THE YOUNG TURKS' CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY

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The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire

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TANER AKÇAM



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

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In memory of Hrant Dink, whose dream
of bringing our two peoples together
lives on in my heart and soul,
and in honor of Vahakn N. Dadrian, with
my deepest gratitude and respect

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PREFACE

The demise of the Ottoman state was a one-act drama that lasted a century, with a changing cast of players reenacting the same scenes over and over. As the great empire crumbled, a succession of ethnic and religious groups played out their struggles for independence on its shrinking stage against a backdrop of forced population exchanges, deportations, massacres, and ethnic cleansing.

As the last of the great early modern empires, the Ottoman state entered its long nineteenth century trailing the heritage of Byzantium but lacking the means of modernization.[1] Without the requisite political and social structures and public consensus of a nation-state, "the Muslim Third Rome" could no longer bind together the diverse groups that peopled its vast territory.[2]

"First one encounters the question of borders," wrote the French historian Fernand Braudel. "Everything else is derived from this. In order to draw a border, it is necessary to define it, to understand it, and reconstruct what that border means."[3] The nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Ottoman Empire were the centuries in which answers to these questions were sought—and the answers were bloody.

The reason is not difficult to understand. The logic of the nation-state utterly contradicts that of empire. Whereas an empire, by definition, encompasses a number of territories and diverse peoples, a nation-state is circumscribed by two clearly defined boundaries: geographical and social. Whereas geographical borders demarcate a physical territory, social boundaries delimit a collective identity, ideally homogeneous, that binds together all inhabitants within the geographical border. Thus the era of the nation-state ushered in a new period of defining the "other."

[1] İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Hil Publications, 1983).

[2] İlber Ortaylı, *Son-İmparatorluk Osmanlı*, 2nd ed. (Istanbul: Timas Publications, 2006), 44.

[3] Quoted from Hagen Schulze, *Gibt es überhaupt eine deutsche Geschichte?* (Berlin: Corso, bei Siedler, 1989), 20.

As the Ottoman Empire devolved into nation-states, ethnic and religious groups, which until then had been living not only within the same territory but even side by side in the same villages, struggled to define themselves against the Ottoman state and their own neighbors, purging the designated "outsiders" from villages, towns, and regions from the Balkans eastward. The mass violence that accompanied the formation of nation-states in the nineteenth century erupted in the first two decades of the twentieth. The succession of wars and revolutions, brutally suppressed rebellions, forced population exchanges, deportations and ethnic cleansing, massacres and genocide—human destructiveness on a previously unimaginable scale—only concluded in 1923 with the Treaty of Lausanne, which provided for the independence of modern Turkey.

Yet it was not enough to have redrawn the boundaries of territorial and collective identity, for the developing nation-state requires a third factor, collective memory, which combines the other two. To create this common memory, the history of the former Ottoman lands as experienced by the peoples of the Balkans, Middle East, and Caucasia in all their ethnic, religious, and national variety was written anew. Strikingly, however, these divergent accounts of the immediate past can be boiled down to one of two seemingly contradictory narrative themes: one in which the Great powers dismantled and destroyed the Ottoman Empire by using its Christian subjects; the other, an account of persecution and massacre by the Ottoman authorities. These two narratives were developed and persist today as competing and mutually exclusive historiographies.

The first narrative is associated with the Muslim Turkish communities that gradually, over time, identified with their otherwise cosmopolitan and multiethnic Ottoman rulers. Muslim Turks came to believe that they founded their republic after a life-or-death struggle against the Great powers and their treacherous collaborators, the Ottoman Christians, whose sole aim was to wipe the Ottoman state and Muslim Turks from the face of the earth. For this reason, in the early years of the century, the imperative to protect their (Ottoman) state from dissolution became firmly established among Muslim Turks, especially the authorities and intellectuals: "Their greatest objective and greatest concern, the beginning and

end of their thoughts, was to save the state."[4] As for the powers' expressed rationale for intervening on behalf of the Christians, it was said at the time that "Europe's humanitarianism and justice consist of pure hypocrisy [*hiyakârlık*]."[5]

This notion of an encircling threat not only helped to motivate the massacre and annihilation of Christians, especially Armenians, but it was also invoked to justify, in retrospect, the policies of destruction as legitimate, national self-defense. "It's one thing to say that the Turks killed the Armenians spontaneously," wrote the doyen of Turkish historians, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, in his monumental work, *The History of the Turkish Revolution*, "and another to say that, when the Armenians revolted, the Turks, who were locked in a life or death struggle, used excessive force and killed a good many people."[6]

"This deportation business, as you know, has put the whole world in an uproar, and has branded us all as murderers," declared a Muslim Turkish deputy to the new parliament in 1920. "We knew even before this was done that the Christian world would not stand for it, and that they would turn their fury and hatred on us because of it. But why should we call ourselves murderers? These things that were done were to secure the future of our homeland, which we hold more sacred and dear than our very lives."[7]

The existential imperative to preserve the state at all costs was adopted as the basis of official Turkish policy and historiography. "National security" not only explained and justified the traumatic events of the past but would also support the construction of genocide denial in the future. Thereafter, an open and frank discussion of history would be perceived as a subversive act aimed at partitioning the state. Well into the new millennium, Turkish citizens who demanded an honest historical accounting were still being treated as national security risks, branded as traitors to the homeland or dupes of hostile foreign powers, and targeted with threats.

In February 2009, during a raid against the ultranationalist terror organization Ergenekon, the personnel of which were believed to be deeply

[4] Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türkler ve Siyasi Fikirleri* (Istanbul: İletişim Publications, 1983), 14.

[5] Quoted from a Unionist journal in ibid., 117.

[6] Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkilabı Tarihi*, vol. 3, part 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), 35.

[7] From a speech by Hasan Fehmi Bey in the secret session of Parliament, 17 October 1920, in *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1985), 177.

embedded in the military and state bureaucracy, the police seized a file of "Traitors to National Security." Included on this "hit list" were Hrant Dink, the Istanbul Armenian journalist who was assassinated in 2007; Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk; and this writer.[8]

Rationalizing the Armenian annihilation and its denial in terms of "national security" has not been limited to political circles or ultranationalist criminal organizations, but has also underpinned Turkish jurisprudence. In 2007, two Turkish Armenian journalists, Sarkis Seropyan and Arat Dink, the son of assassinated journalist Hrant Dink, received suspended sentences of a year's imprisonment for using the term "genocide" in connection with the events of 1915. "Talk about genocide, both in Turkey and in other countries, unfavorably affects national security and the national interest," declared the court. "The claim of genocide . . . has become part of and the means of special plans aiming to change the geographic political boundaries of Turkey . . . and a campaign to demolish its physical and legal structure." Observing that the Republic of Turkey is under "a hostile diplomatic siege consisting of genocide resolutions," the ruling warned that "[t]he acceptance of this claim may lead in future centuries to a questioning of the sovereignty rights of the Republic of Turkey over the lands on which it is claimed these events occurred." The assertion that genocide was committed in 1915 is not protected speech, said the court, noting that "the use of these freedoms can be limited in accordance with aims such as the protection of national security, of public order, of public security."[9]

In summary, given this mind-set, one would be hard-pressed to find a reference in Turkish historiography to forced deportations, massacres, and genocide during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Instead, the Ottoman Christian communities are painted as the seditious agents of the imperialist Great powers, continually conspiring against the state.

The second narrative is associated with the ethnic and religious minority groups that were systematically, though differentially, subjected to abuses during that same period. This historiography foregrounds the minorities' quest for social and political rights throughout the nineteenth

[8] *Radikal*, 11 February 2009. For more detailed information about Ergenekon, see http://www.turkishgladio.com/.

[9] Court Decree, Second Penal Court of First Instance for the District of Şişli, File Number 2006/1208, Decree Number 2007/1106, Prosecution No. 2006/8617.

century and is bolstered from time to time by the interventions of the Great powers. The demise of the empire is viewed as a positive development of the national liberation struggle against the oppressive Ottomans, that is, the "Turks."

The contrasts between the official Muslim Turkish historiography and that of the other ethnic religious groups, whether or not they established a nation-state, could not be clearer. The first laments the unjust end of the great empire, while the second celebrates its partition and demise; the former criticizes the Great powers for intervening *too much*, while the latter faults them for not having intervened *enough*. The fierce partisans of either side remain convinced that the other version of events is inaccurate or irrelevant. In fact, however, a close review of the literature on the last Ottoman century reveals the opposing historical theses as two sides of a coin: they describe the same events, but from different viewpoints. The official Muslim Turkish historiography identifies itself with the decline of the state, whereas the versions of other ethnic religious groups tend to focus on the suffering of their own group in that process. What is needed, therefore, is a history that incorporates both perspectives into a single, unified account. In this way the massacres and genocide can be understood in their full historical significance.

This book does just that by building on the discourse introduced by its predecessor, *A Shameful Act*.[10] With greatly extended and unpublished documentation from the Ottoman archives, especially dating from January 1913 onward, I hope to shed new light on the increasingly radical decisions that set in motion the ethnic cleansing of Anatolia and the Armenian Genocide in particular.

The Ottoman records from August 1914 and beyond are crucial to understanding the decision-making process. They reveal that the Ottoman authorities, convinced that the Armenian reform agreement signed by the Russians in February 1914 would lead to the dissolution of the empire, were determined to prevent this outcome at any cost. The outbreak of war heightened this existential fear and the corresponding imperative to save the state, setting in motion a chain of increasingly radical policies that culminated in the campaign to extirpate the Armenians from Anatolia. As the

[10] Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act: The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

hundred-year drama drew to a close, national security concerns, among other factors, set the stage for genocide.

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The scene opened just after the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, as the empire—having been forced to cede more than 60 percent of its territory over the entire nineteenth century—was confronting its greatest loss: more than 80 percent of its European lands (and nearly 70 percent of its European population) in less than one disastrous month. The worst defeat in Ottoman history had also displaced a huge wave of Balkan Muslim refugees southeast toward Anatolia, the home of a large Christian population and the new focus of both Great power and Ottoman concern.[11] The ruling party, the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter CUP or Unionists),[12] was beginning to believe that collapse was imminent. "It is impossible to save Anatolia from the destiny awaiting Rumelia,"[13] headlined the newspaper *Tanin*, the CUP party organ. Kuşçubaşı Eşref, an active member of the Special Organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa; hereafter SO) recounted his conversation with defense minister Enver Pasha, a triumvir of the CUP, on 23 February 1914.[14] Painting a picture of national collapse, Enver claimed that the "non-Turkish elements" within the country (read: Christians) had shown themselves to be opposed to the empire's continued existence. The salvation of the state therefore depended on taking measures against them. In the words of Kuşçubaşı Eşref, the "non-Turkish elements"

[11] Anatolia was not of central importance in Ottoman and Great power policy until the Balkan Wars. The region first became important for the Russian policy after 1905. For more detail on Russian and Great power policies and the Armenian reform issue, see Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914," *American Historical Review* 53, no. 3 (April 1948): 481–505.

[12] Whether the organization should be called committee or party is a complicated question. It was founded as the Committee for Union and Progress, but after the 1908 revolution, when it obtained a majority in Parliament, the CUP was also organized as a political party in order to carry out its parliamentary activities. Until 1913, the party in Parliament acted as the legal arm of the committee, and the relations between the party and the committee were regulated through a special statute. According to this arrangment, the committee was the upper and the party the lower organ. At the 1913 Congress, the committee organized itself as a party, and ended the party-committee duality. For more detailed information, see Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 3, *İttihat ve Terakki: Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Partinin Tarihi* (Istanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), 200–204.

[13] Aram Andonian, *Balkan Savaşı* (Istanbul: Aras Yayıncılık, 1999), 227; Rumelia is used to define the territories approximating the Balkans today.

[14] For more detailed treatment of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*, see chapter 10.

were "an internal tumor," the "purging" of which was a "matter of national importance."[15]

In the wake of their devastating defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, the Unionist leaders, increasingly convinced that tolerating the Ottoman Christians would lead to national collapse, made a series of policy decisions aimed at the ethnoreligious homogenization of Anatolia. The CUP's rationale was rather simple and straightforward. Assuming a direct relationship between governability and demographics, party leaders reasoned that the Ottoman state could retain control of its remaining territories only if most of the inhabitants were Muslim Turks. This concept of *governability* can be considered as a kind of surveillance policy to collect information about the population in order to conceptualize it as a discrete, aggregate object. Governability may also be understood as "a shift in the goal of ruling, a shift from a territorial concept to a governmental one. A governmental state seeks to manage the populations, not just to rule the territories."[16] To achieve this administrative goal, therefore, the population of Anatolia would have to be reconfigured. The Christian population was to be reduced; that is, removed, and the non-Turkish Muslim groups were to be assimilated.

Faith in science held a central place in CUP philosophy. Like physicians, the Unionists would cure society's ills through the proper application of science.[17] In keeping with this orientation, their demographic policy has been characterized as "social engineering."[18] The result of this approach was the implementation, after 1913, of what I call a *demographic policy* aimed at the radical restructuring of Anatolia's population. Christians were not the sole focus of this policy, which also targeted non-Turkish Muslim communities; however, it was implemented in a differential manner, according to religion. Christians were to be eliminated by expulsion or massacre. Non-Turkish Muslims, such as the Kurds,

[15] From the memoirs of Kuşçubaşı Eşref, quoted in Celal Bayar, *Ben de Yazdım*, vol. 5 (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1967), 1578.

[16] Peter Holquist, "'Information Is the Alpha and Omega of Our Work': Bolshevik Surveillance in Its Pan-European Context," *Journal of Modern History* 69, no. 3 (September 1997): 419.

[17] For further background on the CUP, see Taner Akçam, *A Shameful Act*, 47–67.

[18] Nesim Şeker, "Demographic Engineering in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians," *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 3 (2007): 46–474; Uğur Ümit Üngör, "Geographies of Nationalism and Violence: Rethinking Young Turk 'Social Engineering,'" *European Journal of Turkish Studies* 7 (2008), http://ejts.revues.org/index2583.html.

Arabs, and Balkan migrants (refugees from Christian persecution), were relocated and dispersed among the Turkish majority to be assimilated into the dominant culture. This book reconstructs in detail the implementation of this policy.

A central theme of the present study is the significance of the "5 to 10 percent principle." This rule was fundamental to the implementation of the demographic policies, in particular, the destruction of the Armenians in 1915. For example, Christians (especially the Armenians) were deported and resettled in other regions so as to constitute no more than 5 to 10 percent of the local population. In like manner, non-Turkish Muslims were relocated and redistributed among the Turkish Muslim majority in conformity with the 5 to 10 percent principle.[19]

How did the Unionists come up with this "magic" proportion? It seems to have been mentioned initially during the reform agreement talks of the 1890s and an early draft report by British colonel William Everett in 1895. The report was intended to serve as the basis for an administrative reform that would allow Armenians to hold positions in departments of government, such as the gendarmerie and police.[20] In 1913, the parties to a later round of Armenian reform talks agreed to use the Everett report as a starting point for negotiations.

In accordance with Unionist demographic policy, the ethnic character of Anatolia was thoroughly transformed. The prewar population (estimated at approximately 17.5 million in 1914) was so completely disrupted over the next six years that almost a third of the inhabitants were internally displaced, expelled, or annihilated.

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This demographic policy was not implemented, nor was it experienced, in a linear, detailed, uniform manner. Zigzag changes of course and methods of implementation were tried at various points throughout the course of the war. Of particular significance was the differential enforce-

[19] This information suggests that the relationship between Armenian reform plans (including those of the 1890s) and genocide was stronger than has been assumed in Armenian Genocide scholarship. I am studying the reform plans of 1895 and 1914 and their impact on the genocide.

[20] For the full text of the report, see Fuat Dündar, *Crime of Numbers: The Role of Statistics in the Armenian Question (1878–1918)* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions, 2010), appendix 3, 178–81.

ment of the policy as it applied to two Christian populations, the Greeks and the Armenians.

Especially in 1913 and 1914, the Ottoman Greek inhabitants of the Thrace and the Aegean coast were subjected to a campaign of massacre and expulsion to Greece. This "ethnic cleansing," in modern terminology, would be suspended after November 1914 under pressure from Germany, in particular. During the war years, the policy toward the Ottoman Greeks was limited to relocation from the coastal areas into the interior out of military necessity. The later removal of the Greek population from Anatolia, especially the genocidal massacres of the Pontic Greeks and the forced population exchange with Greece in 1923, took place during the republican era in Turkey.

In contrast to the Ottoman Greeks, the Armenians were targeted by a wartime policy of total destruction. Those who survived deportation were forcibly resettled in the deserts of what are now Syria and Iraq, which left the six historically Armenian provinces of eastern Anatolia completely emptied of Armenians. By no coincidence, the targeted provinces were those in which Armenians were allowed to participate in local government, according to the Armenian Reform Agreement of February 1914.

Likewise, most of the Armenians were deported from western Anatolia to the deserts of present-day Syria and Iraq, but here again, the policy was implemented in a differential manner. Armenians were allowed to remain within the boundaries of certain provinces as long as their numbers did not exceed 5 percent of the Muslim population. As for the Armenians who were resettled in Syria and Iraq, great care was taken to ensure that they numbered no more than 10 percent of the local Muslims.

What was the relationship between demographic policy and genocidal intention? Why did the policy toward Armenians take on the form of genocide? This entire work is dedicated to answering these crucial questions. For now it is enough to say that the mass murder of Armenians was not the automatic result of the demographic policy toward the Greeks from 1913 onward. During the First World War the Ottoman authorities, having sustained a punishing sequence of military defeats, came to fear the imminent loss of the empire's entire territory, with the horrendous possibility that the reform agreement of February 1914 would be implemented. Their concern for national security was what gave the policy toward

Armenians its genocidal character. According to this reform agreement, the Armenians were to participate on an equal basis in the local administration of what now constitute the eastern provinces of Turkey (an area that is also known as historic or Western Armenia), where the Armenians were living in dense concentrations. All parties participating in the negotiations of the reform agreement knew that this was the beginning of an independent Armenian state.

Two major themes were intertwined in the Ottoman policy of extermination: the demographic restructuring of Anatolia, which was already in progress against the Greeks, and the fear of the 1914 Armenian reforms, an existential issue for the Unionists. The relationship between demographic policy and genocide is a linchpin of this book. In the Ottoman case, the demographic restructuring, and especially its 5 to 10 percent regulation, may be said to have laid the groundwork from which the Armenian Genocide would be launched. Dikran Kelegian (Diran Kelekian), an Armenian intellectual who knew the Unionists well and maintained friendships with them, foretold what was to come with this telling statement after his arrest on 24 April 1915: "They were going to implement the Armenian massacres with mathematical accuracy."[21] It is as if the 5 to 10 percent principle embodied this mathematical accuracy.

Abdullahad Nuri, in charge of the resettlement office in Aleppo, boldly summarizes the main argument of this book in a telegram he sent on 10 January 1916 to the central government: "Enquiries having been made, it is understood that hardly 10 percent of the Armenians subjected to the general deportations have reached the places destined for them; the rest have died from natural causes, such as hunger and sickness. We inform you that we are working to bring about the same result with regard to those who are still alive, by using severe measures."[22] The second great

[21] Aram Andonian, *Exile, Trauma and Death: On the Road to Chankiri with Komitas Vartabed*, trans. and ed. Rita Soulahian Kuyumjian (London: Gomidas Institute & Tekeyan Cultural Association, 2010), 160.

[22] Aram Andonian, *The Memoirs of Naim Bey* (1920; 2nd repr., Newton Square, PA: Armenian Historical Research Association, 1965), 57–58. Aram Andonian was an Armenian journalist and intellectual who was deported. In 1920 he obtained some telegrams from a Turkish official named Naim Bey (who worked in an office in Aleppo on issues connected with the settlement of Armenians) that included orders concerning the killing of Armenians. They were published in Adonian's book. It has been claimed that the telegrams are forgeries (Şinasi Orel and Süreyya Yuca, *The Talat Pasha Telegrams: Historical Fact or Armenian Fiction?* [Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1986]). For a discussion as

wave of massacres in Der Zor, Syria, during the summer of 1916, seems to have been motivated primarily by demographic anxieties, along with security concerns.

The wartime policies of the Ottoman government toward the Armenians were never, as has been frequently claimed, the result of military exigencies. While planning their measures against the Armenians, the authorities knew very well that the problem they wished to resolve was not simply a result of war. Rather, the policy toward the Armenians was conceived, planned, and put into effect with the clear intent of eliminating the so-called Armenian reform problem, a *gaile* (burden, trouble, worry) of civil administration in the Armenian provinces. Even before the war, stated interior minister and Unionist triumvir Talat Pasha, the Ottoman authorities had conceived of an approach "to eliminate [this problem] in a comprehensive and absolute manner" and had made several projections and considerations in this direction.[23] In this book, I will show how demographic policy and national security were intertwined in a manner that made genocide a possibility.

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Among the Ottoman archival sources on which this study is based, great weight has been given to the records of the Ministry of the Interior's Office of the General Directorate of Security and its component units, as well as an independent unit, the Cipher Office. Although these documents do not reveal the government's plans for Christian populations other than the Greeks and Armenians, some documents do indicate that the Ottoman authorities were gathering information on the social, political, and economic conditions of these other Christian groups.[24] For example, according to a

to whether these documents are authentic, see Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Naim-Andonian Documents on the World War I Destruction of Ottoman Armenians: The Anatomy of a Genocide," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, no. 3 (August 1986): 311–36. Many telegrams similar to the above-mentioned one of Abdullahad Nuri are found in this book. I therefore consider it necessary to reopen the discussion concerning the authenticity of the documents published by Andonian.

[23] "the complete removal of this worry by solving and settling it in a fundamental way." Communiqué from Talat Pasha to the Office of the Grand Vizier, dated 26 May 1915, in *Ati*, 24 February 1920.

[24] "Assyrian," "Chaldean," "Nestorian," "Syriac," and "Syrian" are alternative historical names for a Christian group that mainly inhabited the southeast Anatolian provinces of Mardin, Hakkâri, and Diyarbekır.

telegram of July 1914, when the outbreak of war and the empire's participation in it were not yet certain, the Interior Ministry requested a detailed report from the regional office in Mosul on the Nestorians of the province, including their numbers and distribution, their present political and social conditions, and the propaganda to which they were being subjected, as well as the provincial government's views on appropriate measures toward them in the future.[25]

Similar messages were cabled to a great number of provincial offices of the ministry in the succeeding war years. A telegram of 10 September 1916 orders: "Report with additional comments regarding the Syriacs' stance towards the government since the beginning of the war, the regions and districts in which they are found, as well as their numbers, and whether or not they travel to other parts of the Ottoman realm for the purpose of trade and commerce."[26] It is possible to observe this situation through a document from May 1919, in which the government asks about "the number of the population of Syriacs in the province and how many of them were deported together with the Armenians, and their circumstances and situation there."[27] As this document shows, the government appears to be unaware of how many Syriacs were deported together with Armenians. The main question, though, is whether or not the Syriacs and other Christians in eastern Anatolia were treated differently than the Armenians. As can be discerned from an order sent to the eastern provinces in December 1915 that stated that "instead of deporting all the Syriac people found within the subdivision/province," they should be detained "in their present locations," one can argue that these Christian groups were treated somewhat differently than the Armenians.[28] Nevertheless, they were subjected

[25] BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 42/263, Coded telegram from the Interior Ministry's General Directorate of Security (Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdürlüğü; hereafter EUM) to the Province of Mosul, dated 12 July 1914.

[26] BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 68/98, Coded telegram from interior minister Talat to the Provincial District of Urfa, and to the Provinces of Mamuretülaziz (Elazığ), Diyarbekır, Bitlis, and Mosul, dated 23 September 1916.

[27] BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 87/40, Coded telegram from the Interior Ministry's General Security Directorate to the Provinces of Aleppo, Diyarbekır, Mosul, Mamuretülaziz, and Bitlis, and to the Provincial District of Urfa, dated 1 May 1919.

[28] BOA/DH.ŞFR, no. 57/112. Coded telegram from the Interior Ministry's General Security Directorate to the Provinces of Diyarbekır, Bitlis, Mamuretülaziz (Elazığ), and Aleppo, and to the Provincial District of Urfa, dated 25 December 1915.

to similar policies and were often eliminated alongside the Armenians in spite of frequent orders to the contrary.[29]

Finally, not all of the population movements that were observed throughout the period were well defined and well planned from the start. During the war, in particular, populations were moved for a variety of ad hoc reasons. Examples include the resettlement in western and central Anatolia of nearly a million Muslim refugees who had escaped from advancing Russian units in 1915; the relocation, as required by the military, of Christians, particularly Greeks, from strategic areas along the seacoast into the interior regions of Anatolia beginning in late 1916; and the deportations of Arab families in Syria and Lebanon for political reasons. Detailed information on these events is included in this book. I thereby hope to radically restructure the present framework of debate on the 1913–18 period of Ottoman history and the "ethnic cleansing" policies that the Unionists put into place throughout Anatolia.

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This book could be considered a "first" in another way because it explains the demographic policy and genocidal character of the actions against the Armenians on the basis of Ottoman archival records. Most of the approximately six hundred Ottoman documents presented here are seeing the light of day for the first time. By demonstrating that the policies toward the Armenians, in particular, were intended to bring about their annihilation, and supporting this argument entirely on the basis of Ottoman archival records, I hope to have made a significant contribution to the existing literature.

Because of the importance of the subject and the examination of an unprecedented number of Ottoman records at one time, I have chosen a somewhat unusual method of presentation. Unlike classic accounts of history, which analyze a given narrative chronology in light of various archival sources, this study gives central place to a single source, the Ottoman archives, as the basis for reconstructing a sequence of events as viewed

[29] For a recent and very important work that does cover the policies toward these Christian groups, see David Gaunt, *Massacres, Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I* (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006).

and recorded by the central authorities. German and American records, as well as Armenian accounts, are also introduced for comparison, as appropriate, to demonstrate the consistency one finds across all sources. Examining this period from the government's perspective raises questions that I have attempted to address in chronological order; however, my approach has been thematic rather than strictly narrative.

Second, in order to nail down the correctness of a point, and at the risk of being repetitive, a superabundance of evidential records is presented throughout the study. Particularly when it pertains to "proving or disproving the genocide," one is frequently tempted to declare, "Eureka! I've found the missing document that will end all debate." Nevertheless, it should be obvious that no social policy, including genocide, can be proven with a single document. If in fact there was a policy, then it should be evident from dozens, if not hundreds or thousands of documents, and a discernible pattern should emerge from the totality of documents of the era. By introducing such a large number, I have attempted to ascertain the existence of particular policies and the pattern of their implementation.

Third, with this work, one can declare that a taboo among researchers of the Armenian Genocide has finally been broken. Until recently there have been two opposing assessments of the Ottoman and Turkish state archives. According to the "official Turkish position," what happened to the Armenians was a tragic but unintended by-product of the war, and there is no reliable evidence of a deliberate policy of systematic killing. In this view, the only source of reliable evidence on the topic is the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive in Istanbul. Foreign archives—American, British, German, and Austrian—as well as the domestic proceedings of the Istanbul Court-Martial, are dismissed as politically motivated distortions of the events.

Conversely, those who maintain that the policies toward the Armenians constituted genocide dismiss the Ottoman archives as an unreliable source of information. According to this view, the Ottoman records were falsified in order to cover up the genocide, and therefore the intent of the Ottoman authorities can be demonstrated only through the use of Western archives. The underlying logic common to both arguments is that the Ottoman and Western sources are mutually exclusive; that is, these documents contain irreconcilable contradictions. Each camp insists that its

own particular favorite archival sources are the canonical ones, while the other side's documentation is wrong and unreliable.

In this work I hope to have demonstrated, for the first time, the falseness of this apparent contradiction. Far from conflicting with one another, the sources are in fact complementary: they tell the same story but from different points of view. In this respect, the quarrel over archival sources parallels the conflict between Muslim Turkish and minority historiographies.

Taken in their entirety, Ottoman and Western archives jointly confirm that the ruling party CUP did deliberately implement a policy of ethnoreligious homogenization of Anatolia that aimed to destroy the Armenian population. As a demonstration of the consistency among the various archives, I have incorporated German and American documents as appropriate to show that Ottoman records confirm and support those found within foreign archives.

A final word of caution on the character of the Ottoman documents presented here and their relation to the actual developments on the ground: although these "secret" and "top secret" telegrams from Istanbul provide extraordinarily important evidence of the true purpose and mentality of the ruling party and central government officials, there are few replies to indicate how and under what conditions these telegraphed orders were implemented in the various regions. More regional studies are needed in order to answer these questions.

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When documents are published describing how the Christians were forced out of Anatolia and subjected to deportations and massacres, one further point must be emphasized. As described in this book, the CUP developed a "dual-track" mechanism for deporting the Ottoman Greeks to Greece between 1913 and 1914, as well as for deporting and killing the Armenians.

One track was the legal framework that had been created in order to execute the deportation. This encompassed official acts of state, such as the agreements with Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, regarding the population exchanges of 1913–14. An example of the legal track is a 27 May 1915

decree that authorizes the deportation of Armenians and that cites another government decision on the proper procedure. The official dimensions of the deportations, such as the disposition of Armenian property and the problems of resettlement, were discussed exclusively through government channels of communication.

The unofficial track consists of extralegal acts of violence, such as forced evacuations, killing orders, and massacres. For example, between 1913 and 1914, the evacuation of Ottoman Greek villages, the massacres, and the forced shipping of Ottoman Greeks out to sea were all performed and probably discussed and communicated outside government channels. Maximum effort was expended to create the impression that none of these actions by agents of the CUP were ever connected to the state. Similarly, orders to annihilate the Armenian deportees were sent to the provinces via private channels, chief among them the CUP's so-called responsible secretaries. In addition, the planners of these massacres were meticulous in ensuring that no documentation of the crimes would be left behind.

Many witnesses attested that Talat Pasha, in particular, directed the deportations from outside official channels by sending personal orders to the regional offices from a private telegraph in his home. Those witnesses included not only contemporary political figures such as Ottoman Parliament leader Halil Menteşe and American ambassador Henry Morgenthau, but also the pasha's own wife. In an interview given in October 1982, and first published in 2008, Hayriye Talat (Bafralı) acknowledged that this private line had allowed her husband to send information about the deportations to the regional offices all night long.[30]

The CUP created an organizational structure well suited to this dual-track mechanism. In the main indictment of the CUP Central Committee members during their 1919 trial in the Istanbul Court-Martial, the prosecution stated that, in line with the Unionist Party's structure and working conditions, a "secret network" (*şebeke-yi hafiye*) had been formed in order to carry out its illegal actions. The CUP itself, the indictment said, "possessed two contradictory natures (*iki mâhiyet-i mütezâdde*): the first, a visible and public [one] based on a [public] program and internal code of

[30] Murat Bardakçı, *Talat Paşa'nın Evrak-ı Metrukesi: Sadrazam Talat Paşa'nın Özle Arşivinde Bulunan Ermeni Tehciri Konusundaki Belgeler ve Hususi Yazışmalar* (Istanbul: Everest, 2008), 211.

regulations (*nizâmnâme-i dâhilîye*), the other based on secrecy and [operating according to unwritten] oral instructions."[31]

As a result of this penchant for secrecy, there is practically no chance of finding records of the plans for annihilation, the "smoking gun," if you will, among the Ottoman state documents in the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive. Add to this the fact that from time to time, archival documents were purged, as I describe in detail below. Nevertheless, even though the CUP made every effort to disguise its crimes, the state's full resources were required to execute an operation of historic immensity, which impacted the lives of millions. Inevitably, such an enormous crime left traces among official state documents. The ethnic cleansing of the Ottoman Greeks and the genocidal policy against the Armenians can be demonstrated through these documents alone, and this book endeavors to do just that.

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This work may also be read as a critical reflection on the silences in Ottoman historiography as practiced both in Europe and in the United States until recently. Most historians of the late Ottoman period have elided the internal deportations, expulsions, massacres, and genocide that took place during the demise of the empire. These events have been "nonexistent" in their works.[32] What is more, broaching this subject has generally been dismissed as a disturbing expression of narrow-minded ethnocentrism by members of the targeted ethnic groups. Not so long ago, it was common practice to shun anyone who tried to open the topic at the annual meetings of the Middle East Studies Association, the umbrella organization for scholars in this field. It was as if ignoring mass deportations and annihilation were an academic virtue and noble act.

The resultant damage to scholarship has not been limited to the failure to illuminate this period of history. By refusing to investigate mass annihilations, traditional Ottoman historians have failed to confront the mentality of those who perpetrate these convulsively destructive episodes. They

[31] *Takvim-i Vekayi* (hereafter *TV*), no. 3540, 5 May 1919. The first session of the trial was held on 27 April 1919.

[32] Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), is a more recent example of this kind of work.

have squandered opportunities to understand and thereby help to prevent mass violence as a means of resolving social and political problems, and to bring about that universal respect for humanistic and democratic values that makes free intellectual inquiry possible. Nowhere are the consequences of this failure more apparent than in Turkey, where a veritable industry of Armenian Genocide denial prevails in public discourse, intimidating scholars and rationalizing the violent persecution of religious and ethnic minorities.

Philosopher Jürgen Habermas's concept of "secret violence," which is built into the fabric and institutions of society, illustrates what I am trying to say. Habermas explains that this "secret violence" effectively legitimizes the tacit restrictions and exclusion of certain topics from public discourse.[33] Topics that society wishes to avoid by general consensus cannot only be relegated to the past but also forgotten. Freud describes this social-psychological process as very normal and observes that "what the society finds to be unpleasant is made wrong."[34] "Disturbing" episodes from the past disappear down the black hole of collective memory. One may speak here of a "communicative reality" in society.[35] This communicative reality determines the systems of belief and the network of social relations within which people describe their existence, their feelings, and their way of thinking. It can be described as a shared secret of society that is based on a silent consensus.

This is what happened to the Armenian Genocide and all the other instances of mass violence in that region at the turn of the century. In Turkey, since the establishment of the republic, national identity has been constructed on a communicative reality that includes a shared social secret carried by a coalition. Ottoman historiography has emerged as an important part of this social coalition. Consequently, society has lost its moral sensitivity to past genocide as well as to current and possibly future episodes of mass violence. With the disappearance of the Armenian

[33] Jürgen Habermas, "Die Ütopie des guten Herrschers," in *Kultur und Kritik*, ed. Jürgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1973), 386–87.

[34] Sigmund Freud, *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse*, vol. 11, *Gesammelte Werke* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1999), 16.

[35] I borrowed "die kommunikativen Wirklichkeit" from Elias Siberski, who uses this term as one of the characteristics of underground organizations (Elias Siberski, *Untergrund und Offene Geselschaft, Zur Fragen der strukturellen Deutung des sozialen Phaenomens* [Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1967], 51).

Genocide and other mass violence from public discourse, a prevailing mind-set that makes future mass crimes possible has also been granted tacit support.

Today, Turkish society is confronting the source of all its democracy and human rights issues, including, to name some of the major ones, the Kurdish problem, the military domination of political life, and four military coups, three of which were violent. That source is this coalition of silence and the communicative reality that has made it possible. Everything—institutions, mentalities, belief systems, creeds, culture, and even communication—is open to question. The time has come—in fact, it is passing—for the social sciences to contribute to the development of democracy and civic culture in Turkey.

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It is known that Raphael Lemkin, who coined the term "genocide," wanted to define a phenomenon that differed from the concept that found its way into the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). This difference was not limited to the cultural aspect of genocide, as is commonly thought. No doubt "cultural genocide" was important to Lemkin, but it was sacrificed in order to gain acceptance for a concept of genocide within criminal law.

As important as this difference is, however, another difference in Lemkin's approach should be noted. Lemkin understood genocide not only as a single act, but alternatively as a series of connected acts, a process that unfolded over time. "Generally speaking," Lemkin wrote in *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, the work that introduced the concept, "genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation."[36] In contrast, the Genocide Convention of 1948 enshrined a narrower concept of genocide as a unitary event or act that resulted in the immediate destruction of a "national, ethnical, racial or religious group." After the broader concept of genocide as a prolonged process slipped into oblivion, all subsequent debate revolved around whether a given episode of mass violence conformed to the United Nations definition of genocide and therefore could

[36] See Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), 79.

be qualified as such. This was an unfortunate consequence of the adoption of genocide as a concept of criminal law.

A further consequence of the legal definition was the conceptualization of genocide solely as an act of physical destruction. For the inventor of the term, however, physical destruction was only one aspect of the genocidal process. Lemkin understood that genocide, as a social reality, constructs as much as it destroys. To quote Lemkin again: "Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor."[37] While this second phase can take many different forms, in the end the targeted group is compelled to adopt the lifestyle, culture, and institutions of the dominant group. Without doubt, assimilation is among the most effective ways to achieve this result. Scholarly debates on genocide have neglected the constructive phase of genocide for far too long.

It should not come as a surprise if I argue that Lemkin, despite having fought very hard for the acceptance of genocide as a legal concept, conceived of genocide in much broader terms as a social and political practice. It was as if he considered genocide, in this larger sense, as the comprehensive enactment of an underlying philosophy about how to construct a society. For Lemkin, genocide was a dynamic, not static, concept, and his own use of the term appears to describe the process unleashed by this philosophy.

"To what extent is it legitimate to adopt an international legal norm resulting from a political compromise between states as a basis for historical, sociological or anthropological inquiry?" asks genocide scholar Jacques Semelin.[38] The 1948 definition gave rise not only to this problem but also to a series of other equally important and interrelated conundrums that plagued the relatively new academic discipline of genocide studies:

> Genocide was regarded as a single event, and the event in question (which was generally physical annihilation) was examined from

[37] Ibid.

[38] Jacques Semelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 321.

the perspective of whether or not it conformed to the 1948 Genocide Convention;

Those social scientists who did not agree with the United Nations definition (whether justified or not) began proposing their own. Nearly every genocide scholar had her or his own definition, and therefore most debates were focused on classification and labeling;[39]

The Holocaust occupied the central place in these debates as a sine qua non.

Similarity to the Holocaust became the yardstick against which an event might or might not measure up as genocide. Every researcher of mass violence other than the Holocaust spent enormous amounts of energy trying to prove that the event they were studying shared similarities with the Holocaust, so as to strengthen the case for genocide.[40]

Instead of developing models and trying to explain a dynamic process, genocide scholars were working with a static concept that was delimited by definition as a single act. It is not too much to say that this definitionalism has damaged the field to the point of methodological suicide. Genocide scholars have constructed their individual definitions of genocide like the Procrustean bed of Greek mythology. They analyzed social events according to the definition they chose, stretching some points, shortening others, and in general "cutting and pasting" the narrative to match their "bed." To understand a dynamic historical process over a period of time was less important than whether or not a given sequence of events met the definition of the concept they were proposing.

Fortunately, this state of affairs is beginning to change as scholars abandon the Procrustean model for a rather flexible concept of genocide, which, like the term "art," is in common use without general agreement

[39] For different definitions and their relationship to one another, see Scott Strauss, "Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, no. 3 (2001): 349–75; Henry R. Huttenbach, "Towards a Conceptual Definition of Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 4, no. 2 (2002): 167–76.

[40] The relationship between the Holocaust and other genocides is such a highly debated topic today that there exists a wide range of literature on it; for an overview, see Dirk Moses, "The Holocaust and Genocide," in *The Historiography of the Holocaust*, ed. Dan Stone (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 533–55.

as to its meaning. In place of the endless definitionalist wrangling, new debates have arisen over structures, mentalities, continuities, and ruptures in a long genocidal process. At the head of these topics is the idea that mass annihilation must be understood and explained as a dynamic flow of events. How to identify the states of mind and institutional structures that lend themselves to mass violence, how these structures and states of mind function, and where the breaks and continuities in the process are: such are the leading questions today.

Debates on the Armenian Genocide within genocide studies have also suffered from the general weaknesses of the emerging field and have had to contend with similar issues, especially given the Turkish Republic's preferred stance of denial regarding mass annihilation. The question of whether or not the 1948 definition of genocide—or other definitions—could appropriately be applied to the events of 1915 became the touchstone for all debate. The fear that the events of 1915 would not be considered genocide if they did not resemble the Holocaust obstructed serious analysis along the lines of dynamic social processes and redirected it toward proving just how similar the Armenian Genocide was to the Holocaust. Meanwhile, a concerted effort was made to ignore all the differences that would naturally arise between two discrete events of mass violence.

At times the struggle to prove similarities reached such ludicrous lengths that some of the most significant structural components of the Armenian Genocide, such as religious conversion or the assimilation of Armenian children into Muslim households, were almost completely omitted from analyses of the events of 1915 because such elements played no role in the annihilation of the Jews in Europe. The chaotic, unorganized, and oftentimes unsystematic structure and variation at the local level was explained away as part of the Ottomans' sinister master plan.

The documents presented in this book show that prior to the physical destruction of Armenian communities, the decision was made to gather Armenian children into city orphanages and force them to abandon their religion, language, and culture. As long as genocide was understood and explained solely as a people's physical destruction, all these structural components of the Armenian Genocide were essentially ignored: permission for religious conversions in some of the regions during the early

months of deportation and the resulting exemptions from deportation; the suspension and reinstatement of conversion procedures in the locations to which the Armenians had been deported; the selective granting, in those locations, of permission to convert, and the means by which the converts managed to survive; and finally, the creation of Armenian settlements in Aleppo and Der Zor between August 1915 and January 1916, together with consideration of how to implement the assimilation of the Armenians there. While this study does not aim to address each of these questions and issues, I mean to provide a snapshot, a status report, on the state of Armenian Genocide studies.

That the situation developed in this way is undoubtedly because, on one hand, the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive in Istanbul, which contains official records of the Ottoman government, have been underutilized as a basis for arguments about the events of 1915; and, on the other hand, because Armenian survivor narratives have been poorly integrated into the research and debates. Nevertheless, what can be said for genocide research in general is also true for Armenian Genocide studies: a new era has dawned, and we are reading by its earliest light. I would like to think of the approximately six hundred Ottoman documents and related information provided in this book as a harbinger of this new era. Even if other researchers of this topic do not fully agree with the ideas set forth here, I hope that this new source of records will help to illuminate their own analyses and opinions.

"Now this is not the end," said Winston Churchill during World War II. "It is not even the beginning of the end," Churchill continued. "But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning."

The position of Armenian Genocide research at this very moment could not be better described than this. Our field of study has completed its first phase of solid academic production. We have, indeed, reached "the end of the beginning."[41] May this book serve as a sign that the debate on the Armenian Genocide is moving beyond the "end of the beginning" to-

[41] Stephan H. Astourian, "The Road Ahead for Armenian Genocide Studies," paper presented at the workshop "The State of the Art of Armenian Genocide Research: Historiography, Sources, and Future Directions," Clark University, April 2010. I thank Stephan Astourian for allowing me to use this quote, which he introduced in his paper.

ward a new horizon of understanding the Ottoman policies of 1913–18 that were directed at the empire's Christian subjects.

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Some final words of acknowledgment: this book was first published in Turkish with the title *"Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur": Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere Yönelik Politikalar* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008). However, the book in your hands differs substantially from the Turkish version. Some sections have been removed, others have been completely revised and rearranged, and still others have been entirely rewritten. Moreover, several entirely new chapters and sections have been added.

Your encounter with this book was made possible through the contributions of many individuals and institutions. First, I would like to thank the Jerair Nishanian Foundation from the bottom of my heart for its contributions toward the translation and editing. Were it not for their generous contributions, this book would not have come into being. Paul Bessemer masterfully translated the original Turkish text, just as he did for my prior book, *A Shameful Act.* Fatima Sakarya was always available for any document or paragraph that required retranslation. As the editors of the book, Aram Arkun and Lou Ann Matossian accomplished a very difficult task. Not only did they transform the work into a single, unified text, they helped shape my thoughts through their ideas. I am indebted to each of these individuals, and to the Cafesjian Family Foundation for in-kind support. I owe Eric Weitz special thanks, as his guidance was important for the changes made to the book. It should, however, go without saying that the responsibility for all the ideas in the book is mine. I would also like to extend my heartfelt thanks to editorial assistant Sarah Wolf, who assisted me in preparing the manuscript for the editorial stage and who coordinated the illustrations and the redrawing of the maps, and to Princeton University Press copy editor Cathy Slovensky for her careful editing, her eye for detail, and her helpful collaboration during the manuscript review process.

I chose to use English equivalents for the names of Ottoman Turkish administrative units, regions, and people. In cases where this was impossible, the meanings of some terms used, as well as a glossary of abbreviations, may be found in the appended lists.

Worcester, Massachusetts, February 2011



Map 1. Ottoman Empire 1914 and the deportation roads. Source: *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Ermenilerin Sevk ve İskanı (1878–1920).* Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü, 2007.


Black Sea
RUSSIA
IRAN
Canik
Ordu
TRABZON
Rize
Giresun
Kars
Mesudiye
Gümüşhane
Tokat
Bayburt
ERZURUM
Bayezid
SİVAS
Erzincan
Kiği
Kangal
Dersim
Gürün
Muş
MAMÜRATÜLAZİZ
BİTLİS
VAN
Elbistan
Malatya
Maden
Zeytun
Siverek
DİYARBEKİR
Siirt
Maraş
Hakkari
Mamure
Mardin
Cizre
Anteb
Urfa
Islahiye
Birecik
Suruç
Nusaybin
Resulayn
Kilis
Raco
Telebyad
Hasiçe
Talafar
MUSUL
Katma
Bab
Erbil
HALEP
Kürsi
Rakka
Şidadi
Süleymaniye
Meskene
Dibsi
Hamam
Sebha
Kerkük
Maarratunnuman
Tibni
Suvar
Der Zor
Hama
Mayadin
Humus
Tikrit
SURIYE VİLAYETİ
Ramadi
BAĞDAD
Museyyib

Map 2. Ottoman provinces. *Source*: Adapted from a map by Silvina Der Meguerditchian.

GUIDE TO OTTOMAN TURKISH WORDS AND NAMES

Key to Transcription and Pronunciation

Letter	English Transcription and Pronunciation
c	*j*, as in *jan*, or *just*, or *jargon*
ç	*ch*, as in *church*
ğ	*gh*, as in *though*, or *w*, as in *flow* or *sowing*
ı	short *e*, as in *often*, or *o*, as in *second*
j	*zh*, as in *gendarme*
ö	*oe*, as in *Goethe*, or *i*, as in *girl*; in French it corresponds to *eu*, as in *seul*, or in German *ö*, as in *Öl* or *öffentlich*
ş	*sh*, as in *sugar*, or *shut*, or *she*
ü	high *u*, as in *fortune*, or *du* in French, or *ü* in German, as in *Lüge*
v	*w*, as in *weary* or *worry*
y	*y*, as in *young*, or *youth*, or *year*

The Ottoman Provincial Hierarchy of Governors

Rank in Turkish	Rank in English	Jurisdiction in Turkish	Jurisdiction in English
Vali	Governor-General	Vilayet	Province
Mutasarrıf	District Governor	sancak, liva	Provincial district
		Mutasarrıflık	Provincial district
Kaymakam	County Executive	Kaza	County
Müdür	Administrator	Nahiye	Township
Muhtar	Headman	Karye	Village