Aybars, Alexander Iskandaryan, and Sergey Minasyan. "Turkey-Armenia Dialogue Series: Assessing the Rapprochement Process." TESEV (The Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation), Istanbul, May 2010.
- Gregg, Heather S. "Divided They Conquer: The Success of Armenian Ethnic Lobbies in the United States." Working Paper No. 13. Cambridge, MA: Inter-University Committee on International Migration, 2002.
- Guclu, Yucel. "Will Untapped Ottoman Archives Reshape the Armenian Debate?" *Middle East Quarterly* 16 (Spring 2009), pp. 35–42.
- Gunter, Michael M. "The Armenian Dashnak Party in Crisis." *Crossroads* (No. 26; 1987), pp. 75–88.
- . "Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal." *Journal of Conflict Studies* 27 (Winter 2007), pp. 109–128.
- . "The Armenian Terrorist Campaign against Turkey." *Orbis* 27 (Summer 1983), pp. 447–77.
- . "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism." *Terrorism: An International Journal* 8 (No. 3; 1986), pp. 213–52.
- . "Deep State: The Arcane Parallel State in Turkey." *Orient* 47 (No. 3; 2006), pp. 334–48.
- . "Gunter Response to Dadrian Article." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 19 (November 1987), pp. 523–24.
- . *Pursuing the Just Cause of Their People: A Study of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986.
- . "A Reply to Joseph Kechichian and Keith Watenpugh." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (August 2007), pp. 514–18.
- . Review of Guenter Lewy, *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*. In *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 38 (November 2006), pp. 598–600.
- . "Self-Determination in the Recent Practice of the United Nations." *World Affairs* 137 (Fall 1974), pp. 150–65.
- . "Self-Determination or Territorial Integrity: The United Nations in Confusion." *World Affairs* 141 (Winter 1979), pp. 203–216.
- . *Transnational Armenian Activism*. Conflict Studies No. 229. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1990.
- . "United State-Turkish Intelligence Liaison Since World War II." *Journal of Intelligence History* 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 33–46.
- Gunter, Michael M., and Dirk Rohtus. "Special Report: The Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement." *Middle East Critique* 19 (Summer 2010), pp. 157–72.
- Gurun, Kamuran. *The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.
- Halacoglu, Yusuf. *The Story of 1915: What Happened to the Ottoman Armenians?* Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2008.
- Harff, Barbara, and Ted Robert Gurr. "Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945." *International Studies Quarterly* (No. 32; 1988), pp. 369–81.

- Hassassian, Manuel S. *ARF as a Revolutionary Party, 1890–1921*. Jerusalem: Hai Tad Publications, 1983.
- Helsinki Watch. “Human Rights in Turkey’s ‘Transition to Democracy.’” New York and Washington, D.C.: U.S. Helsinki Watch Committee, 1983.
- Honig, Jan Willem, and Norbert Both. *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*. New York: Penguin, 1997.
- Hovannisian, Richard G. *The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915–1923*. Cambridge, MA: Armenian Heritage Press, 1978.
- Howard, Harry N. *An American Inquiry in the Middle East: The King-Crane Commission*. Beirut: Khayats, 1963.
- Human Rights Watch. *Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995.
- Huntington, Samuel P. “The Erosion of National Interests.” *Foreign Affairs* 76 (September/October 1997), pp. 28–49.
- Hurewitz, J. C. *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record*. 2 vols. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956.
- Huttenbach Henry R. “Locating the Holocaust under the Genocide Spectrum: Toward a Methodology of Definition and Categorization.” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 3 (no. 3, 1988).
- Hyland, Francis P. *Armenian Terrorism: The Past, the Present, the Prospects*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991.
- Idiz, Semih. “The Turkish-Armenian Debacle.” *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 11–19.
- International Crisis Group. “Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace.” Europe Report No. 167, Tbilisi/Brussels, October 11, 2005.
- . “Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War.” Europe Report No. 187, Tbilisi/Brussels, November 14, 2007.
- . “Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders.” Europe Report No. 199, Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, April 14, 2009.
- International Court of Justice. *The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina vs. Serbia and Montenegro)*. Case 91, The Hague, 26 February 2007.
- Iskandaryan, Alexander. “Armenian-Turkish Rapprochement: Timing Matters.” *Insight Turkey* 11 (Summer 2009), pp. 37–44.
- Iskandaryan, Alexander, and Sergey Minasyan. “Pragmatic Policies vs. Historical Constraints: Analyzing Armenia-Turkey Relations.” *Caucasus Institute Research Papers*. Report No. 1. Yerevan: Caucasus Institute, January 1, 2010.
- Jonassohn, Kurt. “What is Genocide?” In *Genocide Watch*, ed. Helen Fein. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.
- Jordan, Robert Paul. “The Proud Armenians.” *National Geographic* 153 (June 1978), p. 846–73.
- Jorgensen, Torben. “Turkey, the US and the Armenian Genocide.” In *Genocide: Cases, Comparisons, and Contemporary Debates*, ed. Steven L.B. Jensen.

- Copenhagen: The Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2003, pp. 193–223.
- Joseph, Joseph S., ed. *Turkey and the European Union: Internal Dynamics and Extended Challenges*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
- Judah, Tim. *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Kaiser, Hilmar. "Regional Resistance to Central Government Policies: Ahmed Djemal Pasha, the Governors of Aleppo, and Armenian Deportees in the Spring and Summer of 1915." *Journal of Genocide Research* 12 (September 2010), 173–218.
- Karal, Enver Ziya. *Armenian Question*. Ankara: Gunduz, 1975.
- Karaosmanoglu, Kerem. "Reimagining Minorities in Turkey: Before and After the AKP." *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 193–212.
- Katchaznouni, Hovhannes. *The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnagzoutiun) Has Nothing To Do Anymore*. Reprint, trans. from the original by Matthew A. Callender and edited by John Roy Carlson (Arthur A. Derounian). New York: Armenian Information Service, 1955. This version of Katchaznouni's address, which I have used, omitted some text about Armenian dealings with the Bolsheviks in the early 1920s. For a complete e-version of Katchaznouni's testimony, see Lale Akalin, *Dashnagzoutiun Has Nothing To Do Anymore—Hovhannes Katchaznouni Manifesto*, 2006. Accessed July 19, 2008, <http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2006/05/679-dashnagzoutin-has-nothing-to-do.html>.
- Katz, Stephen. *The Holocaust in Historical Context*. Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Kechichian, Joseph A., and Keith David Watenpaugh. "A Response to Michael Gunter's Review of *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*. (IJMES 38 [2006]: 598–601." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39 (August 2007), pp. 509–14.
- Kocas, Sadi. *Tarih Boyunca Ermeniler ve Turk-Ermeni Iliskileri*. Ankara: Altinok Matbaasi, 1967.
- Kubosova, Lucia. "MEPs Back Armenia Genocide Clause in Turkey Report." *EU Observer*, September 5, 2006.
- Kuper, Leo. *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*. London: Penguin Books, 1981.
- Kurz, Anat, and Ariel Merari. *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool*. Jerusalem: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, and Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.
- Laciner, Sedat, Mehmet Ozcan, and Ihsan Bal. *European Union with Turkey: The Possible Impact of Turkey's Membership on the European Union*. Ankara: ISRO Publication, 2005.
- Lake, Michael, ed. *The EU and Turkey: A Glittering Prize or a Millstone?* London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 2005.
- Lang, David. *The Armenians: A People in Exile*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981.
- Langer, William. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902*. Boston: Knopf, 1951.

- Laqueur, Walter. *Terrorism*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1977.
- Lemkin, Raphael. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944.
- Lepsius, Johannes. *Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei*. Potsdam: Tempelverlag, 1916.
- Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 2nd ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1968.
- Lewy, Guenter. *The Armenian Massacres in Ottoman Turkey: A Disputed Genocide*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2005.
- Libaridian, Gerard J. *Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2004.
- Lind, Jennifer. *Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
- Lochner, Louis P. *What about Germany?* New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1942.
- Lowry, Heath W. *The Story behind Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990.
- . "The U.S. Congress and Adolf Hitler on the Armenians." *Political Communication and Persuasion: An International Journal* 3 (No. 2, 1985), pp. 111–40.
- Lutem, Omer Engin. "Armenian Question in a Historical Context: The Armenian Question from Lausanne until Today." Institute for Armenian Research, Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM), [2005], accessed April 29, 2008 at http://www.eraren.org/bilgibankasi/en/index1_1_3.htm.
- Malanczuk, Peter. *Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law*. Revised 7th ed. London and New York: Routledge, 1997.
- Mandalian, James G. *Armenian Freedom Fighters: The Memoirs of Rouben Der Minasian*. Boston: Hairenik Association, 1963.
- Mango, Andrew. *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey*. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000.
- Mann, Michael. *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Marashlian, Levon. *Politics and Demography: Armenians, Turks and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1991.
- . "Population Statistics on Ottoman Armenians in the Context of Turkish Historiography." *Armenian Review* 40 (Winter 1987), pp. 1–59.
- Markusen, Eric, and David Kope. *The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.
- McCarthy, Justin. *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*. New York and London: New York University Press, 1983.
- . *The Armenian Rebellion in Van*. Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press, 2006.
- Mehtiyev, Elhan. "Turkish-Armenian Protocols: An Azerbaijani Perspective." *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 41–47.

- Melkonian, Markar, ed. *The Right to Survive: Selected Writings of Monte Melkonian on the Armenian National Question*. 2nd ed. San Francisco, CA: Sardarabad Collective, 1993.
- Melkonian, Monte. "Booklet Giving History of ASALA's Existence Gives New Insight into the Revolutionary Movement." *Armenian Reporter*, January 10, 1985, pp. 3 and 10; and the eight subsequent issues. Referred to in the text as "ASALA-RM History."
- Melson, Robert. "Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of 1915." Paper presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, November 4, 1983.
- . *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
- Midlarsky, Manus. *The Killing Trap: Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Minasian, Edward. *Musa Dagb: A Chronicle of the Armenian Genocide Factor in the Subsequent Suppression, by the Intervention of the United States Government, of the Movie Based on Franz Werfel's The Forty Days of Musa Dagb*. Nashville, TN: Cold Tree Press, 2007.
- Minassian, Anaide Ter. *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement (1887–1912)*. Cambridge, MA: Zoryan Institute, 1984.
- Minasyan, Sergey. "Prospects for Normalization between Armenia and Turkey: A View from Yerevan." *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 21–30.
- Mirak, Robert. *Armenians in America, 1890 to World War I*. Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Morgenthau, Henry. *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story*. Garden City and New York: Doubleday, Page, 1919.
- "Nadim Nasir Report: *Al-Majallah* Visits an Armenian Secret Army Base in Lebanon." In *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)*, Daily Report (Middle East and Africa), September 1, 1982, p. G8.
- Naimark, Norman M. *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth-Century Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
- Nalbandian, Louise. *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties through the Nineteenth Century*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963.
- Nansen, Fridtjof. *Armenia and the Near East*. New York: Daffield & Company, 1928.
- Nassibian, Akaby. *Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915–1923*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- Neccef, Mehmet. "The Turkish Media Debate on the Armenian Massacres." In *Genocide: Cases, Comparisons, and Contemporary Debates*, ed. Steven L. B. Jensen. Copenhagen: The Danish Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 2003, pp. 225–62.
- Oberling, Pierre. *The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus*. Boulder, CO: Social Science Monograph, 1982.

- Office of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic in the United States. *Artsakh Newsletter*. July-August 2008, email: info@nkrusa.org, received September 8, 2008.
- Orel, Sinasi, and Sureyya Yuca. *The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?* Nicosia: K. Rustem and Bro., 1986.
- Papazian, K[apriel] S[erope]. *Patriotism Perverted: A Discussion of the Deeds and the Misdeeds of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the So-Called Dashnagtzoutune*. Boston: Baikar Press, 1934.
- Paul, Rachel Anderson. "Grassroots Mobilization and Diaspora Politics: Armenian Interest Groups and the Role of Collective Memory." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6 (Spring 2000), pp. 24–47.
- Phillips, David L. *Unsilencing the Past: Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation*. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005.
- Phillips, Jenny. *Symbol, Myth, and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American Population*. New York: AMS Press, 1989.
- Power, Samantha. *"A Problem from Hell": American and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.
- Prunier, Gerard. *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
- Ravitch, Norman. "The Armenian Catastrophe: Of History, Murder and Sin." *Encounter* (December 1981), pp. 69–84.
- Rieff, David. "Case Study in Ethnic Strife: Nagorno-Karabakh." *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1997), pp. 118–26.
- Robbins, Philip. "Back from the Brink: Turkey's Ambivalent Approaches to the Hard Drugs Issue." *Middle East Journal* 62 (Autumn 2008), p. 630–50.
- Rohde, David. *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacre since World War II*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997.
- Rummel, Rudolf J. *Death by Government*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994.
- Sahin, Erman. "Review Essay: The Armenian Question." *Middle East Policy* 17 (Spring 2010), pp. 144–57.
- . "Review Essay: A Scrutiny of Akcam's Version of History and the Armenian Genocide." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 28 (August 2008), pp. 303–19.
- Salt, Jeremy. *Imperialism, Evangelism and Ottoman Armenians, 1878–1896*. London: Frank Cass, 1993.
- . "The Narrative Gap in Ottoman Armenian History." *Middle Eastern Studies* 39 (January 2003), pp. 19–36.
- . *The Unmaking of the Middle East: A History of Western Disorder in Arab Lands*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008.
- Sanjian, Avedis K. *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Sarkissian, A. O. *History of the Armenian Question to 1885*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1938.
- Schlesinger, Jr. Arthur M. *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.

- Seker, Nesim. "Demographic Engineering in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians." *Middle Eastern Studies* 43 (May 2007): 461–74.
- Semelin, Jacques. *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide*. Translated from the French by Cynthia Schoch. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
- Setting the Record Straight on Armenian Propaganda against Turkey*. (Booklet published by the Assembly of Turkish American Associations, 1982.)
- Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Vol. II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1805–1917*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Shiragian, Arshavir. *The Legacy: Memoirs of an Armenian Patriot*. Boston: Hairenik Press, 1976.
- Simsir, Bilal N., ed. *British Documents on Ottoman Armenians. Volume I (1856–1880)*. Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1982.
- Smith, Roger W., Eric Markusen, and Robert Jay Lifton. "Professional Ethics and the Denial of Armenian Genocide." *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 9 (Spring 1995), pp. 1–22.
- Somer, Tarik. "Armenian Terrorism and the Narcotic Traffic." In *International Terrorism and the Drug Connection*. Ankara: Ankara University Press, 1984, pp. 19–27.
- Sonyel, Salahi Ramsdan. *The Ottoman Armenians: Victims of Great Power Diplomacy*. London: K. Rustem & Bro., 1987.
- Special Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council. UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 2/L. 583, June 25, 1973.
- "Srebrenica Genocide: Questions and Answers." Accessed July 23, 2008, <http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com/2007/07>, July 7, 2007, p. 5.
- "Statement of Francis M. Mullen, Jr., Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration US Department of Justice on Drug-Related Terrorism Before the United States Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse, Paula Hawkins, Chairman, August 2, 1984." (Mimeographed).
- "Statement of Nathan M. Adams Senior Editor of Reader's Digest August 2, 1984; Room 428 Dirksen Senate Office Building Before the Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse." (Mimeographed).
- Staub, Ervin. *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Steidle, Brian, and Gretchen Steidle Wallace. *The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur*. New York: Public Affairs, 2007.
- Steinberg, Maxime. "Le genocide: Historie d'un imbroglio juridique." In *Genocide*, ed. Kathia Boustany and Daniel Dormoy. Bruxelles: Ed. De l'Universite de Bruxelles, 1999.
- Straus, Scott. "Darfur and the Genocide Debate." *Foreign Affairs* 84 (January/February 2005), pp. 123–33.

———. *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2006.

"Straws in the Wind: Prospects for Human Rights and Democracy in Turkey." New York and Washington, D.C.: US Helsinki Watch Committee, 1984.

Suny, Ronald Grigor. *Armenia in the Twentieth Century*. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983.

———. "Truth in Telling: Reconciling Realities in the Genocide of the Ottoman Armenians." *American Historical Review* 114 (October 2009), pp. 930–46.

Tatz, Colin M. *With Intent to Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide*. London: Verso, 2003.

Ternon, Yves. *The Armenian Cause*. Delmar, NY: Carvan Books, 1985.

———. "Freedom and Responsibility of the Historian: The 'Lewis' Affair." In *Remembrance and Denial: The Case of the Armenian Genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1999.

Terzian, Pierre. "La question armenienne aujourd'hui." In the special issue of *Critique Socialiste* 55 (No. 4, 1982) entitled "Armenie du genocide a l'explosion."

Therault, Henry C. "Denial and Free Speech: The Case of the Armenian Genocide." In *Looking Backward, Moving Forward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide*, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2003, pp. 231–61.

Tololyan, Khachig. "Conflict and Decline in Armenian Terrorism." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 29, 1986.

———. "Martyrdom as Legitimacy: Terrorism, Religion and Symbolic Appropriation in the Armenian Diaspora." In *Contemporary Research on Terrorism*, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair M. Stewart. Aberdeen, UK: Aberdeen University Press, 1987.

Torbakov, Igor. "Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus." *Insight Turkey* 12 (Spring 2010), pp. 31–39.

Toriguian, Shavarsh. *The Armenian Question and International Law*. Beirut: Hamaskaine Press, 1973.

Torture in the Eighties. London: Amnesty International Publications, 1984.

Totten, Samuel, and Eric Markusen, eds. *Genocide in Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan*. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Toynbee, Arnold J. *Acquaintances*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

———. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilizations*. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1922.

The Turco-Armenian Question: The Turkish Point of View. Constantinople: The National Congress of Turkey 1919 [reprinted].

"Turkey's Candidacy for the United Nations Security Council." *Embassy Notes: From the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey, Washington, D.C.*, September 18, 2008.

United Nations. *Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica*. UN Doc. No. A/54/549, November 15, 1999.

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights. UN General Assembly Resolution 217, UN Doc. A/810, p. 71, 1948.
- Uras, Esat. *The Armenians in History and the Armenian Question*. Istanbul: Documentary Publications, 1988.
- US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and Bureau of Intelligence and Research. *Documenting the Atrocities in Darfur*. September 2004
- Valentino, Benjamin A. *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Vratzian, Simon. "The Armenian Revolution and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation." *Armenian Review* 3 (Autumn 1950).
- Waal, Thomas de. *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War*. New York: New York University Press, 2004.
- Walker, Christopher J. *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.
- . "The Armenian Holocaust in its Modern Historical Context." *Ararat* 24 (Spring 1983), pp. 43–45.
- Wegner, Armin T. *Der Weg ohne Heimkehr: Ein Martyrium in Briefen*. 2nd ed. Dresden: Sibyllen, 1920.
- Weitz, Eric. *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.
- Zalewski, Piotr. "Abnormalisation: The Bumpy Road to Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement." Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, December 17, 2009.
- Ziya Karal, Enver. *Armenian Question*. Ankara: Gunduz, 1975.
- Zwaan, Ton. "On the Aetiology and Genesis of Genocides and Other Mass Crimes Targeting Specific Groups." Report written at the request of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. University of Amsterdam/Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, November 2003.

Newspapers, Weeklies, Et cetera

Armenia (ASALA/Greece)
Armenian Mirror-Spectator
Armenian Reporter
Armenian Weekly
Artsakh Newsletter
Briefing (Turkey)
British Broadcasting Corporation (Radio)
California [Armenian] Courier
Christian Science Monitor
Daily Star (Lebanon)
Economist (UK)

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (USA)

Guardian (UK)

Haytong (USA)

International Herald Tribune

Los Angeles Times

Moush (ASALA/Greece)

New York Times

Times (UK)

Turkish Daily News

Voice of America (Radio)

Wall Street Journal

Washington Post

Washington Times

Index

- Abdulhamid II (Sultan), 4, 8
 Abu Iyad, 60, 68
 Abu Nidal, 69
 Aegis Trust, 85
 Afghanistan, 84, 96
 African Union, 35, 36
 Agca, Mehmet Ali, 117
 Aghtamar (Cathedral), 112, 167n58
 Aharonian, Avetis, 45
 AK Party (AKP), 117, 129
 Akcam, Taner, 37, 51, 52
 Akhalkalak, 63, 155n39
 Aktan, Gunduz, 124
 Aksoy, Dursun, 101
 Akyol, Mustafa, 131
 Akyol, Taha, 117
 Albanians, 78
 Alexandropol (Gumru) Peace Treaty (1920), 42, 45
 Alliance of Civilizations, 87
 Al-Qaeda, 82, 92
 American Turkish Council (ATC), 96
 Amnesty International, 35, 107
 ANCA (Armenian National Committee of America), 91, 92, 93. *See also* Armenian Lobbies (United States); Dashnaks; Hypermobilization (Armenian Lobbies in the United States)
 Andonian Telegrams (Documents), 46, 51, 55
 Andranik (Ozanian), 14, 44, 65, 120
 ANI (Armenian National Institute), 92
 Ani, 18, 112
 Annan, Kofi, 35
 Antelias (Lebanon), 60, 91
 Apartheid, 30
 April 24 Commemoration Day. *See* Genocide Day
 ARA (Armenian Revolutionary Army), 57, 63, 99. *See also* Armenian Terrorism; Dashnaks; JCAG
 Arab League, 35, 36
 ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation). *See* Dashnaks
 Arikian, Kemal, 1, 59, 64
 Arinc, Bulent, 117
 Arlen, Michael J., 70
 Arman, Karabet, 109
 Armenia (1918–1921), 18, 39, 41–43, 44–45, 120
 Armenia (1991–), 18, 64, 68, 89, 92, 93, 94, 122, 128–38, 155n39, 172n77; declaration of independence (September 21, 1991), 89; declaration of sovereignty (August 23, 1990), 38, 130, 135; soccer diplomacy, viii, 129–32; Zurich Protocols (2009), viii, 26, 129, 132–34, 135–36, 137, 155n40
 Armenia (Soviet 1921–1991), 59, 61, 67, 93
 Armenian Assembly of America (The Assembly), 91, 92, 93, 94, 124. *See also* Armenian Lobbies; Hypermobilization (Armenian Lobbies in the United States)

- Armenian Caucus (U.S. Congress), 91, 95
- Armenian Church(es), 60, 91, 104, 105, 108, 109, 111, 112, 162n71, 163n72
- Armenian Diaspora, 65, 71, 75, 78, 81, 90, 91, 123, 124, 126, 131, 137, 138
- Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), 81, 93, 162n70
- Armenian Genocide. *See* Genocide (Armenians)
- Armenian Genocide Museum (USA), 92, 94
- Armenian Lobbies (United States), viii, 75, 82, 90–96, 113, 121. *See also* ANCA; Armenian Assembly of America; Hypermobilization; USAPAC
- Armenian National Committee of America. *See* ANCA
- Armenian Question, 1–26
- Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Dashnaks). *See* Dashnaks
- Armenian Terrorism, 1, 3, 7, 8, 18, 24, 43, 57–63, 85, 89, 99–105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 121, 139n1. *See also* ARA; ASALA; JCAG; Operation Nemesis
- Arsacids (AD 53–429), 18
- Article 301 (of Turkish Penal Code), 116, 117, 118
- Artsakh. *See* Nagorno Karabakh
- Artsruni (AD ninth century), 18
- Arzoumanian, Alexander, 124
- ASALA (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia), 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 64, 65–70, 72, 81, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 155n35, 157n76, 164n14. *See also* Armenian Terrorism; Hagop Hagopian
- ASALA-RM Faction, 101, 102. *See also* Melkonian, Monte
- ASAM (Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies), 52
- Ashjian, Apo (Abraham), 64, 65, 101
- Assad, Hafez, 72
- Assembly, The. *See* Armenian Assembly of America
- ATAA (Assembly of Turkish American Associations), 97, 123
- Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, 18, 51, 52, 88, 116
- Athens (ancient), 30
- Austria, 30
- Azerbaijan (Azeris), 20, 45, 54, 64, 68, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 92, 93, 95, 96, 131, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139n1, 155n39, 172n77. *See also* Nagorno Karabakh
- Aznavourian, Sarkis, 65
- Babacan, Ali, 80, 113
- Baghdad (1258), 30
- Bagradian, Gabriel (fictional character), 115. *See also* *Forty Days of Musa Dagh, The*
- Bagratids of Ani, 18
- Bahaeddin Shakir, 62
- Bahcheli, Devlet, 132
- Baker, Howard, 96
- Baker, James, 96
- Balkar, Galip, 62, 107
- Ballaigue, Christopher de, 36
- Ban Ki-moon, 133
- Bardakci, Murat, 55, 128
- Bashir, Omar al-, 34–36. *See also* Darfur
- Baydar, Mehmet, 59
- Baydar, Yavuz, 127
- Baykal, Deniz, 132
- Bekaa Valley (Lebanon), 67
- Berlin, Treaty of, 3, 7
- Betts, Robert, 48
- Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC), 87, 122, 130

- Black Sea Naval Task Force, 87
 Bloxham, Donald, 37, 39, 51
 Blue Book, 9, 11, 12, 13, 36, 40,
 47. *See also* Bryce, Lord James;
 Genocide (Armenian); Toynbee,
 Arnold
 Boghos Nubar Pasha, 45, 162n70
 Bolsheviks, 41, 42
 Bosnia, 29, 38, 41–44, 85
Bosnia vs. Serbia, 32–34
 Bosnian Muslims, 31–34
 Bosnian Serbs, 31–34
 Bourj Hammoud (Lebanon), 60
 Bristol, Mark Admiral, 37
 Britain. *See* England
 Brownback Amendment (USA), 82. *See*
 also Silk Road Strategy (USA)
 Bryce, Lord James, 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12,
 13, 47. *See also* Blue Book
 Bryce-Toynbee Blue Book. *See* Blue Book
 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 83
 Bulgaria (Bulgarians), 62, 77, 78, 80
 Burundi, 29
 Bush, George W., 35, 71, 82
Buyuk Felaket (Great Catastrophe), 128,
 136. *See also* *Mets Yeghern*
 Buyukanit, Yasar, 117
- Cafesjian, Gerard, 94–95
 Gagaptay, Soner, 84
 Calmy-Rey, Micheline, 133
 Cambodia, 29, 85
 Canada, 35, 69, 99
 Cannon, Bruce, 75, 90
Carbonaris, 61
 Carter, Jimmy, 84
 Carthage (146 BC), 30
 Caspian Pipeline Project, 93–94
 Caucasian Stability and Cooperation
 Platform (CSCP), 87, 130
 Cemal, Hasan, 161n48
 Chamoun, Camille, 60
 Charny, Israel, 30
 Chechnya, 29
- Chernobyl, 30
Chezoks (Neutrals), 162n67
 China, 35, 82, 130
 Chirac, Jacques, 80
 CIA (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency),
 65, 101
 Cicek, Kemal, 127
 Cilician Armenia, 18
 Clinton, Bill, 91, 97
 Clinton, Hillary Rodham, 133
 Colonna, Catherine, 79
 Columbia, 29
 Committee of Union and Progress
 (CUP; *Ittihat ve Terakki*), 9, 13,
 17, 46, 51, 52
 Congressional Caucus on Armenian
 Affairs (USA). *See* Armenian
 Caucus (U.S. Congress)
 Copenhagen Criteria, 88, 89, 90. *See*
 also EU (European Union)
 Crimes against Humanity, 29, 31, 32,
 35, 36, 78, 145n9
 Culturicide, 31
 CUP. *See* Committee of Union and
 Progress
 Cyprus, 18, 19, 22, 110
- Dadrian, Vakhakn N., 12–21, 46, 50, 51
 Daghljan, Vatche, 66
 Darfur, 31, 34–36, 38, 83, 160n38
 Dashnaks (Dashnags/*Dashnaktsutjun*),
 4, 7, 8, 14, 39, 41, 43–46, 57,
 60, 61–65, 66, 68, 69, 91, 92, 94,
 99, 102, 103, 120, 124, 126, 127,
 132, 150n60, 154n22, 155n40
 Davis, Leslie, 47, 52
 Davison, Roderic, 49, 76
 Davutoglu, Ahmet, 131, 133
Deep State (*Derin Devlet*), 116, 117
 Defferre, Gaston, 72
 Demir, Behadir, 16, 59
 Democide, 31
 Denmark, 80
Department of State Bulletin (U.S.), 19

- Dink, Hrant, 116–17, 122, 129
 Djemal Azmi, 62
 Dole, Robert, 91, 92
 Doremus, Inc., 96
 Dro (Igdir Drasdamat Kanayan), 14, 44, 120
 Drug Trafficking, 70, 87
 Dyer, Gwynne, 16, 52, 119
- Eagleburger, Lawrence, 96
 East Timor, 85, 159n30
 Eblighatian, Melkon, 102
 Ecocide, 31
 Elitocide, 31
 England (Britain, United Kingdom), 3, 4, 11, 13, 20, 22, 35, 41, 80, 134
 Enver Pasha, 9, 10
 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 113, 117, 123, 125, 126, 129, 132, 133
 Ergenekon, 116, 129. *See also* Deep State
 Ergun, Enver, 99
 Erickson, Edward J., 37, 49
 Ethnic cleansing, viii, 31, 33, 35, 83
 Ethnocide, 31
 EU (European Union), 35, 79–80, 86, 88–90, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133
 Eupen (Belgium), 30
 Evren, Kenan, 99, 100
 Ex-post-facto Proclamation, 38. *See also* Intertemporal Law
- Fedayeen*, 61, 154n25
 Feminicide, 31
 Ford, Gerard, 76
Forty Days of Musa Dagħ, The, 114–16, 122. *See also* Werfel, Franz
 France, 8, 13, 22, 30, 41, 47, 49, 50, 58, 67, 68, 69, 72, 77–80, 90, 135
 Fur, 36
- Gallipoli (1915), 18, 20
 Garabedian, Varoujan, 68
 Garo, Armen (Garegin Pasdermajian), 14, 44, 53, 55, 62
- Gayssot Act (France), 78
 Gemayel, Pierre, 60
 Geneva Conventions (1949), 146n10
 Genocide, vii, 27–56, 84, 85, 86, 146n11, 147n23; ambiguity of, vii, viii, 2, 9, 29–56, 85, 104, 120, 121, 125, 126, 128, 136, 137, 139n1, 151n89, 152n1. *See also* G-Word
 Genocide (Armenian), 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 27, 57, 58, 72, 73, 75, 78, 79, 88–90, 93, 95, 107, 110, 112, 114, 119, 123, 133, 135, *passim*; Turkish position on, 13–16, *passim*. *See also* G-word
 Genocide Day (Armenians), 59, 67, 106, 153n8
 Genocide Resolutions (U.S. Congress), 71, 76–77, 83–85, 96, 113, 132, 151n89, 153n8
 Genocide Treaty (Convention), 28–29, 30, 35, 38, 80, 88
 Georgia (Georgians), 20, 30, 41, 45, 87, 129, 130, 132, 137, 155n39, 159n30
 Gephardt, Richard, 96
 Germany, 11, 13, 30, 134
Giaours (Infidels), 2
 Gocsek, Muge, 127
 Goering, Hermann, 28
 Gomidas Institute, 126, 127, 169n28
 Gordon, Philip, 133
 Greeks (Greece), 6, 14, 37, 68, 70, 72, 78, 93, 110, 111
 Guatemala, 29
 Gul, Abdullah, 130, 131, 132, 133
 Gulbenkian, Calouste, 109
 Gunter, Michael: Reply in *IJMES*, 48–54
 Guzelian, Kevork, 66
 G-word, 35, 36, 71, 136. *See also* Genocide (Armenian)
- Habbash, George, 60
 Haddad, Wadi, 60

- Hagopian, Hagop, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 102, 153n12, 156n53. *See also* Armenian Terrorism; ASALA
- Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutiun* (Armenian Revolutionary Federation). *See* Dashnaks
- Haig, Alexander, 96
- Halacoglu, Yusuf, 126, 127, 129
- Hamidiye*, 4
- Hatay (Alexandretta), 72, 114
- Hatchinlian, Simon A., 110
- Herero (1904), 30
- Hernu, Charles, 72
- Hill & Knowlton, 96
- Hiroshima (1945), 30, 134
- Hitler, Adolf, 27–28, 55
- Hovannisian, Richard G., 17, 19, 23, 49, 50
- Hovhanissian, David, 124
- Huber, Max, 149n58
- Human Rights Watch, 35
- Hunchaks, 4, 7, 162n70
- Huntington, Samuel, 121
- Hurewitz, J. C., 49, 76
- Hypermobilization (of Armenian lobbies in United States), 90, 95, 121
- Ihin, Baki, 86
- Incirlik Base (Turkey), 84
- Indians (North America), 30, 37, 39
- Institute of Turkish Studies (USA), 114
- International Advisors, Inc., 96
- International Court of Justice (ICJ), 31–34, 147n23
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 149n57
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 149n57
- International Criminal Court (ICC), 30, 35, 36
- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 31–34, 35, 145n9, 147n23
- International Crisis Group, 132
- International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)*, 19, 48, 50
- Intertemporal law, 38, 39, 149n58. *See also* Ex-post-facto Proclamation; Huber, Max; Island of Palmas Case
- Ipekci, Abdi, 117
- Iran, 82, 84, 111, 136, 138
- Iraq, 29, 84, 95, 96, 103
- Iskandarian, Alexander, 131
- Island of Palmas Case (1928), 149n58
- Israel, 30, 69, 80, 87, 88, 92, 100, 105, 112, 113
- “Israel of the Caucasus,” 93, 94, 121
- Istepanyan, Torlom, 109
- Ius Cogens* (Peremptory Norm of General International Law), 38
- Jackel, Eberhard, 49
- Janjaweed*, 34. *See also* Darfur
- Japan, 134
- JCAG (Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide), 57, 59, 60, 63, 64, 70. *See also* ARA; Armenian Terrorism
- Jemal (Cemal) Pasha, 9, 84
- Jevdet Bey, 21
- Jewish Holocaust, vii, 27, 29, 30, 55, 85, 119, 158n12
- Jews, 11, 13, 18, 28, 115; support for Turks, 113; Turkish reprisals against?, 105–106, 112–113
- Jones, Jim, 30
- Judeocide, 31
- Jumblatt, Kemal, 60
- Kaiser, Hilmar, 55, 127
- Kaloustyan, Shnork, 104, 105, 107, 110
- Kandemir, Nuzhet, 114
- Karabagh (Karabakh), 45. *See also* Nagorno Karabakh; Artsakh
- Karadzic, Radovan, 32
- Katchaznouni, Hovannes: Manifesto of, vii, 39–43, 54, 120
- Katz, Stephen, 30

- Kechichian, Joseph A., 48–52, 54
 Kery (Arshak Gafavian), 44, 120
 Khojali Massacre (1992), 81, 126
 King-Crane Commission, 25
 Knollenberg, Joe, 91
 Kocharian, Robert, 125
 Kosovo, 30, 159n30
 Kouchner, Bernard, 133
 Kouymjian, Dickran, 104
 Krikorian, Van Z., 124
 Kristof, Nicholas, 35
 Krstic, General Radislav, 31–32
 Kuper, Leo, 51
 Kurds, vii, 3, 4, 10, 11, 20, 21, 22, 45, 56, 93, 103, 110
 Kuscubasi, Esref, 52

 Langer, William, 53, 61
 Laughlin, Greg, 96
 Lausanne, Treaty of, 22
 Lavrov, Sergei, 133
 Law of Treaties, Vienna Convention on, 38
 League of Nations, 4, 86
 Lebanon, 6, 58, 59, 60, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 91, 101
 Lemkin, Raphael, 27, 29, 30, 38, 46, 86
 Lepsius, Johannes, 13, 47, 115
 Lewis, Bernard, viii, 5, 47, 49, 76, 77–79, 121
 Lewy, Guenter, 46–54, 120
 Libaridian, Gerard J., 58, 85, 127
 Libricide, 31
 Lind, Jennifer, 134
 Linguicide, 31
 Livingston Group, 96
 Livingston, Robert, 96
 Lochner, Louis, 27–28
 Lockhart, Joe, 97
 Loris-Melikov, General Mikhail, 6, 21
 Lowry, Heath W., 114

 Malmedy (Belgium), 30
 Mammadyarov, Elmar, 131

 Mango, Andrew, 49
 Manukyan, Arman, 108
 Martayan, Lucika, 108
 Masada, 115
 Masalit, 36
 Mauserists (Dashnak fighters), 44
 McCarthy, Justin, 17, 22, 127
 McCauliffe, Kelly, Rafaelli & Siemens, 96
 McConnell Amendment (USA), 82
 Mekhitarist fathers, 106, 115
 Melkonian, Monte, 59, 60, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 81, 101, 102, 153n12
 Melson, Robert, 51
Mets Yeghern, 136, 169n32. *See also* *Buyuk Felaket* [Great Catastrophe]
 Mikaelian, Kristapor, 8
Millet-i Sadika, 2, 77
 Millet System, 2
 Milos (416 BC), 30
 Minasian, Edward, 115
 Minsk Group/Initiative of OSCE, 138, 159n30
 MIT (Turkish Intelligence Agency), 101, 157n76
 Mladic, General Ratko, 32, 33
 Mongol, 30
 Moreno-Ocampo, Luis, 35
 Morgenthau, Henry, 9, 10, 11, 12, 47
 Moumjian, Garabed, 127
 “Mountain Turks,” 110
 Mouradian, Khatchig, 127
 Mumcu, Ugur, 117
 Musa Dagħ, 114–16
 Mustafa Kemal. *See* Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal

 Naess, Ragmar, 127
 Nagasaki (1945), 30
 Nagorno Karabakh, 63, 64, 68, 71, 80–82, 92, 93, 122, 126, 133, 135, 136, 138, 139n12, 153n12, 155n39, 159n30, 172n77. *See also* Karabagh; Astsakh

- Naim Bey, 46, 51. *See also* Andonian Telegrams (Documents)
- Nakhichevan, 63
- Nalbandian, David, 133
- Nalbandian, Louise, 8, 53, 55
- Nansen, Fridtjof, 14
- Narodovolets*, 61
- Natali, Shahan (Hagop Der Hagopian), 62, 63, 65. *See also* Operation Nemesis
- Native Americans (Indians). *See* Indians (North America)
- NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 71, 73, 76, 83, 86, 93, 135
- Nazis, 27, 29, 33, 79, 158n12
- Nerses, Patriarch, 6
- New York Times*, 86, 88, 151n89
- Norway, 127
- Nuremberg Tribunal, 27, 29, 145n9, 146n10
- Obersalzberg (Hitler Speech), 27–28
- Odar*, 71
- Operation Nemesis, 57, 58, 62, 63
- Oran, Baskin, 127
- Oric, Nazer, 33
- OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), 86, 138, 159n30
- Ottoman Bank (1896), 8
- Ottoman (Turkish) Empire, vii, 2, 4, 6, 8, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 37, 39–43, 47, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62, 72, 75, 77, 83, 85, 88, 89, 110, 119, 120, 127, 128, 139n1
- Ouzounian, Levon, 101
- Palestinians, 30
- Pallone, Frank, 91
- Pamuk, Orhan, 117
- Papazian, Dennis, 127
- Papazian, K. S.: *Patriotism Perverted*, author of, vii, 43–46, 120
- Paragraph 30 (UN Report on Armenians), 58, 85, 153n5
- Parris, Mark, 131
- Pasdermadjian, Garegin (Garó). *See* Garó, Armen
- Pashayan, Charles (Chip), 24
- Pelosi, Nancy, 83, 160n37
- Peremptory Norm of General International Law (*Ius Cogens*), 38
- Peres, Shimon, 80
- PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), 60
- Phalangists (Lebanon), 60
- Phillips, David L., 124, 125
- Ping-Pong Diplomacy, 130
- Pinochet, Augusto, 30
- PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), 60
- Politicide, 31
- Politicizing History, viii, 75–97, 121
- Porter, Edward, 91
- Powell, Colin, 35
- Powers, Samantha, 35
- Prometheus Organization, 42, 43, 63
- Protocols (Turkey-Armenia, 2009). *See* Zurich Protocols
- Ramgavars (ADL), 162n70
- Rayah*, (Flock), 2
- Rehn, Olli, 79
- Riegle, Don, 96
- Rifat, Mevlanzade, 46, 52
- Rome (Destruction of Carthage), 30
- Roosevelt, Theodore, 121
- Russia, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 20, 30, 40, 41, 43, 44, 61, 77, 87, 95, 119, 120, 129, 130, 132, 136, 138, 159n30
- Rwanda, vii, 29, 33, 35, 85, 86, 119
- Sachaklian, Aaron, 62
- Safrastian, Ruben, 132
- Sahakian, Bako, 81
- Sahin, Erman, 37, 56

- Said Halim, 62
 San Stefano, Treaty of, 3, 6, 7
 Sanberk, Ozdem, 124
 Sarafian, Ara, 55, 84, 126, 127
 Sarajevo (1990s), 32
 Sarkisyan (Sarkisian), Serzh (Serge),
 130, 132, 133
 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 80
 Sassounian, Hampig (Harry), 1, 64, 69,
 139n2
 Sassounian, Harut, 123
 Schlesinger, Arthur M., 121
 Scowcroft, Brent, 96
 Section 907 (of Freedom Support Act,
 USA), 82–83, 92–93
 Semelin, Jacques, vii, 29, 30, 31, 33,
 34, 120
 Serbia (Serbs), 30, 78, 147n23
 Sevres, Treaty of, 18
 Sezer, Ahmet, 117
 Shafak, Elif, 117
 Shaw, Stanford J., 19, 49, 54
 Shirakian, Arshavir, 62
 Shish Kebaps, 162n67
 Silk Road Strategy (USA), 82. *See also*
 Brownback Amendment
 Simonian, Simon, 156n53
 Soccer (Football) Diplomacy, viii,
 129–32
 Solana, Javier, 133
 Solarz, Stephen, 96
 Soufouyon, Noubar, 70
 South Africa, 30
 Southeast Europe Brigade, 87
 Southeast Europe Cooperation Process,
 87
 Soviet Union, 18, 42, 61, 63, 64, 67,
 71, 77, 80, 89, 135
 Spain, 87
 Special Organization (*Teskilat-i*
 Mahsusa), 52
 Srebrenica, 31–33, 35, 147n23
 St. James Brotherhood (Sourp Hagop),
 106
 Stalin, Joseph, 30
 Stepanakert (Nagorno Karabakh), 81
 Stewart, Potter, 29
 Sudan, 29, 34, 36, 85. *See also* Darfur
 Suni, Babken, 8
 Suny, Ronald Grigor, 127
 Sureniants, Suren, 131
 Sweden, 80, 132
 Switzerland, 109; mediates between
 Turkey and Armenia (2009), 129,
 132–34
 Syria, 68, 72, 77, 87, 88, 111
 Talaat Pasha, 8, 9, 10, 15, 44, 46, 55,
 56, 62, 128
 TARC (Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation
 Commission), 122–25; 128. *See*
 also Phillips, David L.
 Tehlirian, Soghomon, 62
 “Ten Commandments,” 46
 Ter-Petrosian, Levon, 131
 Terrorists (Armenian). *See* Armenian
 Terrorists
The Forty Days of Musa Dagh. *See* *Forty*
 Days of Musa Dagh, *The*
 Thompson & Co., 96
 Tigranes the Great (94–55c. BC), 18
 Tokyo Tribunal, 29
 Toranian, Ara, 102
 “Torbari” (Sackers), 33
 Tourian, Ghevond (Leon) Archbishop,
 43, 91
 Toynbee, Arnold, 10, 11, 12, 13, 36,
 47, 53, 55. *See also* Blue Book
 Track-two Diplomacy, 123, 124, 128,
 136, 138. *See also* TARC
 Tunaligil, Danis, 59, 63
 Turan, 9
 Turkey (Republic), 63, 77, 84, 85,
 86–90, 93, 94, 95, 96–97,
 99–118; recommendations for the
 future, 137–38
 Turkish Armenian Business Development
 Council (TABC), 137

- Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), 87
- Turkish Counterterror and Harassment, 99–118, 122
- Turkish Empire. *See* Ottoman Empire
- Turkish Historical Society, 126, 127–29
- Turkish Lobbies (in United States), 95, 96–97
- Turkmen, Ilter, 99, 124
- Tutsis, 33
- Ukraine (1930s), 30
- United Kingdom (UK). *See* England
- United Nations, 35, 58, 85–88, 138
- United States, 21, 30, 41, 54, 69, 71, 73, 79, 81, 111, 112, 113, 130, 134, 136; Armenian genocide resolutions in U.S. Congress, 71, 76–77, 83–85, 96, 113, 132n89, 153n8; Armenian interest groups in, viii, 75, 82, 90–96, 113, 121; Turkish interest groups in, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 38, 149n57
- United States Department of State, 19, 76, 123
- United States Holocaust Museum, 28, 35, 92
- Urbicide, 31
- USAPAC (U.S.-Armenia Public Relations Committee), 90, 94–95. *See also* Armenian Lobbies (U.S.)
- U.S. Congress, Armenian Genocide Resolutions of. *See* Genocide Resolutions (U.S. Congress)
- U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, 10
- U.S. State Department, 76
- Van Operation, 66, 67, 68, 107. *See also* Armenian Terrorism; ASALA
- Varandian, Mikayel, 43, 61
- Varlik Vergisi* (Capital Levy), 110
- Vartian, Ross, 94
- Vehip, General (Pasha) Mehmet, 44, 52
- Vendee (1793), 30
- Verdun (France), 135
- Villepin, Dominique de, 79
- Vorontzov-Dashkov, I.I., 40
- Vratzian, Simon, 45, 61
- War Crimes, viii, 29, 31, 32, 36, 56, 146n10
- Watenpaugh, Keith David, 48, 49
- WATS (Workshops for Armenian/Turkish Scholarship), 127
- Wegner, Armin T., 47
- Werfel, Franz, 114–16, 122. *See also* *Forty Days of Musa Dagh*, *The*
- Wilson, Woodrow, 63
- World Council of Churches, 66
- Yanikian, Gourgen, 59, 65, 105, 153n10
- Yergatian, Manuel Father (Haig Eldemir), 106, 107
- Yugoslavia, 31
- Zaghawa, 36
- Zbogor, Samuel, 133
- Zeitun, 20
- Zero Problems with Neighbors Policy (Turkey), 129, 132
- Zoryan Institute, 52, 85
- Zurcher Erik Jan, 52
- Zurich Protocols (2009), viii, 26, 129, 132–34, 135–36, 137, 155n40
- Zwaan Ton, 30