

SOCIAL THEORY AND LATER MODERNITIES

The Turkish Experience

IBRAHIM KAYA

LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY PRESS

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Preface

Currently, a debate on varieties of modernity occupies a central place within social theory and research. Within the conceptual context of this debate, this book aims to understand the Turkish experience as a particular model of modernity. In the light of current developments in the tradition of comparative-historical sociology, this book shows that an alternative to Eurocentric social theories is a perspective that accords a central place to the concept of varieties of modernity. The starting point of the book is the possibility of the emergence of multiple modernities, with their specific interpretations of the 'imaginary significations of modernity'. In this context, a critique of perspectives that reduce the modernization of non-Western societies to 'Westernization' emerges immediately. The assumed equivalence between the West and modernity is problematized through the themes of a plurality of histories, civilizations, modernizing agents and projects of modernity.

The concept of 'later modernities' developed in this book suggests a new approach to understanding and interpreting multiple modernities. It inspires renewed attention to the current state of the social world. The term 'later modernities' refers in particular to non-Western experiences that came about as distinct models of modernity, different from the Western European experience, in the absence of colonization. In this light, the present study questions two sorts of perspective, one of which argues for globalization and the other for localization. From this point of view, this book suggests that we need a social theory beyond the thesis of the clash of civilizations and that of the end of history. History has not come to an end, nor do the civilizations clash. And a perspective of later modernities, provided in this book on the basis of an analysis of Turkish modernity, constitutes a break with theories of convergence and divergence. Neither modernization theory nor the dependency

school of thought is seen as desirable for understanding multiple modernities. By understanding Fukuyama as a theorist in the tradition of modernization theory, this book shows that his thesis of the end of history is untenable. The concept of later modernities suggests that there have been multiple ways to modernity and that those multiple ways give rise to multiple consequences. These consequences do not converge anywhere, neither under the label of liberal democracy nor under that of communist society. The multiple consequences of multiple ways indicate that history is far from coming to an end. This conclusion is reached through examining the importance of the plurality of civilizations in shaping human identity and practice. However, one should not conclude that the distinctions between people are purely cultural by eliminating political, economic and ideological differences, as Huntington (1997) does. In the light of the concept of later modernities I shall show that Huntington's thesis fails. This book argues that modernity plays a part in reducing oppositions between civilizations. Civilization is important for the creation of different modernities, but modernity does not allow civilizations to remain stable. In conclusion I stress that we need a theory beyond the thesis of the end of history and that of the clash of civilizations.

The Turkish experience is a particular modernization, an analysis of which is able to clarify the argument for varieties of modernity. The Turkish experience has so far been analysed only as a case of Westernization, but by analysing both civilizational patterns and modernizing agents in Turkey, this book suggests that Turkish modernity cannot be read as a version of the Western model. This conclusion is reached through examining Turkish history in terms of a 'singularization of culture', against the view that sees Turkey as a border country between the West and Islam. It is argued that the division between West and East is, in fact, irrelevant in the case of Turkey. The Turkish experience, as a later modernity, does not express a Western model of modernity, nor does it correspond to a 'pure' Islamic East.

This book first took shape during my doctoral study in the Department of Sociology at Warwick University, England. I would like to thank Peter Wagner for his supervision; his critique and comments provided me with an excellent opportunity for revising my perspective and I benefited greatly from the works he suggested. Some of the ideas in this book have been developed and presented in several workshops and seminars. To mention some of them, I gave a talk about non-Western experiences of modernity in a seminar on Advanced Social Theory at the University of Warwick and my thanks go to those participants who provided both critique and comments. Again at the University of Warwick, I presented a paper on the relations between Islam and modernity in the workshop on the Plurality of Modernities, organized by David Toews. In

Florence, at the European University Institute, I presented a paper on later modernities twice, first in the workshop on Varieties of Modernity and secondly in a seminar on European Modernity and Beyond, both organized by Peter Wagner. I am particularly grateful to Johann Arnason, Heidrun Friese and Peter Wagner.

INTRODUCTION

The Theme of Varieties of Modernity

The theme of varieties of modernity, in its new form, has come to the fore at a time when the primary interest of social sciences is no longer the transformation of societies from tradition to modernity. Rather, in recent decades, social science has dealt with a 'new' phase of modernity, termed 'postmodernity', 'late modernity', 'high modernity' or 'liquid modernity' by diverse theorists. In this development, one element has been central to the theorizing of modernity: the fact that a notion of modernity has spread around the globe so quickly. As a critique of modernity or as a perspective on a so-called 'new modernity', postmodernism led some observers to pay renewed attention to modernity's current phase.[1] The debate on varieties of modernity could be seen as a response and a contribution to new theoretical developments regarding modernity.

Recently, several works have appeared treating the 'plurality of modernities' (see Arnason, 1997, 1993; Eisenstadt, 1996; Wagner, 2000, 1999a, 1999b). This shows that current events under conditions of modernity not only give rise to arguments between the defenders of modernity and postmodernists, but also make it feasible, for some critics, to employ the concept of varieties of modernity in the exploration of the contemporary social world. The debate on varieties of modernity, as a sociology of knowledge would show, is not an intellectual product that does not seriously consider the social, but rather, a reflection on the realities of the social world.

In the first place, it might seem surprising that the theme of varieties of modernity has come to the fore at a time when the end of crucial conflicts and tensions between societies has been largely celebrated, with an insistence on the 'happy ending' of the war between the socialist and the capitalist blocs (see, for example, Fukuyama, 1992). This, however, should rather be unsurprising, because the collapse of the Eastern bloc, contrary to widely shared assumptions,

indicated that 'convergence' was far from being achieved. Against those who argued that the collapse of communism marked the end of conflictual relations between human societies, it revealed that societies should be seen as distinct from one another. The realities of the social world failed to support the assumption that societies were converging. Two cases are of particular importance: the Islamist movement and the case of East Asian specificity, both of which played a crucial role in the emergence of the debate on varieties of modernity.[2]

The Islamist movement emerged at a time when the new world order was being prepared. Some Western writers were of the opinion that after the collapse of communism the major conflict was to be between the West and Islam. Islamic societies not only rejected the new North American and West European convergence but, at the same time, showed that they differed from the owners of the project of a new world order. First, in social science, the reaction of Islam was taken as showing that postmodernism's observation was convincing: Islam, it was assumed, resisted modernity and the West (Ahmed, 1992; Sayyid, 1997). This observation was intended to prove postmodernism's assumption of the end of modernity, rather than trying to understand the motivations of Islamist movements in order to open a discussion as to whether Islamic societies are modern too but in different configurations. In this respect, the concept of varieties of modernity can be used to argue that the Islamist movement is far from demonstrating how modernity came to an end, but it is rather the expression of the distinguishing features of 'Islamic modernities' (see Chapters 5 and 6 below).

The theme of varieties of modernity emerges in works on Japan and, to a lesser degree, on some other East Asian cases, for example South Korea. Japan was the first non-Western country to become a highly advanced modernity. The specificity of Japan, on the one hand, and the development of some other East Asian countries, on the other, has led some scholars to pay attention to the region (Eisenstadt, 1996; Arnason, 1997). Some of the following crucial theoretical questions arise from these studies on East Asia and, in particular, on Japan: if modernity is a Western project, how did East Asia, by keeping its civilizational distinctions, produce modernities without imitating or even having much contact with the West? What are the specific elements in these countries, particularly in Japan, that brought about very advanced modernities?

Taking Islamism and East Asia into consideration gives rise to the most crucial question: can modernity not be interpreted as having variations? In other words, can it not be argued that there are distinct modernities with their own specific interpretations of 'imaginary significations of modernity'?[3] It could be said that the above questions have played a great part in the emergence of the debate on varieties of modernity on which this study is built. Thus, this book is

set in the conceptual context of the current debate on varieties of modernity by aiming to understand the Turkish experience as a particular model of modernity. So far I have briefly mentioned some realities on the social ground from which the debate about varieties of modernity stems. It is now necessary to discuss what this perspective signifies in terms of theory and research.

Most of all, the perspective of varieties of modernity should, in two respects, be able to show that modernity may no longer be read as a uniform progress towards final integration. First, modernity should be viewed as a phenomenon open to definitions and interpretations and as a condition under which conflicts and tensions are constantly at stake. This observation expresses a break with mainstream modernization theory, which emphasizes that an individual society should be understood as an integrated functional system (Parsons, 1971). Once modernity is seen to be unable to unify or integrate a single society, the 'universalization' of human societies under conditions of modernity must be rejected. Thus, secondly, modernity should not be understood as progress towards universalization. Modernity cannot end conflicts and tensions between social actors in a single society, nor can it end conflicts and tensions between societies and between civilizations. Modernity should not be viewed as a unifying phenomenon. It could be shown that there are different, even conflicting, interpretations of modernity that do not permit human history to come to an end. Both the concept of the integration of individual societies and that of the 'universalization' of world societies must be rejected, in order to elaborate a concept of varieties of modernity.

This perspective constitutes a break with Eurocentric theorizing, but it should also be noted that 'it is obviously incompatible with postmodernist positions' (Arnason, 2000a: 1). Rather than viewing a radical pluralism of lifestyles and cultural worlds as an indication of the failure of 'the project of modernity', the perspective of varieties of modernity should read the plurality of cultural worlds as an indication of the possibility of different interpretations of the imaginary significations of modernity.[4] This possibility could indeed make it plausible to talk about varieties of modernity. For this argument to be developed, the perspective of varieties of modernity needs to define the themes of its analysis as explicitly as possible. In other words, in what way this perspective could overcome a Eurocentric view of modernity needs to be shown explicitly. In the following outline, some of the most basic themes will be considered.

Historical Background

A study of varieties of modernity should question the universalistic perspectives of history, most importantly by portraying the plurality of histories, for example that of feudal Europe versus that of the centralized Ottoman Empire.

In this light, it can be argued that different historical backgrounds do not necessarily converge under conditions of modernity. In brief, an analysis of varieties of modernity is necessarily a comparative-historical analysis of modernity (see Chapter 2) with a rejection of evolutionary-universalist theories of history.

The Varieties of Modernizing Agency

The plurality of modernizing agents should be taken to be an important factor in the formation of different modernities. Because of historical and contextual distinctions, the agents of modernization differ from place to place. The conflicts causing change do not occur between the same actors in all places. For example, in feudal Europe, civil conflicts gave rise to the bourgeoisie as an important agent of modernization, whereas in the imperial-patrimonial Ottoman Empire, the central conflict emerged with regard to responses to the rise of the West, which gave rise to a new elite that produced the Turkish project of modernity (see Chapters 2 and 3).

The Multiplicity of Projects of Modernity

Modernity could appear in different versions because of factors that define the views of the agents of modernization. In this respect, it is important to insist on the fact that institutional spheres of modernity could be formed in different ways. Modernity does not explicitly define or found institutional spheres automatically. It is because of this fact that Western modernity aimed at imposing capitalist economy, liberal democracy, and autonomous individuality as universal and explicitly defined, closely linked, realities. Nevertheless, modernity was not understood in the same way in other parts of the world. It is possible, for example, to examine socialist modernity as a different configuration of the institutional spheres of modernity. Thus, the institutional spheres of modernity should be used to prompt questioning, critique and interpretation, so that an observation of varieties of modernity can become plausible (see Chapters 1 and 2).

Civilization

The perspective of varieties of modernity should no doubt consider the relation of modernity to civilization. All other themes within the perspective are indeed related to civilization. For example, a most important element in defining the views of modernizing agents is the civilizational legacy on which their projects are built. Thus, the analysis of multiple modernities is also a civilizational analysis (see Chapters 2 and 3).

The theme of varieties of modernity has come to the fore at a time when the

concept of the nation-state seems to have lost much of its credibility. It should not be surprising that the perspective of varieties of modernity accords a central role to civilizational analysis. In other words, civilizational analysis concentrates on units of larger dimensions and of longer duration than single societies, and therefore questions the understanding of society as a self-contained nation-state (Arnason, 2000b). Furthermore, this civilizational perspective necessarily questions the idea of civilization in the singular – a product of the eighteenth-century European intellectual climate – so it is also necessary to argue for a plurality of civilizations (see Chapter 3). In brief, the idea of multiple modernities undoubtedly needs to consider relations between modernity and civilization so as to see whether civilizational characteristics are the peculiar dynamics that shape modernities (see Chapter 2). In terms of the civilizational characteristics of modernity, two scholars are to be considered: Shmuel Eisenstadt and Johann Arnason.

Eisenstadt, a prominent authority on civilizational perspectives, reads modernity as a new civilization, which is thought to come about because of the 'revolutionary' dynamics of modernity. The modern revolutions, according to Eisenstadt (1978: 177), by means of breaking away from the past, brought about the civilization of modernity. In contrast, Arnason does not view modernity as a separate civilization in itself. Rather, for him, modernity could be described as being both more and less than a civilization (Arnason, 2000a, 1997). In terms of the dependence of modernity on civilizational legacies, in the contexts in which it is present, modernity is less than a separate civilization; while it is more than a civilization in terms of global transformations (Arnason, 2000a).

In relation to the civilizational characteristics of modernity, this book sides with Arnason's view, but with a slightly different observation: modernity is understood as a human condition rather than as a separate civilization. Modernity could be seen as a human condition in that both opportunities and discipline confront people. In other words, modernity is a human condition that provides new opportunities, such as individual liberty, but the modern condition is also a disciplining condition. But this human condition does not define how people should live their lives, and it is important here to stress that modernity is not a separate civilization. Because modernity does not create a separate civilization, civilizations are important in terms of the shape of modernity. However, civilizations are not the only distinguishing elements of modernities; there are also 'cultural worlds', which may be able to produce 'different modernities' in the same civilization (see Chapters 2 and 3).[5] It may be useful to observe that some societies might distinguish themselves as civilizations, with insistence on their own particular traits (Turkey is a relevant case). As Friese and Wagner (2000) observe, any civilizational analysis may

refer to 'cultural theorizing'. The study of varieties of modernity needs a 'cultural theory of modernity'.

A distinction between civilization and culture is necessary for showing that a culture belonging to a civilizational zone may particularize itself, thus producing a different modernity. However, when defined in this way, it becomes problematic: when culture is insisted on as a value system (as in modernization theory), it becomes difficult to explore social change. We need to pay further attention to culture, and it must be stressed that without 'social actors' no culture could produce a new world or a modernity in this respect.

The perspective of multiple modernities should view culture as open-ended and understructured, an imperfectly integrated complex of interpretive patterns (Friese and Wagner, 2000). Since culture is not strictly structured, its openness to (re)interpretations makes it desirable for social actors to bring about innovation. The agency of modernization needs to be considered in each case, rather than giving all our attention to macro-level socio-historical moments, as does Arnason (1997, 1993). No doubt, cultural patterns are not reducible to individual forms of action, but at the same time the capability of actors to create new meanings and new pictures of the world must be emphasized (Castoriadis). The creativity of action should never be neglected in analysing multiple modernities. In sum, the centrality of analysis of major socio-historical moments and civilizational/cultural frameworks should not be exaggerated, nor should the creativity of action be neglected.

I have outlined four basic themes for a sociology of multiple modernities. However, it should be emphasized that these themes are not strictly separable. Rather, there are relations between them that could be clarified as follows: historical background constitutes the most general category, and civilization concerns that against which modernizing actors define their projects of modernity. It should be clear that the four basic elements for a reading of varieties of modernity are not autonomous realms, but are interrelated in ways that could be dialectical, conflictual or peaceful.

The Concept of Later Modernities

An essential goal of this book is to question ethnocentric (Western) theories of modernity. More precisely, this book aims at problematizing present-day mainstream social theory, a product of Western experience, with the theme of varieties of modernity. For this goal to be achieved, it is argued that an immediate distinction in terms of varieties of modernity remains between the West and the East. The distinction has been developed as one between Western 'original' modernity and 'later modernities'. For historical reasons, Western European

modernity has been termed 'original modernity', and modernities emerging in the East, including the Russian experience, 'later modernities'.[6] This distinction accepts that modernity emerged first in Western Europe, but does not privilege Western modernity as the only model of modernity. The understanding of modernity as being identical with the West is based on the assumption that because Western Europe, with its distinctive characteristics, produced modernity, so any other modernity necessarily based itself on the existing model. The concept of later modernities breaks with this view mainly by observing contextual distinctions and a plurality of projects of modernity in which the West has not served as the model of modernity for the East. Thus, the specificity of the West should no longer matter, or, in other words, the West should be seen as just another civilization among many.

In a broad sense, 'later modernities' refers to Eastern modernities, but more explicitly it observes those modernities that emerged in the absence of colonization. In other words, later modernities are those modernities that came about on the basis of 'indigenous projects' rather than being modernized by the dominant forces of imperialist, Western modernity, as in the case of Algeria. A later modernity is a modernity that does not belong to those countries whose developments are far from being 'autonomous'.[7] And more importantly, in order to be able to speak of a later modernity, it should possess elements that should be distinct enough to problematize the Western understanding of modernity (see Chapter 2).

The distinctions between Western modernity and later modernities are examined so as to argue that it is no longer tenable to view the modernization of non-Western societies merely as 'Westernization'. Rather, it is important to observe that self-questioning and self-problematization are the basic dynamics for societies in the transformation to modernity (see Chapter 2). And these self-questionings and self-problematizations are far from being mere outcomes of the rise of the West. An analysis should consider the fact that before the rise of the West there were already some tangible conflicts in terms of interpreting the world and the self in some Eastern societies – conflicts that mark the self-transformative capacities of civilizations and societies.

In terms of the theoretical direction of the concept of later modernities, the following points should be made. The perspective of later modernities argues against the convergence thesis developed by earlier modernization theory by indicating that modernity brings about 'tension-ridden' relations rather than being the integrating force of human societies. In other words, under conditions of modernity, conflicting projects of life contest one another, for instance the liberal Western interpretation of autonomous individuality versus the Islamic insistence on community. Nor is the concept of later modernities in

agreement with neo-modernization theory. The social theory of Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) is a neo-modernization theory in that it emphasizes autonomous individuality, the contrast of modernity to tradition and the rationalization of culture (culture as an expert system). Emphasizing both new individuation and globalization, the theories of Beck, Giddens and Lash and others are indeed continuous with earlier modernization theory.

Nor is dependency theory considered to be a desirable perspective in applying to the exploration of later modernities. Emerging as a critique of modernization theory, the dependency perspective surprisingly read diverse socio-cultural formations as being one and the same (Amin, 1976). In understanding the world according to a centre–periphery dichotomy created by Western capitalism, the dependency perspective saw the West as shaping the entire world. Therefore, it is, in an important sense, a Eurocentric theoretical observation. World systems theory is also continuous with that tradition. By adding the notion of semi-periphery, it observed the world as one socio-historical system, that of the capitalist world economy (Wallerstein, 1987).

On the other hand it is important to note that this book does not side with perspectives that reduce modernity simply to the imperialist power dimensions of the West (Said, 1978). This book recognizes that Western modernity has possessed imperialist characteristics, but it also proposes that modernity is much more complicated than a mere power struggle. The interplay of different dynamics should be investigated, for example that between power and culture. Nor is a theory of civilization as unitary and self-defined taken to be important (Huntington, 1997). The latter perspective sees civilizations, as unitary and self-defined, causing conflicts that leave no room for peaceful relations between civilizations.

A perspective incorporating the notion of later modernities does not aim to argue that multiple modernities are necessarily antagonistic. Although one of the goals of this book is to argue that in order for a society to represent a distinct version of modernity a 'different' interpretation of modernity is unavoidable, there is still a way of showing that since these societies exist as part of the same human condition – larger than a separate civilization – they also share some basic characteristics. Here, I wish to state that the modern condition, which provides opportunity but also disciplines human beings, may not be viewed as subject only to civilizational contexts, but in itself changes civilizational characteristics. It is important in this respect to note that this book argues neither for globalization nor for localization.

Convergence and divergence need to be considered not as necessarily antagonistic but rather as dialectical partners in the formation of modern histories. Neither is the one achieved nor does the other establish itself as the

rule of human nature. Neither universalism nor particularism may be seen as providing the full condition of human life. From the beginning, human practice and identity have always followed 'local' patterns. In this respect, it is unavoidable to submit to the truth: world interpretations and cultural worlds are subject to a radical pluralism. In other words, in this world, in different places, human beings have built different socio-cultural worlds with no project able to assimilate the differences between the world interpretations. However, human beings are always aware that all other human beings belong to the same species. There have always been commonalities among human cultures regardless of how distinct they are.

The concept of later modernities does not understand the existence of different modernities as an indication that there is more conflict among modern societies than in previous ages. In contrast, it is held that modernity, as an actor between civilizations, has a strong capability to reduce oppositions between societies and between civilizations. However, the concept of globalization is rejected, precisely because it is understood as the diffusion of Western civilization. In fact, for the achievement of a 'universal' world, the recognition of 'different' modernities is an unavoidable condition. Globalization will not be achieved on the basis of a specific world-interpretation, but would have to set procedural foundations, which do not read the world as an integrated unity. By this I mean that a global world would need a mentality that would recognize all societies as equal but not as unified on the basis of a specific civilization, namely the Western desire to unify the world around its own values.

The Specificity of Turkey

Turkey has often been assumed to be a bridge between the West and the East, more specifically a bridge between the Islamic East and the Christian West. This already observes a particularity about Turkey's 'civilizational patterns'. Some have seen Turkey as having the capacity to bring Islamic East and Christian West together in order to reach a consensus in ending historical conflicts (see Berkes, 1976). However, to assume that Turkey might play such a role is problematic, in that Turkey has never aimed to achieve full membership either of the Islamic East or of the West. As history shows, the Turks did move culturally towards the West, while never leaving Anatolia, Islamic since Turkish conquest. And thus it has been assumed that, in modern times, Turkey could move further towards the West, and hence that a non-Western 'identity' could be Westernized (see, for example, Eren, 1963).

It should not be surprising then that Turkey has recently been regarded, in contradictory terms, as an image of the East in the West and as an image of the

West in the East (Stokes, 1994). This perspective aims to show us that as a contradictory image of significance and power Turkey is a 'European Islam' on the one hand, and a 'modernizing context' in the Middle East, on the other. Despite the many apparent reasons to regard Turkey as presenting the West in the East and the East in the West, the reality should be opened to discussion. The Islamic East found by Westerners in Turkey does not correspond to a 'pure' Islamic East; and the West found by Easterners in Turkey may not typify the actual West. This is to say that the division between West and East is, in fact, contested in the case of Turkey.

It is, first, in this respect that Turkey presents an interesting case for a civilizational perspective. One cannot grasp the meaning of Turkish modernity by observing Islamic civilization as the context from which Turkish modernity stems.[8] Nor can one investigate the Turkish experience by analysing its connections with Western civilization as the determining force. Rather, the 'singularization' of culture requires interpretation. In referring to the singularization of culture, I mean to stress that views that aim at understanding the Turkish experience by using a West–East division as the basis of their analyses necessarily fail because Turkish modernity may be seen as a case in which the opposition between West and East is not determinative. Turkey's position may be understood by observing the fact that Turkish culture singularizes itself. In the formation of the Turkish world in Anatolia, Islamic civilization played a very important part, as indeed did the West. However, what is necessary is to examine the capability of a single culture in terms of its 'openness' to the 'outside world' and in terms of its success in coping with the 'outside world'. Borrowings from other cultures, however, should not lead one to conclude that the culture under investigation is not 'authentic' or 'distinct'. On the contrary, it is possible to show that this sort of culture could display a distinct experience due to its assimilation of borrowings.

No doubt precisely because of this feature, Turkey is often observed as neither becoming truly Western, nor easily locatable in Islamic context. The second important feature of Turkey regarding the theme of varieties of modernity is the interpretations of the experience. The crucial question should not be whether Turkey could become a Western society. The starting point of previous works on understanding the Turkish experience, therefore, needs to be problematized. Kemalism has been emphasized, by both critics and supporters, as aiming to Westernize Turkish society. It is hardly relevant to ask whether a society already considered as belonging to the West was Westernized or not. This sort of question could be posed in the context of an Eastern country, such as India, that did not have close relations or connections with the West before the beginning of modernization. Although the West has played a

part in the formation of 'Turkish identity' for much longer than is commonly assumed, Turkish modernity needs further interpretation, because it does not express a Western modernity. It is thus a basic argument of this book that it is important to explore the Turkish experience as a different form of modernization rather than viewing it merely as a case of Westernization. Certainly, to an extent Westernization plays a role, but this is not abnormal for a society that long ago made its entry into the West. Nonetheless, it is not Westernization that makes Turkey a specific case.

Thirdly, it has often been stressed that Turkey is the first modern Muslim country and that it provides a model of modernity for other Islamic societies. In this respect, a most crucial point in terms of the centrality of the Turkish experience to the theme of varieties of modernity may be demonstrated. It has been argued by many observers that Islam does not separate the worldly and the divine orders and that, therefore, the way to modernity is undermined (Gellner, 1992). Islam is known not to separate religious and political authority and it is therefore assumed that Islam does not permit a republic or a democracy to emerge (Watt, 1988). Islam is also viewed as a communitarian model that does not credit 'individuation', one of the distinguishing elements of modernity. The Turkish experience, however, does not prove these observations.

In analysing the relations between Islam and modernity it is essential that both are seen, not as clearly defined and fixed entities, but as open to interpretation. Not only are there different modernities, but there are also different Islams. Turkey in this respect presents a very interesting case that casts doubt over the view of Islam as incompatible with modernity. Contrary to those observers who stress the unified nature of Islam (see, for example, Ahmed, 1992), the Turkish experience indicates that there is more than one Islam. Thus, it is urgent to pose questions to those observers who regard 'Islamism' as a rejection of modernity.

Fourthly, the Turkish project of modernity, Kemalism, needs to be reviewed in order to understand whether it merely replicates European Enlightenment. It is in this respect that the Turkish experience deserves attention as part of an analysis of modernity as existing in different versions. An interpretation of Kemalist modernity shows that there is not just one project of modernity, but many. Emerging from an imperial state system, which was in no way feudal, the proponents of Kemalism did not look for agents of Western modernity on whom to model themselves; rather, the actors were already at hand for modernizing Turkey. Kemalism was built according to a specific historical-cultural legacy. Its protagonists did not have the same notion of modernity as did Westerners. Not only the historical background but also the individual actors who formed Kemalism imagined a modernity that was different from

the Western model. It is clear that Kemalism needs to be interpreted as a different project of modernity.

So far, I have briefly outlined the specificity of Turkey in relation to the debate on varieties of modernity: civilizational particularity, the Westernization–modernization argument, the Islam–modernity debate, and the existence of a different project of modernity. I shall now identify what I specifically aim to examine in order to understand Turkish modernity as a different model.

In mainstream social theories, modern society is viewed as a self-contained society, the nation-state (see, for example, Giddens, 1985). The transition from 'local' characteristics of human practice to wider network relations and the transition from the imperial state tradition and from small, regional polities to nation-states are assumed to mark the beginning of the modern epoch. However, this study, though accepting the centrality of the nationalization process to the modern experience, reads modern society as not completely breaking with civilizational legacies and does not take the nation-state to mean a harmonious collectivity.

Recently, it has been argued that national boundaries and the centrality of the nation-state are being undermined by the forces of globalization and localization. Turkey seems to present an interesting case in that, on the one hand, it seeks to achieve full membership of the European Union while, on the other hand, inside its borders a problem shakes its integrity: that of the Kurdish question. These situations need an interpretation that considers civilizational and cultural characteristics and that observes the question of 'ethnicity'. Thus, the nationalizing process and its aftermath in the Turkish experience are analysed by considering the themes of civilization, culture and ethnicity (see Chapter 3).

The redefinition of collective identity and its symbols could be equated with a social revolution (Eisenstadt, 1978). This has a special place in the Turkish case. Not only is the 'invention' of the nation important for the present purposes, it is also important to note distinctive characteristics of one nation-building process among others. Turkish modernity shows, for example, that it is not necessary to privilege previous history and traditions in the nationalizing process, but rather that history could be used 'negatively'.[9] Or, for example, there do not always exist imperial institutions for political and economic development, as assumed by Arnason (1998, 1997). Rather, the Turkish experience presents a unique pattern of transition from an imperial state system to a non-imperial one. The case of Turkey is, for example, quite different from that of Japan, which became an imperial centre in East Asia where it had played a marginal part before (Arnason, 1997). A different picture of nation, nation-state and civilization is observed, showing how the concept of nation could be differently interpreted (see Chapter 3).

Integrating and differentiating forces must be analysed in relation to the specific configuration of a later modernity. The social world comprises three main spheres: polity, economy and culture. It must be stressed that these spheres do not necessarily determine one another, nor does one of them shape the entire social world. This makes the concept of the plurality of modernities plausible; for example, the industrial economy does not require a standard, universal culture. There is every reason for social actors in different contexts to form these spheres in different ways. Hence the Turkish experience involves its own specific configuration of state, economy and society (see Chapter 4). For example, efforts to impose social integration were much less successful in Turkey than in Japan.

Legitimizing aspects of the integrative forces and the self-interpretation of differentiating forces are examined to show that the Turkish experience paints a specific picture of the tensions between liberty and discipline. Interpreting some elements as either integrative or differential forces has led, paradoxically, to both discipline and liberty: Islam was an integrating element of society for the 1980 military coup, while the attempts at Islamizing society caused new conflicts between different parts of the same society. The relations between the state and society and between the state and the economy need to be considered as key indicators for a different configuration of modernity. It is, therefore, argued that in the Turkish case the differentiation and integration of the state, society and economy deserve special attention; for example, the modern state and the capitalist economy are much more closely integrated in the Turkish experience than in the West (see Chapter 4).

In terms of the current debate on Islam's relations with modernity, Turkey presents a particularly interesting case. This is so for two reasons. First, with its particular project of modernity – Kemalism – Turkey has often been noted as a model of modernity for the Islamic world. Secondly, however, the Iranian Islamic revolution posed a serious question of whether Kemalism had failed because Iran had, to a large extent, chosen the Turkish way of modernization as its model for development. By analysing modernity and Islam in Turkey, this book argues that in terms of relations between Islam and modernity, a different interpretation is needed (see Chapter 5).

So long as critics continue to operate with 'idealized' versions of Islam and modernity, concrete historical experiences cannot be explored. Previous work on the relations between Islam and modernity tends to display a sense of Islam as being either incompatible or fully compatible with Western modernity. But it must be considered that neither Islam nor modernity can be shown to be a fixed and unitary way of living. Thus, by analysing modernity and Islam as projects open to interpretation, this book questions modernist, postmodernist

and traditionalist perspectives on Islam.

Gender relations play an important part in shaping the entire social world, and it is in modern history that the place of women in society has become a crucial debate, giving rise to some disputes over goals in modern history. More perhaps than in any other social setting, it is in Islamic societies that the question of women's role in society occupies a special place in relation to understandings of the 'good life'. A distinguishing characteristic of Turkish modernity can be analysed by considering the 'female question' (see Chapter 6). Some of the most crucial tensions between Kemalist modernity and Islam relate to women's liberation and the Turkish experience expresses this characteristic explicitly. By examining the central place of this issue in the Turkish experience I show how both Kemalism and Islamism, as opposed projects, have seen women as key actors for the achievement of their ambitions. The analysis of Islamist veiled women is taken to serve as a cornerstone both for understanding Kemalism's distinction among other projects of modernity, and for understanding how the question of women's role in society has reasserted itself in the current phase of Turkish modernity. The chapter also serves to show that the Islamist movement should not be understood as a rejection of modernity. The two basic goals in analysing Islamist women are, first, to show that different modernities display different characteristics because of differences in historical background, and secondly that Islamism deserves attention beyond being viewed simply as fundamentalism (see Chapter 6).

The lessons to be learned from the Turkish experience serve as theoretical conclusions to the theme of varieties of modernity (see Chapter 7). In other words, the main findings of this analysis of a 'later modernity' point to the usefulness of a concept of varieties of modernity. However, a conceptual analysis of modernity needs to be completed before attempting to investigate the crucial distinguishing points of later modernities and the specificity of Turkey. Therefore, I begin with an analysis of modernity as a 'field of tensions' (Chapter 1). Once an argument is made for the plurality of modernities, a view of modernity as 'open' needs to be developed. To this end, I shall analyse modernity as a field of tensions that cannot be assumed to be a singular entity or an a priori project of the good life. In analysing modernity, we must observe the process of differentiation, but, contrary to the claims of modernization theory, this differentiation does not end with (final) integration. Since the concept of modernity is open to interpretation, the project of modernity cannot be completed once and for all. The 'openness' of modernity is unavoidable, although we need to ask how far it is open. The consequences of openness require a new understanding of modernity's current phase.