The Emergence of a New Turkey

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Democracy and the AK Parti

M. Hakan Yavuz, editor

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADD	Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği (Association for Kemalist Thought)
BRSA	Bank Regulation and Supervision Authority
CDMEC	Central Decision Making and Executive Committee
CDU-CSU	Christian Democratic Union
CSU	Christian Social Union
DEHAP	Demokratik Halkın Partisi (Democratic People's Party, DPP)
DC	Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democracy Party)
DEP	Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi)
DLP	Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Party; DSP)
DP	Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti; DP)
DRA	Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Baskanlığı)
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ESK	Economic and Social Council
EU	European Union
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
FP	Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi; SP)
GUP	Greater Unity Party (Büyük Birlik Partisi; BBP)
HDS	Guardians of the Salafi Call
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
İHL	İmam Hatip Liseleri
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JDP	Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP)
JP	Justice Party (Adalet Partisi; AP)
MLSS	Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Çalışma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlığı; ÇSGB)
MP	Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi; ANAP)
MRP	Mouvement républicain populaire

MÜSİAD	Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
NAP	Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi; MHP)
NOM	National Outlook Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi)
NOP	National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi; MNP)
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi; MSP)
NTP	New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi; NTP)
NTSB	National Turkish Students Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği; MTTB)
NWP	Nationalist Work Party (Milliyetçi Calışma Partisi; MCP)
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
PWP	People's Work Party (Halkın Emek Partisi; HEP)
RPF	Rassemblement du peuple français (Rally of the French People)
RPP	Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; CHP)
SMC	Supreme Military Council (Yüksek Askeri Şura)
SPD	Social Democrat Party of Germany
TCK	Turkish Penal Code (Türk Ceza Kanunu)
TGS	Turkish General Staff (Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı)
TESEV	Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)
TİSK	Confederation of Turkish Employers' Associations
TOBB	Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalor Birliği)
TPP	True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi; DYP)
TRT	Turkish Radio and Television
TÜSİAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
VP	Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi; FP)
WP	Welfare Party (Refah Partisi; RP)
YÖK	Council of Higher Education (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu)
YP	Young Party (Genç Parti; GP)

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The Emergence of a New Turkey

INTRODUCTION

The Role of the New Bourgeoisie in the Transformation of the Turkish Islamic Movement

■ *M. Hakan Yavuz*

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (the Justice and Development Party; JDP) is also called AK Parti, meaning the "uncontaminated" or "pure" party to differentiate itself from the other political parties that were involved in widespread corruption before the November 2002 Turkish national elections. The JDP was victorious in the 2002 national elections because it moved to the center of the political spectrum, and voters regarded this shift as credible and positive. What explains the transformation of the JDP? Given its Islamic roots, and the past activities and statements of its leaders, the party's programs, growth, and conquest of power in Turkish politics merit attention. One needs to explain how and why the party adopted a more liberal line. The transformation of the Islamic movement in the form of shifting from oppositional to propositional is an outcome of underlying changes in Turkish society, especially changes in the new business class and new intellectuals. Although the pressures put on the JDP to undertake changes to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria for European Union (EU) membership are important, they are insufficient to fully explain the JDP's path of change. It is a sociological error to reduce the compass of political change solely to the Copenhagen criteria. In this sense, the JDP is not the cause of the silent revolution occurring in Turkey, but rather the outcome. The prime agent of this transformation is the new emerging bourgeoisie rooted in Anatolia. This new Anatolian business class evolved as a result of Prime Minister Turgut Özal's neoliberal economic revolution. The second key agent is the new intellectual class outside the control of the state.

Some scholars tend to read the current experiment in Turkey as the successful political integration of an Islamic movement within a democracy.[1]

Several facts support such an interpretation. Although the JDP leadership denies its Islamic background and claims to be a conservative democratic party, nonetheless the party did emerge out of the ashes of the Welfare and Virtue parties that were closed down by the Constitutional Court on charges of being a forum and proponent of antisecular activities.[2] Moreover, the majority of the JDP's deputies are observant Muslims in their daily lives. For instance, their spouses continue to wear headscarves, which have been banned at public offices, ceremonies, and universities because they are regarded as a challenge to the secular nature of Turkey. Nonetheless Turkey's experience with the JDP raises several complicated questions: Is the JDP an Islamic party? Is it possible for an ex-Islamic movement to become a-Islamic or un-Islamic? Is the commitment of the members of the JDP to religious values in their personal life enough to label the party Islamic? When does a movement or a party become or cease to be Islamic? Even if the administration of the party denies any connection with political Islam, can we still consider the party Islamic?

On the other hand, one may read JDP's denial of its Islamic connections as simply a compromise between the state and the JDP. The JDP, as the argument goes, is free to govern the country as long as it stays within Turkey's strictly proscribed constitutional framework and ignores many religious claims of its conservative constituency. This alternative interpretation further complicates the issue and raises the following question: Is the case of the JDP, rather than being a success story of *an Islamic movement* that has adapted to a host of new conditions, a story of *the ability of the Turkish system* to transform and domesticate political Islam to the extent that it denies its Islamism, even its explicit Islamic roots?

Despite popular arguments to the contrary, it is problematic to propose Turkey as a model for Islamic democracy, and the Turkish experiment cannot be recreated in other Muslim countries.[3] For instance, Turkey itself has not persuasively solved significant problems regarding the integration of political Islam into its system by accommodating it, but rather it has used extrajudicial means to transform political Islam to the point that the movement seeks refuge in the denial of its past and reacts negatively when it is called Islamic or Muslim. As such, the JDP refuses to define itself as an Islamic or Muslim party.

I would argue that if an Islamic political movement actively hinders the articulation of arguments on the basis of Islamic values, it is no longer Islamic. A movement is Islamic to the extent that it is making political claims on religious—Islamic—grounds. In the case of Turkey, we see such a process, the process of post-Islamism or the shift from the pol-

itics of identity to the politics of services—*hizmet partisi.* One sees the realization/materialization of liberal politics in Turkey in the sense that a political movement is not engaged in the politics of identity, which tend to be conflict-ridden and confrontational, but rather in the politics of services, based on compromise and cooperation. A new social and political contract, as a result, is evolving in the case of Turkey on the basis of neoliberal economic and political values. This can be seen as the normalization of Turkish politics since it hints at the positive integration of the country into many of the macro trends taking place on a global scale. The JDP, being the product of these transformations, is not a party of identity but rather a party that strives to provide better services. It does not develop or articulate any claims on the basis of Islam or other forms of identity, but acts as an agent of the country's integration into neoliberal economic and political spaces.

Going back to our main question, that is, when and under what conditions a movement ceases to be Islamic, I contend that it ceases to be Islamic if it fails to articulate policies based on Islamic identity but makes claims on the basis of public reasoning.

Based on the activities of the JDP, it is possible to conclude that the Islamic political movement has helped to consolidate democracy in Turkey by offering the country's marginalized groups an alternative avenue for political participation. Yet this positive role is very much an outcome of expanding opportunity spaces and the contracting of military-legal institutions, made possible in large part through the actions and the trendsetter role played by a new and rising Anatolian bourgeoisie who have refused to support confrontational policies. The democratic bargaining between the state establishment and the JDP forced the latter group to give up any search for governmental "hegemony" and to accept EU-oriented democratic norms. Turkey's Islamic groups, more than the secularists, reluctantly support this new democratic bargain because they intrinsically understand that this was the only way for them to come to power.

Turkey's accession process to the EU helped to domesticate and force not only the state but also the antisystemic actors to change their perceptions and strategies and to adopt EU norms as the point of reference to create a new social contract in Turkey. When a possible accession date is given by the EU, what the JDP is going to do is not clear. Although some members of the JDP are in the process of formulating some sort of post-EU platform/program, other broad-based programs, which would appeal to the sectors of the population that have supported the JDP in the past, have yet to be articulated. There is still a high likelihood that Turkish

voters will return to the identity-based parties they have voted for in the past, having used the JDP "like a streetcar" to get to their desired destination, namely EU membership, and to cleanse the political landscape of corrupt politicians. I believe this is the biggest question facing Turkish politics in the near future, the question of whether politics in Turkey has really shifted from the politics of identity to the politics of issues/services, or whether the case of the JDP is simply a temporary development, if not an anomaly.

The Source of Silent Revolution: The New Bourgeoisie

The Turkish case challenges two dominant Orientalist theses: that is, that Islam and democracy, on the one hand, and capitalism and Islam, on the other, are incompatible. In the case of Turkey, one sees the evolution of Islam that is entrepreneurial and capitalist-oriented. The rise of an Islamic bourgeoisie is a challenge to the Weberian reading of the relationship between Islam and capitalism as incompatible and antagonist. By Islamic entrepreneurs, I mean those pious individuals who identify Islam as their identity and formulate their everyday cognitive map by using Islamic ideas and history to vernacularize (Islamicize) modern economic relations that promote the market forces and cherish neoliberal projects.

Political Islam is most often depicted as the enemy of the West and the Western values of capitalism, democracy, human rights, and modernity. Throughout the 1990s the image of *Mecca* vs. *Mechanization* of Daniel Lerner has been replaced with Benjamin Barber's *Jihad* vs. *McWorld*. The case of Turkey is useful to challenge and question this dichotomous mode of thinking. It not only indicates the prospects for the compatibility of Islam with democracy and Islam with capitalism but also demonstrates how the new wave of globalization has opened new spaces for the evolution and consolidation of Islamic economic actors. The Islamic movement in Turkey, which is led by counter-elite with a counter project, is progressive in several aspects. While it challenges state ideology (Kemalism) and a secular bloc (military-bureaucracy-capitalist), it also critiques "traditional/folk" Islamic ways of doing and thinking. This is a case whereby the neoliberal project produced new Islamic actors, and these actors, in turn, shaped Islamic discourse and practices. The expansions of the market, the increasing role of the middle class, and the strengthening of civil society have had profound impact on Islamic actors and their identities.

In order to understand the origins and policies of the JDP, one has to explore not only the social and political context of the new Muslim

actors, that is, the Islamic bourgeoisie, but also the JDP's identity, its politics, and its relationship with Islamic political groups. It is important to study the role of the Islamic bourgeoisie and its relationship to Islamic groups because the bourgeoisie provides the financial means to develop the new political movement through its charities, TV stations, radios, and newspapers, and, as such, has boosted its social status.

Who are these actors? What are their identity and politics? How do they shape the orientation of the JDP? What is the role of the Islamic bourgeoisie in the fragmentation, and even in the end, of Islamism? The Islamic movement is not shaped by the shantytowns surrounding large cities in Turkey but rather by rising social groups in terms of wealth and education. Thus, it is these rising social groups, especially the Islamic bourgeoisie, that fuel the locomotive of Islamization regarding consumer patterns and are the vanguard of Turkey's recent democratization.

The Islamic bourgeoisie evolved out of the state's neoliberal economic policies that created conducive economic conditions and the emerging transnational financial networks as a result of deregulation and the opening of the Turkish economy. The Islamic bourgeoisie has also benefited from the local governments of the Welfare Party, especially after 1994. This new actor is both a cause and an outcome of the neoliberal economic policies of Özal, the former reformist Turkish prime minister and president who died in 1993. The symbiotic relationship between the state and the large Istanbul-based capitalists had been based on agreement over secularism and the Kemalist ideology. The emergence of an Anatolian-based Islamic bourgeoisie ran counter to the existing economic and cultural alliance between the state and the Istanbul-based capitalists.

Islamic entrepreneurs consist mostly of a first generation of college graduates who are the children of an Anatolian-based petty bourgeoisie who benefited from Özal's neoliberal economic policies that increased their social mobility, which allowed them to establish their own medium-sized and small-sized firms. They are the first generation of urbanizing economic elite who continue to maintain strong ties with the provincial towns and villages of Anatolia. Most of them were born and raised in provincial towns and villages and only settled in the big cities of Turkey after their college education.

They were first introduced to Islamic values in their provincial towns and villages and later spent several years in university dormitories, mostly run by Nurcu or Nakşibendi Sufi orders, and objectified Islam as an alternative project, becoming conscious Muslims who had a clear and concise notion of what constituted an Islamic identity. Thus, a closer

study indicates that most of the members of MÜSİAD (Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association), a consciously Muslim businessmen's association, appear to have come from a conservative Muslim social environment with a history of antiestablishment discontent. They were and are critical of state subsidies for the Istanbul-based business class and have always been disgruntled with Turkey's history of state–big business connections. The Anatolian-based petty bourgeoisie were mostly excluded and marginalized by the import-substitution policies of the state, and the state, from the foundation of the Turkish Republic onwards, always favored a secular-oriented big city–based bourgeoisie as the carrier of its modernization projects and purveyor of its prescribed lifestyles as well. Most of this new urbanizing economic elite became involved in the growing textile and construction trade. Eventually services, transportation, and tourism became important fields of activity. Most of these small and medium firms are family owned and they maintain family structures with conservative religious values. In other words, even though they all come from a traditional petty bourgeoisie background and culturally marginalized milieu, they used education and the new economic and political conditions of the post-1980s to develop entrepreneurial and organizational skills to reposition themselves as the new economic actors of Anatolia with the goal of modernizing their cities and lifestyles through Islamization. They identified the state's interventionist policies and its ties to big business as being responsible for Turkey's uneven economic development and socioeconomic problems that excluded large sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. Islamic identity, which was marginalized and identified as the cause of Turkey's backwardness by the Kemalist elite, was mobilized by these new actors to challenge state policies and to form a new organization to articulate their policies. In other words, Islamic identity was not a cause but rather was used as the lubricant to prime the workings of market forces and as an instrument of carving their share of the market. The transformative history of MÜSİAD is the history of this new urbanizing economic elite who were steeped in Islamic ethics and networks. This entrepreneurial Islam is the outcome of this new elite, who critique the Istanbul-based secularist elite and traditional Islamic conception of *esnaf* (small merchants).

The expansion of the economic opportunity spaces not only facilitated the evolution of more moderate political forces but also enhanced the civil society and private education. The autonomous economic groups supported a number of cultural projects, along with new TV stations, radio channels, and magazines.

This transformation of Turkey's Islamic movement could be called a conservative revolution because it wants to maintain Turkey's generally conservative traditions and bring local norms and identities to the national level; it is a normative revolution in that it seeks to moralize the political institutions and networks. By conservative revolution I mean not advocating wholesale change or a sharp transformation but rather creating new cognitive spaces for different imaginations of the past and the reconstruction of the present. This conservative revolution is very much based on the Ottoman imperial dream of becoming "bigger" and "better" by overcoming the rigid nation-state ideology. This imagination is not carried out by the intelligentsia. It is a bottom-up imagination of those who felt excluded and dissatisfied with the prevailing sociopolitical conditions of Turkey. For a new Turkey, the JDP leadership has looked toward reconfiguring alliances and redistributing political power, has sought ways to create new institutions and new values, and more importantly has attempted to overthrow the ingrained Kemalist mode or patterns of "progressive" and elitist thinking. The main goal is to level the society so that top and bottom are not widely separated. In short, the JDP's dream is to shape politics along the identity and needs of civil society. But the party's dream of putting power in the hands of the people has not been fully materialized because of the authoritarian temptations of the leaders of the JDP and the political culture of modern Turkey.

Religious and Civil Societies

Contemporary Turkish society is often pragmatic rather than ideological, inclusive rather than exclusive, and essentially nonviolent. Turks—as in Turkish citizens of all ethnicities including Kurds—seek to build civic institutions by utilizing religious idioms and practices in order to gain better lives. Individuals, whether in rural or urban areas, are not able, however, to act together for their common good that somehow transcends the immediate material interests of the family or their neighborhood. Most provincial foundations and associations are formed around a religious idea or institution. Many Turks live with their families, and single households remain the exception rather than the rule. Turkish businesses are mostly family owned, with fewer than twenty employees. Here family loyalty is paramount, under patriarchal control, exhibiting very little trust in the government. These small shop owners and merchants are the principal supporters of the JDP and its leader Erdoğan, giving him a much larger percentage of votes compared to the rest of the parties. Since

many Turks live in a condition of habitual illegality (either their home or shop has been built on state property; or they do not pay proper taxes) and because they live in conflict with the establishment over its own moral code and lifestyle, they easily identify with Erdoğan as a symbol of their own condition. His understanding of liberty is very much defined in negative terms, however—that is, in terms of removing all impediments and interferences.

Many scholars of Turkish politics and society tend to view Turkey's Islamic movement in opposition to the state rather than focusing on the symbiotic relationship between the two. This dominant framework of reading the inevitable clash of Kemalist and Islamist ideologies ignores the more nuanced evolution and mutual transformation of state and society. One of the logical outcomes of this framework is to read the rise of political Islam as the failure of Kemalism or the demise of Islamism as the rise of Kemalism. This mutually exclusive mode of reading has become the dominant mode in Turkish studies. The long-term impact of reformist policies of the Kemalist elite and economic liberalization facilitated the formation of opportunity spaces, and these spaces, in turn, became the site of the reconstitution of Islam. Because of this imagined Kemalist secularism as an antireligious ideology, almost all scholars see the 1980 military coup's initiative of reconciliation with Islam and Islamic activism as the cause of post-1980 Islamism in Turkey. This mode of reading ignores the complex and multifaceted relationship between Islam and the state. The main source of the legitimacy for the Turkish state has always been Islam and its close ties with Islamic groups. Islamic and Republican secularism are not separate worlds in conflict, but are symbiotic parts of the same historic whole. The Islamic movement evolved and was defined very much as a result of its oppositional interaction with the state. Yet the interactions between the state and Islamic movements are not about the bipolar clash of identities and ideologies but rather occasional cooptation, confrontation, and overall symbiotic interaction. The Turkish religious landscape consists of four actors: political Islam, social Islam of widespread (neo)Sufi groups, the state Islam of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA),[4] and radical Islam.

The presence of an Islamic party and its role in local and national politics are important in terms of domesticating the excesses of Islamic claims and "learning" to articulate religious interests and claims in the secular idiom of politics. With the multiparty system in the 1950s, it was the center-right Democrat Party that first brought Islamic claims to the political sphere in terms of human rights and respect for culture.

For a variety of reasons the voters of Turkey overwhelmingly voted for the JDP in 2002 and swept away a generation of established politicians to give what was essentially Erdoğan's party enough seats in Parliament to form a single-party government. These election results provided one of the most interesting experiences in the Muslim world and begged the question: Was a modern democratic party with deep roots in political Islam capable of expanding civil liberties and maintaining a democratic system?

Against this background, this book will examine the social and political roots of the JDP. It will attempt to answer whether the JDP is a product of temporal conditions and if so, how will these changes shape the future of Turkey and the party itself? What are the major constitutive principles of the ideology and identity of the JDP, and how is the party different from earlier Islamic parties in Turkey? How does the JDP resemble or differ from other Islamic parties and Islamic movements in the wider Middle East? How does it view the separation of church (mosque) and state? Does it actually favor a secular or a Muslim Turkey and what are the building principles of the JDP's self-declared "conservative democracy"?

Furthermore, in regard to Turkey's overall political landscape, what is the JDP's relationship with the Kemalist secular military and how does the military view the party? Also, what kind of radical solutions, if any, does the party propose for alleviating Turkey's enduring problems on the issue of the Kurds, individual freedoms, the Armenian question, and human rights? How do these views influence and affect possible EU candidacy for Turkey? Furthermore, how and why has Turkey's diverse and powerful Islamic movement reconstructed a positive view of integration with Europe? As a corollary question, what is the link between domestic politics and foreign policy; that is, is the EU essential for the JDP's survival and how have domestic politics affected Turkey's strategic relationship with the United States in the aftermath of the occupation of Iraq? How does the United States view the party and vice versa, and how will this view affect the significant United States–Turkey partnership of the last fifty years? In regard to democracy and social issues, how democratic is the JDP structurally as a party? How does the party view the role of women in society? This book seeks to answer these pertinent questions and also to highlight the deeply rooted contradictions of the JDP.

The analyses in this book suggest that the JDP is wrapped in a number of contradictions: It seeks to "reform" the political system and state-society relations while at the same time declaring its identity as a

"conservative" democracy; it champions for political participation and pluralism while at the same time the party does not allow much room for its own internal democracy; the party identifies decentralization and local-based governance as a solution to Turkey's overburdened bureaucracy while it seeks to centralize JDP's own party structure and decision making. The party eliminated almost all bottom-up channels, and Erdoğan rules it with his all-male advisors.

For one, there are a number of reasons for the JDP's centralized politics: Since the JDP is a coalition of diverse people who came together under the pre-2002 political conditions, it is not homogenous and it needs a strong leader to rule over it. Moreover, Turkish politics has always been dominated by personalities, and "personal networks" count more than principles. On the other hand, the party's proposed identity of conservative democracy is very much like a "space" where people with diverse identities and interests meet to express their desire for change of the status quo. For instance, Erol Kaya, the mayor of Pendik, argues that the JDP is a "supermarket" where people come to meet their need and as such, by itself, "it has not formed an identity." Its claimed identity of conservative democracy does not necessarily reflect in all its policies, but rather it is an identity tool for external legitimacy. Ahmet Yıldız argues that the JDP's conservative democracy does not seek to lead or guide its party policies but rather to overcome the suspicions of outside countries, especially the United States and the EU states.[5] The party's image of a conservative democracy, according to Yıldız, also carves a space in the center-right spectrum of Turkish politics to overcome the secularist suspicion, and seeks to connect with Islamist-oriented masses. In short, Yıldız is right to conclude that the JDP's conservative democracy tries to define the party for others rather than serving as a guiding ideology for the party itself.

Organization of the Book

This introduction and the first chapter of part I (Identity, Ideology, and Leadership) form the historical and theoretical background of the rest of the chapters. The introduction examines the historic context of the evolution of the Islamic movement into a more a-Islamic or non-Islamic movement in the case of the JDP, and focuses on the determinant role of the political economy in the evolution of a more liberal Islamic movement in Turkey. In chapter 1, Massimo Introvigne provides a theoretical framework to examine the pluralization and evolution of Turkish Islamic movements. By utilizing religious economy theories developed by R. Stark,

L. Iannaccone, and others, he argues that religious competition taking place in a "religious market" where "religious firms" compete for the allegiance of "religious consumers" is at the core of the pluralization of Islamic movements. Introvigne also examines the sociopolitical consequences of the state intervention into the religious market before and after the 2002 elections.

The chapters by Yalçın Akdoğan and William Hale analyze the meaning of "conservative democracy." Akdoğan provides the official version of the concept and responds to some of the critics of the definition and the use of the concept by the JDP. He defines it in opposition to the Islamic identity of the previous pro-Islamic parties of the National Outlook Movement. Hale's chapter brings in the comparative dimension by comparing the Christian democracy in Europe with the "conservative democracy" of the JDP. However, Hale treats the JDP as a pro-Islamic party attempting to redefine the role of Islam in a democratic context. Both chapters indicate that "conservative democracy" is a concept in the making in Turkey, and it is made in practice rather than imposed on Turkish political realities. İhsan Dağı examines the connection between the insecurity of the JDP (felt exclusion) and the degree to which the party has internalized the human rights discourse in its policies. This paradox of a deep sense of insecurity despite huge electoral support of the JDP makes it very sensitive to the politics of human rights. Dağı displays how the JDP has instrumentalized both human rights and EU membership in its search for systemic legitimacy and security. He argues that under such circumstances the JDP has developed a three-layered strategy: It has adopted a language of human rights and democracy as a "discursive shield"; it has mobilized popular support as a form of "democratic legitimacy"; and it has built a liberal-democratic coalition with modern secular sectors within Turkey's political spectrum that have recognized the JDP as a legitimate actor. Sultan Tepe directly deals with some of the issues raised in Dağı's chapter about the party's role in the consolidation of democracy. Tepe concludes that an overall analysis shows that the JDP is a party shaped by the centrifugal forces of Turkey's highly volatile electoral politics and fragmented party system. The party's ideology, its conservative democratic demeanor, and its organization are still in the making. Rather than being a novel political project rooted in Islam, the party's ideology marginalizes the role of Islam in the public sphere or reduces it to a set of traditional values.

Ahmet Kuru starts where Tepe leaves the reader, with a number of questions about the role of Islam in the public sphere. Kuru seeks to cope

with this issue by focusing on the JDP's conceptualization of secularism. He starts with the following question: "Is secularism a universally monolithic phenomenon with a standard meaning or a contextually changing concept based on varying interpretations?" This question has been at the core of debates on state-religion relations in several predominantly secular states. Turkey provides an intriguing example to examine fundamental and changing aspects of secularism regarding distinct normative backgrounds of political actors and their conflicting policy decisions. In contemporary Turkish politics, powerful institutions, for example the military and the Constitutional Court, have had conventional attitudes toward secularism. Following the November 2002 national elections, the JDP joined the political balance of power with an unpredictable view of secularism. Today, both the followers and the discontents of the mainstream understanding of secularism in Turkey are trying to understand the JDP, which also tries to recreate itself on the issue of secularism.

Kuru thus analyzes the debates on secularism in Turkey through the lens of the JDP case. He provides the appropriate theoretical and historical backgrounds on this important issue. He covers the general theoretical framework of his argument through a conceptual survey of secularism with a comparative perspective. He then briefly looks at the historical origin of and contemporary disagreements on secularism in two prominent Western countries—the United States and France. Kuru's aim is to specify the commonalities and differences between secularism and laicism, essential to understanding secularism in Turkey. Following these two background sections, the main body of Kuru's chapter examines three issues: first, the external challenges that the JDP has faced on secularism from state institutions, its constituency, and the EU. Second, he examines the JDP's policies for the last two years to understand the party's general attitude toward secularism. Finally, the chapter contributes to our understanding of the JDP's new self-professed ideology—"conservative democracy"—since a balancing view of secularism has a crucial place in the party's self-identification as a conservative party.

Ali Çarkoğlu argues that the rise in support for the JDP marks the progression of electoral collapse of centrist politics in Turkey. His chapter focuses on the main characteristics of the electoral support for the party in two elections. The first one is the general elections in November 2002. The second is the municipality elections in March 2004. Çarkoğlu's main questions are: From where is the JDP's support coming? How different are these support bases compared to earlier Turkish pro-Islamists?

Part 2 of the book (The JDP Policies) deals with the JDP's economic

policies (Ziya Öniş), JDP-Turkish military ties (Gareth Jenkins); the party's gender policies (Edibe Sözen); its labor relations (Engin Yıldırım); and the party's foreign policy stances as seen through the "Islamic civilizational" lens (Burhanettin Duran) and the Iraqi war crisis of 2003 (Saban Kardaş). Since the JDP's program is largely shaped by its commitment to fulfilling the political criteria for EU membership, the main policy framework is the EU accession rules and norms. Thus the relations between the JDP government and the Turkish military have taken place against the backdrop of—and been largely shaped by—Turkey's progress toward fulfilling the political criteria for EU accession. Civilian control of the military is a sine qua non for EU membership. For the party, EU accession is thus not only attractive in itself but provides the opportunity to contain arguably its most implacable domestic opponent: the Kemalist secularist-oriented military establishment. Jenkins argues that although it's still doubtful that the EU will ever grant Turkey full membership, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) nevertheless supports accession because it sees it as the culmination of Atatürk's policy of Westernization and because it believes that accession will result in higher levels of welfare and education, which in turn will erode electoral support for Islamism via parties such as the JDP. Equally important, the TGS is aware that the vast majority of the Turkish public supports EU membership, and being seen as opposed to membership would undermine the military's still considerable public prestige.

Yıldırım's chapter examines the JDP's approach to labor in the context of the party's socioeconomic and Islamic backgrounds, membership requirements of the EU, and International Monetary Fund–led economic policies. He argues that the party's relations with labor are influenced by two contradictory processes: On the one hand, the JDP seems to have followed the anti-labor pattern set in the early 1980s when Turkey's labor market was deregulated to achieve competitiveness through increased market flexibility and its trade unions suffered from political assaults and economic setbacks. On the other hand, having received significant support from the lower classes whose interests often, if not always, clash with those of business owners, the party has been aware that it must also please the economically disadvantaged with its policies. Indeed, reconciling interests of the laboring classes and (conservative) business owners has been a real challenge for the JDP government. The party has thus oscillated between respecting labor rights and favoring policies that defend the interests of employers. The party's understanding of social justice probably revolves around maintaining and strengthening traditional

relations of charity, solidarity, and cooperation rather than strengthening individual and social rights.

The last two chapters deal with the foreign policy of Turkey: Burhanettin Duran examines the role of Islamic civilizational identity in the foreign policy making of the JDP. Duran argues that the party has been transforming both the parameters of Turkish politics and Islamist politics through "Europeanization" and "internationalization" of internal issues. The task of transforming both itself and Turkey, argues Duran, is based on a careful balance between Islamist and secularist expectations in domestic politics and between the United States and Europe in international context. The transformation has not been limited to Turkish domestic and foreign policies. A more critical process of change can be observed in respect to Islamic political identity and discourses in Turkey. Duran claims that the party's foreign policy represents a departure from the Islamism of the National Outlook Movement, which embraced an anti-Western/European stance from the 1970s to the 1990s. The JDP expects that EU membership will allow Turkey to further a process of promoting its relations with the Middle East and the Muslim world. But this expectation seems to be ignoring the possible difficulties of pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy within the Union. Duran concludes that apart from the EU harmonization process, it is difficult to say that the JDP has successfully triggered political debates over the sensitive issues of identity politics. The party's political identity of "conservative democracy" is not theorized properly, according to Duran, in order to resolve the tensions of identity politics in Turkey. In the context of the EU accession process and globalization, the primary challenge of the JDP's foreign policy is thus to redefine the Turkish national identity.

Saban Kardaş focuses on the more specific issue of the Iraqi crisis to examine the role of identity and national interests in the formulation of the foreign policy of Turkey under the JDP. By comparing the party leadership's strategic language with that of Turkey's security and foreign policy elite, Kardaş seeks to better account for the dynamic interaction between the continuities and changes, and identity and interests, in Turkish foreign policy. He argues that throughout the Iraqi crisis involving critical decisions by Turkey, the JDP leadership employed a rhetoric that dismissed an ideological-ideational approach to foreign policy and prioritized the country's national interests, paying due attention to material and practical considerations—a foreign policy based on *realpolitik*, if you will. He concludes that the differences between the JDP's leadership and the establishment, to the extent that they existed at the commence-

ment of the Iraqi crisis, have been more in the details than in the substance of foreign policy.

The title of this book (*The Emergence of a New Turkey*) illustrates the main thesis of these chapters that a new Turkish elite in terms of its regional, social, and religious cultural background has emerged on the scene. The book's focus is on the JDP. The architects of this new Turkey are the Anatolian bourgeoisie, new intellectuals, and the JDP. These new agents of political change created an alliance in response to the February 28 military coup and the 2001 economic crisis. As the new Turkey is in the making, two major defining characteristics need to be revealed. One of them is the evolution of a new political discourse. This discourse consists of democracy, civil society, human rights, and freedom of speech. This new discourse empowers the marginalized sectors of Turkish society and opens new ways of imagining state-society relations. This language opened a national debate over key issues of political and national identity centering on the state, security, Turkishness, Islam, Alevism, and Kurdishness. Almost all key concepts of the old Kemalist contract are contested and redefined in accordance with the new wave of globalization and, most importantly, the demands of the Copenhagen criteria. This is an outcome of the dynamic public sphere in Turkey, which has resurfaced as a result of the burgeoning financial and economic sectors outside the control of the state. In the evolution of this new political language, the Anatolian bourgeoisie played an important role by financing private education, newspapers, journals, and radio stations. The new bourgeoisie has provided the necessary material support to put demands for greater democracy and a more open civil society into practice. The transformation of political Islam is also the story of the support of this new class and its ability to carry its ideas into the political domain. This class first supported the Welfare Party, engineered a transformation within the party, and eventually came out in support of the Gül-Erdoğan ticket.

As part of the evolution of a new political language, a major revolution has taken place at the cognitive level. With EU institutional support, new interest groups want to guarantee their intrinsic freedoms and transform state-society relations. Another major change is taking place in regards to the definitions of the state, politics, and nation. Politics in Turkey has always been treated as an instrument for proclaiming bureaucratic decision demands to the public, and not as an instrument for articulating societal claims and demands through political contestation. Thus, political debates in Turkey have always focused on the protection and consolidation of state power, and nation is defined as an extension of the state.

A popular saying in Turkey goes: "May God protect the state and the nation" (*Allah devlete ve millete zeval vermesin*). For instance, opposition parties are not monitoring state activities on the basis of societal interests but rather from the perspective of state interests. Although politics was presented as a conflict between the forces of modernity and religious fanaticism, it was an elite-centered instrument managing the process of exclusion and inclusion into and out of the system. In Turkish political culture, the state used to have a semisacred meaning and the Turkish nation and faith existed in order to serve the state. This situation has changed, and the state is now regarded as a set of institutions to serve the people and protect the value structure of society. The supporters of the JDP do not want the party to define itself in terms of the concerns and the politics of the center. They have redefined the perceived core values of the social center and have demanded that the party restructure the existing political center (the state) in terms of societal values in Turkey.

The second defining characteristic of this new Turkey is the end of dual sovereignty or "parallel governments" in Turkey as a result of the curtailing of the power of the military. Sovereignty in Turkey has always been divided between those who are elected and those who are appointed, such as the military and civilian bureaucracy. The latter group had the preponderance of power to set the framework of Parliament and the functioning rules of democracy and has also determined whose voices are deemed legitimate or illegitimate. In previous decades, those who were appointed were never held accountable by the populace and derived their legitimacy simply by "preserving the Kemalist ideology." As guardians of the state ideology, they protected their own power and position and, among other things, sought to keep the elected government within the boundaries of the state ideology by manipulating and using the media, the military, and the judiciary. Their goal was to protect the state and its ideology from the populace and democratically elected politicians who might have challenged their authority and ideology from an independent power base. This appointed group determined and formulated its own "defensive and protective task" of Kemalism. They, like the Council of the Guardians in neighboring Iran, designated the boundaries of elected government. This dual government came to an end with the constitutional changes of 2004. This change came with the support of domestic forces, especially the coalition that developed between Istanbul and the new Anatolian-based bourgeoisie. The end of the military's power came about because of two interrelated events.[6]

With the 1997 soft coup, by implementing harsh policies against Muslim groups and the presence of Islamic symbols and discourse in the public sphere, the military lost a great deal of its popular base of support amongst pious Anatolian Sunni-Turks who had traditionally been willing to grant a great deal of deference to the Pashas because of the war of liberation of 1919–21. Furthermore, the Copenhagen criteria called for the separation of military decision making from the civilian political system. Turkey's Euro-skeptic conservative Muslims became Europhiles almost overnight after the 1997 coup. Many realized that domestic forces did not have the necessary resources and ability to end the military's power and antireligious authoritarianism and recognized the Copenhagen criteria as the only way of rolling back those in the military and bureaucratic establishment who interpreted Kemalism in a militant and anti-Islamic fashion. Today, because of this process, one sees the emergence of a democratic Turkey and the corollary expansion of political freedoms. Since 1999, the Turkish Parliament enacted seven major reform packages and a number of harmonization laws to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership.[7]

One of the major cognitive impacts of these changes is the redefinition of security and the role of the security forces (military and police). The previous paradigm of protecting the state from society has shifted to a paradigm espousing the protection of society from state interventions. The new agent of change in Turkey is no longer the military but the evolving bourgeoisie. The new class of intellectuals, who are funded by the bourgeoisie and work outside the state institutions, play an important role in the process of redefining the political language of Turkey in accordance with the global discourses of human rights, democracy, and market economy. In short, now the people are not a subject but an object of their own destiny. They do not want to be defined by the state but seek to define the state instead. Turkey is searching for a new social contract outside of the rigid Kemalist public philosophy. It is important in this process to redefine state-society relations and the role of state institutions. The EU process, along with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, has offered a framework for this new social contract in Turkish society by stressing the secular and democratic nature of the Republic in which individual rights are protected with legal mechanisms. In the constitution of this new social contract, the role and meaning of politics is crucial. By reducing politics into "rendering social services," the JDP has not developed a necessary framework for public debate.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's new conception of politics and globalized discourse, along with his charismatic personality, is behind his electoral success in November 2002. As an activist of Islamic politics within the National Outlook Movement of Necmettin Erbakan and then as the mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan understood that political success and consolidation occurs at the local level, as İhsan Dağı aptly explains in his chapter. At the local level, politics is not about big ideas or liberation ideologies but rather about rendering social services and proving to the population that issues of corruption and accountability are addressed in a fashion markedly superior to previous administrations. Politics, for Erdoğan, is about serving and improving one's everyday life and a pragmatic instrument to articulate the claims of people. On the basis of his experience in Istanbul, Erdoğan became aware that the main source of the JDP's legitimacy is based on meeting the needs of people and providing social services to all. This awareness makes him the most pragmatic leader in Turkish history, and at the same time the least ideologically committed. It is locally based politics on a national scale.

Although the leadership of the JDP lacks a developed ideological map of action, they have a good understanding of Ottoman history. This history provides them a rich laboratory of insights and lessons that are useful for guiding current politics. In the case of the JDP leadership, history, especially the classical period of the Ottoman Empire, becomes an "ideology." The makers of new Turkey, the Anatolian bourgeoisie, the new intellectuals, and the JDP leadership, especially Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, and Bülent Arınç, the speaker of the Parliament, are informed by the grandeur and self-confidence of the Ottoman Classical age, which represented one of the high-water marks in Islamic and indeed world civilization more than the Republican fears of "partition of the country and the collapse of the state."

As this brief sketch shows, a great many problems are addressed, or at least touched upon, by the authors of this collection of essays. This is the first comprehensive study on the governing Justice and Development Party. Many other issues of the party and Turkey also need to be explored, as the JDP struggles to define the concept of conservative democracy in practice. This edited volume, therefore, is but a first step in what, it is hoped, will eventually become a well-developed area of political party studies in comparative politics.

Notes

1. Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities," *Washington Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 51–64. Daniel Pipes also argued that "The Justice and Development Party in Turkey is very different from the Taliban in its means, but not so different in its ends. If the party gained full control over Turkey, it could be as dangerous as the Taliban were in Afghanistan." Washington Institute, *Policy Watch* 746 (April 10, 2003), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2003/746.htm.

2. M. Hakan Yavuz, *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003).

3. Etga Uğur, "Intellectual Roots of 'Turkish Islam' and Approaches to the 'Turkish Model,'" *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24, no. 2 (October 2004): 327–46.

4. DRA is one of the largest state institutions, with its own branches and budget both inside and outside Turkey. It has the second largest representation outside of Turkey after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It owns over 120 mosques and has several hundred employees in various European states. The DRA licenses mosques, appoints all prayer leaders (Imams), pays their salaries, and controls all their activities and speeches. The education of the personnel of religious institutions is carried out by the Ministry of Education and the autonomous Council of Higher Education, known as YÖK. Education and religious services and the meaning of Islam are tightly controlled in Turkey. This state Islam regularly contains and contests diverse interpretations of Islam.

5. Ahmet Yıldız, "Muhafazakarlığın Yerlileştirilmesi ya da AKP'nin 'Yeni Muhafazakar Demokratlığı,'" *Karizma* 7 (January–March 2004): 54; Fahrettin Altun, "Islamcılık ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi," *Anlayış*, December 2005, 41–43; Altun, "Ak Parti'nin Topuğu," *Anlayış*, January 2006, 26–28; Yasin Aktay, "Ikrar ile Inkar Arasında Ak Parti'nin kimliği," *Anlayış*, December 2005, 51–54; Necdet Subaşı, *Ara Dönem Din Politikaları* (Istanbul: Küre, 2005), 155–73.

6. For a very different reading of the role of the military in the EU process, see Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Dogan Akyaz, "The Turkish Military's March toward Europe," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 1 (January–February 2006): 77–90.

7. Bertil Emrah Oder, "Enhancing the Human Face of Constitutional Reality in Turkey through Accession Partnership with the EU," in *Turkey: The Road Ahead?* ed. Bertil Duner (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 72–104.