

The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide

An Annotated Bibliography

Samuel Totten

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Dedicated to three great friends and colleagues who care deeply about the prevention and intervention of genocide, and whose work has had a profound impact on the field of genocide studies.

Dr. Israel W. Charny, Director of the Institute on the Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Jerusalem, Israel

Jerry Fowler, Director of the Committee on Conscience, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C.

William S. Parsons, Chief of Staff, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C.

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Introduction

Prevention and Intervention of Genocide: An Annotated Bibliography is the first major bibliography dedicated solely to the prevention and intervention of genocide. It is the culmination of five years work in nine major libraries: The Library of Congress; The Jeannette Rankin Library of the United States Institute for Peace (Washington, D.C.); The Netherlands War Documentation Center Library (Amsterdam); Mullins Library and the Leflar Law School Library at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville; American University Library (Washington, D.C.); and Trinity College Library at the University of Dublin/Trinity College, Boole Library at University College, Cork, and James Hardiman Library at the National University of Ireland, Galway, all of which are located in Ireland.

Only relatively recently—the past two decades or so—has there been a concerted effort by scholars to examine the complex array of issues germane to the prevention and intervention of genocide. To a large extent, most issues pertinent to the prevention and intervention of genocide have either been studied in isolation and/or by scholars specializing in different fields (e.g., genocide studies, conflict resolution, conflict studies, peace studies, political science, sociology, psychology, and international law). In many cases, such scholars are not familiar with each other's work or efforts, let alone appreciate how various components under study are related to one another. As a result, the effort to develop an effective anti-genocide regime is not as far along as it could or should be. In that regard, this bibliography is an attempt to bring the work, findings, insights, and quandaries of scholars in various fields (political scientists, sociologists, historians, psychologists) specializing in different areas of study (genocide studies, peace studies, conflict resolution, et al.) together under a single umbrella.

As humanity gradually moves into the twenty-first century, it continues to struggle to ascertain *and* to develop the most effective means for preventing

genocide. It is an effort of the utmost importance, for genocide, which stained the globe throughout the twentieth century, continues unabated to this day.

Century of Genocide

Some scholars have deemed the twentieth century a century of genocide. That is understandable in light of the fact that every single decade of the twentieth century was witness to at least one genocide somewhere in the world. It is also understandable due to the fact that the various genocides resulted in the mass murder of tens of millions of people—some estimate the number to be well over one hundred million (Rummel 1992, p. 1)—between 1904 (when the first genocide of the twentieth century was perpetrated by the Germans against the Hereros in Southwest Africa) and 1995 (when over seven thousand Bosnian Muslim boys and men were murdered by Serb militia in Srebrenica). (For critical analyses and first-person accounts of these and other genocides, see *Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts*, edited by Samuel Totten, William S. Parsons, and Israel W. Charny. New York: Routledge, 2004)

Various genocides perpetrated prior to World War II (e.g., that of the Hereros, the genocide of the Armenians by the Ottoman Turks between 1915 and 1919, and the Soviet man-made famine in Ukraine between 1932 and 1933) were, in their immediate aftermath and for many years afterward, largely forgotten about by the rest of the world. Indeed, the issue of genocide did not gain the attention of the international community until the conclusion of World War II when stories and photographs began appearing in newspapers and magazines about the Nazi perpetrated Holocaust (1933–1945). Undoubtedly, a large part of the attention focused on the Holocaust was due to the fact that it was a genocide perpetrated in the West by a people considered highly cultured and sophisticated; it was a genocide of massive proportions that engulfed peoples all across Europe and beyond; it was a genocide that was meticulously planned, carefully documented, and carried out in a highly bureaucratic and technologically sophisticated manner; and the perpetrators (the Germans/Nazis) were the same ones who were responsible, in part, for initiating the Second World War.

In the aftermath of World War II and the Nazi extermination of approximately six million Jews and five million other people (including but not limited to the Gypsies, mentally and physically handicapped, and Slavic peoples) during the Holocaust, the United Nations adopted a resolution on December 9, 1946, recommending that international attention and cooperation be focused on the prevention and punishment of genocide. It was, in fact, the horrific slaughter by the Nazis, along with the ardent and tireless efforts of Polish émigré jurist Raphael Lemkin, that prompted the member states of the United Nations to formally recognize genocide as a crime under international law.

From the outset, the development of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide (UNCG) was plagued by controversy. For example,

a brouhaha erupted over whether to provide protection for “political groups” under the UNCG. The Soviet Union argued that the inclusion of political groups would not conform “with the scientific definition of genocide and would, in practice, distort the perspective in which the crime should be viewed and impair the efficacy of the Convention” (U.N. Economic and Social Council 1948, p. 712). Similarly, the Poles asserted that “the inclusion of provisions relating to political groups, which because of their mutability and lack of distinguishing characteristics did not lend themselves to definition, would weaken and blur the whole Convention” (U.N. Economic and Social Council 1948, p. 712). Another argument against the inclusion of political groups was that unlike national, racial, or religious groups, membership in political groups was voluntary. However, in a later session, the French argued that “whereas in the past crimes of genocide had been committed on racial or religious grounds, it was clear that in the future they would be committed mainly on political grounds” (UN Economic and Social Council 1948 p. 723). Ultimately, as a result of a great deal of compromise, both political and social grounds were not granted protection under the UNCG.

The upshot was that the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide came to define genocide in the following manner:

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- a. Killing members of the group;
- b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The ratification of the UNCG in 1948 and the hope it inspired immediately clashed with the realities of the cold war spawned by the antipathy between the Soviet Union and the United States. Indeed, for all intents and purposes, the UNCG became a dead letter of sorts during the cold war years.

1945–1989—The Cold War Years

The objectives of those who initially shaped the post-1945 agenda of protecting every single individual’s human rights (as specified in UN Declaration of Human Rights, the UNCG and other documents) became increasingly diluted as the twentieth century wore on. Indeed, the postwar cry of “Never Again!” became more and more muted until the second half of the century began to appear as an almost endless chain of genocidal actions—in large wars, small wars, civil wars, and sometimes when there was no war at all. Periodic genocides, largely ignored by the outside world, were perpetrated throughout the cold war period in such

places as Bangladesh, Burundi, East Timor, Indonesia, Paraguay, Cambodia, and Guatemala.

In 1971, East Pakistan sought to secede from West Pakistan, a move that was resisted with staggering violence. The subsequent emergence of the independent nation of Bangladesh was accompanied by some three million dead and a quarter of a million women and girls raped, the result of a calculated policy of genocide initiated by the government of West Pakistan for the purpose of terrorizing the population into accepting the continuance of Pakistani rule over the region. Ultimately the strategy did not work, as Bangladesh achieved its independence after the intervention of India in the conflict and the consequent defeat of the Pakistani forces.

The following year, 1972, an outbreak of genocidal violence shook the tiny central African nation of Burundi, where a Hutu-instigated uprising against Tutsi domination resulted in the army subjugation and mass murder of tens of thousands of Hutu civilians over a five-month period. The final total of dead numbered between two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand Hutu men, women, and children, and ushered in a period of Tutsi dominance that was to last for several decades. During this period, the Hutu majority population was reduced to a position of entrenched second-class subservience (Lemarchand 2004).

It was characteristic of the era that Burundi became a location for cold war rivalries. The Western world, and in particular the United States, saw the catastrophe that befell the Hutu as an irrelevancy so far as the bigger picture of defeating Communism was concerned. The French government saw the conflict as an opportunity to reinforce its preferred Francophone client-state relationship, while Communist countries such as China and North Korea took the opportunity to assist the Tutsi junta with arms and infrastructural support as a way to woo the regime away from the West.

A little over two years after the worst of the violence ceased in Burundi, Communist tyrant Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge won a bloody civil war in Cambodia, and began one of the most radical attempts at remodeling an existing society the world had ever seen. In taking the Cambodian people back to the “Year Zero,” as Pol Pot put it, at least 1.5 million people lost their lives (Kiernan 2004, p. 339). The killing continued for over three years, and did not come to an end until Communist Vietnam invaded Kampuchea and drove the Khmer Rouge from power. The intervention by Vietnam was not due to altruism or concern over the genocide *per se*, but was rather a result of political differences and violent border skirmishes and incursions by the Khmer Rouge. Such countries as the United States, Great Britain, and Australia basically looked the other way as the genocide unfolded for the Khmer Rouge were the enemy of the allies’ enemy, Vietnam.

In 1975, yet another cold war genocide was taking place in Asia—in the former Portuguese overseas territory of East Timor. In 1975, one of the political factions jockeying for power in the aftermath of Portuguese decolonization, FRETILIN, declared the territory’s independence; within weeks, Indonesian military forces

invaded, declared East Timor to be that country's twenty-seventh state, and began a systematic campaign of human rights abuses which resulted in the mass murder, starvation, and death by torture of up to two hundred thousand people—about a third of the pre-invasion East Timorese population (Dunn 2004).

In sum, the cold war had a devastating effect on post-1945 hopes that a new, non-genocidal regime could be created *and* honored across the world. Not only were peoples and groups in conflict left to fight out—or in the case of the victims, defend—their differences unimpeded; all too often, as capitalist and Communist states saw the possibility of achieving an advantage through either action or inaction, those committing genocidal acts were frequently aided and abetted for the most blatant of *realpolitik* motives.

As long as the cold war continued, there was little chance that the pressures likely to lead to a genocidal situation would find a “release valve.” The great powers played a leading role in manipulating local conflicts so as to suit their own needs, after which each side was able to serve as a proxy in the greater ideological conflicts of the time. The cold war showed with great clarity that the world's major actors paid only lip service to their postwar commitment to “never again” allow genocide to take place.

The 1990s and Early 2000s

The international community's record vis-à-vis the *prevention* of genocide in the 1990s and early 2000s was, with one major exception (in northern Iraq in 1991) abysmal. Its record for halting genocide once it had begun was, with two major exceptions (East Timor in 1999 and Kosovo in 1999) equally abysmal. Oddly, and ironically, this is true despite the fact that the UN and other members of the international community engaged in more intervention efforts throughout the 1990s and early 2000s than ever before. That said, it is important to note that the conflicts the international community confronted in the 1990s and early 2000s essentially moved away from those it had been accustomed to addressing (e.g., conflict and warfare between sovereign nations) to those with which it was largely unfamiliar (e.g., intrastate violence, often set off by religious, ethnic, and political triggers). That, of course, is no excuse; rather, it is recognition that the world had become a radically different, if not somewhat more complex, place in the aftermath of the cold war.

At one and the same time, it is also important to note that the relatively new concept of “the responsibility to protect” grew out of the ever-increasing concern over the seemingly constant perpetration of crimes against humanity and genocide throughout the 1990s. While the concept has been hotly debated, it has grown in visibility and stature; still, only time will tell whether or not it results in something positive—meaning, the imposition of early and effective actions to prevent (and when necessary, halt) the perpetration of crimes against humanity and genocide.

The Early Years of the Post-Cold War Period

When the cold war came to an end in 1989, there was a great surge of optimism and hope that the world would be a more peaceful place. Such optimism, however, was short lived.

With the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union, internal tensions broke out in violent conflict (or, in certain cases, continued apace) in numerous places across the globe, including the Middle East (e.g., Iraq), Europe (e.g., the former Yugoslavia), and Africa (e.g., Somalia and Rwanda). Some of the crisis situations resulted in crimes against humanity, while still others degenerated into genocide. No longer prevented by the USSR and the United States from intervening in such matters, the international community made one attempt after another, depending upon the circumstances, to keep the peace, enforce the peace, or make the peace.

The earliest—and one of the most successful post-cold war interventions—took place in Iraq in April 1991, when the United States and its allies conducted Operation Provide Comfort. This involved creating a “safe haven” for those Kurds residing in northern Iraq who were threatened by Saddam Hussein’s troops. While interventionary troops established relief camps and safe havens in northern Iraq, NATO planes established a no-fly zone over the area. As Samantha Power (2002) noted in her Pulitzer Prize-winning book, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, “Operation Provide Comfort was perhaps the most promising indicator of what the post-Cold War world might bring in the way of genocide prevention. . . . This marked an unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of a state for humanitarian reasons. Thanks to the allied effort, the Iraqi Kurds were able to return home and, with the protection of NATO jets overhead, govern themselves” (p. 241). If only the international community had acted in such a manner in 1988 when the Iraqi government carried out its so-called “*Anfal Operations*,” which resulted in the murder of between fifty thousand to two hundred thousand Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq (Leezenberg 2004).

In the aftermath of the success in Iraq and with an eruption of strife in post-Communist Yugoslavia, various parts of Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) in which he delineated an optimistic and grand plan vis-à-vis future UN peace operations. But his plan was sorely naive in that it was bereft of a real sense of the many and complex barriers that had to be overcome when an intervention was attempted. Among such were the complex machinations of the UN Security Council; the issue of *realpolitik* practiced by states (including those on the UN Security Council); the lack of political will that prevented many states from contributing to key peace operations; the complexity of the intrastate violence that was to be confronted by various peace operations; and, last and certainly not least, the UN’s own Byzantine, slow moving and often inept way of handling major peace operations in locales where a combination of politics, heated ethnic differences, and/or major religious divisions made for a toxic stew that was extremely complex, volatile and, more

often than not, lethal. Put another way, Boutros-Ghali's ideas regarding the implementation of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace making, all of which were highlighted and discussed in *Agenda for Peace*, were no match for the complicated and wrenching facts on the ground. The disasters that were already under way (e.g., in the former Yugoslavia), as well as those that were brewing (e.g., in Somalia and Rwanda), provided ample proof of that.

The Former Yugoslavia

In 1991, following the fall of the former Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the former Yugoslavia began to disintegrate into internecine conflict between and amongst the three major groups—Serbs, Muslims, and Croats—that had lived in peace in Tito's Yugoslavia. More specifically, in the wake of extreme nationalist sentiments espoused by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, first Slovenia seceded, then Croatia and, not long afterwards, Bosnia. Upon each secession, Serb forces attacked the break-away states. For the next eight years, horrific atrocities, including crimes against humanity and genocide, were committed. The CIA reported that “90 percent” of the atrocities perpetrated between June 1991 and January 1995 were committed by Serb military and paramilitary forces (Power 2002, p. 310).

The international community was well aware of Milosevic's words and threats, and the fear they instilled in the Muslim and Croat populations. It was also well aware of the ever-increasing and brutal actions committed by the Serb troops against their former neighbors and newly declared enemies. Based on her analysis of declassified documents, Power (2002) asserts that “no other atrocity campaign in the twentieth century was better monitored and understood by the U.S. government. U.S. analysts fed their higher-ups detailed and devastating reports on Serbian aims and tactics” (p. 264). And yet, the world basically watched as the horrific events unfolded. “Despite unprecedented public outcry about foreign brutality, for the next three and a half years the United States, Europe, and the United Nations stood by while some two hundred thousand Bosnians were killed, more than two million were displaced, and the territory of a multiethnic European republic was sliced into three ethnically pure statelets” (Power 2002, p. 251).

The reasons for the lack of action on the behalf of the victims varied from nation to nation. In the United States, for example, it varied from such attitudes as “we don't have a dog in this fight” (the actual words of then Secretary of State James Baker), to “the Vietnam analogy” (e.g., the military's fear of getting bogged down in a quagmire that the public would not support and which might lead to a large loss of military personnel), onto the so-called “Somalia factor” (an intervention likely to go awry and result in the deaths of U.S. troops). And these were only three of the main reasons.¹

This is not to say that the international community did nothing. In fact, it became deeply involved in attempting to quell the violence in the former Yugoslavia by

brokering cease-fires, imposing sanctions, and establishing peace agreements. But the attempts at intervention were either too little, too late, or totally ineffective. Diplomatic efforts, sanctions, and even threats seemed to fall on deaf ears, and when either no attempts or extremely weak attempts were used to carry out the threats, the perpetrators of the violence seemed to become even more emboldened to have their way. Indeed, the Western powers, led by the UN, the European Community, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (and preeminently, the United States and Britain), failed consistently both to resolve the war and to stop the killing.

In regard to the UN's efforts, Thomas Weiss, (1993, p. 7), a political scientist and specialist in the field of intervention, argued that

Incremental measures under United Nations auspices paradoxically fostered Serbia's genocidal war aims. Given their traditional constraints and operating procedures, UN soldiers were not strong enough to deter the Serbs. But they deterred the international community from more assertive intervention because the troops, along with aid workers, were vulnerable targets. While assistance to refugees saved lives, it also helped foster ethnic cleansing by stimulating movement of unwanted populations. Air-drops of food made it seem as if people counted; while massive and unspeakable human rights abuse and war crimes continued unabated. Inadequate military and humanitarian action, combined with half-hearted sanctions and a negotiating charade, thus constituted a powerful diversion. They collectively impeded more vigorous Western diplomatic and military pressure for lifting the arms embargo for Muslims to help level the killing fields.

Rwanda

Tensions in the early 1990s between the ruling Hutu and the Tutsi people in Rwanda were nothing new. Indeed, from the time Rwanda gained its independence from Belgium in 1962, the Tutsis had been subjected to discrimination and had been the victims of periodic outbreaks of mass killing perpetrated by the Hutus.

Tensions, though, increased dramatically in 1990, following an invasion into Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) (primarily comprised of exiled Tutsi). As the RPF made headway in its battle against the Hutu-run government, Tanzania, with the assistance of major Western powers, brought the warring parties together in order to bring about a cease-fire. Ultimately, both sides signed the Arusha Peace Accords in 1993, which provided for shared governance of Rwanda by both the Hutus and the Tutsis.

Alarmed at what the Arusha accords would result in, not only did Hutu extremists set out to totally undermine the talks and the peace accords but they did everything in their power to terrorize the Tutsis and moderate Hutus who supported the accords. Ultimately, the Hutu extremists made plans for doing away with their perceived enemies. The subsequent terrorist tactics of the Hutu extremists were evident to all

who were residing in Rwanda, and scholar-activist Alison Des Forges (a noted human rights researcher with Human Rights Watch, and co-chair of the International Commission on Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda 1992–1993) has argued that the donor states and international organizations working in Rwanda “could and should have anticipated” the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (quoted in Fein 1994, p. 21).

As a result of the Arusha Accords, the UN inserted a peace mission (the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda—UNAMIR) in Rwanda for the express purpose of overseeing the cease-fire, helping with the demobilization and demilitarization of the area, and working to establish a modicum of safety as the Tutsis in exile returned to Rwanda. The ensuing turmoil, though, took place despite the signing of the Arusha Accords; and, in fact, the increased tensions and ultimate genocide were largely a result of the Hutu extremists’ disdain for the conditions set by the Arusha Accords. As time went on, the Hutu extremists grew bolder in their attacks on the Tutsis, while also building up huge caches of weapons, establishing and training militias, and issuing radio broadcasts decrying the very existence of the Tutsis in Rwanda. As Alison Des Forges has correctly asserted “the international community was not resolute in holding the Rwandan government and the RPF to the peace accords signed on August 4, 1993” (quoted in Fein 1994, p. 21), and that, as the world now knows, was a grave error.

Within a relatively short period, it was obvious to the UN force commander, Lt. General Romeo Dallaire, that a Chapter VI peace mission was an inadequate mandate for what UNAMIR faced. His call for a more robust mandate, though, fell on deaf ears at the UN (and, in particular, within the UN Security Council) and in the capitals of the most powerful nations across the globe. Undoubtedly, that was due to a host of reasons and, in reality, a commixture of them: the international community already felt overburdened by the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia; there was a general tentativeness about becoming immersed in another African ethnic conflict; and there was the bitter aftertaste as a result of the then recent and disastrous intervention in Somalia in which U.S. and Pakistani troops helped to provide humanitarian relief for an ongoing famine and then attempted to restore peace and disarm rampaging militia groups. Some commentators even suggested that it was due to the possibility that those in danger in Rwanda, unlike those in the former Yugoslavia, were black and that the Western powers cared less about their fate than they did that of white victims.

What it was not due to, though, was a dearth of information. In fact, throughout the early 1990s, the United Nations, the United States, and various European nations (including France and Belgium) were well aware as to what was transpiring in Rwanda (Barnett 2002; Des Forges 1999; Melvern 2000; Power 2002).

Then, as the killing increased to full tilt, the United Nations Security Council exacerbated the situation by scaling back the size and scope of the peacekeeping forces already on the ground (Barnett 2002). Belgium, the former mandatory power, withdrew from Rwanda altogether, along with most other Western countries.

France, after the worst of the killing had taken place, established a so-called “safe zone” in the south, but its ultimate effect was to protect the tens of thousands of Hutu killers who had poured into the area escaping the advancing Tutsi rebel army (Melvern 2000, pp. 210–226).

Ultimately, during this so-called “machete genocide” an estimated eight hundred thousand Tutsi men, women, and children, along with moderate Hutus (e.g., non-extremist Hutus and/or those who attempted to defend the Tutsis from slaughter), were slain in a three-month period.

In its introduction to the “International Panel of Eminent Personalities (IDEP): Report on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events,” the Organization of African Unity (2001) asserted that “the U.N.’s Rwandan failure was systemic and due to a lack of political will. . . . Just about every mistake that could be made was made” (p. 140). The panel also declared that the U.N. had compromised its integrity by maintaining “insistent and utterly wrong-headed neutrality regarding the genocidaires” (Organization of African Unity 2001, p. 140). Finally, the panel found clear evidence that “a small number of major actors,” including Belgium, France, and the United States, could have directly “prevented, halted, or reduced the slaughter” (Organization of African Unity 2001, p. 140).

The Establishment of the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC

In 1993 and 1994 two ad-hoc international courts were established by the United Nations Security Council for the express purpose of trying those indicted for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, as they pertained to the crises in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have both been moderately successful (if excruciatingly slow) in bringing prosecutions, and in September 1998 the ICTR made history when it found Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former mayor of the Rwandan town of Taba, guilty of the crime of genocide. It was the first time an international court had issued such a verdict for this specific crime. Other prosecutions have followed, and case-law precedents in international law and genocide-law prosecutions are now growing.

It is noteworthy that during the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu, Pierre Richard Prosper, a U.S citizen serving as a prosecutor at the ICTR, argued ardently to convince the court that “sexual violence against women could be carried out with an intent that amounted to genocide” (Power 2002, p. 485). As Power notes, Prosper argued that “a group could physically exist, or escape extermination, but be left so marginalized or so irrelevant to society that it was, in effect, destroyed” (p. 486). Ultimately, the ICTR found that the systematic rape of Tutsi women in Rwanda’s Taba commune was found to constitute the act of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” and, as a result, Akayesu was found guilty of genocide.

As if to demonstrate the firmness of the international community’s resolve to do something about genocide—and to prove that impunity is no longer an option for

those who commit it—the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted on July 17, 1998. The court was established by the United Nations under the aegis of the UN Security Council. The statute gives the court jurisdiction to try alleged suspects for the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It is both an extension of the ICTY and the ICTR, and the fulfillment of the promises first articulated in the aftermath of the Holocaust (Schabas 2000, pp. 1–21). After considerable debate, the ICC decided to absorb the UN Convention on Genocide, including its definition, directly into its Charter. The court became operative on July 1, 2002, after a minimum of sixty UN countries had ratified it. Notable among those refusing to ratify was the United States. Cognizant of the United States' intransigence, most European countries had earlier decided that the leadership of the United States would not be required for the purpose of establishing what was seen as a highly moral body that would assist in safeguarding the peace of the world and the lives of its citizens. The United States promptly sought, and received—much to the dismay of many (including the leaders of other nations, as well as human rights activists)—an agreement within the UN that would place Americans serving in foreign postings outside the court's jurisdiction.

Time will tell whether the ICC's principles and mandate will be backed up by concrete action and the political will to see things through.

Srebrenica

Even when the international community attempted to be proactive in addressing massive violent conflicts, it did so in a haphazard manner with inadequate UN mandates and missions that were often sorely undermanned, under-resourced and poorly supported. In fact, its half-hearted approach (including its indecision, decisions, inaction, and actions) resulted in, and in some cases, even abetted (though inadvertently), the crimes against humanity and genocide that were perpetrated. The classic case was the tragedy that befell the so-called “safe area” of Srebrenica, in Bosnia, in July 1995.

The UN, NATO, and individual nations, such as the United States, Great Britain, and others, had the knowledge and the wherewithal to have prevented this genocide but basically chose not to do so. (For a detailed discussion of the factors that led the international community to allow Srebrenica to fall, see David Rohde's *End Game: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe's Worst Massacres Since World War II*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997.)

In 1993, Serb attacks on Bosnian Muslims increased in eastern Bosnia, and the latter fled from their homes and villages to seek protection in the nearby town of Srebrenica (and, roughly, a thirty square mile area surrounding it), which had been designated a UN-sponsored “safe area.” The “safe area” had been developed as a result of Security Council Resolution 819 on April 16, 1993. In part, the wording of the resolution read as follows: “...the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its

undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crimes of Genocide" (UN Security Council 1993, p. 1). Subsequently, the UN forged an agreement in which the Muslim troops in the enclave of Srebrenica would disarm, the Serbs would halt their attacks on Srebrenica, and the UN would oversee and enforce the cease-fire. While it is common knowledge that both the Serbs and Muslims periodically violated the agreement, the Serb forces were the ones who, over the years, applied ever-increasing pressure on the Muslims in Srebrenica—as well as on the Dutch peacekeepers (commonly referred to as Dutchbat) charged with protecting the safe area—by periodically shelling them, and preventing humanitarian assistance from entering the enclave.

As the attacks increased in number and ferocity, NATO authorities discussed the possibility of air strikes against Serb-held areas. However, many of the European nations that had contributed troops to the UNPROFOR peacekeeping mission argued against the air strikes, asserting that such attacks would endanger their troops—both those on the ground and those who were being held hostage by the Serbs. As a result, the air strikes were not carried out.

While one debate after another was held by the Security Council regarding the safe area policy, the council ultimately refused to provide the Dutchbat troops with an adequate mandate (that is, a strong Chapter VII mandate versus the highly restrictive Chapter VII mandate it had, which, in fact, constituted more of a Chapter VI or peacekeeping versus a peace enforcement mandate) that would have helped to save innocent and imperiled lives. And while the council made frequent promises to help the UN contingents protecting the safe areas, these promises were a matter—yet again—of too little too late. In far too many cases, the help that was offered never arrived.

The culmination of the constant harassment and attacks by the Serbs was the all-out attack and subsequent take-over of Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. The attack was led by Ratko Mladic (the Bosnian Serb Army commander), Radislav Kristic (the commander of the Drina Corps), and others. For all intents and purposes, the way in which the so-called safe area was established and "protected" was tantamount to making the Muslim people easy targets at the mercy of the heavily armed and well-trained Serb militia and troops.

Acting on the Serb orders, Dutchbat even expelled five thousand Muslims from the Dutchbat headquarters in Potocari, where the latter had fled seeking protection. Ultimately, an estimated eight thousand boys and men were captured by the Serbs, lined up in the woods outside of Potocari and murdered. Understandably, some have asserted that Srebrenica was "not so much a safe area as a besieged area" (War Crimes Watch 1996, p. 2). Ignominiously, the genocide in Srebrenica was the largest single act of genocide in Europe in since the Nazi Holocaust that ended in 1945.

A Revision of An Agenda for Peace

It was no surprise when in 1995 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued his *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, which called for a rethinking of his earlier statement (*An Agenda for Peace*) as well as a dramatic overhaul of UN peace operations. It was obvious to anyone who followed international matters that there had been and continued to be a catastrophic disconnect between what the UN had promised and what the latter had resulted in on the ground.

Among the major problems Boutros-Ghali addressed were the UN's dismal failure to differentiate between peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates, the severe problems posed by missions that were undermanned and underresourced, and the weaknesses and problems inherent in previous peace operation command structures. Once again, there was hope among some that key changes would be made at the UN, and that such changes would result in much more effective peace operations.

Kosovo

In 1999, almost as an acknowledgment of a guilty conscience concerning their failure to adequately protect Bosnia, the combined air forces of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, operating together as part of NATO, attacked Serbia with the intention of forcing the Serbs to stop their persecution of the ethnic Albanian population living in the Serbian province of Kosovo (Weymouth and Hening 2001). It was the first occasion in which a war was fought for the express purpose of stopping a genocide before its worst horrors took place. Under international law, however, the attack was illegal as it was neither called for nor approved by the United Nations. After a lengthy and intensive bombing campaign lasting three months, the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic pulled its troops out of Kosovo. UN peacekeepers moved into the province, allowing the one million persecuted Kosovars, who had been expelled from the country in a huge outbreak of so-called "ethnic cleansing," to return home.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo is an example of how a potential genocide can be addressed early on if the international will to do so is present. Be that as it may, some were highly critical of the intervention due to the West's delayed reaction. Joyce P. Kaufman (1999, p. 33) was one such critic:

Despite the lessons of Bosnia, despite the clear indications that crisis was imminent, in the case of Kosovo, NATO still waited until armed conflict erupted before getting involved, and as was true with Bosnia, then reacted to the circumstances. Alliance leaders once again sought diplomatic and negotiated settlements before authorizing the use of force, holding out the threat of NATO military strikes should negotiations fail. But, as in the past, diplomatic initiatives continued long after

it became apparent that they would come to naught, especially in the case of a leader like Slobodan Milosevic.

That was not the only focus of criticism aimed at those who carried out the intervention in Kosovo. Part of the criticism was a result of the extreme measures taken by the interveners to avoid sending in ground troops. That is, in March 1999, a decision was made by NATO to use air power—versus ground troops—in an attempt to halt Serb troops from carrying out violence (as well as ethnic cleansing) against the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo. The controversial NATO air attack lasted for seventy-eight days. As Alvarez (2001) notes, ironically and tragically, “the attacks incited the Serb leadership to speed up the policies of ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians, resulting in wide-spread massacres and the uprooting and dislocation of the majority of the population” (pp. 139–140). Had NATO or UN troops been on the ground, they may have been able to prevent the Serbs from carrying out their policies.

The Kosovo intervention was even more severely criticized, though, by those who viewed the intervention as illegal. Not only was there the issue of acting without the imprimatur of the UN, but many innocent people were also killed as a direct result of NATO air sorties. There was such anger in some quarters that threats were made by various parties to bring the United States and NATO up on charges of genocide.

East Timor—An Anomaly?

For many years, the international response to what was happening in East Timor was one of indifference. Indonesia’s neighbor, Australia, was especially keen not to antagonize the populous nation to its north, and was the first (and for a long time, only) country to recognize the *de jure* incorporation of East Timor into the body of Indonesia after the latter’s invasion of the tiny ex-Portuguese territory in 1975 (Aubrey 1998). United Nations resolutions calling on Indonesia to withdraw were ignored, and the United States, anxious lest a hard-line approach toward the annexation be seen by the Indonesians as a reason to look elsewhere for support—for example, to nonaligned nations—trod very softly on the whole issue (Gunn 1997). Only in 1999, after a long period of Indonesian oppression and the threat of another outbreak of genocidal violence (this time committed by Indonesian-backed militias and units of the Indonesian army), was East Timor freed. In 2002, the first parliament, elected by universal suffrage and guaranteed by the United Nations, allowed East Timor to take its place among the community of nations.

But the resulting freedom did not come without a great deal of violence, followed by international intervention. In 1999, in a UN-sponsored referendum, the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence. Immediately following the election, the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militia gangs went

on a rampage that resulted in the deaths of 1,500 people and massive destruction throughout the territory (e.g., about 70% of East Timor's buildings were destroyed, telephone exchanges were wrecked, electrical lines ripped out, and farms burned to the ground). An estimated eight hundred thousand people were forced into military-controlled camps in Indonesian-controlled West Timor. Ultimately, the terror and killing drew international attention, and pressure was placed on the United Nations by various foreign ministries and human rights organizations to act. The killing and destruction only came to an end three weeks later once international peacekeepers (who were authorized by the UN Security Council to use "all necessary measures" against violent militias) intervened to halt the violence and place East Timor under United Nations rule on September 20, 1999. Notably, in the end, Indonesia voluntarily relinquished its claim to the territory. This came as a relief to the countries taking part in the intervention, for although the declared mission was to rescue civilians, "the unspoken premise was potentially explosive: the international community was effectively coming to the aid of a separatist movement in a sovereign nation" (King 1999, p. A9). Had the international community not intervened when it did, many more innocent victims would have been slaughtered—possibly in the tens of thousands or more.

Some have claimed that the intervention in East Timor bodes well for the future in that it might prompt outside nations to be more proactive when crimes against humanity and/or potential genocide are on the horizon; indeed, some claim that the actions undertaken by Australia constitute a precedent that could have profound implications for the future. In this regard, Alan Ryan, a senior research fellow with Australian Army's Land Warfare Studies Centre, argues that the way in which the intervention was conducted could serve as a model for similar interventions in the future. More specifically, he asserts that

the speed with which the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) was deployed and the rapidity with which it was able to establish conditions of security in East Timor make this operation an excellent model for future ad hoc, complex, multinational deployments. In large part, the success of the operation was due to the troop-contributing nations' acceptance of the imperfections inherent in such a disparate force. Operational responsibility was distributed according to the abilities of the forces assigned to the mission. The need for a robust command-and-control architecture was realized in the strong-lead-nation model that INTERFET adopted. Short-notice deployments of "coalitions of the willing" in the future will benefit from a consideration of the clear, simple, and unified command structure that characterized Operation *Stabilise* in East Timor. (Ryan 2002, p. 23)

Others are not as sanguine. For example, James Cotton argues that the 1999 intervention in East Timor was an anomaly in the region, and for that reason the intervention is not an indication of a change of principle regarding the "sanctity" of non-interference in the region. More specifically, he states that

The principle of non-interference is an integral part of the “Asian Way.” Countries of the region have doggedly opposed any suggestion that state sovereignty should be softened by a new doctrine of “humanitarian intervention.” The participation of some countries in the 1999 intervention in East Timor—an action sanctioned by the United Nations for specifically humanitarian purposes—was thus out of character. But this departure, far from reflecting a re-evaluation of doctrine, was a consequence of specific historical and political factors, most important of these was the fact that the UN had never accepted the Indonesian incorporation of the territory as legitimate. Once the United States adopted a more critical attitude, after Australia pressured Indonesia to test local opinion on East Timor’s future, the internationalization of the issue became inevitable. In the aftermath of the post-ballot militia violence, Indonesia’s uncertain transitional leadership could not resist calls for an intervention by peacekeepers. There are certainly lessons in the East Timor case for coalition operations and other interventions. But the actions of the Australia-led coalition do not indicate a wider regional acceptance of the norm of humanitarian intervention. (Cotton 2001, p. 127)

Again, as is often the case, time will tell which perspective is the more correct of the two.

The “Brahimi Panel”

On March 7, 2000, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan convened the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations “to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future” (p. I).²

In the “Introduction” to the *Report on the Panel of United Nations Operations*, the authors commented as follows:

Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge [of addressing complex peace operations], and it can do no better today. Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years. . . . [W]hen the United Nations send[s] its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them. . . . For preventive initiatives to succeed in reducing tension and averting conflict, the Secretary-General needs clear, strong and sustained political support from Member States. Furthermore, as the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peace-keeping, in particular, is to succeed. . . . Moreover, the changes that the Panel recommends will have no last-

ing impact unless Member States summon the political will to support the United Nations politically, financially and operationally. (UN, 2000, p. i)

The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (ICISS)

In light of the international community's abysmal record in halting crimes against humanity and genocide prior to the deaths of tens of thousands, if not millions, of people, various individuals and parties began exploring "the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive—and, in particular, military—action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that state (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, p. 1). In early 2000, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was asked by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to address a wide range of questions (legal, moral, operational, and political) in regard to the issue of "the right of humanitarian intervention."

In 2001, the ICISS issued its report. Following a careful interpretation and analysis of the United Nations Charter, international law, and the sea-change in perspective vis-à-vis the sanctity of every person's basic rights as a result of the human rights regime of the latter half of the twentieth century, the ICISS "reconceptualized" the concept of sovereignty to be understood as the responsibility of a state to protect its citizens. Concomitantly, the authors argued that when a state fails, for whatever reason, to protect all of its citizens from grave injustices and harm, the international community not only has the right but the responsibility to intervene for the express purpose of protecting the population at risk.

Numerous reasons have been offered for the theoretical shift toward a so-called "norm of intervention," including: the emergence of an ever-stronger worldwide human rights regime—and "changing international expectations regarding the responsibilities of states and of the international community for halting gross and systematic violations of human rights with grave humanitarian consequences" (Karns and Mingst 2001, 216); the end of the cold war, which allowed for interventions without the fear of causing a catastrophic, and, possibly, nuclear war; the ever-increasing interdependence of nations; various UN proposals, including Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* and his *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*; UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's call for the "development of international norms" to protect civilians from slaughter," along with the UN Security Council's support and legitimation of the Annan's call (Wheeler 2002, p. 127); "the complete disregard for international humanitarian law by war criminals," which incensed large portions of the international community (Weiss 2003 p. 84); the prevalent "use of foreign aid to fuel conflicts and war economies" and the backlash against such (Weiss 2003, p. 84); and "the protracted nature of many so-called emergencies" (Weiss 2003 p. 84).

Some claim, though, that such a shift is not a result of recent events, but one that has been unfolding over the past hundred years or so. In this regard, Krasner and Froats (1998, pp. 227–228) argue that

The view that developments [in the world] signal a fundamental change in how international relations are ordered in fact—rather than theory—is myopic both empirically and analytically. . . . Relations between ruler and ruled have been an enduring international concern. The principles of nonintervention and territoriality, which define the Westphalian model, have persistently been challenged by alternative principles such as universal human rights, toleration, and ethnic determination. Every major peace settlement of the modern period has addressed the fate of minorities, defined in terms of religious affiliation and later ethnic identity. With the end of the Cold War, minority rights have [“simply,” once] again become a focus of inter-national concern.

Nardin (2002, pp. 57–58), for one, goes even further in that he first observes and then asserts that

Humanitarian intervention is usually discussed as an exception to the nonintervention principle. According to this principle, states are forbidden to exercise their authority, and certainly to use force, within the jurisdiction of other states.

The principle finds firm support in the United Nations Charter, which permits a state to defend itself from attack but forbids the use of armed force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. Taken literally, these provisions prohibit armed intervention, including intervention to protect human rights. And in general, humanitarian intervention finds scant support in modern international law.

There is, however, a much older tradition in which the use of force is justified not only in self-defense but to punish wrongs and protect the innocent. This tradition is in some tension with modern international law and especially with the UN Charter. It holds that armed intervention is permissible to enforce standards of civilized conduct when rulers violate these standards, and finds expression today in the widely held opinion that states, acting unilaterally or collectively, are justified in enforcing respect for human rights. It is this enduring tradition, not current international law, that best explains the moral basis of humanitarian intervention.

[. . . In] other words, humanitarian intervention is justified within a powerful reformulation of natural law worked out by philosophers influenced by Immanuel Kant. This post-Kantian version of natural law, which I follow Alan Donagan in calling “common morality,” suggests why humanitarian intervention remains morally defensible despite modern efforts to make it illegal.

Be that as it may, Michael Ignatieff (2002) seemingly has it right when he asserts that “At this point, we are in a halfway house, no longer in the world of 1945, where sovereignty was clearly privileged over human rights, and yet nowhere near

the world desired by human rights activists, in which sovereignty is conditional on being good international citizens. We are somewhere in between, negotiating the conflicts between state sovereignty and international human rights as they arise, case by case (p. 232).

Not surprisingly, there are those (various scholars, government leaders, and personnel in intergovernmental organizations) who are adamantly against any type of change that challenges the Westphalian Treaty's position on nonintervention. In fact, they vehemently question the legality of intervening in another state's "internal affairs" (thus breaching its sovereignty), even in the face of mass killing.

No matter how the current climate is described—be it a sudden shift, an ongoing shift (or, for that matter, legal or illegal, moral or immoral)—it is a given that most, if not all, interventions are bound to be contentious, and nothing in the short term is going to change that.

Assuming the shift continues forward, the question, of course, is will anything radically change as a result of the shift; and, if so, what? What can be said is this: one possible major change, and it will be positive *if* the shift continues unabated, is that neither the United Nations nor individual states will have the excuse to not intervene in a major human rights crisis (including crimes against humanity and genocide) "because it is a matter of 'internal affairs.'" Put another way, they will not be able to claim that "it's solely the business of the country/state where the violations are being perpetrated." That, in and of itself, is a quantum leap forward in the effort to make the prevention and intervention of genocide "a given."

But, then again, the shift may not continue. Thus, as to what the ICISS's recommendations will result in over the long haul is a truly question mark. Be that as it may, based on the current (2005–2006) "efforts" (fiasco might be a more apt word) to halt the crimes against humanity and genocide being perpetrated in Darfur, Sudan, the recommendations in the report have, seemingly, had little to no impact.

The Twenty-first Century: Another Century of Genocide?

The twenty-first century, and the new millennium, began inauspiciously. Various massacres, some of a potentially genocidal nature, continued to be perpetrated in the Congo and Uganda—and, again, little to nothing was done to halt such killing. Ongoing conflicts between the Hutus and Tutsis also continued to simmer and boil over in Burundi. And then, beginning in 2003, a violent crisis in Darfur, Sudan, began to degenerate into a genocide (2003–present). Yet again, the international community reacted in a typical and totally inadequate manner.

Darfur

The Arab and the black Africans of the Sudanese province of Darfur, all of whom are Muslim, lived decades on end, for the most part, in relative peace. Though much of Darfur is comprised of stark and forbidding desert, some areas have been

cultivated. While these areas were primarily occupied by sedentary farmers and cattle owners who tended to be black Africans, at various times during each year the grazing areas were used by semi-nomadic Arabs for grazing their cattle and camels. The livestock, in turn, fertilized and renewed the soil for subsequent growing seasons. While local disputes between the two groups were not uncommon, they were generally resolved in a peaceful manner.

This more or less stable relationship began to fray, however, in the 1970s, and in successive decades it disintegrated altogether as drought and desertification vastly increased competition for fewer and fewer natural resources. Over time, as weapons seeped, and then flooded, into Darfur from battles raging in the region (both in Chad and southern Sudan), the traditional methods of resolving disputes were generally overtaken by heavily armed self-defense groups and militias.

At one and the same time, many black Africans grew increasingly agitated that not only were their needs being ignored by the Sudanese government, but that the Arab groups were being accorded rights, resources, and assistance that they were themselves being denied. Ultimately, out of sheer frustration with the government's lack of attention to their needs, black African rebel groups began attacking Government of Sudan (GOS) facilities. In February 2003, the ever-increasing tension exploded into a heated and prolonged conflict when the GOS began carrying out a violent campaign purportedly against the two main rebel groups (the Sudan Liberation Army or SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement or JEM) as a result of the latter's attacks on government facilities.

In retaliation against the rebel groups, the GOS and the *Janjaweed* (Arab militia) not only engaged in battles with the rebel groups, but carried out a scorched earth policy against civilians (primarily members of the Massalit, Fur, and Zaghawa tribal groups) that share the same ethnicity as the rebel groups. In so doing, the GOS and the *Janjaweed* burned down hundreds of villages, carried out ethnic cleansing (in which over two million people were driven from their homes), and committed mass rapes, mass killings, and, according to the United States government, many scholars, and human rights activists, genocide. Estimates of those who have been killed and/or died from injuries, illnesses, and/or starvation range from 180,000 to over 400,000. Based on a careful examination of mortality rates in Darfur, various scholars and human rights organizations believe the larger number is the more accurate of the two.

Beginning in December 2003, various nations (including the United States Agency for International Aid and Development (USAID)), nongovernmental organizations (e.g., Human Rights Watch), and international agencies (including those of the United Nations) began focusing attention on the situation in Darfur and calling for a halt to the ongoing killing and mass rape of the black African civilians.

Following a U.S. State Department-sponsored investigation (the Darfur Atrocities Documentation Project (ADP)) in Chad in July and August 2004, U.S. Secretary of

State Colin Powell declared, on September 9, 2004, that genocide had been (and possibly continued to be) perpetrated in Darfur. At the same time, Powell called on the international community to act to stanch the killing.

Subsequently, the United Nations conducted its own investigation, the Commission of Inquiry (COI), and upon the conclusion of its field-based study (in Darfur, Khartoum, Chad, and adjacent areas), the UN declared that crimes against humanity had definitely been committed by the GOS and *Janjaweed*, but it could not, at the time, declare that genocide had been committed.

In the months following the ADP's and COI's findings, the international community and individual nations supported a Chapter VI intervention in Darfur by the African Union (AU). The AU's mandate was one of peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement, meaning that AU troops could not engage GOS troops and *Janjaweed* in battle if they caught the latter attacking civilians in their villages or in internally displaced persons' camps. And while the UN, NATO, and numerous individual nations (e.g., including Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom) provided transport and key supplies for AU troops (and hundreds of millions of dollars for humanitarian support of the victim population), not a single nation outside of Africa volunteered to send troops. The reason for the latter was two-fold: most nations did not want to become embroiled in the violent conflict, and the AU insisted that the situation be dealt with solely by African troops.

Throughout 2005, the violence in Darfur flowed and ebbed, but then exploded again in October 2005 and continued on into 2006.

Issues of Prevention: Complexities and Possibilities

Preventing genocide is politically complex and involves, contingent on the situation on the ground, a host of possible decisions, actions and reactions—none of which guarantee ultimate success.

It is true, of course, that until a situation degenerates, or explodes, into genocide, no one truly knows whether a conflict, ethnic warfare, or series of massacres will actually result in genocide or not. Concomitantly, if a genocide is avoided as a result of various decisions and actions by the international community or some other entity, no one can definitively say that the latter actually prevented genocide for no one can know, positively, whether the situation on the ground would have resulted in a genocide. Thus are the complexities and paradoxes of genocide prevention.

Be that as it may, knowledge about the causes of genocide is a prerequisite to prevention. Fortunately, over the past thirty years or so a great amount of effort has gone into developing theories and conducting research into the various causes—and, more accurately, the combination of causes—of genocide (extreme ideology and/or ideological differences; authoritarianism; extreme nationalism; ever-increasing ethnic tensions; extreme ethnocentrism; ethnically divided, or “plural societies”;

“social fragmentation” (Smith 1998); groups treated as inferior and as “others” and thus not only discriminated against but utterly disenfranchised; extreme scarcity of resources and competition for such; “direct conflict over resources” (Smith 1998); and “horizontal inequalities”). Such research continues to be conducted by many in a wide array of disciplines and fields. Be that as it may, much work has yet to be done. As in all serious scholarly endeavors, earlier findings, conclusions, and recommendations are, if not built upon, often revised, refined, and honed as new research is carried out. And, as the research becomes more sophisticated, it becomes more nuanced in its findings. A case in point is the following observation by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (1999): “. . . most researchers agree that it is useful to distinguish ‘structural’ or long-term factors, which make violent conflict more likely, from ‘triggers,’ which actually ignite it. The structural factors all have to do with social and economic policy, and the way that societies govern themselves” (p. 47). Continuing, Annan (1999, p. 51) comments on a major UN report that suggests

that simple inequality between rich and poor is *not* enough [as some once thought] to cause violent conflict. What is highly explosive is what the authors of the study call “horizontal” inequality: when power and resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways—for instance by race, religion or language. So-called “ethnic” conflicts occur between groups which are distinct in one or more of these ways when one of them feels it is being discriminated against, or another enjoys privileges which it fears to lose. . . . As resources get scarcer, competition for them gets fiercer, and elites use their power to retain them at everyone else’s expense. And when economic decline is prolonged—especially when it starts from an already low base—the result can be a steady degeneration of the State’s capacity to govern, until the point where it can no longer maintain public order.

Scholars and practitioners have also developed a strong theoretical base vis-à-vis the prevention of genocide (Adelman 1999; Charny 1982; Crocker, Hampson, and Aall 2001; Davies and Gurr 1998; Freeman 1999; Hirsch 1999; Nafziger and Väyrynen 2002; Rupesinghe 1992; van Walraven 1998). Be that as it may, all of this work (the research, theory, and practical applications of such) is still, in its totality, at an incipient stage. Indeed, that is true in regard to ascertaining and then addressing critical systemic issues in the most efficacious manner possible, developing and implementing fully operational and highly effective genocide early warning systems, developing the most effective means of carrying out “preventive diplomacy,” ascertaining the most effective means vis-à-vis the implementation of sanctions, et al.³

Knowledge of the critical need to address such concerns is, of course, altogether different from acting on such knowledge. And while hundreds of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), along with various arms and branches of the United Nations

and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), are working on a bewilderingly number of fronts and issues germane to the amelioration of “want” and/or the prevention of violent conflict, relatively little attention has focused on how such research, theories and strategies can be fully and effectively integrated for the express purpose of devising the means to prevent genocide. Instead, as previously noted, many, if not most, efforts at genocide prevention have been undertaken in piecemeal fashion and are disconnected from other research efforts, programs and strategies that could possibly, in tandem, strengthen the overall effort vis-à-vis genocide prevention.

What the international community seems to grasp intellectually, but has largely failed to act on, is that to prevent genocide prophylactic action must begin *as soon as* a specific group is in some way ostracized, treated as “other,” and/or “targeted” in any number of ways. That is, ameliorative action must be taken *before* the conflict or crisis results in violence, for by the time violence breaks out and help is on the way, many hundreds, if not thousands or tens of thousands and more, may already be dead as a result of a massacre, a series of massacres, and/or genocide. In other words, to wait until the targeted group is attacked violently and/or threatened with expulsion, if not death, constitutes a dangerous “waiting game.” Unfortunately, despite many lessons learned due to catastrophic errors, the United Nations, other intergovernmental organizations, individual nations, and many NGOs (including many human rights organizations), as well as those genocide scholars who consider themselves, either to a lesser or greater extent, activists, are more reactive than pro-active in their efforts to halt genocide. And that must change.

The Ineffectiveness of the International Community in Detecting Genocide

Undoubtedly, there is a plethora of reasons why the international community is less effective than it could and should be in preventing genocide. Some of the more significant ones shall be noted and commented herein.

Genocide Detection

Genocide detection (e.g., early warning) is still far from being a precise science. Indeed, in light of the plethora of violent conflict in the world, it is no small task to keep a hand on the pulse of such conflicts in order to ascertain the likelihood or possibility that they are going to erupt in genocide.

Many, however, have argued that in the information age it should be fairly easy to detect a potentially explosive/genocidal situation in the making. Some assert that with twenty-four hour news coverage by such outlets as CNN, along with the daily coverage of world news by major newspapers and the Internet, there is absolutely no excuse for not ascertaining when a crisis is degenerating into genocide. Furthermore, it has been argued, that the hundreds of nongovernmental humanitarian

organizations that operate across the globe constitute an unofficial and quasi early warning system.

None of the aforementioned news sources, though, have the mandate, let alone the desire or the means, to monitor, month-in and month-out, the day-to-day statements, decisions, actions, and reactions of human rights violators in order to ascertain the evolution of such actions, let alone, to ascertain, even if it were possible, the ultimate intentions of key actors. Indeed, time and again, the media—due, in part, to the way it gathers information—have misinterpreted and misjudged actions that have ultimately resulted in mass slaughter. In fact, conflicting reports of the same situation by different media sources, humanitarian groups, and/or government officials have often confused the issue.

The 1994 Rwanda genocide presents a classic example of the aforementioned situation. In *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, Alan J. Kuperman (2001, pp. 26–27) reports that

Starting on April 11, just four days into the violence, news reports indicated that fighting in Rwanda had “diminished in intensity.” Three days later it was reported that “a strange calm reigns in downtown” Kigali.... The commander of Belgian peacekeeping in Rwanda confirmed: “The fighting has died down somewhat, one could say that it has all but stopped.” As late as April 17, UNAMIR commander Dallaire told the BBC that except for an isolated pocket in the north, “the rest of the line is essentially quite quiet.”

Only on April 18 did a Belgian radio station question this consensus, explaining that the decline in reports of violence was because “most foreigners have left, including journalists.” The exodus of reporters was so extreme that it virtually halted Western press coverage.... For example, Frances’s *Le Monde* went silent for four days and Britain’s *Guardian* for seven. Ironically, this was just as the killing peaked and spread to Rwanda’s final two prefectures.

Three days into the killing, on April 10, the *New York Times* quoted an estimate of 8,000 dead in Kigali by the French humanitarian group Médecins San Frontières and “tens of thousands” by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Three days later, the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front] offered its own estimate that “more than 20,000” were dead in Kigali. However, during the second week, media estimates did not rise at all and so failed to approach levels that commonly would be considered “genocidal” for a country of 8 million people that included 650,000 Tutsi.

... Death tolls of 20,000 are not uncommon in civil wars and generally are not considered genocidal. In order to make a determination of genocide in a specific case, one has to examine the details of the violence including whether the victims were noncombatants, were killed deliberately (rather than in crossfire), were members of a single group defined by ascriptive characteristics, and were being targeted exclusively because of their identity rather than for suspected actions such as supporting government rebels. In the absence of such details, only a high death estimate would suggest the possibility of genocide. Accordingly, given the

early confusion about the nature of the violence in Rwanda, a death toll of 20,000 during the first week did not seem to indicate the occurrence of genocide.

Variations of the above situation have been “played out” time and again throughout the last century when massacres have been perpetrated.

On a different but related note, when a major crisis hits a region, television news teams flock to the area to cover the events, but as soon as the events are no longer “newsworthy” or a crisis hits another part of the world, the teams are often en route elsewhere. As a result, television news networks are not in a position to gauge whether a situation is moving toward genocide. Newspaper coverage of major conflicts is not as “flighty” as television coverage, but even major newspapers’ intensive coverage of an area has proved inadequate in detecting early signals that genocide is on the horizon.

Although field personnel with NGOs are often privy, if not outright witnesses, to major human rights infractions, it is not their job or within the realm of their expertise to track human right violations or other types of conflict for the purpose of ascertaining whether a potential genocide is looming. NGO personnel dealing with famines, the care of refugees, and other major crises, already have their hands full, often working in far-flung areas under chaotic and dangerous conditions. Thus, while such individuals and groups can, when possible, provide critical information regarding major human rights infractions, their efforts are, at best, fragmentary and often sporadic.

That said, in various cases where the press and various NGOs provided fragmented information about incidents of cataclysmic violence that eventuated in genocide, it would have proved invaluable had the reports been conscientiously followed up on and fully investigated by the UN and/or independent governments. The reality, though, is that many individuals in the UN and independent governments have cavalierly disregarded or outright dismissed such reports. Here again, Rwanda provides a classic example. In her hard-hitting book *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide*, Linda Melvern (2000, pp. 55–56), an investigative journalist, reports the following:

In the years immediately before the 1994 genocide... human rights groups [were] gathering information and becoming increasingly active in Rwanda. They reported extensively on the Bagogwe massacres in January 1991 and the February 1992 massacre at Bugesera, describing the involvement of military and local government officials. In some communities Tutsi had been repeatedly attacked and the military had distributed arms to civilians who supported [President] Habyarimana....

So bad did the situation in Rwanda become that, in January 1993, a group of international human rights experts from ten countries collected testimony from hundreds of people, interviewed witnesses and the families of victims, and reviewed numerous official documents. In March 1993 a report was published revealing that in the previous two years those who held power in Rwanda had

organized the killing of a total of 2,000 of its people, all Tutsi, singly, or in small or large groups . . .

The word genocide was not used in the report, being considered too highly charged by some of the group's authors, but a press release distributed with the report carried the head line: "Genocide and War Crimes in Rwanda."

... There was little international concern when the human rights report came out (italics added). Only the Belgian government recalled its ambassador from Kigali for consultations, and the Rwandese ambassador in Brussels was told that Belgium would reconsider its economic and military aid unless steps were taken to rectify the situation. The French ambassador dismissed the massacres as rumors.

A complicating factor in some, if not many, pre-genocidal situations, is that certain warnings may come from unknown parties, and thus it is difficult to ascertain their validity. One such case occurred during the period of the Holocaust. More specifically, as Pauline Jelinek (2001) writes in her article "File: Allies Tipped Off to Genocide in Early '42," it is now believed that "The West may have been informed about Nazi Germany's plans for the Holocaust months earlier than previously thought. 'It has been decided to eradicate all the Jews,' says a newly declassified document believed to have been obtained by British and American intelligence by March 1942. Previously, historians have judged that the West didn't learn until August 1942 that the Holocaust was happening" (p. 4). As to why the British and U.S. governments did nothing in response to such news, Holocaust historian Richard Breitman answered with a question: "Why would any British or American official pay particular attention to the views of an unknown Chilean diplomat in Prague?" (quoted in Jelinek 2001, p. 4).

It is also true that when warning after warning of a pending genocide is reported over a period of months (and even years), those on the receiving end tend to dismiss them. Once again, the 1994 Rwandan genocide offers an instructive example. A U.S. government official, Colonel Tony Marley, the U.S. State Department's political-military advisor in the region, asserted that "'We had heard them cry wolf so many times' that the new warnings fell on deaf ears" (quoted in Kuperman 2001, p. 105).

Finally, intelligence gathering and analysis is not as strong as it could or should be when racial, religious, national, political, and ethnic strife is taking place. In some cases, early warning signals are either missed entirely or not pieced together in order to demonstrate that there is a pattern indicating the likelihood of genocide. Then there is the problem where one intelligence body neglects, for whatever reason, to share its intelligence with other parties (including the United Nations).

A Lack of a Sophisticated Genocide Early Warning System

As previously mentioned, no entity has totally implemented a sophisticated and highly effective genocide early warning system. While many early warning sys-

tems have been developed—including those that track weather patterns in order to detect hurricanes or tornadoes, the potential for drought, and/or the possibility of famine, and/or detecting various types of violent conflict—*no single early warning system* has been established whose express purpose is tracking each and every conflict simmering across the globe in order to detect the earliest signs of a potential genocide in the making. (An equally great problem, of course, is that even if such an early warning system were operating, there would still need to be the political will by an entity to address the looming crisis in the most effective manner possible in order to prevent it from spiraling into a genocidal conflict. And the latter, in more cases than not, is generally what is missing in the calculus of both genocide prevention and intervention efforts. A related problem which looms even larger is that of *realpolitik*.)

It is, of course, far easier to detect a genocide under way versus those situations that have the potential for degenerating into genocide; it is also a fact that not all extrajudicial killings or massacres of innocent victims eventually culminate in genocide.

Other Major Issues That Prevent Effective Prevention

The numerous conflicts plaguing the world make it extremely difficult for those involved in preventive measures (e.g., individuals and organizations involved in such efforts as conflict resolution, preventive diplomacy, mediation, preventive peace building, and peacekeeping) to cover the globe in an effective manner. Even where preventive efforts are under way, a great number are not as effective as they could be—and that is due to various reasons.

One of the more perspicacious statements of late vis-à-vis the problematic nature of genocide prevention efforts was issued by Stephen Steadman (1998, pp. 67–68), a senior research scholar at CISAC at Stanford University:

The single largest error in the conflict prevention literature is the tendency of scholars to analyze conflict as something divorced from its antagonists. Metaphors of prevention suggest that conflict is something mechanical, as opposed to something relational among human beings. To give one example, one author proposes a tool-box for practitioners of prevention, suggesting that preventing violent conflict is akin to fixing a leaky faucet. Another study treats conflict as similar to disease, as if preventing a civil war from erupting is like preventing a cholera epidemic. These metaphors, and hence the analyses that flow from them, profoundly mislead about what conflict prevention is and how it can be accomplished. Because they deny agency to the actors who are in conflict and who decide whether and how to use violence to pursue their goals, such analyses tend to create an illusion of ease about conflict prevention. Properly understood, conflict prevention is about convincing human beings who strategically calculate how to achieve their goals and who may possess incommensurable worldviews that their interests can be and

should be pursued while refraining from violence. Because analysts of prevention fail to ascribe agency to the human beings involved in conflict, they are usually stridently confident about the correctness of their recommendations.

...Many who have studied preventive action have engaged in cheerleading rather than the tough-minded assessment that might have strengthened practice. We have tool kits and studies of missed opportunities, but few works that provide accurate diagnoses of different kinds of conflict situations and actors, specify alternative strategies of prevention and link the two in ways that could inform policymaking. We have myriad works on early warning, but little understanding of the organizational blinders that lead to missed information, incorrect diagnosis, and failed prevention.

Between 1994 and 1998 there were few successes of conflict prevention in the real world. The world had ample early warning of potential large-scale violence in places like Kosovo and Congo, prompting pundits to fault a lack of international will as the key missing factor in successful prevention. But in their exhortation to act, those same pundits ignore a key intermediate step: recommending a strategy of prevention and clearly specifying what actions by outsiders will persuade all sides in a conflict from refraining from the use of violence, while at the same time convincing them to pursue necessary societal, political, economic, and cultural changes that address the grievances of people, leaders and organizations who are in conflict.

The Cost of Prevention Versus the Lack of Prevention

Not only is the prevention of genocide complex and difficult, but it is also costly; costly, for example, in terms of “political capital” spent on such efforts; the hours consumed in diplomatic efforts; the many and varied effects of the imposition of sanctions (if and when they are used); and the costs incurred in developing and implementing, for example, conflict resolution, mediation, and other types of programs whose express purpose is to ameliorate conflict and prevent violence.

The lack of prevention, though, is much more costly than undertaking preventive measures. First, and foremost, of course, are the innocent lives engulfed in the maw of genocide. Among other costs are: the dangers posed to the international community by such violence (e.g., the violence seeping across the borders of countries and igniting conflict in adjacent states, if not the region); the costs in humanitarian resources resulting from refugee flows into neighboring states (including manpower; hours consumed; transport and the servicing of such; providing water, food, shelter, and medical care for the survivors of the victim population as well as aid personnel; establishing a humanitarian aid infrastructure; providing necessary security; et al.); the tremendous expense of carrying out major interventions (the dangers to and the “costs” of the interveners’ lives; manpower; transport; weapons systems; and infrastructure); and the danger of residue hatred (if not, the desire for retribution) felt by the remnant of survivors (which has, in the past, ignited new conflicts and genocidal actions years after the initial genocide).

The point is the use of funds to attempt to solve major complex systemic issues, social problems and crises, which may contain potential seeds of genocide, is not only wise but far less costly than attempting to address them once violence has broken out. Once violence breaks out, the international community must not only deal with stanching the killing but then face the grueling, time-consuming and immensely costly task of rebuilding a failed state riven with even more problems, including the remnant of highly dangerous cleavages amongst and between the various members of the state.

Successful efforts of prevention, then, negate, at least to a large extent, the need for intervention—which is often controversial, late in coming, and horrifically tragic for many. But when the opportunity to prevent genocide is, for whatever reason(s), missed then it is time to conduct, as quickly and effectively as possible, an intervention.

Intervention

The complexities, difficulties, and costs of interventions are many, and no doubt that is why, at least in part, most have not been as effective as they could or should have been.

Maley (2002), associate professor of politics at the University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy, delineated twelve theses that he asserts may *adversely impact* the success of external military interventions (whether authorized by the UN Security Council or not), and they are worthy of consideration for while not all twelve were evident in each and every humanitarian intervention undertaken between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, one, or more was evident.

- I. Interventions will more readily and rapidly address symptoms than underlying causes of political disorder;
- II. Interventions will have significant, and quite possibly unintended, effects on the value to particular individuals of positional and distributional goods;
- III. Intervention will bring a range of new actors to the political landscape;
- IV. Interventions may foster warlordism;
- V. Some new actors may be intent on settling old scores;
- VI. Interventions will be merely the starting points in complex processes of change;
- VII. Intervening forces will find it difficult to confront problems of political culture, elite structure, institutional design and institutionalization;
- VIII. Post-intervention peace processes may be faced with serious “spoiler” problems, with vulnerable civilians on occasion the principal targets;
- IX. Interventions may have significant potential impact on trust, social capital and the character of society, but it is difficult to produce positive effects directly;

- X. Progress towards a civil economy will be difficult if the intervening powers perversely distort local incentive structures, create an unaccountable 'rentier state' or inadvertently provide space for criminality to flourish;
- XI. Interventions may end up being under-resourced; and
- XII. A coalition of intervening powers may fragment over some of these issues (Maley 2002, pp. 266–274).

On a different note, time and again in the aftermath of a genocide when nothing was done to halt it, commentators asserted that such inaction was due to a "lack of political will." The charge has become so common that it verges on cliché. Be that as it may, in many cases the inaction by individual states, regional organizations, and/or the United Nations was, at least in part, due to a lack of political will. The lack of will basically came down to one factor: governmental leaders were unwilling to incur the potential political costs by supporting, contributing to, and/or taking part in an intervention. Part and parcel of the latter was that governmental officials were unsure if their constituents would support deploying troops to a conflict that had no direct or obvious bearing on their own country's welfare. Fearing blame, many leaders were also averse to deploying their troops where the latter might suffer injury and death. Governmental leaders were also unwilling to incur the monetary costs in leading or supporting an intervention. In the case of third world nations, many simply did not have the wherewithal to incur such costs.

Speaking about the lack of political will by the international community during the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the danger such a lack of will results in, Orth (1997, pp. 95–96) comments as follows:

International actors lacked the will to support their diplomatic efforts with military power when it was needed most. This impacts on the international community's credibility and ability to prevent conflict. A basic political science tenet is the ability to use power to impose one's will on another for a desired effect. Unfortunately, the international community did not understand that a vital component of successful preventive diplomacy is the willingness to threaten to use military power or its actual use when all else fails. In the Rwandan case that vital component was missing.

Also addressing the issue of a lack of political will, Jentleson (2000b, p. 24), professor of public policy and political science at Duke University, asserts that

Almost every study of conflict prevention concludes that when all is said and done, the main obstacle is the lack of political will. As an explanatory statement this is largely true. The United States and other governments have not acted because they have not had the political will to do so. If the domestic constraints that make this so are unchangeable and fixed, then that would be the end of the story. Prevention would continue to be sporadic and mostly too little, too late. There is reason to

argue, though, that the domestic constraints are not necessarily all that fixed, that they have greater malleability than typically presumed.

This issue will be addressed in more detail later herein.

Political will, however, is not the only reason why states, regional organizations, and/or the United Nations are tentative, at best, and unwilling, at worst, to intervene to halt a genocide. While lack of action may appear to be a case of political will, it may, in fact, be due to bureaucratic inertia, *realpolitik*, or indecisiveness in regard to whether the crisis is either slouching toward or has already degenerated into genocide. (The latter situation, though, raises another issue altogether: Why is there the ostensible “need” to wait to act until a situation is deemed to be a case of genocide? Isn’t a case of crimes against humanity horrific enough? And shouldn’t the latter be the “trigger” for action? Ironically, and unconscionably, the concept and term of “genocide” has become so sacrosanct that governmental leaders and others now ostensibly use it as a shield not to act—that is, if a situation is not deemed genocide then many leaders, both at the UN and individual state level, feel they can ignore the situation and not be blamed for doing so.)

Mayhall (1996) and Barnett (2002) assert that a major weakness of the so-called “new interventionism” is bureaucratic inertia, and that it is a direct result of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy’s make-up. Such inertia, they argue, constitutes a classic example where the right hand doesn’t know what the left hand is doing and vice versa. This is equally true, they argue, whether the miscommunication and/or lack of communication is between the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, the UN Secretary General and various department’s within the UN, or UN headquarters and the commanders of its field operations/missions.

Finally, there is the issue of *realpolitik*, which plays a huge key role in regard to whether a nation intervenes or not. Concomitantly, it directly impacts who decides to intervene when (if, in fact, they do), where, why, and to what extent. Indeed, the tentativeness to intervene, the slowness to carry out an intervention, the lack of support for specific interventions, and the weak mandates provided for various interventions have all been impacted, in one way or another, by *realpolitik*. The same is true in regard to the outright refusal to intervene or to support an intervention. In this regard, Sadkovich (1996) argues that “The United Nations and other international and regional organizations act to contain and manage, not end or resolve, such phenomena as aggression and genocide [and] the proponents of state sovereignty and *realpolitik* rule the day” (p. 283). Continuing, Sadkovich (1996, p. 294) asserts that

The years [1991–1995] may have marked the victory of the proponents of state sovereignty and the practitioners of bureaucratic barbarism and power politics over the advocates of individual and collective rights, [...but] there has been a tendency to reassert the *realpolitik* of the nineteenth century without the humanistic principle of the period. So foreign policies are now less “hypocritical” in that the

naked self-interest of states is repeatedly invoked to justify action or inaction, but elites have become morally insensitive. Governments will not intervene to stop aggression or genocide so long as doing so presents any risk of serious conflict.

The words of various government leaders in response to genocidal crises perpetrated over the past 30 years provide abundant evidence of *realpolitik* at work. Two “classic” examples follow. Speaking of the crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker cavalierly stated that the United States did not “have a dog in [that] fight,” thus dismissing his underlings’ urgent messages vis-à-vis the ongoing ethnic cleaning and mass murder faced by the non-Serb Bosnians (Power 2000, p. 267). Later, in July 1993, when a reporter asked then U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher what the United States could do to stop what appeared to be the imminent demise of Sarajevo, he replied “It’s the world’s most difficult diplomatic problem I believe. It defies any simple solution. The United States is doing all that it can consistent within our national interest” (Power 2002, p. 310). Power (2002) makes the trenchant observation that “Christopher was a veteran of [U.S. President Jimmy] Carter’s foreign policy team that had helped introduce the rhetoric of human rights in foreign policy. But here only national interests, narrowly defined, would count, and Bosnia was not one. . . . The following day, the Bosnian Serbs fired 3,777 shells into Sarajevo in a sixteen-hour period, one of the highest counts ever recorded” (p. 310).

Even when intervention is undertaken, it is often, as previously mentioned, a case of “too little, too late.” Integrally connected to the issue of “too little” is the issue of mission mandates. In one case after another (though certainly not all), the mandates of many relatively recent missions to ostensibly prevent bloodshed, massacres, and genocide have been totally inadequate. That is, various missions have either been given a Chapter VI or peacekeeping mandate that does not allow a mission to aggressively halt the violent and illegal actions of the perpetrators, or the mandate has been a “soft” Chapter VII mandate that does not allow for a mission to use all means necessary to halt the murderous actions of the perpetrators. To a large extent the latter is due to either *realpolitik*, political will or a deadly combination of the two. The UN missions in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), and the current African Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan serve as classic examples of the latter.

There are numerous degrees and stages of intervention available prior to outright military intervention that need to be considered and/or used early on, e.g., the threat and/or implementation of sanctions, information intervention, coercive inducement, the establishment of “safe havens,” peacekeeping, and peace enforcement.

When “preventive diplomacy”⁴ fails, one of the first lines of intervention often considered is that of sanctions. There is a wide variety of sanctions available for use, and among these are: diplomatic sanctions; arms embargoes; flight bans; travel bans; economic (e.g., freezing of financial assets, prohibition of financial transactions, trade bans, oil embargoes, bans on transshipment of strategic goods through the targeted nation); and bans on sporting and cultural events. The imposition of

sanctions also includes a broad set of possibilities: unilateral, bilateral, regional, bargaining, comprehensive, coercive, incremental versus rapid imposition, targeted or smart sanctions, and a stick and carrot approach (the imposition of negative sanctions followed by positive incentives).

The imposition of sanctions is often controversial. Three of the major reasons for such controversy are: (1) sanctions often do not result in the desired effect (e.g., a halt in the killing or ethnic cleansing and/or the failure to bring a perpetrators' economy to a standstill); (2) sanctions often result in unintended consequences (e.g., they often penalize—in extremely severe and harmful ways—the nation's general population more than the leaders of the government they are aimed at); and (3) they can, if implemented poorly, inadvertently enrich the very governmental leaders the sanctions are aimed at coercing.

Over the past decade and a half (1990–2006), the threat and/or imposition of sanctions have had varying degrees of success. For example, while the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia during the 1990s met with partial success, the sanctions against Rwanda in 1994 were a dismal failure. The latter was due in part to the fact that the sanctions were both extremely limited and poorly enforced. And as for the threat of sanctions against the Government of Sudan throughout 2004 and 2006 in response to its and the *Janjaweed*'s attacks on the black African population of Darfur, the threats did little to nothing to stanch the killing. (For a detailed and insightful examination of the imposition of sanctions in the post-Cold War period, see *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* by David Cortright and George A. Lopez. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.)

Information intervention can be applied prior to, during, and following humanitarian intervention that involves force. Such intervention involves various actions: blocking or scrambling propagandistic and/or hate-filled messages (prior to and during military intervention), broadcasting of counter messages (prior to and during military intervention), full-scale bombardment of television and radio stations (during military intervention), the confiscation of transmitters (during military intervention), and the establishment of new laws and regulatory regime (following the conclusion of a military intervention) (Price and Thompson 2002).

Humanitarian intervention runs the gamut from coercive inducement to various types of “peace operations” (peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement). Each task is unique and it is critical that the component used is appropriate to the task for which it is most applicable. In other words, to place a peacekeeping operation in an all-out war or genocide zone is not only nonsensical but is bound to lead to disastrous consequences, as the world saw only too clearly during the 1994 Rwandan genocide and throughout the 1990's in the former Yugoslavia.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan coined the term “coercive inducement” when he was under-secretary general for peacekeeping. It is a form of coercive diplomacy that involves the deployment and demonstration of military power versus the actual use of the power. In other words, it constitutes a warning that force could be used if

the belligerent does not heed the demands of the international community to cease and desist from its abhorrent and illegal actions. As Daniel, Hayes, and Oudraat (1999, pp. 22, 23) state,

The coercive side of coercive diplomacy is usually effectuated through the transmittal of latent or explicit military threats, the deployment or massing of forces, their peaceful displays of capabilities and demonstrative resorts to violence. Their diplomatic leverage is a function of their credibility, of whether they are physically up to the task of intimidation and whether political leaders are committed to employing them violently if necessary. . . . Military efficiency would take second place to politico-diplomatic concerns, the most important of which is not military victory but change in the target state's . . . behavior.

... [W]ithout any prior formal agreement among competing parties, a coercive inducement force could be employed as part of an international response to a man-made catastrophe such as when innocent civilians are being slaughtered in the midst of an ethnic or civil conflict (the events in Rwanda [1994] being a worst-case example in this regard). The underlying purpose of all coercive inducement, as with peacekeeping, would not be to unduly favor the victory or defeat of one or another of the competing groups (as might be a nation's purpose when engaging in coercive diplomacy in general) but rather to help contain the crisis, to keep it from getting worse so that peacekeepers and peacemakers can work with the conflict parties to help makes things better. In the area of crisis those would usually involve providing a secure environment and often basic services to needy locals. Even when highly capable and endowed with Chapter VII authority to employ "all necessary means," the longterm underlying presence of an inducement force is to be more reactive than initiatory, [and whose charge is to] employ when possible essentially defensive measures . . . and use focused violence such as striking only at specific weapons causing death or injury.

While Daniel, Hayes, and Oudraat do a decent job of describing coercive inducement/diplomacy, their suggestion that it would likely have been beneficial during the 1994 Rwandan genocide is not a little bewildering. Indeed, based on the accounts of the efforts of UNAMIR, it seems as if only an all out peace enforcement effort would have been able to reign in the *génocidaires*.

Numerous times over the past decade and a half, both individual nations and the United Nations have opted to "do something," no matter how ineffective that "something" might be. Indeed, all that ostensibly mattered was that there was the appearance of concern and/or action. I refer to such a situation as the "mirage effect," a situation that offers a false hope and nothing more. Such half-hearted actions can, and have had, deleterious results.

Weiss' (1993, p. 7) trenchant commentary on the West's and the United Nation's tentative, and often disastrous, interventions in various crisis-situations in the early 1990s, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, underscores the above point:

Incremental measures under the United Nations auspices paradoxically fostered Serbia's genocidal war aims. Given their traditional constraints and operating procedures, UN soldiers were not strong enough to deter the Serbs. But they deterred the international community from more assertive intervention because the troops, along with aid workers, were vulnerable targets. While assistance to refugees saved lives, it also helped foster ethnic cleansing by stimulating movement of unwanted populations. *Air-drops of food made it seem as if people counted; while massive and unspeakable human rights abuse and war crimes continued unabated* [italics added].

Inadequate military and humanitarian action, combined with half-hearted sanctions and a negotiating charade, thus constituted a powerful diversion. They collectively impeded more vigorous Western diplomatic and military pressure or lifting the arms embargo for Muslims to help level the killing fields.

Dayton Maxwell, a retired U.S. senior Foreign Service officer for the Agency for International Development (USAID), argues that by failing to examine the mid- to long-term effects of pursuing short-term politically acceptable solutions in countries immersed in conflict, "better options may be discarded. The willingness on the part of the international community to spend billions of dollars over the last few years in relief and minimal security protection for relief efforts has led to the use of the term 'fig leaf.' Providing relief hides the fact that more vigorous actions and greater risks are required to bring a conflict to a close" (Maxwell 1998, p. 179).

Over the past fifteen years or so, interveners have established a wide array of so-called safe locations, including "safe havens" (e.g., in northern Iraq in 1991 to protect the Kurdish population from the ongoing attacks by Iraqi forces) and "safe areas" in the former Yugoslavia (e.g., Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac).

"Safe areas" are useful and can work, but only when they are well protected by an adequate number of troops that have a mandate that allows them to use "all necessary force" to protect the areas/havens. To accomplish the latter, the troops must have ready access to adequate firepower, including fighter aircraft, if the situation calls for it. The latter requirement seems rather obvious, but the dangers of not providing adequate military support became horrifyingly obvious when the Serbs overran numerous safe havens, including Srebrenica. As a result of the latter, the concept and term "safe area" began to be perceived as an oxymoron.

In light of the fact that key distinctions between peacekeeping and peace enforcement have been addressed throughout this introductory essay, there is no need to reiterate them here. Suffice it to say that as long as *realpolitik*, a lack of political will, and the bureaucratic inertia at the UN persists, along with the vise-like grip the major powers have on the UN Security Council, it is highly likely that the "international community" will continue to attempt to place a "bandage" (e.g., peacekeeping missions versus peace enforcement missions) on a "gaping wound" (the perpetration of crimes against humanity and genocide), much to the utter detriment of the victim population and the international community, itself.

Early Exit Plans

A thorny issue that arose as a result of so many interventions in the 1990s was that of predetermined exit strategies and exit dates. In an essay entitled "The Exit Strategy Delusion," Gideon Rose (1998), deputy director of National Security Studies and Olin Fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, argues that the Clinton administration's and the U.S. Congress' obsession with "exit strategies" in the 1990s, especially in regard to establishing a set timetable for exiting from an intervention, constituted skewed thinking and actually endangered the potential success of interventions.

It is virtually impossible for any intervener to know how an intervention is going to play out until relatively late in the process. Thus, to either design an exit strategy and/or set an exit date early-on is bound to adhere to an arbitrary set of plans that may have little to nothing to do with the effectiveness of the intervention (e.g., establishing a stable and safe environment in which the population is on the road to rebuilding, and hopefully, reconciliation).

Anti-Genocide Rapid Action Force/Standing Army

Many practitioners and scholars have repeatedly called for the establishment of a special Rapid Action Force/Standing Army whose primary purpose would be the prevention and intervention of genocide. Many member states of the United Nations, though, are leery about establishing such a force. Among the greatest concerns and reservations are as follows: Who would have ultimate authority over the force? What would the criteria be for initiating action by the force? What troops would comprise such a force? How would the troops be selected? Who would be responsible for training the troops? How would the selection of the force commander be handled? How would the force be funded? Where would the force's headquarters be situated?

The impetus for establishing such a force should be taken up by the UN Security Council for it is "the main organ of the UN entrusted with the responsibility for the maintenance or restoration of peace [, and] ... [i]t is given broad powers of enforcement under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in order to achieve this objective [e.g. the establishment of an anti-genocide rapid action force]" (Sarooshi 2001, p. 1). However, as Sarooshi (2001), senior lecturer in public international law of University College, London, University of London, notes "the Charter provision which was intended to provide the Council with a standing military force to carry out enforcement action has not as yet been implemented. In response, the Council has sought to deal with an increasing demand for military enforcement action by delegating its powers in this area to other UN organs (e.g., the UN Secretary-General in Somalia, and the War Crimes Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia), UN Member States (e.g., the coalition against Iraq), and regional and collective self-defense organizations (e.g., NATO in Bosnia, p. 1).

In light of the fact that the establishment of such a force is a major issue amongst genocide studies scholars, human rights activists, and others, it is likely to continue to be the subject of much discussion and debate. Until this issue is resolved, the world will undoubtedly continue to witness ad hoc missions, not all of which will be effective—and that is a gross understatement. In all likelihood, it is going to take a major campaign by human rights activists, scholars, and others to prod, cajole, and convince the Security Council to act on this issue.

The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide: The Likelihood of Success?

What is Needed

In light of the international community's dismal record in preventing genocide between 1945 and 2006), it seems as if nothing short of the establishment of a well-funded and powerful anti-genocide regime is needed. Ideally, such a regime would be responsible for conducting theoretical work and research, developing and implementing early warning efforts, undertaking field investigations, and overseeing a broad spectrum of anti-genocide efforts. Undoubtedly, the establishment of such constitutes a Herculean challenge.

That said, in light of the ever-increasing concern over genocidal actions by both scholars and the general public, as well as the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's declaration vis-à-vis the responsibility to protect, it seems as if it is a propitious time to move forward with such a project.

The Development of a Partial Anti-Genocide Regime Is Currently Doable

Many elements of an anti-genocide regime could be developed, assembled, and placed into operation under one roof in a relatively short period of time. That includes the establishment of: a think tank in which research is conducted into all aspects of genocide, a sophisticated genocide early warning system, investigative teams to conduct field research into whether situations are either slouching toward or already have degenerated into genocide, and conflict resolution and mediation teams to try to bring crises and conflicts to a peaceful end. To varying degrees of sophistication and effectiveness, all of these components are in place in various parts of the world. None, though, are located within the confines of a single organization. And few of the components are as sophisticated, well funded or effective as they could be.

With technology at such an advanced stage and with so many scholars and practitioners in the fields of genocide studies, early warning, and human rights working on the development of a genocide early warning system, it is simply a matter of time until a fully operational and highly sophisticated system is up and running—one that, in fact, will be capable of gathering, analyzing, and disseminating virtually any amount of data from every corner of the globe. Tellingly, close to a decade ago, Rupesinghe (1999, 265) reported the following:

In an attempt to address the manifold difficulties of establishing an effective early warning system that can provide reliable information in a coherent and accessible way, a coalition of IGO [intergovernmental organizations] representatives, U.N. agencies, and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], including International Alert, have developed the FEWER project. It was launched as a concept in 1996 and is still in the development stage as of [the early 2000[‘s].

Rupesinghe (1999, p. 265) goes on to note that

FEWER distinguishes itself from other early warning initiatives in a number of important ways. First, it is highly action-oriented, directly linking conflict early warning to early action. Secondly, it works to provide decision makers with balanced, timely and reliable information and analysis on conflict-threatened countries and regions as well as possible policy responses based on and tailored to local needs and capacities for peace.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, FEWER is a collaborative effort on a global scale encompassing existing early warning projects and capitalizing on expertise drawn from both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. Ultimately, its objective is to develop a single coherent system of conflict indicators, analysis and policy recommendations in order to identify opportunities for conflict prevention and provoke constructive responses from the international community.

The operative term for the time being is “ultimately.” In other words, the goal of implementing a fully operational system has not been realized yet. But the good news is that the work toward such a goal continues a pace.

Such positive news, though, is also tempered by the reality of politics. As previously noted, it does not matter how sophisticated an early warning system is if the international community is bereft of either the political will to act to prevent genocide before it breaks out or to intervene once it has done so.

A Fully Operational and Effective Anti-Genocide Regime Remains More of a Future-Oriented Goal

To develop a truly effective anti-genocide regime, the international community must consciously and arduously work to avoid applying old—and often ineffective—“remedies” to tortuously complex problems. This is true, for example, in regard to: changing how systemic issues are handled (that is, they must be viewed and approached with an eye to ameliorating the problems versus applying the proverbial bandaid to them); moving from a system predicated more on intervention to one of prevention; the need to view crimes against humanity as worrisome and despicable as genocide (and thus, avoiding the current tendency to avoid serious action until a situation is deemed a potential or actual genocide).

To develop an effective means of tackling, for example, “horizontal inequality” is going to require a great deal of thought and effort, but it is a task that an anti-

genocide regime must not flinch from undertaking. Some may question the sagacity of an anti-genocide regime taking on such an endeavor, but if the regime neglects to address such concerns then its overall effort will be little more than skimming the surface of the proverbial iceberg. Indeed, until such issues are largely ameliorated, crimes against humanity and genocide are likely to continue to be facts of life and death on this planet.

There is absolutely no way, of course, that an anti-genocide regime is going to ameliorate such problems on its own. They are simply too numerous and too complex. Corroborating the latter point, David Boaz (2005, p. 3J), executive vice president of the Cato Institute in Washington D.C., notes that

[Today,] there are more than 80 poverty-related programs, which in 2003 cost \$522 billion. . . . Government-to-government aid has tended to strengthen governments in poor countries at the expense of business and individuals and has made governments increasingly dependent on their rich lenders. Few countries have “graduated” from aid to self-sufficiency. After all that aid, according to a National Bureau of Economic Research study, sub-Saharan Africa is actually poorer than it was 30 years ago.

Not only does such information prove there is a dire need to replace “old remedies” and “acceptable” practices with research-based innovations, it also supports this author’s supposition that an anti-genocide regime must be comprised of experts in a host of fields and not simply those in the fields, for example, of political science, sociology, genocide studies, and/or human rights.

The major barrier regarding the establishment a fully operational and effective anti-genocide regime is, as previously mentioned, the creation of a rapid action force that is, for the most part, free of the constraints of *realpolitik*, a lack of political will and bureaucratic inertia—or put another way, a force that truly has the green light to act when needed. Unless there is a major break through on how such a force could be developed and implemented in a way that is truly effective—and not simply something “in name only,” let alone a “paper tiger”—the dream of such a force will likely remain just that, a dream.

There is also the issue of funding. Currently, most genocide studies centers are small concerns, with a staff ranging from one to five individuals. A few receive ample funding from grants, most are run on a shoe-string. All are vastly limited in what they can accomplish, and that is due to a dire lack of adequate personnel with the diverse expertise needed to address the plethora of issues germane to the prevention and intervention of genocide, the funding to carry out projects across the globe, the means to purchase the type of equipment and technology to operate a sophisticated program, and the money to cover the costs of other needs vis-à-vis infrastructure.

The upshot, this author believes, is that the issues germane to the prevention and intervention of genocide are so great in number and so complex in nature that

it is going to take nothing less than a “Manhattan-like Project” (the major effort undertaken by the United States during World War II to develop the first atomic bomb) and/or the U.S. government’s effort to send the first man to the moon. In other words, for an anti-genocide regime to be anything more than window-dressing, it must be comprised of great minds, and an extremely bright (if not brilliant) leader who not only has a vision but who can inspire people, obtain continued funding, manage a huge budget, and work his/her way around and through bureaucratic mazes with the utmost efficiency and effectiveness. And it must be well-funded, into the tens and hundreds of millions of dollars. The latter, alone, is a tall order, but it does not stop there. Even if an anti-genocide regime were established (along with the rapid action force) and adequately funded, it would still face the ongoing battle over who had the power to make critical decisions free of the constraints of *realpolitik*, lack of political will, and bureaucratic inertia. And that will likely be the toughest aspect of establishing an effective anti-genocide regime.

As for the issue of *realpolitik* and the lack of political will, the major question that remains, of course, is how to apply pressure on the UN, regional organizations (e.g., the European Union, NATO, the African Union), and individual nations to act expediently when a genocide is on the horizon? To make any headway at all in addressing the prevention and intervention of genocide, it is imperative that scholars, policy makers, and activists who care about the deprivation of human rights and genocide focus their attention on this most complex and contentious of issues. Four possibilities along this line (and there are bound to be many more) are worthy of serious examination are: (1) conducting research studies into those pressure points that induce political leaders to act on an issue (for example, this might include the enormous application of pressure by a massive number of constituents on such bodies as a nation’s parliament, congress, and/or executive branch); (2) the development of specific procedures and/or campaigns in which the general public can be quickly and thoroughly informed of—and about—a pending genocide, and efficiently polled in regard to its position regarding the prevention and intervention of genocide; (3) a thorough study should be conducted of those few situations where at least certain parts of the international community ostensibly overcame *realpolitik* and mustered the political will to act in order to prevent a potential genocide in order to assess what can be learned and applied to future pre-genocidal situations. In this regard, two essential situations worthy of study are those of the Iranian Bahá’í community in the 1980s, and the violence wracking East Timor at the close of the twentieth century; and (4) the development of methods and programs for applying the most effective pressure on the United Nations and the governments of independent nations to act, sooner than later, to prevent genocide from becoming a reality—and in doing so, to issue an appropriate mandate and then carry out the mission in an effective and timely manner.

Finally, there is the issue of the United Nations—its reactions, inactions, decisions, and indecisions in responding to a looming, or actual, genocide. First, there

is a critical need to streamline the bureaucracy at the United Nations for the current structure creates unnecessary and harmful delays in both communication and decision-making processes. Various attempts by various UN Secretary Generals have already been made along this line, but the result has been compared to little more than rearranging the deck chairs on the *Titanic*. Thus, it is anyone's guess as to what it will take to ameliorate this problem, and there is no telling if it will happen, let alone when.

Second, there is a dire need to radically revise the composition of the UN Security Council. For too long several nations—the five permanent members—have controlled far too many critical decisions and actions vis-à-vis the fate of the world. As result, those nations that are far less powerful and/or wealthy have had little to no *real* say regarding a host of critical issues. Changing the make-up of this “controlling” group will not be easy (and that is a gross understatement), but a serious effort must be made to do so.

Third, what appeared to be a sign of some progress at the UN regarding the prevention of genocide was Secretary General Kofi Annan's naming Juan E. Méndez (a human rights advocate, lawyer, and former political prisoner from Argentina) as his first Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. That was in July 2004. The establishment of the position, itself, at least initially, seemed to be a step in the right direction. However, the UN's tepid and totally ineffectual response to the genocidal violence throughout the summer, fall, and winter of 2004, all of 2005, and most of 2006 in Darfur, Sudan, has to make one wonder about the value of there even being a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. That said, the ultimate significance and value is yet to be determined.

Conclusion

Following the end of the cold war, it appeared that a sea-change might be taking place in international relations regarding the willingness of nations to attempt to prevent genocide. But, as noted throughout this “Introduction,” such a change has not taken place.

It is certainly positive that the issue of “sovereignty” in the post-cold war period has come under closer scrutiny and is no longer seen, in certain cases at least, as sacrosanct. Thus, a nation committing genocide or other egregious human rights violations against its own people is no longer seen as totally untouchable. Indeed, such situations are no longer automatically deemed a matter of “internal affairs.”

While change is in the air (evidenced in certain notable cases by the fact that the international community did act in concert to stave off potential genocides), the jury is still out in regard to whether or not the international community is going to dedicate its all to preventing genocide. When all is said and done, over the past decade and a half, there has been more talk than action when it comes to the prevention of genocide. And that is not only true of the leaders and bureaucrats

of individual nations and international organizations, but genocide scholars, human rights activists, and others who have studied, written about, or decried acts of genocide.

Evidence clearly shows that when the international community waits until the killing has begun to act, tens of thousands, if not millions, of people are likely to end up in the deadly maw of genocide.

As the cliché goes: action speaks louder than words. *It is time for action. If not now, when?*

Notes

1. The "Somalia factor" resulted from a bloody fiasco in which the United States found itself in Somalia in October 1993. In an attempt to capture those responsible for killing over twenty Pakistani peacekeepers, elite U.S. forces engaged in a fierce battle with the militia troops of Mohammed Farah Aideed that resulted in the deaths of eighteen U.S. soldiers and the wounding of over seventy-three. Adding insult to injury, a dead U.S. soldier was stripped of his clothes and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, a horrific image that was broadcast across the globe. The image and impact of the entire mission soured the leadership in Washington on humanitarian missions. The backlash from the killings of the Pakistanis and the U.S. soldiers also cut into, if not partially gutted, the optimism expressed in Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*.
2. The panel was chaired by former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, and as a result the panel's report is now commonly referred to as "The Brahimi Report." The rest of the panel was composed of individuals with eclectic and significant experience in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building.
3. Over the past twenty-five years or so, genocide scholars (as opposed to those in fields such as peace studies, conflict resolution, international law, and criminal law) have basically focused on nine major concerns vis-à-vis the intervention and prevention of genocide: (1) defining what genocide is and is not; (2) examining and delineating the processes of genocide; (3) analyzing specific genocidal events, including their causes, the individuals and groups involved (e.g., perpetrators, collaborators, victims, bystanders, rescuers), the ways in which the genocides were perpetrated, the horrific results, and the aftermath; (4) analyzing data from genocidal incidents in order to ascertain early warning signals; (5) developing risk data bases; (6) undertaking incipient work on the development of genocide early warning systems; (7) delineating and analyzing the adverse impact of the denial of past genocides; (8) arguing in favor of trying and punishing perpetrators of genocide, and analyzing the adverse impact of impunity; and (9) developing and implementing educational efforts at different levels of schooling (secondary, college, and university) and/or within governmental agencies (including legislative, judicial, and executive bodies, as well as the military). All of these efforts constitute a significant contribution to the effort to develop efficacious means to intervene and prevent future genocides. However, as significant as these developments are, they only begin to touch the proverbial tip of the iceberg in regard to what needs to be done.

The fact is, an eclectic group of organizations and individuals outside the field of genocide studies is also interested in, writing about, and working on the problems of the prevention and intervention of genocide. Among the varied issues they are working on are: international law (accords, covenants, conventions, treaties); information-gathering and analysis; intelligence sharing; the development and/or analysis of the efficacy of various types of early warning systems; analyzing data from genocidal incidents in order to ascertain early warning signals; the development of data risk bases; attempting to ascertain effective confidence building measures; develop-

ing and implementing preventive diplomacy, Track I diplomacy efforts, and/or Track II diplomacy; examining, developing and/or implementing such varied measures as conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, diplomatic peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, sanctions (including “smart sanctions” or combinations of sanctions, as well as the use of “carrots” or inducements), partitioning, temporary protection measures for refugees fleeing internal and other types of conflict, humanitarian intervention, various types of policing efforts (such as regional police forces, constabulary forces, private security forces), military intervention, institution building, and the list goes on and on. *If there is to be even a hope of developing effective means to intervene and prevent genocide, genocide scholars and others must undertake a joint effort to create synergism between and amongst the various aforementioned strands.*

4. “Preventive diplomacy” refers to “the range of peaceful dispute resolution methods—mentioned in Article 33 of the UN Charter—applied before a dispute crosses the threshold to armed conflict, e.g., negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice” (Peck 1996, p. 132).

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