

**OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
THE GENESIS OF THE PROGRAM OF GENOCIDE
(1876-1920)**

*Dedicated to the unfading memory of my teachers,
the founders of Ottoman and Turkish Studies in Armenia –
with gratitude.*

REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
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OF GENOCIDE
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Translated from Armenian by **Svetlana Mardanyan**

In the monograph, the process of genesis of the program of genocide in the Ottoman Empire is comprehensively studied from the perspective of theoretical Genocide Studies. The book is intended for specialists and for broad circles of reading public.

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FOREWORD

Genocide is not only a historical phenomenon or a scientific abstraction, but a severe reality of our days, a gravest crime against humanity, which prevention can save millions of human lives. From this perspective, every scientific research, in which examined are the regularities of the genesis of genocide or genocidal programs, as is done in this monograph, can contribute to the choice and application of more effective means of prevention.

One of the most important and, perhaps, least researched aspects of genocide is the conceptual explication of realization of the role of a state power. Among these problems, the study of the process of preparation of genocide by the supreme state bodies stands out. This process results in a state program, stating the criminal intent to commit genocide, and the means to realize it.

This monograph addresses the mentioned issue, exemplified by the Ottoman Empire. The choice is conditioned by that the Ottoman Empire was the first state in the history of the mankind to prepare and perpetrate a large-scale genocide.

Based on diverse factual and documental material, interpreted from the standpoint of contemporary comparative Genocide Studies, the monograph clarifies the prerequisites and genesis of the first program of genocide in that multiethnic and multi-confessional state; the circumstances, under which the program was adopted, and its structure. Comparative analysis of that and the subsequently developed programs of genocide is conducted, and the regularities of rewording of their components are brought up.

In the monograph, a special place is given to theoretical issues, proposed are new conceptual approaches and definitions. The most notable of these are the conceptual-theoretical substantiation of the notion of proto-genocide, and the suggestion of the basic standards of a proto-genocidal situation.

The topicality of this monograph is obvious both from the scientific and political aspects. The investigation of genocide as of the greatest evils in the past and present of the mankind is also urgent from the practical-political standpoint. From the point of view of scientific investigation, one of the major tasks of

today's Genocide Studies is – proceeding from the analysis, comparative investigations of documented genocides, and summing up of the results obtained – to develop a comprehensive and commonly acceptable theory of that phenomenon. The core of that theory will be the concept of the genesis of genocidal programs, formulated based on the comparative analysis and summing-up of the results of determination of structural specificities of genocidal programs, and of creation of the latter in concrete historic and political situations. In our opinion, the results, obtained in the course of the research, conducted in this monograph, are a certain contribution to the definition of said concept.

The other aspect, making the topic of the present monograph urgent, is that the circumstances, related with the causes and specificities of adopting genocide by the Ottoman Empire as state policy, are studied but little. Our study is an attempt to fill that gap.

Genocide is the gravest crime, and those who prepare and commit it are criminals, who try in every way to deny or conceal the fact of the crime. When a state chooses to declare falsification of its historical past and negation of the fact of genocide one of the topmost goals of its state policy, thus equating itself to a state that has committed it – the impartial and factual scientific investigation, based on the facts of genocide as part of historic reality, will certainly contribute to its condemnation and prevention, and thereby acquire a great political worth.

The primary goals of the work are:

- based on archive and other documental materials and sources, to comprehensively study the specificities of genesis of the genocidal program in the Ottoman Empire, and to identify its basic regularities;
- to newly interpret and assess certain periods of the history Ottoman empire;
- to suggest a well-grounded concept of proto-genocide.

To attain these goals, the author prioritized the following tasks:

- to examine the process of formation of the concept of genocide, to emphasize the importance of studying the leading role of a state power in the commitment of genocide, and the specificities of manifestation of the genocidal intent through state programs;
- to examine the significance of the Tanzimat pro-Western reforms in view of the nature of the Ottoman state;
- to examine the concept and policy of "equal attitude" towards Christians during the first phase of the Tanzimat pro-Western reforms;
- to study the concept and policy of "mixing and merging" towards Christians during the second phase of the Tanzimat pro-Western reforms;

- to elucidate the concepts of “Ottoman nation” and “Ottoman patriotism”, proposed by leaders of the oppositional constitutionalist movement, and reflection of those concepts in the first Ottoman constitution;
- to identify the specificities of interrelations between the constitutionalists and the Armenian liberals;
- to bring up and study the role of the increasing anti-Christian sentiments in ripening of the proto-genocidal situation as reaction to the policy of the Tanzimat pro-Western reforms;
- to examine the reasons for making the Bulgarian people the main target of the genocidal program of 1876;
- to elucidate the main aspects of the proto-genocidal situation of 1876 in the Ottoman Empire;
- to conduct a comparative analysis of the circumstances, specificities and the basic components of developing genocidal programs of 1876 against Bulgarians, and of 1915, 1920 – against Armenians.

Both the topic and the basic issues of the monograph are a scientific novelty in historiography – not only Armenian, but also foreign. Neither do works of identical content exist in such a new field of social sciences as comparative Genocide Studies, intensively forming over the last decade in the West, particularly in the USA.

The subject of the investigation is the genesis of a genocidal program in the Ottoman Empire. Based on the study and juxtaposition of primary sources, the author infers that the process started back in 1876 as an attempt of radical reaction to the pro-Western reforms in conditions of abrupt intensification of anti-Christian sentiments among the ruling Turkish elite and the Muslim population of the empire. The author, basing on facts and documents, examines the policy of the Ottoman authorities, oriented to attaining that goal.

The author of the research also explicates the concrete forms of transition from a social reality, where genocide does not exist as a fully shaped phenomenon, to a novel reality, where genocide does exist as a manifestation of that novelty. The methodology, suggested by the author for studying this transition, bases on the following approach: having differentiated some fundamental components of genocide, to separately examine the processes of their formation. This allows us to conduct a complex study of the genesis of genocide on scientific basis. This approach is realized by applying the factor of intent, which is the major distinctive component of genocide. In the author's opinion, the factor of intent usually manifests itself as a state program for exercising genocidal functions and actions. Thus, the existence of such a program, adopted or approved by the supreme body of a state power, is

indicative of existence of the key component of the phenomenon of genocide, which means that the given state has started the transition to a reality, in which genocide is a manifestation of state policy.

In our research, a number of other new views, important for the formation of the universal theory of genocide, are brought up and substantiated. Particularly, it is noted that the program of genocide may appear not in one, but in several documents, each solving its individual problem. Besides, examined are the concrete historical conditions, which furthered the elaboration of several programs of genocidal nature by the leaders of Ottoman Turkey.

In this book, the concept of proto-genocide is brought forward and reasoned, its associations with the concept of genocide are examined, the differences between such phenomena as massacre, proto-genocide and genocide are theoretically substantiated; it is shown that the latter are characterized by certain successiveness, as was the case with the Ottoman Empire. Specifically, it is underlined that the fact of existence of a preliminary state program of genocide, in which the intent of commitment is clearly stated, although the means and methods are not indicated, proves the existence of a shaped proto-genocidal situation. When the program of genocide becomes more clear-cut, in particular, the means of commitment are named, one may state that the transition to the policy of genocide has already started.

The author formulates the abovementioned theoretical provisions by analyzing various periods of the Ottoman history of the last few decades, against which background the process of genesis of the phenomenon of proto-genocide is presented in detail.

In the study, the significant role of anti-Christian sentiments in the emergence of the proto-genocidal situation in the Ottoman Empire is put forward and proved by historic facts.

The author examines the process of genesis of the program of genocide in the Ottoman Empire from the standpoint of comparative Genocide Studies. The programs of 1876, 1915 and 1920 are differentiated and analyzed; the differences between them, as well as the tendency and orientation towards making more "elaborate" and "profound" some of the provisions are indicated.

The chronological frames of the work embrace as long as one century – beginning from the late 20s of the XIX century, when the elite of the Ottoman Empire, aiming to retain the power over its Christian subjects and to maintain the territorial integrity of the country, initiated by the pro-Western reforms, which incited a mighty reaction among the Muslim population and thus furthered the origination of the first state program of genocidal nature against the Bulgarian people (from 1876 till November of 1920), when the leadership of Kemalist

Turkey, not satisfied with the inflicted on the Republic of Armenia defeat, planned to radically destroy the vital forces of the Armenian people. Thus, the chronological frames, chosen by the author, allow to fully reveal the causes and specificities of genesis of a genocidal program in Turkey.

The frame of primary sources of the work embraces archive materials, many of which are put into circulation for the first time. Of topmost significance for this book were the rich funds of the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AFPRE)¹. Unpublished materials from other Russian², as well as Armenian archives³ have also been used.

In the work, widely used are collections of archive documents, published in different countries and containing ample material on the policy of the Ottoman authorities towards Christians in the period of Tanzimat. Here belong American⁴, British⁵, Austrian⁶, German⁷, Bulgarian⁸, Turkish⁹, Russian¹⁰ collections of archive documents.

¹ Arkhiv Vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii [Archives of foreign policy of the Russian Empire], Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1877; Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole; Fund Kantselaria; Fund Kantselaria MID).

² Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiyskoy Federatsii [State archives of the Russian Federation] (Personal Fund of N. P. Ignatyev), Rossiyskiy Gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv [Russian State Military-Historical Archives] (Collection Voenno-Uchenyi Arkhiv, 71 Turkey).

³ Hayastani azgayin arkhiv [Armenian National Archives] (Fund 450, Haykakan harts); HH Ye. Charentsi anvan grakanutyan u arvesti petakan tangaran [Ye. Charents State Museum of Literature and Art of RA] (Fund T. Azatyan).

⁴ Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States transmitted to Congress, with the annual message of the President. December 3, 1877. New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1966.

⁵ British documents on foreign affairs: reports and papers from the foreign office confidential print. General editors: Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt. Part I: from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War. Series B: the Near and Middle East, 1856-1914. Editor: David Gillard. Volume 2: The Ottoman Empire: revolt in the Balkans, 1875-1876. Bethesda, 1984; Eastern Papers: Correspondence Respecting Christian Privileges in Turkey, London, 1856; Reports received from Her Majesty's Ambassador and Consuls relating to the condition of Christians in Turkey. 1867, London, 1867.

⁶ Dokumenty za bylgarskata istoria [Documents of Bulgarian history]. Vol. VI: Dokumenti za Novata istoria na bylgarskia narod iz Vienskite dyrzhavni arkhivi [Documents of the new history of the Bulgarian people from the State Archives of Vienna] 1830-1877. Part II. Coll. by P. Nikov. Sofia, 1951.

⁷ Dokumenty za bylgarskata istoria iz germanski arkhivi [Documents of Bulgarian history from German archives] (1829-1877). Comp. and ed. by Khr. Khristov and V. Paskaleva.

A significant portion of the source documents constitute Turkish materials; part of them, also put into scientific circulation for the first time, is in Ottoman Turkish. They can be divided into a few groups. Understandably, the publications of archive documents make the first group. They are important not only because they enabled to find answers to the questions posed in this research, but because Turkish archive documents are being published but rarely, the more so if they relate to the anti-Christian policy, pursued by the Turkish authorities for centuries¹¹.

Memoirs, works, and interviews of Turkish state and political figures make a separate group of sources. These may be subdivided into two groups. If the leading figures of the period of Tanzimat – Reşit Paşa, Âli Paşa, Fuat Paşa,

Sofia, 1963; A documentation of the Armenian Genocide in World War I, Ed: W. Gust, S. Gust. – www.Armenocide.net; Genotsid armyan pered sudom. Sudebnyi protsess Talaat Pashi [Armenian Genocide before the court. Law proceedings of Talaat Paşa]. Stenographic report. M., 1992; Armyanskiy vopros i genotsid armyan v Turtsii [The Armenian question and the Armenian Genocide in Turkey] (1913-1919). Materials of the Political Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kaiser Germany. Yerevan, 1995.

⁸ Dokumenty za bylgarskata istoria: Arkhiv na Nayden Gerov, [Fund of Nayden Gerov], vol. 1-2, Sofia, 1931.

⁹ Dokumenty za bylgarskata istoria. Vol. 3: Documents from Turkish State Archives. Part I: 1564-1872. Comp. and transl. By P. Dorev. Sofia, 1940; Dokumenty za bylgarskata istoria. Vol. IV: Documents from Turkish state archives. Part. II: 1863-1909. Comp. and transl. by P. Dorev, Sofia, 1942; Osmanski izvori za islamizatsionnite protsesi na Balkanite (XVI-XIX v.)(The Ottoman sources on the processes of Islamization on the Balkans (XVI-XIX cen.)). Edited by: M. Kalitsin, A. Velkov, Yevg. Radushev, Sofia, 1990; Uluğ İğdemir, Kuleli Vak'ası Hakkında Bir Araştırma, Ankara, 1937; H. İnal, Bosna'da Tanzimatın tatbikına ait vesikalar. - Tarih Vesikaları, 1941-1942, 1. Cilt, III, s.374-396; İ. Sungu, Mahnud II.nin İzzet Molla ve Asakir-i Mansure hakkında bir attı. - Tarih Vesikaları, 1941-1942, 1. Cilt, III, s. 162-183; Düstür, Tabî-i sani, Dersaadet: Amire, 1282. Düstür, Cild-i Evvel, İstanbul, 1289. A. Ş. Gözübüyük, S. Kili, Türk Anayasa metinleri, Ankara, 1957.

¹⁰ Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot turetskogo iga [Liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke]: documents in three volumes. Vol. 1: Osvoboditel'naya bor'ba yuzhnykh slavyan i Rossia [Struggle for liberation of Southern Slavs and Russia], 1875-1877. Edited by S. A. Nikitin, V. D. Konobeev, A. K. Burmov, N. T. Todorov. Moscow, 1961.

¹¹ Osmanlı belgelerinde Ermeniler (1915 - 1920). Ankara, 1994; Arşiv Belgelerine Göre Kafkaslarda ve Anadolu'da Ermeni Mezâlimi. I: 1906-1918. Ankara, 1995; T. Z. Tunaya, Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler. Cilt I: İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi, 1908 - 1918. Genişletilmiş ikinci baskı. İstanbul, 1988; K. Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz, İstanbul, 1959 - 1960.

Cevdet Paşa¹², as well as their political opponents – the leaders of the “New Ottoman” oppositional movement – proved to be relatively sincere in expressing their views and approaches¹³, then the leaders of the later period, beginning from their junior contemporary and “pupil” Midhat Paşa, tried every way to veil the actual goals of their policy¹⁴. This hypocritical tradition reached its climax in the memoirs, left by “bloodthirsty” Sultan Abdülhamid II, by the leadership of the Young Turks, as well as by the Kemalists. Of course they knew very well the gist of the policy they were following, especially that of the mass slaughter, perpetrated towards the Armenian people¹⁵.

Some other collections of documents, too, turned out helpful for a more thorough examination of the problems raised in this book¹⁶.

Important are the scientific publications, essays and memoirs of witnesses of the events in question, of contemporaries, foreigners including, which contain factual-documental material with alternative assessments¹⁷.

¹² Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadrazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların Siyasi Vaziyetnameleri, Hazırlayan: E. D. Akarlı, İstanbul, 1973; Aali Pacha, Testament politique. - La Revue de Paris, 1910, T. 3, No. 7, p. 505-524 ; No. 9, p. 105-124; B. Lewis, Ali Paşa on Nationalism. - Middle Eastern Studies, 1974, No. 10, p. 77-79. [Un Impartial]. Réponse a Son Altesse Moustapha Fazil Pacha au sujet de Sa lettre au Sultan. Paris, 1867; Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir: 1-12. Ankara, 1953.

¹³ Ali Suavi, A propos de l'Herzegovine. Paris, 1875; Ahmed Midhat, Üss-i İnkılap. Kısım-ı 1-2. İstanbul, 1295; Namık Kemal, Vatan yahut Silistre. Külliyyat I, Ankara, 1960.

¹⁴ [Midhat Pacha], Memorial de Midhat Pacha au Prince Bismark. - Paris, 1877. Midhat Paşa. Hayat-ı Siyasiyesi, Hidematı, Menfa Hayatı. Naşiri: Ali Haydar Midhat. Cilt 2: Tabsıra-ı İbret. - İstanbul, 1325; Midhat Pacha. La Turquie: son passé, son avenir. London, 1878.

¹⁵ [Abdülhamid II]. İkinci Abdulhamidin Hatıra Defteri. İstanbul, 1960; [Halil Menteşe], Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin anıları. İstanbul, 1986; [Talât Paşa], Talât Paşa'nın Hâtıraları, İstanbul, 1946. İsmet İnönü, Hâtıralar: I. Kitap. Ankara, 1985.

¹⁶ Schopoff A. Les reformes et la protection des chretiens en Turquie, 1673-1904. Paris, 1904; Hayeri tseghaspanutyuny Osmanyany kaysrutyunum [Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire]. Collection of documents and materials, Ed. By M. G. Nersisyan, Yerevan, 1991.

¹⁷ Benoit-Brunswik. La vérité sur Midhat Pacha. Paris, 1877; Ed. Engelhardt, La Turquie et le Tanzimat, t. 1 -2, Paris, 1882 -1884; L. Farley, Turks and Christians, London, 1876; Galerie des contemporains illustres. T.VII: Reschid Pacha. Paris, 1850; Léouzon le Duc, Midhat Pacha, Paris, 1877. C. Oscanjan, The Sultan and his people, New-York, 1857; A. Prokesch-Osten, Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821 und der Gründung des Hellenischen Reiches. Aus diplomatischem Stand. Band 6,

For the research, helpful were the latest works in theoretical and comparative Genocide Studies, written by Western, mostly American, specialists. Some of their approaches are subjected to well-founded criticism¹⁸. Unfortunately, in-depth investigations of that kind have not been conducted in Armenia¹⁹. Of undeniable help were the numerous works on the Armenian Genocide by Armenian historians.

Wien, 1867; S.G.B. St. Clair and Ch. Brophy, *A Residence in Bulgaria, or Notes on the Resources and Administration of Turkey*, London, 1963. L. Thouvenel, *Trois années de la Question d'Orient*, 1856-1859, Paris, 1897; A. Vaillant, *Solution de la Question d'Orient*, Paris, 1853; Valmy, le Duc de, *La Turquie et l'Europe en 1867*, Paris, 1867. [A. D. Mordtmann], *Sambul und das moderne Türkenthum* (Politische, sociale und biographische Bilder von einem Osmanen), B. 1-2, Leipzig, 1877; F. Kanits, *Dunayskaya Bolgaria i Balkanskiy poluostrov* [Danubian Bulgaria and the Balkan Peninsula], S.-Pb., 1876; P. Kisimov, *Mekhmets pasha. Pyrviy turski reformator* [Mehmet Paşa. The first Turkish reformer]. – Bulgarian collection, year V, book IX, p. 799-809; book X, p. 886-898; P. P. K., *Midkhat pasha i opitvanneto mu da poturchi bylgarskit uchilischa* [Midhat Paşa and his attempt of Turkization of Bulgarian colleges]. Bulgarian collection, year V, book I, p. 56-63.; K. Pangalos, *Turtsia i prosveschenie* [Turkey and Enlightenment]. S.-Pb., 1862; D. T. Rozen, *Istoria Turtsii ot reform v 1826 g. do Parizhskogo traktata v 1856* [Turkish history from the reforms of 1826 to the Treaty of Paris of 1856]. In two parts, S.-Pb., 1872.

¹⁸ Leo Kuper, *Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century*, New Haven and London, 1981; *Genocide and Human Rights; A Global Anthology*. Ed. by J. N. Porter. Lanham-New York-London, 1982; Irving Louis Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*. New Brunswick-London, 1997; M. N. Dobkowski, *Genocide and the Modern Age. – Remembering for the Future. Working Papers and Addenda. Vol. II: The Impact of the Holocaust on the Contemporary World*. – Oxford: Pergamon press, 1989, p. 1997-2002; Frederick Guillaume Dufour, *Toward a socio-historical theory of persecution and an analytical concept of genocide*. – YCISS Occasional Paper, No. 67, October 2001; Cecile Tournaye, *Genocidal intent before the ICTY*. – *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, April 2003, vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 447-462; Staub, Ervin. *The Roots of Evil*. (Cambridge University Press), 1989; Franc Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies*. New Haven and London, 1990; William Schabas, *Genocide in international law: the crime of crimes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2000; Kurt Jonassohn, *Defining the perpetrator: seeking proof of intent*. – MIGS occasional paper, March 1993, Part 1-3; Henry R. Huttenbach, *From the editor: towards a conceptual definition of genocide*. – *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2002, 4(2), p. 167-176.

¹⁹ The following work may be mentioned: A. Avagyan, *Genotsid 1915 g. Mekhanizmy prinyatia i ispolnenia resheniy* [Genocide of 1915. Mechanisms of Making and Implementing Decisions]. Yerevan, 1999.

So long as this book is an attempt to newly interpret a number of issues, relating to the history of Ottoman Turkey, the author engages in debates with works and concepts of some well known Turkologists, criticizes the works by representatives of Turkish official historiography, who tend to falsify the history of the Armenian Genocide.

THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS

THE FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF GENOCIDE: ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION

Genocide is one of the most atrocious and shameful phenomena in the history of mankind, a condensed manifestation of absolute evil. In everyday life, any remembrance of a concrete case of it inevitably stirs up emotional outbreak with moral assessments to follow. The word **genocide** by itself carries a mighty emotional charge. This must be the reason why, during the last decades, it has taken its niche in the lexicon of social and political figures, who, however, often use it groundlessly, as a grave accusation against the opponent – just to achieve their political or propagandistic goals.

The emotional and political stratifications, as well as the complexity of this phenomenon of many faces significantly impede its scientific and theoretical investigation and suggestion of issues of conceptual value. In fact, the theory of genocide as of a concrete historic phenomenon has not been formulated yet in the way, acceptable to most scholars. Neither is there a final legal definition of it: the definition of genocide in the adopted by the General Assembly of the UN in 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* is qualified by sociologists, historians and legal experts of today as insufficient and misrepresented.

In the meantime, the succession of slaughters of the peaceful population in different corners of the world definitely tends to thicken; the number of mass killings in cold blood of certain groups of own citizens by authorities increases steadily. The system of security, established after World War II, is unable to protect not only the rights of an individual, but the right to life of vast groups of people. By estimation, the number of victims of mass slaughters, committed by state powers in 1945-1987, is 1.05-2.5 times as big as the number of war

casualties at the period between 1945-1980²⁰. There is hardly anybody who would disagree with the American sociologist and theologian F. H. Little, who termed the XX century as "Age of Genocide"²¹.

The investigation of genocide as the utmost evil in the past and present of the mankind is extremely urgent. The problem is as follows: to develop a comprehensive and commonly acceptable theory of the phenomenon on the basis of the analysis of documented genocides, their comparative research, and summing-up of the results obtained. The quantity of comparative and generalizing studies of the phenomenon of genocide is notably less than that of individual cases. The Canadian specialists in Genocide Studies F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn wrote that, when back in 1979 they engaged in comparative genocide research, they were surprised to find out that in the world, experts in that sphere could be counted on the fingers of one hand²². Among them were, certainly, the American sociologist I. L. Horowitz, whose monograph on the decisive role of a state power in committing genocide had come out²³, and the Armenian-born American sociologist and historian V. Dadrian, who by that time had commenced his noteworthy research on fundamental problems of the phenomenon of genocide, now lasting over a quarter of a century²⁴. Ten years later, the American scholar W. K. Ezell would remark that there are only a dozen of theoretical works on genocide in English²⁵.

²⁰ H. Fein, Political functions of genocide comparisons. – Remembering for the future: working papers and addenda. Vol. III: The impact of the holocaust and genocide on Jews and Christians. Oxford, 1989, p. 2428.

²¹ F. H. Little, Breaking the succession of evil. – Problems of genocide: proceedings of the international conference on "Problems of genocide", April 21-23, 1995, Toronto, 1997, p. 29.

²² F. Chalk, K. Jonassohn, The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies. New Haven and London, 1990. p. 8.

²³ I. L. Horowitz, Taking lives: genocide and state power. New Brunswick-London, 1997.

²⁴ V. N. Dadrian, Methodological components of the study of genocide as a sociological problem – the Armenian case. – Recent studies in modern Armenian history. Cambridge, MA, 1971, p. 83-103; V. N. Dadrian, A typology of genocide. – International review of modern sociology, 1975, vol.: 5, No. 2, p. 201-212.

²⁵ W. K. Ezell, Investigating genocide: a catalog of known and suspected cases, and some categories for comparing them. - Remembering for the future: working papers and agenda. Volume III: the impact of the Holocaust and Genocide on Jews and Christians. Oxford, 1989, p. 2881.

Among the works by the elder generation of genocide researchers worth mentioning are L. Kuper's fundamental research²⁶, and H. Fein's (USA) book.²⁷ Collected articles on the study of genocide began to appear, of which the anthology, edited and introduced by J. N. Porter, stands out by purposefulness and clearness of the problems set²⁸. Porter regarded the anthology as a step towards a comprehensive comparative study of the subject (genocide – R. S.) from global perspective²⁹. The next step in that direction was the mentioned well-balanced book by F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, where an attempt is made to sum up the results of the studies between the 1970s - 1980s³⁰.

The aforementioned monographs served as an incentive for Genocide Studies to develop into a separate branch of sociology. At present, Genocide Studies is a rapidly and dynamically progressing science, the investigations by leading representatives of which were a theoretical support for our interpretations of the issues, discussed in this chapter.

The term "genocide" was coined in 1943, and the next year put into scientific circulation by the Polish legal scholar of Jewish origin Raphael Lemkin. In 1944, his "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe" came out in the USA. The author, based on the formulated by him back in 1933³¹ thesis of punishing those responsible for the "barbaric" acts, committed in wartime, and having studied the policy of Nazi Germany in the occupied countries, not only introduced this word to the public, but was the first to define that phenomenon³². In his subsequent works Lemkin elaborated his characterization of genocide, thereby paving the way for the process of formation of the genocidal concept³³.

²⁶ L. Kuper, *Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century*. New Haven and London, 1981.

²⁷ H. Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*. New York, 1979.

²⁸ *Genocide and human rights: a global anthology*. Ed. By J. N. Porter. Lanham-New York-London, 1982.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. IV.

³⁰ F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn. *The history and sociology of genocide: analysis and case studies*. New Haven and London, 1990.

³¹ R. Lemkin, *Akte der Barbarei und des Vandalismus als delicta juris gentium*. – *Anwaltsblatt Internationales*, Vienna, vol. 19, No. 6 (Nov. 1933), S. 117-119.

³² R. Lemkin, *Axis rule in occupied Europe: laws of occupation – analysis of government – proposals for redress*. Washington, D. C.: Carnegie endowment for international peace, 1944, p. 79-95.

³³ R. Lemkin, *Genocide – a modern crime*. – *Free world*. Vol. 4 (April 1945), p. 39-43; Raphael Lemkin, *Genocide*. – *American scholar*, vol. 15, No. 2 (April 1946), p. 227-230; Raphael Lemkin, *Genocide as a crime under international law*. – *American journal of international law*, vol. 41, No. 1 (1947), p. 145-151.

In his view – besides the policy of physical extermination – persecutions of a group's social, spiritual or economic institutions, of cultural, language, ethnic or religious sentiments, which endanger the further existence of said group as a distinct entity, should also be recognized as genocide.

One of the major determinants of genocide – the *intent* to annihilate any racial, national or religious group, was also put into scientific and legal circulation by Raphael Lemkin. Proceeding from the fact of intent on behalf of the perpetrator of genocide, he characterized it as “a composite of various acts, aimed at persecution or extermination” of a certain national, religious or racial group.³⁴ Lemkin also identified the other major determinant of genocide – *premeditation* to annihilate racial, national or religious group in whole. This enabled to differentiate between *massacre*, in which case there is no such premeditation, and *genocide*. Hence, from sociological and judicial (certainly, not moral and ethical) viewpoints, between these two phenomena there is a qualitative, not just a quantitative difference³⁵. Another important outcome was that the category of premeditation, by revealing systemic identity, made possible the differentiation between various types of genocide. Let us consider, for instance, the following hypothetical case: premeditation arises to exterminate some ethnic or other human group, but to accomplish it, instead of applying measures for physical destruction, conditions are created for the forcible alienation of the group. Based on R. Lemkin's definition, in this case, too, genocide is committed. With time, this kind of actions was termed *ethnocide*³⁶.

Raphael Lemkin's definition of the phenomenon of genocide had a number of significant oversights. One of them was that he passed by the problem of characterization of the authors of genocide. In particular, the fact that, in modern times, state powers play the central role in genocides, what necessitates the conviction of the state power, remained unnoticed by him. At the same time, Lemkin, when founding his research and theoretical conclusions on the extermination of Jews in Europe, i.e. on the destruction of a nation, living beyond its homeland, overlooked in his definition the phenomenon of the organized by a state power and executed mostly through mass slaughters extermination of an indigenous people in its historic homeland. Such genocide

³⁴ Raphael Lemkin on Genocide. – Genocide and human rights: a global anthology. Ed. By J. N. Porter. Lanham-New York-London, 1982, p. 330.

³⁵ L. A. Chorbajian, Massacre or genocide: an essay on personal biography and objective experience. – Genocide and human rights: a global anthology. Ed. By J. N. Porter. Lanham-New York-London, 1982, p. 121.

³⁶ F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn. The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies. New Haven and London, 1990, p. 9.

can be qualified as deportation. It aggravates the fault of the state power as the organizer of the genocide.

The term "genocide" was first used in official documents in 1945, in the indictment of the Nurnberg Military Tribunal, established to try the principal German war criminals. Interestingly, in the Russian version of the indictment, the term is substituted for the phrase "premeditated and systematic extermination of peoples", which is nothing but an interpretation of the term in the Russian language³⁷.

Since 1946, the term "genocide" has been used in the official papers of the UN and gradually entered the lexicon of the world's most spoken languages. That process was rather slow. For instance, in the well-known "Webster's Dictionary of the English Language" it only appeared in 1961³⁸. In some languages, such as Armenian or German, its loan translations are also used as synonyms.

R. Lemkin, in his own statement, coined the term "genocide" by analogy with the already existing "tyrannicide" (killing of a tyrant), "homicide" (killing of a human being), and "infanticide" (killing of an infant)³⁹. He might have been familiar with the word "Armenocide"⁴⁰ (killing of Armenians), used for the first time by Friedrich Naumann (the German religious and social theorist of the late XIX – early XX centuries, one of the ideologists of German expansionism) as early as in the early XX with regard to the Armenian massacres of the mid-1890s. It was used thenceforth in publications in the German and Armenian languages. The term "Armenocide" clearly conveys the idea of deportation.

The emergence of the term denoted the end of the process of conceptual definition of "systematic extermination of a nation in whole", of its moral and ethical assessments, occurring in the European and Russian publications from the late XIX century on with respect to the Armenian massacres in the Ottoman Empire. Not going deep into its specificities and applications, which is a

³⁷ Mezhdunarodnyi voennyi tribunal No. 1: Obvinitelnoe zakluchenie [International military tribunal No. 1: Bill of indictment]. – Nurnberg Trial: collected materials in 8 Volumes, vol. 1, M., 1987, p. 293.

³⁸ J. N. Porter, Introduction: what is genocide? Notes toward a definition. – Genocide and human rights: a global anthology. Ed. By J. N. Porter. Lanham- New York-London, 1982, p. 5.

³⁹ Raphael Lemkin on Genocide. – Genocide and human rights: a global anthology. Ed. by J. N. Porter. Lanham-New York-London, 1982, p. 317.

⁴⁰ V. N. Dadrian. The convergent aspects of the Armenian and Jewish cases of genocide. A reinterpretation of the concept of Holocaust. – Holocaust and Genocide studies: an international journal. 1988, vol. 3, No. 2, p. 163.

scientific problem by itself and needs a separate research⁴¹, we would only note that the coinage of the term was impelled by reflections not only around the Holocaust against Jews, organized by Nazi Germany, but – to a considerable extent – around the great Armenian Genocide of 1915. Particularly, the grounds for the legal notion of genocide as the gravest international crime against humanity, and for the personal responsibility of its organizers, were laid in May, 1915, in the official joint declaration of the governments of Great Britain, Russia and France⁴². Unfortunately, later Lemkin overlooked the fact that in said official document, the subject at issue was the massacre of the Armenian people in Armenia proper.

The development of the international legal concept of genocide became one of the primary tasks of the United Nations (UN). The UN addressed this issue at the first session of the General Assembly. In the preamble to resolution 96 (I), passed during the session, it said, "Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings"⁴³.

The General Assembly recommended that the Economic and Social Council of the UN initiated investigations for drafting a preliminary text specifically for the convention of genocide⁴⁴. An ad hoc committee was established, which undertook the preparation of the text of the convention jointly with the UN Secretariat. In May 1947, the draft convention, drawn up by the UN Secretariat, was ready; a year thereupon, the ad hoc committee's draft was finalized⁴⁵.

⁴¹ L. Kuper, *Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century*. New Haven and London, 1981, pp. 19-20.

⁴² Yu. G. Barsegov, *Genotsid armenyan – prestuplenie protiv chelovechestva (o pravomernosti termina i yuridicheskoi kvalifikatsii)* [The Armenian Genocide – crime against humanity (toward lawfulness of the term and legal qualification)]. Yerevan, 1990, p. 18-28.

⁴³ Leo Kuper, *Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century*. New Haven and London, 1981, p. 23.

⁴⁴ J. H. Tashjian. *Genocide, the United Nations and the Armenians. – Genocide and human rights: a global anthology*. Ed. By J. N. Porter. Lanham-New York-London, 1982, p. 134.

⁴⁵ Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide – the secretariat and ad hoc committee drafts – first draft of the Genocide Convention, prepared by the UN Secretariat, [May] 1947 [UN Doc E/447] and second draft Genocide Convention prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), meeting between April 5, 1948, and May 10, 1948 [UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR. 1 to 28]. – William A.

The process of formation of the legal concept of genocide was basically finished in December of 1948, when the UN General Assembly passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide⁴⁶.

The definition of genocide, given here, for the most part reiterates that of R. Lemkin's – with one most important difference that genocide means acts committed with the intent to destroy a "national, ethnical, racial, or religious group" not only "in whole", but also "in part". The inclusion of this category into the definition of genocide is humanistically justified, yet some difficulties arise in its practical use, since there is no clarity as to destruction of what part of a group may be qualified as genocide. As is noted in one of the first interpretations of the Convention, the factor of intent may be helpful in overcoming this difficulty⁴⁷.

The definition of genocide has been criticized many a time by sociologists for the last two or three decades: in their opinion, it does not reflect the entire diversity of historical realities. Periodically, attempts are made to revise it and new definitions are proposed, which, however, do not get the approval of broad circles of scholars. Thus, in recent years a number of genocide researchers have tried to "expand" and "simplify" the definition of genocide, which can be exemplified by that of Jane Springer's: "Genocide is mass killing of a group of unarmed people"⁴⁸. Such approaches cannot be accepted, as they disregard the decisive role of the state power in conspiring and committing genocide.

The major judicial drawback of the definition of genocide, given in the UN Convention, is that it overlooks the issue of holding the state power responsible. In our opinion, neither is comprehensive the content of the definition of genocide, since deportation – in spite of its grave consequences – is not included there as a distinct type of such crime.

Schabas, Genocide in international law, the crime of crimes. Cambridge, UK, 2000, p. 553-564.

⁴⁶ Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide A/RES/260 A (III), 9 December 1948. - The United Nations: Blue Books series, Vol. VII: The United Nations and Human Rights, 1945-1995. With an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations. New York: Department of public information, United Nations. 1995, p. 151-153.

⁴⁷ In favor of the ratification of the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Presented to the Subcommittee on the Genocide Convention of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. – Armenian Affairs: A Journal on Armenian Studies. 1950, vol. 1, No. 2, p. 221.

⁴⁸ Jane Springer, Genozid: Aus dem Englischen von Birgit Fricke, Hildesheim, 2007, S. 11.

The concept of proto-genocide, presented in the following subchapter, responds to the abovementioned flaws in the light of the theoretical principles, suggested by modern Genocide Studies.

THE CONCEPT OF PROTO-GENOCIDE

The definition of the basic notions of the concept of proto-genocide, advanced by the author, prioritizes the in-depth analysis of the two fundamental components of the concept of genocide: the role of the state power, and the factor of intent.

One of the most important and, perhaps, least researched aspects of theoretical investigations of genocide is the explication of certain issues, related with the role of state power.

The majority of scholars are inclined to assign to state power a determinative role in conspiring and committing genocide. First of all it refers to the genocides, organized by a state power against own subjects. During the last century, as many as 120 million people had fallen victim to such crimes⁴⁹. This opinion is shared by such prominent figures, engaged in the research of the phenomenon of genocide and of its various aspects, as aforementioned F. H. Little, H. Fein⁵⁰, and F. Chalk⁵¹, R. Hovhannisian⁵², I. Ternon⁵³, R. W. Smith⁵⁴, and others. Also investigated are the ways of making responsible the states,

⁴⁹ I. L. Horowitz, Science, modernity and authorized terror: reconsidering the genocidal state. - Problems of genocide: proceedings of the international conference on "Problems of Genocide", April 21-23, 1995, Toronto, 1997, p. 135.

⁵⁰ H. Fein, Testing theories brutally: Armenia (1915), Bosnia (1992) and Rwanda (1994). - Problems of genocide: proceedings of the international conference on "Problems of Genocide", April 21-23, 1995, Toronto, 1997, p. 181-190.

⁵¹ F. Chalk, Definitions of genocide and their implications for prediction and prevention. - Remembering for the future: working papers and addenda. Vol. III: the impact of the Holocaust and Genocide on Jews and Christians. Oxford, 1989, p. 2377-2389.

⁵² R. G. Hovhannisian, Eighty years: memory against forgetting. - Problems of genocide: proceedings of the international conference on "Problems of Genocide", April 21-23, 1995, Toronto, 1997, p. 13-20.

⁵³ I. Ternon, The will to annihilate: for an approach of the concept of genocide. - Remembering for the future: working papers and addenda. Vol. II: The impact of the Holocaust on the contemporary world. Oxford, 1989, p. 2060-2067.

⁵⁴ R. W. Smith, State power and genocidal intent: on the uses of genocide in the twentieth century. - Problems of genocide: proceedings of the international conference on "Problems of Genocide", April 21-23, 1995, Toronto, 1997, p. 225-236.

which have committed genocide⁵⁵. An interesting work in this field is Yu. Barsegov's paper⁵⁶.

However, it were only I. L. Horowitz and L. Kuper, who gave the theoretical substantiation of the problem. Horowitz was the first to put into scientific circulation the notions "genocidal state" and "genocidal society", and undertook elucidation of some of their aspects⁵⁷. Kuper, based on Horowitz' studies, approached the issue from the opposite side. He formulated the notion of a "non-genocidal society", and attempted to define it⁵⁸. V. Dadrian had his own contribution to the study of the problem: having examined the interrelations between the Young Turk party and the Ottoman government, he arrived at some conceptual conclusions regarding the determinative role of the ruling party⁵⁹.

One of the indications of a genocidal state is the presence of state programs for committing genocide, while the major determinant of a genocidal program is the factor of intent.

As mentioned above, one of the most important determinants of genocide – the intent to annihilate a racial, national or religious group was also introduced into scientific and legal circulation by Raphael Lemkin. In judicial practice, the factor of intent is decisive. The UN former Secretary General Boutros-Ghali even characterized it as the fundamental component of the Genocide Convention⁶⁰. Based on the analysis of concrete examples, the pioneer of

⁵⁵ L. R. Beres, International law, selfhood and the prevention of genocide. – Remembering for the future: working papers and addenda. Vol. II: the impact of the Holocaust and Genocide on the contemporary world. Oxford, 1989, p. 1236-1241.

⁵⁶ Yu. G. Barsegov, *Otvetstvennost' gosudarstva za genotsid v mezhdunarodnom prave i v mezhdunarodnoy politike*. – Genotsid – prestuplenie protiv chelovechestva [The Responsibility of the State Power for Genocide in International Law and International Politics. – Genocide – a Crime Against Humanity] (Proceedings of the I Moscow International Symposium, April 18-19, 1995). Ed. by V. A. Mikaelyan, M., 1997, p. 90-101.

⁵⁷ See the mentioned monograph by this author.

⁵⁸ Leo Kuper, *Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century*, New Haven and London, 1981, p. 186-208.

⁵⁹ V. Dadrian, *Petutean my yev petakan kusaktsutean my miadzoil dery haykakan tseghaspanutean mej* [The Combined Role of the State and the Ruling Party in the Armenian Genocide]. – The Armenian Genocide with parliamentary and historiographic discussions. Watertown, 1995, p. 107-140.

⁶⁰ Introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations. – The United Nations: Blue Books series, vol. VII: The United Nations and human rights, 1945-1995. With an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations. New York: Department of public information, United Nations, 1995, p. 21.

genocide research Leo Kuper infers that the responsibility for genocide is avoidable, unless the factor of intent is identified and proved⁶¹. Thus, the government of Brazil in its time evaded the charge of genocide against some of the indigenous tribes, as it managed to evince that those groups disappeared in consequence of hunger, which had not been planned by the government⁶².

Some legal experts, supportive of this view, severely criticize the UN Convention, arguing that the factor of intent significantly narrows the frames of applicability of the document in practice, since it is extremely difficult to confirm and document such intent, the more so in cases, when the genocide is authored by the state power. A UN document even states the existence of two judicial schools on that matter, one of them finding that identification and proof of the intent is quite essential, while the supporters of the other maintain that the factor of genocidal intent must not be necessarily proved, as it objectively ensues from genocidal acts as such⁶³. In recent years, a growing number of international legal experts consider identification and statement of the content of intent as one of the problems of law, which still awaits in-depth investigations⁶⁴.

The discrepancy in approaches among lawyers, although brought forward for discussion in the UN Commissions on Human Rights and International Law, did not receive any judicial formulation. The UN Convention of 1948 remains unaltered. This fact was confirmed yet another time by the Resolution of the Security Council of the UN, passed in November 1994, on creating an International Criminal Tribunal, authorized to punish the individuals, responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of humanitarian law in Rwanda and the neighboring countries. This document exactly reproduces the definition of genocide, brought in the Convention of 1948.⁶⁵

⁶¹ L. Kuper, *Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century*. New Haven and London, 1981, p. 33-35.

⁶² F. G. Dufour, *Toward a socio-historical theory of persecution and an analytical concept of genocide*. – YCISS Occasional Paper, No. 67, October 2001, p. 13.

⁶³ Yu. G. Barsegov, *Genotsid armyan – prestuplenie po mezhdunarodnomu pravu* [The Armenian Genocide – Crime under International Law]. M., 2000, p. 93-121.

⁶⁴ C. Tournaye, *Genocidal intent before ICTY*. – *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, April 2003, vol. 52, No. 2, p. 447-462.

⁶⁵ Security Council resolution containing the decision to establish an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda or in the territory of neighboring States S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994. – In: *The United Nations: Blue Books Series*, vol. VII: *The United Nations and human rights, 1945-1995; With an introduction*

The revision of law documents and practices demonstrates that national judicial schools also give preference to the first approach, trying at the same time to give the factor of intent a more accurate definition. Thus, the Congress of the USA, after long debates in 1988, passed the resolution to put into effect in the United States the "International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide", adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, having replaced the term "intent" in the definition of genocide with the phrase "specific intent"⁶⁶.

The new criminal law in France goes even further and introduces a principal novelty into the document. Here, the term "intent" is replaced with "concerted plan"⁶⁷. Judicially, this phrase makes "intent" more specific. Yet, upon analyzing that document from the perspective of historical political science, we may infer that, in essence, in it, the process of crystallization of the intent is clarified, since the "concerted plan" is the final destination of such process.

The picture is different at studying genocide as a sociological phenomenon. During the past decades, the concept of genocide has been revised and supplemented by scholars many a time. Nevertheless, as the renowned Canadian genocide researcher Kurt Jonassohn justly states, the factor of intent has retained its central meaning as the basic criterion of genocide⁶⁸. Thus, in the sociological definition of genocide, given by Franc Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn in 1990 and widely disseminated ever since, premeditation has retained its central meaning: "Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group..."⁶⁹.

Helen Fein, former Director of the New York Institute for Genocide Studies, arrives at remarkable conclusions. In one of her early definitions of Genocide, she had made the characteristic of intent even clearer, proposing to

by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995, p. 490.

⁶⁶ F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, *The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies*. New Haven and London, 1990, p. 51.

⁶⁷ U. Makino, *Final solutions, crimes against mankind: on the genesis and criticism of the concept of genocide*. – *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2001, 3(1), p. 67.

⁶⁸ K. Jonassohn, *Defining the perpetrator: seeking proof of intent*. – *MIGS Occasional Paper*, March 1993, p. 1.

⁶⁹ F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, *The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies*, New Haven and London, 1990, p. 23.

replace it with the word “calculated”⁷⁰. Thereupon, she began to use the word “purposeful”⁷¹. Of late, she has made some further amendments in her definition of intent, proposing to regard as one of the key determinants of genocide the situation when the policy of mass extermination of a certain group of people with the intent of killing detects evidences that the authorities have planned, organized or are aware of their genocidal activities⁷². In fact, in the given characteristic, three manifestations of the factor of intent are present, which often, judging by historic experience, present themselves separated by time.

The rewordings of “intent” by the abovementioned scholar are reformative, which is typical of modern Genocide Studies, and come to prove that the research in that field leads to a more specified definition of the factor of intent – both semantically and temporally.

In particular, as Henry Huttenbach generalizes in his recently published interesting observations, the studies in this field lead towards identification of different levels of intent⁷³. For instance, the concept of a “genocidal paradigm”, proposed in the 90s of the last century by Vahagn Dadrian, distinguishes two – preliminary and final – phases⁷⁴.

The application of the factor of intent in historiographic investigations enables to differentiate between *massacre* and *genocide*. We have already noted that, from sociological and judicial (certainly, not moral) viewpoints, between these two phenomena there is a qualitative difference.

⁷⁰ H. Fein, *Testing theories brutally: Armenia (1915), Bosnia (1992) and Rwanda (1994). – Problems of genocide: proceedings of the international conference on “Problems of Genocide”*, April 21-23, 1995, Toronto, 1997, p. 182.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁷² H. Fein, *Denying genocide: from Armenia to Bosnia: a lecture delivered at the London School of economics and political science on 22 January 2001. – London School of economics and political science: Occasional Papers in Comparative and International Politics 1*. London: Department of Government, [2001], p. 4-5.

⁷³ H. R. Huttenbach, from the editor: *towards a conceptual definition of genocide. – Journal of Genocide Research*, 2002, 4(2), p. 167-176.

⁷⁴ V. N. Dadrian, *Towards a theory of genocide: incorporating the instance of holocaust: comments, criticisms and suggestions. – Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 1990, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 143.

According to the opinion, that has become popular in Genocide Studies, in the event of massacre, the factor of intent is not present⁷⁵. In his time, Levon Chorbajian justly remarked that massacre manifests itself as wild killings, as distinct from genocide, in which case present is the factor of being planned⁷⁶.

As it often happens in real life, plans remain unfulfilled, partially or fully. Yet, the very existence of a program as such is a proof that the given state power has entered a new phase, which we suggest to designate as "proto-genocidal".

The term "proto-genocide" has been used for a decade now in special and socio-political literature. Vahagn Dadrian was among the first to use it for characterizing the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Armenians by Abdülhamid⁷⁷. However, he neither substantiated the need for applying the term, nor gave its explication.

Such an approach by the renowned genocide scholar was conditioned by the fact that based on the comparative study of the Holocaust of Jews and the Great Genocide of Armenians; in one of his theoretical works he inferred that in both cases, the key perpetrator was not the state power, but the solid political party⁷⁸. Hence a "logical" conclusion: since in the times of Abdülhamid such party did not exist in the Ottoman Empire, then his policy towards Armenians cannot be qualified as genocide.

Different is the approach of the Turk sociologist Halil Berktaş. In his opinion, since the term "genocide" was coined to characterize the Holocaust of Jews, then the Armenian Genocide may only be qualified as proto-genocide⁷⁹.

In fact, this approach reproduces the assertions of a number of well-known specialists in Genocide Studies, who consider that only the Holocaust of

⁷⁵ C. P. Scherrer, Towards a theory of modern genocide. Comparative genocide research: definitions, criteria, typologies, cases, key elements, patterns and voids. – Journal of Genocide Research, 1999, 1(1), p. 15.

⁷⁶ L. A. Chorbajian, Massacre or genocide: an essay on personal biography and objective experience. – Genocide and human rights: a global anthology. Edited by J. N. Porter. Lanham-New York-London, 1982, p. 121.

⁷⁷ V. N. Dadrian, The history of the Armenian Genocide: ethnic conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Providence – Oxford, 1995, pp. 111-176.

⁷⁸ V. N. Dadrian, Towards a theory of genocide: incorporating the instance of Holocaust: comments, criticism and suggestions. – Holocaust and Genocide studies, 1988, vol. 5, No. 2, p. 139.

⁷⁹ Kh. Mouradian, The specter of the Armenian Genocide: an interview with Halil Berktaş. – Aztag daily, November 12, 2005,

Jews can be termed “genocide”, while the Armenian Genocide is, at best, a “related” phenomenon⁸⁰.

The author of the present monograph has addressed such approaches in his time and demonstrated that they were based on the methodologically wrong thesis, according to which there is only one, “ideal” case of genocide – the Holocaust of Jews, serving as an “archetype” for all the other cases of genocide.

In political essays, the word “proto-genocide” is used quite often and usually stands for a phenomenon of genocidal nature – with a relatively small number of victims, and chronologically preceding genocide⁸¹.

There are two cornerstones of the concept of proto-genocide, offered by the author: the presence of the intent of committing genocide, and the absence of actions of committing such. In the first circumstance, it is possible to distinguish proto-genocide from mass slaughter (where there is no factor of intent⁸²). The absence of adequate actions allows to distinguish proto-genocide from genocide, since, according to the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, one of the key elements of genocide is the action, undertaken to realize the already identified intent⁸³.

In recent years, ways of documenting the factor of intent are widely discussed among legal and genocide scholars. Attempts are made to give it a more accurate definition. For instance, the US Congress, in 1988, passed the resolution to put into effect in the United States the Convention of 1948 and

⁸⁰ Y. Bauer, *Is the Holocaust explicable? – Remembering for the future: working papers and addenda*. Vol. II: the impact of the Holocaust on the contemporary world. Oxford, 1989, p. 1970.

⁸¹ K. Drum, *Mass Graves... Does this matter?* – Washington monthly, July 19, 2004; David Pryce-Jones, *Curse of the Militias: what Balkanization has done to Iraq, Lebanon, and others*. – National Review, March 27, 2006.

⁸² Ch. P. Scherrer, *Towards a theory of modern genocide. Comparative genocide research: definitions, criteria, typologies, cases, key elements, patterns and voids*. – Journal of Genocide Research, 1999, 1(1), p. 15.

⁸³ Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide A/RES/260 A (III), 9 December 1948. – In: *The United Nations: Blue Books Series*, vol. VII: *The United Nations and human rights, 1945-1995*. With an introduction by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations. New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1995, p. 151-153.

replaced the term “intent” in the definition of genocide with the phrase “specific intent”⁸⁴, as it was mentioned earlier.

In the Criminal Code of France the term “intent” is replaced with “concerted plan”⁸⁵. As we have already noted, this phrase makes “intent” more concrete, since the “concerted plan” is the final destination of process of preparing of genocide.

The evolution of rewording of “intent” is typical of modern Genocide Studies, and comes to prove that the research in that field proceeds towards a more specified definition of “intent” – both semantically and temporally.

In particular, as Henry Huttenbach generalizes in his recently published interesting observations, studies in this field lead towards identification of different levels of intent⁸⁶. For instance, the concept of “genocidal paradigm”, suggested in the 90s of the last century by Vahagn Dadrian, distinguishes two – “preliminary” and “final” – phases⁸⁷.

The clarifications, made by genocide scholars, are useful for the further detailed elaboration of the concept of proto-genocide. Based on them, the author formulates the following theoretical notions:

- a genocidal program is a means to manifest the factor of intent;
- a genocidal program may exist as a document, or within a composite of genocidal acts, imparting to them coordinateness;
- a genocidal program may have various levels of elaboration, differing from one another by the extent, to which the means for carrying out massacres are identified.

Based on these characteristics, the phenomenon of “proto-genocidal situation” can be defined as follows: the situation in a country, when a preliminary program of genocidal nature already exists, yet it still needs to be finalized, and the means of commission are still to be identified. The main trait

⁸⁴ F. Chalk and K. Jonassohn, *The history and sociology of genocide: analyses and case studies*. New Haven and London, 1990, p. 51.

⁸⁵ U. Makino, *Final solutions, crimes against mankind: on the genesis and criticism of the concept of genocide*. – *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2001, 3(1), p. 67.

⁸⁶ H. R. Huttenbach, *From the editor: towards a conceptual definition of genocide*. – *Journal of Genocide Research*, 2002, 4(2), p. 167-176.

⁸⁷ V. N. Dadrian, *Towards a theory of genocide: incorporating the instance of holocaust: comments, criticisms and suggestions*. – *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 1990, vol. 5, No. 2, p. 143.

of a proto-genocidal situation is that it, possessing potentials to grow into a large-scale genocidal situation, in which genocide is integral part of the reality, does not always evolve in that direction. In other words, in a proto-genocidal situation, genocide is one of the ways – not the only way of solving political problems.

To substantiate this theoretical thesis by historical facts, the developments in the period of the pro-Western reforms of the XIX century in the Ottoman Empire are examined. It is shown, that in May-December of 1876, when the mighty armed revolt of Bulgarians was already suppressed, a proto-genocidal situation emerged, which, however, did not evolve into genocide, because the ruling group chose another way of struggling against the national-liberation movement of Christians – the way of constitutional reforms.

The example of the Ottoman Empire also demonstrates that proto-genocide precedes the implementation of large-scale genocide polity.

PRO-WESTERN REFORMS AND CHRISTIANS

EQUAL RIGHTS?

From the late XVIII century, a new era began in the history of the Ottoman Empire, which gist was the ongoing expansion of the national-liberation movement of the subject Christian nations, and their gradual riddance of the Turkish yoke. To maintain the territorial integrity became an issue of top priority for the governing body of the Ottoman state. This necessitated quests for new means of neutralizing the liberation movements of the Christian nations.

At the period of military-political might of the empire, the basic suppressive means was the brute armed force. This stemmed from the very nature of the Ottoman military-feudal autocratic state order. The then Turkish political figures would say, "As the state has been obtained with a *yatağan*, so with a *yatağan* shall it be maintained"⁸⁸.

The decay of the military-feudal system caused the decline of the might of the Ottoman army, so that it not only began sustaining defeats in confrontations with the European armies, but was unable to promptly and prudently suppress armed revolts within the country.

Such were the conditions in the late XVIII century, when some representatives of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite began to realize that prevention of Christian rebellions would be more effective than their suppression by force of arms.

For the first time, this idea was worded in the *lâyiha* (report) of Rumelia's Kaziasker Tatarjyq Abdüllah Effendi, submitted to Sultan Selim II in 1791 in response to the latter's order to draft a program of reforms. Tatarjyq Abdüllah Effendi wrote that, many years ago, when *jizyah* was collected from non-Muslims in accordance with the Sharia, those lived in abundance, knowing no need whatsoever, and their brothers in faith from other countries even envied them. But thereupon, exactions from the *reaya* began, making the tax burden unbearable for them. This stirred up discontent and became the principal cause of

⁸⁸ A. F. Miller, Mustafa Paşa Bayraktar. M-L., 1947, p. 31.

the revolt of 1770. The author remarked that the “*moscovits*” took advantage of the resentment of the *reaya* and incited them against the authorities. He proposed to strictly adhere to all the Sharia laws of taxation, and thereby to restore the trust of the *reaya* in the Ottoman state power⁸⁹.

This idea was officially formulated in the “Allied Pact” of 1808, when in power was the political grouping “Rusçuk friends”, headed by Grand Vizier Bayrakdar Mustafa Paşa. Paragraph 7 of the document made a special emphasis on the necessity of moderate taxation of “the *reaya* and the poor”⁹⁰.

In the time of Mustafa Paşa’s rule, a decree was adopted, which is worth special attention. The periodical “*Vestnik Evropy*”, published in Petersburg, informed that “Mustafa Bayrakdar issued an order that Muslims should no longer use the word “*giaour*” (infidel), because any Christian, regardless of the creed, believed in the same God, as Muslims did”⁹¹.

Formally, this decree did not contradict Koran. But – in Turkey of the beginning of the XIX century, where Muslim fanaticism and the ideas of predominance of Muslims were overwhelming – it was, beyond any doubt, an extraordinary phenomenon. The law, however, had not had any practical application, and the word “*giaour*” had been in use up until the fall of the empire.

From the 20s of the XIX century, in conditions of rise of the national-liberation movement of the Balkan nations, some Ottoman statesmen began insisting that minimal concessions would help prevent uprisings. In 1827, in the special message from the Sublime Porte to local authorities of Rumelia, the necessity to guarantee security of life and property of the Christian subjects was recognized⁹².

This evolved still further in the report of 1828, authored by the renowned poet of divans Keçecizade İzzet Mullah, and *defterdar* (finance officer) Bejih Fendi. It was written there that concessions to rebelled Christians were necessary⁹³. At the same time, they were far from the wish to improve the conditions of the “rebelled *giaours*”. Their point was maintaining Ottoman autocracy towards “infidels”, to which end they were ready to make concessions, and thereby to gain time. For instance, they offered to agree with the rebels and

⁸⁹ R. Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat. Ankara, 1954, s. 172.

⁹⁰ [Cevdet], Tarih-i Cevdet, C. 9, Dersaadet, 1309, s. 281.

⁹¹ Vestnik Evropy [The Messenger of Europe], 1809, part XVIII, No. 1, p. 78-79.

⁹² M. I. Todorova, Anglia, Rossia i tanzimat [England, Russia and Tanzimat] (second quarter of the XIX century). M. 1983, p. 25.

⁹³ İ. Sungu, Mahnud II.nin İzzet Molla ve asakir-i mansure hakkında bir hattı. - Tarih Vesikaları, 1941-1942, I. Cilt, III, s. 173.

stop collecting *jizyah* for a year. This would somewhat quell the fire of revolt, whereupon the same tax could be collected in a bigger amount than before.

These suggestions were not accepted; by order of Sultan Mahmud II their authors were dismissed of their positions and exiled.

Only a year after (1829), Mahmud II, seeking to keep Greece within the Ottoman boundaries whatever the cost might be, was compelled to make considerable concessions – from a Muslim leader's standpoint. In the decree of the end of *Muharrem* of 1245 (July 1829), in his dispatch to Greeks of Morea, he promised, "Henceforward, no discrimination will be made between Muslims and the *reaya*, and everybody's property, life and honor will be ensured by the Sharia and under my supreme aegis"⁹⁴. This was the first case ever in Ottoman history that the sultan gave promises to non-Muslims.

On the one hand, this dispatch was meant to "pacify" Morea, to keep it within the Ottoman Empire at any cost; on the other hand, it was to attain the West's support in solving the Greek question. Worth noticing is that the sultan assumed commitment only before the Greeks of Morea, for he hoped in that way to "calm them down".

The sultan's decree was too late to hamper the onward course of history: in 1830, the independent kingdom of Greece was founded.

The dispatch remained a piece of paper, but the ideas, promulgated in it for the first time, were among the basic mottos of Tanzimat, aimed to stop the further expansion of the national-liberation movement of the Christian nations.

In April, 1837, having quelled the next in turn mighty uprising of Bulgarians, the sultan visited the Bulgarian regions and, in a meeting with the leaders of Christian communities, announced, "Our wish is... to ensure the security of all the residents of our state, both Muslims and the *reaya*... You (i.e. leaders of Christian communities), taking into account this wish of ours, should be committed to us in that cause"⁹⁵.

So the sultan, promising to "take care" of the welfare of the *reaya*, exacted their obedience instead. The same year, Mahmud II came forth with his famous statement, that all the subjects were his own children, and he treated them evenly⁹⁶.

⁹⁴ A. Prokesch-Osten, Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821 und der Gründung des Hellenischen Reiches. Aus diplomatischem Stand. Band 6, Wien, 1867, S. 57.

⁹⁵ H. Inalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi (Doktora Tezi'nin 50. yılı, 1942-1992). İstanbul, 1992, s. 28.

⁹⁶ R. Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat. Ankara, 1954, s. 100.

The years of reign of Mahmud II prepared foundation for Tanzimat – the period of more extensive reforms.

The first phase of Tanzimat (the 30s-mid-50s of the XIX century) was marked by new ideas regarding the status of the Christian nations, developed by Mustafa Reşit Paşa – the “father of Tanzimat”. He was convinced that only introduction of reforms after the European model would make restoration of the past power of the state of the Ottomans feasible. The principal target of those reforms was the status of the Christian nations within the Muslim Ottoman state. Specifically, it was supposed to extend promises of secure life, property and honor also over non-Muslims. This was formulated in the project of the reforms, drawn up by several ministers under his guidance⁹⁷.

This principle was officially promulgated in the *Hatt-Şerif of Gülhane* (Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber), authored by Reşit Paşa and issued on November 3, 1839. In particular, it read, “In accord with the religious law, We (i.e. the sultan) grant all the residents of the state, without exception, absolute security of their life, property”⁹⁸.

Interestingly, the substantiation of this paragraph was purely religious: “in accord with the religious law”. Reşit tried to avoid “any confrontation with the *ulema*”⁹⁹, and often made references to Koran and the Sharia, thus assuring that the reforms, proposed or implemented by him, in no way contradicted them¹⁰⁰.

This assertion reflected the reality. Formally, most reforms of the first phase of Tanzimat did not contradict the Sharia, and were meant to more consistently observe its laws. The Tanzimat reformers considered it to be sufficient for pacifying the *reaya*. In the introduction to the *Hatt* it was indicated that “in the times when all the sacred laws were observed correctly, all the subjects, without exception (i.e. non-Muslims), were in good conditions; these began to worsen as a consequence of nonobservance of the laws”¹⁰¹. On the whole, the *Hatt* of Gülhane was an “Islamic edict” and, despite the

⁹⁷ Ibid., s. 172.

⁹⁸ D. G. Rozen, *Istoria Turtsii ot pobedy reformy v 1826 g. do Parizhskogo traktata v 1856 godu* [The history of Turkey from the victory of reform, 1826, to the Treaty of Paris of 1856]. – Part 2: From enthronement of Abdülmecid to the Treaty of Paris of 1856. S-Pb., 1872, p. 275.

⁹⁹ S. Palauzov, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa*. S-Pb., 1858, p. 11.

¹⁰⁰ F. E. Bailey, *British policy and the Turkish reform movement. A study in Anglo-Turkish relations: 1826-1853*. Cambridge, 1942. p. 274.

¹⁰¹ D. G. Rozen, *Istoria Turtsii ot pobedy reformy v 1826 g. do Parizhskogo traktata v 1856 godu*. – Part 2: From enthronement of Abdülmecid to the Treaty of Paris, 1856. S-Pb., 1872, p. 274.

abovementioned paragraphs, did not conceal the fact that the state order of the theocratic Ottoman Empire was founded on the ideology of Islamism. The *Hatt* officially restated the dominating position of Muslims. As Reşit made clear during a confidential conversation with a high-ranking French official, his intention was not to make equal, but just “to ease” the inequality between the followers of Islam and the followers of the other confessions in the Ottoman Empire¹⁰². Reşit Paşa’s reaction to the *Hatt-i Hümayun* (Imperial Edict) of 1856 was extremely negative, especially to the articles, which theoretically stipulated total equality of Muslims and non-Muslims under the law, and the latter’s right to public service. In his *lyaiha* he condemned the authors of the *Hatt*, Âli and Fuat, for “disloyalty to the religion of Islam”, labeling them renegades¹⁰³.

It would never occur to Reşit Paşa to grant the Christian subjects legal equality with the “true” masters of the country – Muslims. At the same time, the principle of “even approach” to all the residents of the empire without religious discrimination was pregnant with its future development into their equality under the law (incidentally, announced by the reformers of the second phase of *Tanzimat*) and, beyond any doubt, was progressive at that time. It is not accidental that, as the contemporaries mentioned, Reşit’s assistants were for the most part Greeks and Armenians – representatives of the nations, most interested in the bourgeois development of the country¹⁰⁴.

In the 40s, the principle of “even approach” was formulated in some constitutional acts. Thus, in the preamble to the criminal law (adopted on May 3, 1840), there was a quotation regarding the provision from the *Gülhane* edict about ensuring security to all the subjects of the state without exception, while from Paragraph 1 it followed that the law also applied to non-Muslims¹⁰⁵.

Reşit advanced a new for his time idea of “unity of all the subjects of the sultan”. The neologism *tebaa* (subjects) had been coined as a result, and used for the first time in the text of the reforms, drawn up under Reşit’s guidance by a group of ministers and submitted to the sultan. Having put “*tebaa-i Devlet-i Âliyye*” (subjects of the Sublime state), the author promptly specified who that new designation referred to: “All the Muslims and representatives of other millets”¹⁰⁶. The definition was also used in the *Hatt* of *Gülhane*, and thenceforth spread widely.

¹⁰² *Masis*, 1853, No. 79.

¹⁰³ Cevdet Paşa, *Tezakir*, 1-12, Ankara, 1953, s. 8.

¹⁰⁴ S. Palauzov, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa*. S-Pb., 1858, p. 5-6.

¹⁰⁵ R. Kaynar, *Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat*. Ankara, 1954, s. 302-303.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, s. 92.

The issue of maintaining “unity” of all the nations of the empire had always been in the focus of Reşit’s attention. A few years later, in 1846, speaking before the leaders of the Christian communities of Adrianople, he tried to clarify said necessity as follows: “The difference in religion and sect is every individual’s business, it does not affect their rights... We are all subjects of the same government, were born and grew up in the same country. We must always remember this and never give each other a sidelong look...”¹⁰⁷ Thus, for the first time, the principles of “common territory” and “common government” were put forward as the basis of the unity of all the nations of the multiethnic Ottoman Empire, and later widely used by the “New Ottomans”.

The ruling circles of the empire took up the idea of “unity of Muslims and Christians” as a means to consolidate the population in the struggle against external enemies. In the address of the grand vizier (1853) to the “Residents of Constantinople, Ayub, Scutari and Galata”, it was indicated that thenceforth, everybody should seek to live in absolute unity and serve the common homeland. It was claimed in the address that the sultans and the Sublime Porte had always taken care of the welfare of all the subjects, who, allegedly, had been granted religious privileges, and so on. Proceeding from that, the entire population was called to consolidate around the government against the external danger, since “one of the conditions of success is the complete unanimity of all the residents”¹⁰⁸.

Reşit’s ideas certainly played a crucial role in the history of the XIX century socio-political thought of the Ottoman Empire. Even so, they had not been fully implemented in the realm of real politics. Suffice it to say that, within his reign (intermittently from 1846 through 1852), no official resolution had been passed referring to non-Muslim subjects. He did not succeed in reaching through moderate reforms to European models his major goal – to stop the expansion of national-liberation movements. That was all obvious clear even for his contemporaries¹⁰⁹. His political bankruptcy became apparent when, in 1850, the great revolt of Bulgarians broke out.

The Christian nations claimed that the promises, set forth in the Hatt of Gülhane, be carried out; they would not be satisfied with hollow promises. Reşit, in his turn, severely suppressed any attempts of the Christian peoples to attain equity by force of arms – even within the frames of the *Hatt*. In 1850, from the office of the Grand Vizier Reşit Paşa, a secret circular was sent out to the *vali* of

¹⁰⁷ Z. Şakir, *Büyük Türk inkılabı*. C. 1, İstanbul, 1956, s. 56.

¹⁰⁸ A. Vaillant, *Solution de la Question d'Orient*, Paris, 1853, p. 130.

¹⁰⁹ *Galerie des contemporaines illustres*. T. VII: Rechid Pacha, Paris, 1850, p. 1 - 5.

Vedino with an instruction to apply the most rigorous measures to hamper the marches of local Bulgarians, who demanded enactment of the provisions of the *Hatt-i Şerif*, concerning the assurance of security, honor and property of all the subjects of the sultan, Christians included. The vali was instructed to resort to "violent measures" in case of need¹¹⁰. In general, according to the printed media of those times, as a result of Tanzimat, persecutions of Christians for their religious convictions did not abate¹¹¹.

Along with the new policy, based on the most resourceful methods of exactions from the *reaya* during the first phase of Tanzimat, the Turkish authorities, and especially their more conservative part, often resorted to the traditional methods of oppressions and persecutions. Recurrent were cases of provoking feelings of Muslim fanaticism among masses. The radicals in the central government and among the *meclis* members in provinces, taking advantage of resentments of Muslims, caused by the officially promulgated in the *Hatt* of Gülhane principle of "even approach", incited carnages of Christians. After deposing Reşit, from the office of the grand vizier secret circulars were dispatched to the regions, which actually canceled all the resolutions of Tanzimat. During political crises, the will to rely on the old and tested methods of policy making tended to gain strength. Thus it was in 1852-1853, when the government kept arousing anti-Christian attitudes to prepare the country to war against Russia. Notwithstanding the facts brought above, the new ideas gradually paved their way.

"MIXING AND MERGING"

In the history of Turkey, the period between the mid-50s and early 70s of the XIX century is known as the second phase of Tanzimat. The Turkish political figures of that period, the leaders of the reform movement Mehmet Emin Âli Paşa and Fuat Mehmet Paşa conducted a policy of drawing closer to the West, hoping thereby to keep as many regions under the sultan's rule as possible.

The biggest danger for the integrity of the empire was the national-liberation movement of the oppressed Christian nations. Âli Paşa and Fuat Paşa did realize this, and tried to prevent armed insurrections of Christians in the

¹¹⁰ Dokumenti za bulgarskata istoria. Vol. 3: Documents from the Turkish state archives. Part I: 1564-1872. Comp. and tr. by P. Dorev. Sofia, 1940, p. 308.

¹¹¹ F. E. Bailey, British policy and the Turkish reform movement. A study in Anglo-Turkish relations: 1826-1853. Cambridge, 1942, p. 222.

tradition, set by the mentioned in the previous Chapter politicians of the proto-Tanzimat and Tanzimat periods. Hence it follows that Âli and Fuat became ideological successors of the Turkish political figures of the previous generation.

The formation of their worldview was influenced by their first-hand familiarity with the European realities. They explained the necessity of "merging" Muslims and non-Muslims, exemplifying Europe. Âli wrote that there, "all the individuals are free and equal... religion and origin play no role, and any person may assume any position"¹¹².

However, Âli and Fuat not only copied their predecessors, but went even further and formulated the concept of "mixing and merging" of all the residents of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their national or religious background, and made it the topmost goal of their policy. They were convinced that it was the only way to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In May, 1867, Fuat Paşa clearly stated this to the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople N. P. Ignat'ev, who, after his talk with the Turkish politician, reported to Petersburg, "He (i.e. Fuat) claims that the empire can only be saved through merging of the Muslim and Christian nations, and never through their parallel coexistence"¹¹³.

The Turkish politicians discussed the necessity of "merging" not only with the representatives of foreign nations. At the end of his life, in his secret political testament Fuat one more time warned the sultan: "Without merging, the further existence of the Ottoman Empire does not seem realistic to me"¹¹⁴.

The Paşas insisted that merging was to embrace all the spheres of social relations, "except purely religious issues"¹¹⁵. They also emphasized that, in case of transformation, the four pillars, on which the Ottoman Empire rested, should remain unchanged. Those were: "the Muslim millet, the Turkish state, the Ottoman sultans, and Istanbul, as the capital"¹¹⁶.

Âli Paşa had very often stressed the specific role of the Turkish people in the integrated society to be. In a letter (1858) to the French Ambassador in

¹¹² Ali Pascha, Memorandum. - [A. D. Mordtmann], Stambul und das moderne Türkenenthum (Politische, sociale und biographische Bilder von einem Osmanen), B. 1, Leipzig, 1877, S. 84.

¹¹³ N. P. Ignat'ev - A. M. Gorchakovu, Konstantinopol', 25 aprilja/7 maya 1867 g. - Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria, 1867, file 31, sheet 489.

¹¹⁴ Fuad Pasha, Political testament. - J. L. Farley, Turks and Christians, London, 1876, p. 242.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 243.

¹¹⁶ Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir, 1-12, Ankara, 1953, s. 85.

Turkey Thouvenel, he wrote, "If among us there is still a people, able to lead others and serve... as a link for the society, it is the Ottoman people" (meaning Turks)¹¹⁷. In the secret dispatch to Cemil Paşa, who was in Paris at that time (1862), he reiterated his thought, "I think... only Turks can serve as a link, or... wish to retain their dominating position over the others... That is the only way to save the empire from the endless chaos and civil war"¹¹⁸. Thus, for Âli Paşa, the only way to stabilize the situation was to secure the dominating position of Turks. With Fuat, the intention to rely on the Turkish component in the "merging" policy was less apparent, although he also thought that Turks would be a better choice for country governance¹¹⁹. As is obvious from the mentioned facts, the ultimate goal for Âli and Fuat was to preserve and consolidate the dominating position of Turks in the future "reformed" empire.

The Paşas proposed to administer a number of measures, that would facilitate the "merging". The first and foremost was to foster the uniting spirit of allegiance to the authorities in all the nations of the empire. "The state can avoid ideological controversies among its subjects, if they are educated in the same spirit," wrote Âli Paşa¹²⁰. The first landmark on that road was to create mixed educational institutions of the first two levels, since for Fuat, "merging starts at the school desk"¹²¹. "Educating in the common spirit" would continue in lyceums such as the Galatasaray Lycee. In his political testament, written in Turkish, Âli Paşa called for the sultan to open a few more institutions like that as soon as possible, since that would accelerate the process of "merging"¹²². Mixed education, in his opinion, "would unite the interests of different peoples of the empire", make them loyal to the Ottoman government, and thus save the state from dismemberment¹²³.

Another effective measure for "merging" was conscription of Christians. Some western diplomats found that it would be most effective. The Austrian Ambassador to Constantinople Mr. Prokesch wrote, "Nothing would have such

¹¹⁷ L. Thouvenel, *Trois années de la Question d' Orient*, 1856 -1859, Paris, 1897, p. 317.

¹¹⁸ B. Lewis, *Ali Pasha on nationalism*. - *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1974, No. 10, p. 71.

¹¹⁹ P. Challemeil-Lacour, *Hommes d'état de la Turquie. Ali Pacha et Fuad Pacha*. - *Revue des deux mondes*. 1868, XXXVIII année, 2 série, No. 78, p. 922.

¹²⁰ *Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadriazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların siyasi vaziyetnameleri*. Hazırlıyan: E. D. Akarlı, İstanbul, 1973, s. 47.

¹²¹ N. P. Ignat'ev - A. M. Gorchakovu, *Konstantinopol'*, 7/19 marta 1867 g. - *AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria*, 1867, file 31, sheet 63.

¹²² *Ali Paşa, Vaziyetname*. - *Belgelerle Tanzimat: Osmanlı Sadriazamlarından Ali ve Fuad Paşaların siyasi vaziyetnameleri*. Hazırlıyan: E. D. Akarlı, İstanbul, 1973, s. 47.

¹²³ *Ali Pacha, Testament politique*. - *La Revue de Paris*, 1910, T. 3, No. 9, p. 106.

an impact on the realization of merging of the races as incorporation of the military system into life on the basis of permitting conscription of all the subjects"¹²⁴. Among the Turkish political figures, the most supportive of this view was Fuat. This issue "drew attention in Turkey", and was discussed at the Sublime Council, informed Russia's military agent in Constantinople¹²⁵. Most of the Turkish ministers preferred to see Turks in the ranks of officers¹²⁶. Even an ad hoc committee was set up for the comprehensive analysis of the issue, but no final decision was arrived at¹²⁷. Neither Christians, nor Muslims approved of the idea¹²⁸. By the end of his life, Fuat also got disillusioned and in his political testament preferred to pass by the issue.

On the way to the "merged" society, non-Muslim millets were a serious obstacle. The processes in the big Greek and Armenian millets during the first half of the XIX century evinced the growing national sentiments of the Balkan nations and Armenians. Ordinary members of millets claimed freedom and equality with Muslims. The movement of Christian nations for autonomy intensified.

These developments worried the rulers of the empire. If in the first phase of Tanzimat, their objective was not to exacerbate the relations with the millet leaders, now the situation was all different. Reformers of the second phase of Tanzimat considered that millets enjoyed far too much autonomy, and that it should be limited. Nonetheless, it was decided to preserve the institute of millets.

According to the Tanzimat reformers of the second phase, millets were to be transformed to religious communities, and no longer engage in civil life. Thenceforth, Christians were not members of a millet, but just Ottoman subjects. What worried the authorities was that millets had actually grown into legal organizations, which made them to a certain extent conducive to intensification of the national-liberation movement of Christians. For that reason, millets should be under the government's direct control. "Every community (millet)

¹²⁴ Observations du Baron Prokechsh sur le Memoire du cabinet francais. – Schopoff A. Les reformes et la protection des chretiens en Turquie, 1673 - 1904, Paris, 1904, p. 89.

¹²⁵ Voennyi agent v Konstantinopole o predpolagaemom formirovanii voinskiikh chastey is khristian, 10/22 aprelya 1861 g. [A military agent in Constantinople about the supposed regimentation of Christians, April 10/22, 1861] – Russia State Military-Historical Archives (RSMHA) [RGVIA], 3.1. Collection of the Military-Scientific Archives, 71 Turkey, Fund 450, 1658-1917, list 66, sheet. 35.

¹²⁶ Ibid., sheet 36.

¹²⁷ N. P. Ignat'ev – A. M. Gorchakovu, Konstantinopol', 21 marta/2 aprelya 1867 g. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria, 1867, file 31, sheet 159 rev.

¹²⁸ Ibid., sheet 159.

constitutes a distinct entity," wrote Âli Paşa, "different in spirit, language, habits, aspirations. Their development can go out of control... Every community should be entitled by the government to engage in religious issues, and solely in religious issues..."¹²⁹. This thesis of Âli's was formulated in the *Hatt-i Hümayun* of 1856.

The policy of "merging", proposed by Âli and Fuat, was to lead to certain alterations in the political structure of the country, and they certainly were well aware of it. Fuat proposed that the sultan initiated the compelling reforms as soon as possible¹³⁰, while Âli, as a more circumspect politician, knew that the "pace", as he put it, of moving forward by way of reforms "should be restrained by the fear of wrath"¹³¹. He foresaw that "approximately a century is needed to attain stabilization"¹³².

Âli Paşa's and Fuat Paşa's widely propagated "merging" was nothing but an attempt to "peacefully" denationalize and alienate the Christian nations, and thereby to solve the national problem in the Ottoman Empire. Such was the outcome of the fifty-year development of the "most liberal" Turkish politicians' political thought. By appearance pro-Western and progressive, they actually personified a slightly modernized version of the Turkish conservatives. Ignat'ev's characteristic of Âli Paşa was not unfounded: "Despite his outwardly European mode of action, he was a true Turk and – against Europe"¹³³.

A prominent figure of the Tanzimat period, Fuat was seriously concerned about the ever increasing Christian population in the empire – he feared lest they should "swallow up" Muslims¹³⁴. According to a well-informed Englishman, V. Denton by name, who had studied the messages of British councils in the

¹²⁹ Ali Pacha, Testament politique. – La Revue de Paris. 1910, t. 3, N. 9, p. 106.

¹³⁰ Fuad Pasha, Political testament. – J. L. Farley, Turks and Christians, London, 1876, p. 235-236.

¹³¹ P. Challemeil-Lacour, Hommes d'etat de la Turquie. Aali Pacha et Fuad Pacha. - Revue des deux mondes. 1868, XXXVIII annee, 2 serie, No. 78, p. 916-917.

¹³² B. Lewis, Ali Pasha on nationalism. - Middle Eastern Studies, 1974, No. 10, p. 79.

¹³³ [Ignat'ev N. P.], Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignat'eva, 1864-1874. [[Ignat'ev N. P.], Count Ignat'ev's notes, 1864-1874]]. – Russkaya starina [The Russian antique times] 1915, vol. 162, book 4, p. 19.

¹³⁴ V. F. Kozhevnikov, Rusçuk (Ruse), 7 yanvaria 1867 g. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, D. 1 (On Turkish Hatt-ı Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 193.

Ottoman Empire, in order to fight it, the Sublime Porte organized regular carnages of Christians, which fact "horried Europe"¹³⁵.

Besides that, in the 50s-60s, the Ottoman Empire employed another way of maintaining the quantitative majority of Muslims: the powers encouraged mass admission of Muslim refugees from Russia into the country. Only during the first ten years (1854-1864), their number totaled 595 thousand¹³⁶. The majority of Circassians and Tatars were settled in the Balkan vilayets in order to increase the number of Muslims there. Âli and Fuat used every apt situation to resort to the well-tested by the Turkish ruling elite of the past method of getting rid of the disgusting "infidels" – that is, forcible Islamization.

The fundamental provisions of the concept of "merging" of the multiethnic population of the Ottoman Empire were oriented to alienation of the non-Turkish peoples. That was the topmost goal. Equality of Muslims and non-Muslims, "impartial" policy towards the subject peoples were nothing but a veil to obscure it.

Âli and Fuat developed a long-term program of "merging" and tried to put into effect its main points. The legislative reforms, carried out during their rule, prove that they were acting in accordance with that program.

As has already been mentioned, an essential place in the program was assigned to the measures towards transformation of millets to purely religious institutions by revoking their privilege in civil administration. The provision, included in the text of the *Hatt-i Hümayun*, dated February 18, 1856, ensured the implementation of said idea: the religious leaders of millets, who traditionally managed the community affairs and acted as mediators between the ordinary members of millets and the Turkish authorities, were banned from engaging in civil matters. The latter were transferred to the leaders of *meclis* (special councils), consisting of both clerical and secular persons¹³⁷. Thus, patriarchs were deprived of the right to fully represent at the Sublime Porte the interests of the community they headed, while the newly established councils were not given such right. Thenceforward, for a non-Muslim, the only way to seek protection from oppressions by the Turkish authorities was to apply to courts, superintended by the same authorities... This laid foundation for the collapse of the system, which had been ensuring autonomy of the internal life of non-

¹³⁵ V. Denton, *Khristiane v Turtsii* [Christians in Turkey]. – *Russkiy vestnik* [The Russian Bulletin], 1864, vol. 50, No. 3 (March), p. 117.

¹³⁶ E. Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi. VII cilt: Islahat Fermanı devri, 1861 - 1876*. Ankara, 1956, s. 277–278.

¹³⁷ *Düstür. Cild-i evvel*, İstanbul, 1289. s. 9.

Muslim nations within the millets. It was replaced by a system of purely religious institutions, deprived of privileges to engage in the public life. Ten years after, in March of 1866, an official circular was published, which restated this provision of the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*: religious leaders were prohibited to submit to the Sublime Porte the so called *taqrirs* (complaints), concerning any problems other than religious.

The *Hatt-ı Hümayun* contained yet another idea: the activity of non-Muslim millets should be directly supervised by the authorities – through involvement of the elite of the millets into the Ottoman administrative system: by one of the provisions of the *Hatt*, millet leaders were to be paid state salary, thereby becoming government employees¹³⁸.

All the residents of the empire, regardless of their national or religious identity, were unified in the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* as “subjects of the Sublime state”, “subjects of the sacred state”, “subjects of the sultan”. The American Turkologist R. Davison noted that it was a step aimed at removing the “barriers between the millets”¹³⁹.

In the *Hatt*, the word *vatandaşlık*¹⁴⁰, equivalent for *patriotism*, was used for the first time. There were formulated such notions, which later made the basis of the concepts “Ottoman nation” and “Ottoman patriotism”.

The analysis of the content of the sultan's *Hatt* showed that it already carried the concepts of the policy of “merging” in embryonic state. However, the *Hatt* was not a legislative act as such. It only contained some novelties which introduction into legislation was still ahead. It was accomplished in the 60s.

The Tanzimat leaders Reforms attached great importance to the reforms in the field of local governance. Therefore their reform of the vilayet system was regarded as a most significant step towards creating conditions for “merging”.

The so-called “Law on the Danube Vilayet” was adopted in 1864 and served as a model for the Law on vilayet, passed in 1867. In the anonymous brochure, published in Paris, Âli Paşa claimed that the Law met the interests of the residents of the country, irrespective of their national and religious affiliation¹⁴¹. The analysis of the Law allows us to identify the major trends and goals of the Tanzimat leaders' policy of administrative reforms.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856 -1876*. Princeton, 1963, p. 56.

¹⁴⁰ *Düstür*. Cild-i evvel, İstanbul, 1289. s. 9.

¹⁴¹ [Un Impartial], *Réponse a Son Altesse Moustapha Fazil Pacha au sujet de Sa lettre au Sultan*. Paris, 1867, p. 19.

Thus, according to the Law, all the residents of the Danube vilayet, which encompassed the greater part of Bulgaria, were announced "subjects of the Sublime state", no matter which community they belonged to. By that, one of the most important provisions of the policy of "merging" was legally confirmed. Non-Muslims were vested the right of equal representation in the administrative councils of all levels (vilayets, *sançaks* and *kazas*)¹⁴². Yet, as the Muslim population of the vilayets mostly consisted of Turks, whereas the non-Muslims, besides Bulgarians, included also Greeks, Armenians, Jews and others, so Turks unquestionably were to constitute the majority in the *meclis*. The principle of "equal representation", particularly in the conditions of the Danube vilayet, where the number of non-Muslim males was twice as big as the number of the others¹⁴³, in reality pursued the goal of ensuring a disproportionately big representation of Muslims in the *meclis*.

Along with the notorious principle of "equal representation", the Law contained provisions, legalizing much bigger representation of Muslims in the newly set up provincial *meclis* of different levels. The Law proposed, for example, establishment of 11-member vilayet *meclis*, headed by the *vali*. Only 6 of those 11 were to be elected (3 Muslims and 3 non-Muslims), whereas the remaining five were included into the *meclis* "*ex officio*": the *vali* (chairman of the *meclis*), the inspector of the Sharia courts, the financial administrator of the vilayet, the postal administrator, and the foreign relations administrator. The absolute majority of these managerial positions in vilayets were occupied by Turks. In practice, of 11 *meclis* members, only three or four were non-Muslims. In *meclis* of *sançaks* and *kazas* the proportion was very much the same.

One of the goals of the Law of 1864 was to limit the traditional independence of internal affairs in the self-governing Bulgarian communities. Thenceforth, the *meclis* members were considered representatives of all the "Ottomans", not of specific communities¹⁴⁴. Instead of community councils, the so-called councils of elders were established, which were a compliant tool in the hands of the authorities, and assured a more effective supervision by the authorities of the life in the Bulgarian communities.

According to the Law, mixed judicial councils, headed by a Turk *cadi*, were also founded to investigate legal cases between Muslims and non-Muslims.

¹⁴² Düstür. Tabb-ı sani, Dersaadet, 1282. s. 517-536.

¹⁴³ N. Todorov, Balkanskiy gorod XV-XIX vekov [The Balkan city of the XV-XIX centuries]. M., 1978, p. 283.

¹⁴⁴ Düstür. Tabb-ı sani, Dersaadet, 1282. s. 520, 524

The council members, Christians including, were paid a state salary, which meant they were government employees.

As was mentioned above, in conformity with the Law of 1864, Christians were entitled to be elected *meclis* members. A vast place in the Law (Paragraphs 67-82) was given to the organization of elections to councils of different levels¹⁴⁵. The analysis of these paragraphs makes clear that elections were to be conducted so as to guarantee a win for such non-Muslims, who would appear most helpful for the authorities. In other words, the organization of elections was assigned to the authorities, who, in their turn, gained the opportunity to exercise control over the elections. For candidates, high property qualification was set, much higher than the "high" level for *meclis*. Clearly, the authors of the Law preferred to rely on the well-to-do strata of the society, non-Muslim strata including.

In the spirit of "merging" reorganized were also the central bodies of power. In March, 1867, instead of the Supreme Judicial Council, two new institutions were founded – State Council and Justice Council. The Sublime Porte attached exceptional importance to the State Council. The first article of its Statute read that it was "the central body of administrative management of the empire"¹⁴⁶. Even though non-Muslims were also appointed in the Councils, the structure of the latter did not reflect the proportion of peoples and national-confessional groups of the empire. Thus, of 41 members of the State Council, only 13 were non-Muslims¹⁴⁷. Midhat Paşa, the ardent supporter of the policy of "merging", was designated as chairman of the Council. On the whole, the institution of the State Council was yet another step towards introducing the ideas of "merging" in the administrative and management system of the Ottoman Empire.

In the program of "merging", a great importance was attached to the "ideological merging" of the Ottoman nations. Supposedly, fostering them in the spirit of allegiance to the sultan and the "Ottoman homeland" will make "merging" feasible. To this end, two measures were proposed: mixed Muslim-Christian system of public education, and mixed military formations.

In 1860, a governmental decree was issued, in which the necessity to let Christians into Muslim schools was indicated, on the ground that thus they would be educated in complete agreement with "the spirit of the government",

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., s. 531-534.

¹⁴⁶ Düstür. Cild-i evvel, İstanbul, 1289, s. 703.

¹⁴⁷ E. Z. Karal, Osmanlı Tarihi. VI cilt: Islahat Fermanı devri, 1856-1861. Ankara, 1954, s. 148-149.

and further on be employed as public servants¹⁴⁸. This decree failed to be implemented in full. Not only Muslims were against it, who considered that mixed education of children contradicts the spirit of Islam, but also Christians, who had read the hidden goal of the government – “thereby to weaken the sense of nation and religion in them”¹⁴⁹.

Assuming in 1869 one of the highest offices in Constantinople, that of Chairman of the State Council, Midhat Paşa played an instrumental role in drafting the “Law on Public Education”. In that voluminous document of 196 articles, the ideas of the adherents of “merging” by way of “purposeful fostering” of the spirit of allegiance to the “Ottoman homeland” in the non-Turkish nations were formulated. The document makes apparent two principal trends of the policy of “merging” in the sphere of education: to shatter the advanced system of public education of Christian nations – along with intensifying the governmental control over it, on the one hand, and to create a new network of educational institutions, aimed to serve the “ideological merging” of all the residents of the country, on the other.

According to the Law, all the schools in the Ottoman Empire were subdivided into state and private schools¹⁵⁰. For non-Muslim children mainly designated were the private schools, which, by Article 1 of the Law, were to be supervised directly by the state. Incidentally, the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* of 1856 provided for establishing special *meclis* to supervise the schools of the subject Christian nations¹⁵¹. The authors of the Law of 1869 considered this provision overly “liberal”, and decided to put the non-Muslim schools under the direct governmental control.

The creators of the Law went even further. They included provisions in the text, aimed to hamper the progress of elucidation process among Christians. This is typified by Article 129, which stipulated that a “private” school could only be opened on the permission of the Ministry of Education, or the vali of the vilayet, and on the precondition that all the teachers at the newly founded school should have an official permit or a diploma, given by the Ministry of Public Education. This complicated the procedure of opening new schools.

¹⁴⁸ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, Rusçuk (Ruse), 23 yanvaria 1866 g. – [V. F. Kozhevnikov to N. P. Ignat'ev, Rusçuk (Ruse), January 23, 1866]. – AVPRI, Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Consulate in Rusçuk), sheet 23 rev.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., sheet 24.

¹⁵⁰ *Düstür. Cild-i sani*, İstanbul, 1289, s. 184.

¹⁵¹ *Düstür. Tabb-ı sani*, Dersaadet, 1282, s. 11.

At that, the actual significance of the Law was different: it deprived the non-Turkish nations of their right to national identity. Thenceforth, all the residents of the empire were "Ottoman subjects" – not Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians... It was a crucial step towards "mixing and merging" of the multiethnic population of the empire.

In conclusion, it should be stated that the initiators of the "mixing and merging" policy managed to give legal definition to only some of their programs. Very important provisions remained unexercised. They failed to create an operative and strictly centralized administrative system, able to support said "merging". The reforms in the educational and military spheres, intended to shape the "common spirit", did not fully comply with what had been premeditated.

The authors of the policy of "merging" themselves realized this. At the end of his life, assessing the outcomes of their joint efforts with Fuat, Âli Paşa recognized with a heavy heart, "We proved powerless..."

Nonetheless, even as much as the Tanzimat reformers had managed to carry out, presented risks for the further independent existence of the Christian nations. The laws, initiated and enacted by them, paved the way for the "peaceful" alienation of the subject peoples. Let us not forget that said "merging" was being implemented under the pretence of pro-Western reforms and establishment of a fair administrative system for all the subjects of the sultan.

The aforementioned facts demonstrate that, during the years of Tanzimat, the policy of the Sublime Porte on national issues, despite declaration of a number of progressive concepts in governmental acts, was characterized intensification of conservative, antinational, oppressive tendencies. It impels us to revise the general assessment of the Tanzimat period in western and Turkish historiography, as well as the widespread opinion that the Turkish authorities pursued the policy of "liberalization" towards the subject nations. May we unreservedly assert that the Tanzimat novelties were progressive, if they were meant to oppress the national spirit of the Christian nations? In essence, Tanzimat, as is shown below, paved the way for the proto-genocidal situation in the country to come into existence. It is not at all coincidental that Âli's and Fuat's younger colleague Midhat became the one to author the first program of genocidal nature in the Ottoman Empire.

THE OPPOSITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT AND THE CHRISTIANS

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS

The oppositional Constitutional movement stemmed from the secret group of the "New Ottomans", founded in 1865 in Constantinople. In the beginning of their activity its members were under the influence of extremely anti-Christian and radical Muslim ideas of Sheikh Ahmet, who headed the anti-Tanzimat conspiracy, known as the "*Kuleli Event*". The "New Ottoman" leaders spoke highly of the conspirators' acts. Their ideologist Namik Kemal (1842-1888) remarked in the "*Hürriyet*" (published by him) that Ahmet and his company sought to "save the state"¹⁵⁹.

Obviously, this influenced the Constitutionalists' attitudes towards the national question. They had formed it during the first years of their activity. They perceived the national question as purely religious. The whole intricate complex of political issues, ensuing from the extreme great-power policy of the empire towards the subject Christian nations, was characterized by them as a conflict between Islam and Christianity.

Following Sheikh Ahmet, the "New Ottomans" considered that the rights of Muslims had – allegedly – been limited in consequence of the Tanzimat reforms, while Christians were granted too many privileges. They labeled the *Hatt-ı Hümayun* of 1856, which heralded the beginning of the second phase of Tanzimat, a "*firman* on privileges"¹⁶⁰. They wrote that in the Tanzimat era, the goal of the policy the Sublime Porte pursued was to "satisfy Christians," for which reason Muslims as though appeared in the position of a "persecuted community"¹⁶¹. For that reason, according to the "*Muhbir*" periodical, also

¹⁵⁹ *Hürriyet*, 1869, No. 30.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 12.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, No. 14.

belonging to the "New Ottomans", the latter announced themselves defenders of the rights of the "humiliated" Muslims of the empire¹⁶².

The "New Ottomans" did not understand the true goals of the Tanzimat leaders' policy towards the Christian nations; they did not realize that said policy was intended to maintain the integrity of the empire by new, more flexible means. Âli Paşa and Fuat Paşa were looked upon as "traitors", because in 1856, as editor of the "Hürriyet" Namik Kemal put it, the latter published "the famous *firman* on privileges", which turned Christians into "paşas, renowned and revered people"¹⁶³.

In those years, the attitude of the "New Ottomans" towards the Christian citizens was marked by extreme intolerance. The Prussian diplomat A. Mordtmann, who knew some of them closely, wrote that the members of the organization sought not only to remove Âli Paşa and abolish the novelties after the European model, introduced in the course of the Tanzimat period, but to "organize an unconcealed oppression of the sultan's Christian subjects"¹⁶⁴. In particular, they qualified the adoption of the Constitutions of the Armenian Apostolic and the Greek Orthodox millets, imposed by the Sublime Porte, as a pernicious innovation¹⁶⁵. As is known, the adoption of these Constitutions had had a certain positive effect on the condition of the subject nations, having activated their social life and advanced their political and nationalist consciousness. This was why the "New Ottomans" condemned the Turkish government, and why Namik Kemal spoke against Âli Paşa's permission for the Bulgarians to separate from Greek Church¹⁶⁶.

The hostile attitude towards the national-liberation movement of the Christian peoples had always been characteristic of the "New Ottoman" leaders. In the beginning of the movement it aggravated to critical, since at that period of time, as politicians, Namik Kemal with his friends were not so experienced as to conceal their true intentions. Besides, they were under the influence of Sheikh Ahmet's ideas.

¹⁶² *Muhbir*, 1867, No. 1.

¹⁶³ *Hürriyet*, 1869, No. 14.

¹⁶⁴ [A. D. Mordtmann], *Stambul und das moderne Türkenthum (Politische, sociale und biographische Bilder von einem Osmanen)*, B. 1, Leipzig, 1877, S. 66.

¹⁶⁵ A. Ubichini, L. Kurteyl. *Sovremennoe sostoyanie Ottomanskoy imperii* [The Contemporary state of the Ottoman Empire], S.-Pb., 1877, p. 168-170.

¹⁶⁶ M. C. Kuntay, *Namik Kemal devrinin insanları ve olayları arasında*. C. I, İstanbul, 1944, s. 150.

The then views of the "New Ottomans" regarding the national-liberation movement of Christians manifested themselves pronouncedly in their positioning towards the struggle of Cretan Greeks in 1866-1869.

The "New Ottomans" press gave a vast space to the developments in Crete. In the publications, advanced was the idea that the suppression of the revolt would be of great importance for the future of the Ottoman Empire. The "Muhbir" even observed that the "independence of the Ottoman Empire" depended on it¹⁶⁷. Both the "Muhbir" and the "Tasfir-i Efker" (the latter edited by Namik Kemal) rigorously criticized the, in their opinion, overly "soft" attitude of the Sublime Porte towards the rebels. Âli Paşa's policy in Crete they qualified as "pro-Christian", and labeled him a traitor. Their attitude served as a background for the satiric poem "Zafer-name", written by the renowned poet and a famous figure of the "New Ottoman" movement Ziya Paşa (1825-1880). He subjected to criticism and derided Âli's policy of "concessions" to the rebel Cretans¹⁶⁸.

Namik Kemal proposed to substitute the "principle of violent force" for the policy of concessions, and exterminate all the Christians living on the island, since that was the only way, he wrote in the "Tasfir-i Efker", to restore "peace" in Crete. He considered improbable even the smallest concessions to Christians¹⁶⁹. An intensive anti-Greek campaign was launched by the "Tasfir-i Efker" in connection with the crisis in Crete. The Greeks, living in the capital city, were blamed for antagonizing other Christians against the "millet of Islam" by "singing anti-Turkish songs"¹⁷⁰. Namik Kemal called for the government to apply punitive measures against Ottoman Greeks, to exile them from the country¹⁷¹. The "Muhbir", in its turn, published materials in support of the Muslims in Crete¹⁷².

Among the oppositionists, a storm of wrath burst out when the Sublime Porte forcedly surrendered the Citadel of Belgrade to Serbia, and recognized Montenegro's independence. Âli Suavi wrote in the "Muhbir", "Our ancestors shed blood to conquer every inch of this land, while we, their disreputable sons, give it all back by inches."

¹⁶⁷ Muhbir, 1868, No. 41.

¹⁶⁸ E. J. W. Gibb, A history of Ottoman poetry, vol. VI, London, 1967, p. 371.

¹⁶⁹ M. Kaplan, Namik Kemal: hayatı ve eserleri. İstanbul, 1948, s. 51.

¹⁷⁰ M. C. Kuntay, Namik Kemal devrinin insanları ve olayları arasında. C. I, İstanbul, 1944, s. 59.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., s. 62.

¹⁷² Muhbir, 1868, No. 29.

These forced political concessions by the Sublime Porte, ensuing from the general weakening of the empire and decline of its military power, were perceived by the "New Ottomans" as concessions to "infidels", as acknowledgement of the Muslims' weakness before Christians. They tried to arouse the once-warlike spirit of Muslims by publishing literary-publicist works, containing militant calls against the Christian world. Namik Kemal wrote in his popular political essay "Dream", "Our prophet used to serve the world with his yatağan. We, too, must go that way... Let us try to prove that we belong to the Ottoman nation, making the entire world tremble with fear... Let us show the *giaours* our might; let us do that pleasure to the prophet"¹⁷³.

Earlier, such themes sounded in the works by Ibrahim Şinasi. He glorified the warlike spirit of "true Ottomans", their victories over *giaours*¹⁷⁴. He founded the first military newspaper in Turkish history – the "Jeride-i Askerie". In his articles he praised Ottoman Turks, the world's most militant people, which every representative is a warrior and a warrior's son¹⁷⁵.

In the very beginning of their activity, the "New Ottomans" spoke in favor of the Constitutional way of solving the national problem, which they contemplated as a potential for ensuring the unity of the multi-confessional and multi-ethnic population of the empire. Halil Şerif Paşa, a highborn Egyptian, who had joined the "New Ottomans", drafted a leaflet, which claimed that "the Constitution will promptly restore the authority of the Muslim state... putting an end to the political and social differences between Muslims and non-Muslims"¹⁷⁶. The cited passage proves that the Muslim image of the state was not only to remain unchanged, but was to consolidate still further by declaring the Constitution.

Besides Halil Şerif Paşa, another prominent Egyptian aristocrat participated in the "New Ottoman" movement – Mustafa Fazıl Paşa, the brother of İsmail Paşa, the *khedive* of Egypt. In the beginning of 1867, in the European newspapers, his open letter to Abdül Aziz was printed¹⁷⁷, revealing the following perception of the author, "The glorious times", when "the founders of the empire" – Turks and their subject peoples – lived in harmony, are far behind. At present, the Christian nations demonstrate disobedience, rebel against the sultan. The reason, apart from the provocations on behalf of the European state

¹⁷³ M. Kaplan, Namık Kemal: hayatı ve eserleri. İstanbul, 1948, s. 42.

¹⁷⁴ Tanzimat dönemi türk edebiyatı antolojisi. Hazır.: Ş. Kutlu. İstanbul, 1972, s. 17.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, s. 32-33.

¹⁷⁶ Yu. A. Petrosyan, Mladoturetskoe dvizhenie [The Young Turk movement (second half of the XIX – beginning of the XX century)]. M., p. 65.

¹⁷⁷ Z. Şakir, Büyük Türk inkılabı. İstanbul, 1956, s. 68-78.

powers, is the bad governance of the Ottoman rulers. Both Muslims and Christians are infuriated. Yet, the situation with Muslims is markedly worse, since they do not enjoy as many privileges, and do not have as many defenders as Christians". In order to save the state from downfall, the author proposed to establish a respectable, "liberal and fair" system that would put an end to oppressions, meet all the expectations of the subjects, irrespective of their religious affiliation, and restore the bygone concord among them¹⁷⁸.

On the whole, the difference between the approaches of Mustafa Fazil Paşa and other "New Ottomans" is not big. Mustafa Fazil Paşa, just like them, accentuates the more intensive oppression of Muslims compared with Christians, proposes to annihilate all the privileges of the latter, which they allegedly enjoyed. At the same time, worth attention is that, the open letter made no mention about retaining the Sharia as the foundation of the Ottoman Empire's state order. Vice versa, it claimed that religion must not be the political foundation of a state. This idea is in apparent conflict with the principal notion of the "New Ottomans": "If our state (i.e. the Ottoman Empire – R. S.) wishes to be powerful, it shall rely on the Sharia and continue being an Islamic state"¹⁷⁹.

The concept of patriotism, advanced by Mustafa Fazil Paşa, was more secularized; it was based on nationalist sentiments rather than religious. He had written many a time about "lofty sentiments which are typical of the Turkish race" – not Muslims in general. Fazil Paşa differed from the other leaders of the "New Ottomans" by that in the beginning those spoke on behalf of the entire Muslim millet, not just the Turkish people.

In fact, the "New Ottomans" had formulated in embryo two interpretations of the Turkish nationalism: one of them attaching more importance to Islam as its frame, while the basis for the other was the idea of nation, although still lacking finalized substantiation. The former served as a theoretical basis for the first genocidal program, the latter – for the subsequent programs.

In those years, the views of the "New Ottomans" were most comprehensively stated in Namik Kemal's open letter to the editor of the pro-governmental newspaper "Gazette du Levant", issued in Constantinople¹⁸⁰. In fact, it featured the basic provisions of the program of the "New Ottomans".

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., s. 70-72.

¹⁷⁹ *Hürriyet*, 1868, No. 18.

¹⁸⁰ M. C. Kuntay, *Namik Kemal devrinin insanları ve olayları arasında*. C. I, İstanbul, 1944, s. 183 -187, 290-291.

The letter attached great attention to the national-confessional problem, with a stress on the latter aspect. The author spoke on behalf of the Muslims, who, as he put it, "are the predominant millet of the empire". The commonplace arguments of the "New Ottomans" regarding Christians' alleged privileged status were brought. Although Kemal could not but admit that non-Muslims were deprived of "certain rights", which, in his opinion, was compensated by the patronage of the great powers, by exemption from military service. The ideologist of the "New Ottomans" shared his concerns related with the wish of Christians to participate in state governance. Admitting the necessity of reforms, Namik Kemal called to implement them both in Muslim and non-Muslim environments, rather than to focus on a particular millet, as the government had done before, pursuing pro-Christian policy.

In the letter, for the first time ever the topmost goal of the "New Ottomans" in solving the national problem was clearly stated. Namik Kemal wrote, "Now about the most important aspect of the question. The "Gazette du Levant" writes about the necessity for all the peoples of our homeland to merge. *We admit that necessity*" (italics mine – R. S.)¹⁸¹. In spite of the severe criticism of the national policy, pursued by the leaders of Tanzimat Âli Paşa and Fuat Paşa, the "New Ottomans", in fact, agreed with its major goal – "merging" of the peoples, residing in the empire. The letter said nothing about the means to achieve that end; it only remarked that there was no way for Christians to be allowed to take part in the state governing system.

The years, spent abroad, had a considerable impact on the formation of the world outlook of the "New Ottomans": they had familiarized with the works of European enlighteners, studied state law, as well as the state order in the European countries. The result was the suggestion of limiting the sultan's autocracy by way of Constitutional amendments in the spirit of Islam.

Their leaders formulated two new ideological-political concepts of their time: "Ottoman nation" (or "Ottoman community"), and "Ottoman patriotism". The analysis of these would be helpful for understanding the peculiarities of the "New Ottoman" ideology.

The concept of "Ottoman nation" was considered as one of the key notions of their teaching. It was used to characterize the wholeness of all the peoples of the empire, at that, this mythical "nation" certainly included both Muslims and non-Muslims. Ziya Paşa in his comments to the poem "Zafer-name" gave the following definition: "The phrase "Ottoman nation" embraces all

¹⁸¹ Ibid., s. 186.

the peoples, regarded as subjects of the Ottoman state, both Muslims and non-Muslims"¹⁸².

Identical usage had the phrase "Ottoman community". Some of the "New Ottomans", Namik Kemal in the first place, assured that *ummet* ("community") was the exact word to apply to all the nations of the Ottoman Empire, irrespective of their religious-confessional identity¹⁸³. He contrasted an *ummet*, which denoted the wholeness of all the subjects of one state, to a *millet*, which denoted the wholeness of followers of one religion. In his criticism in the "Hürriyet", he wrote that the Sublime Porte "cannot tell a millet from an ummet, does not know the difference between the two"¹⁸⁴. Surprisingly, Namik Kemal would himself confuse these terms, which definition he had given himself. It might even happen in one and the same article. All the said proves that the concept of the "Ottoman nation" was not properly developed. It took almost a whole decade for one of these denominations – the "Ottoman nation" – to be commonly accepted (in the late 70s).

The semantic evolution of the word *millet* also presents interest. In the Koran it had two meanings – religion as such and "true religion", i.e. Islam. Later on, in Arabic, it was used as an antonym for *zimmi*, which meant a wholeness of non-Muslims – Christians and Jews – who enjoyed the patronage of a Muslim state¹⁸⁵. In the Ottoman Empire, a millet was a religious community, officially recognized by the sultan. Muslims of Sunni Islam were considered the "dominating millet", while the non-Muslim millets were contemptuously called "the other millets". *Millet* was often used to denote non-Muslims; Muslims, instead, preferred to call themselves *ummet*.

As European ideas permeated into the Turkish environment, the word *millet* gradually underwent semantic changes and lost its traditional meaning ("religious community"), acquiring a new one, juxtaposable with the English *nation*. One of the initiators of Tanzimat, the renowned politician Sadik Rifat Paşa was the first to use the word *millet* in that meaning. He used such phrases as "millet's interests", "to serve the millet", etc.¹⁸⁶ Sadik Rifat did not specify, whether he referred to Muslims or non-Muslims. With him, *millet* had acquired a collective meaning.

¹⁸² Ş. Kurgan, Ziya Paşa: hayatı, sanatı, eserleri. İstanbul, 1962, s. 121.

¹⁸³ B. S. Baykal, Namik Kemal'e göre Avrupa ve biz. — Namik Kemal hakkında, İstanbul, 1942, s. 194.

¹⁸⁴ *Hürriyet*, 1868, No.19.

¹⁸⁵ F. Buhl, Millet. — İslam Ansiklopedisi, 2. B., C. 8, İstanbul, 1971, s. 317.

¹⁸⁶ Ş. Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman thought: a study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas. Princeton, 1962, p.189.

In the second phase of the Tanzimat reforms a new phrase appeared in the official documentation: "Ottoman millet of the Sublime State" (i.e. of the Ottoman Empire). At first, this mainly implied Muslims, the subjects of the Ottoman sultan. With intensification of the policy of "merging", it also spread over non-Muslims.

In the political-social essays and poetry of Ibrahim Şinasi the meaning of the word *millet* underwent a further revision, coming even closer to that of *nation*. Şinasi was the first to use such phrases as "allegiance to the millet", "idea of a millet", as well as "council of the millet", etc.¹⁸⁷. These were borrowed by other "New Ottomans" and widely used in the press. Then they found their place in the Turkish language as the main expressions for the Turkish nationalist ideology.

Şinasi counted himself as the mouthpiece of the "Ottomans". He called his "Tasfir-i Efker" an "Ottoman newspaper"¹⁸⁸. In Ibrahim Şinasi's essays a marked tendency is observed to subdivide the "Ottomans" into the "true ones", meaning Turks, and the rest, or the secondary ones, meaning non-Muslims. In the editorial to the first issue of the "Terjuman-i Akhval" (another newspaper, published by him), he called it a "true Ottoman" newspaper, as opposed to periodicals of the non-Muslim peoples. For Şinasi, the criterion for belonging to the "true Ottoman" community was the Turkish language¹⁸⁹.

The "New Ottomans" explained the necessity for all the peoples of the Ottoman state – Muslim and non-Muslim – to merge into a single "Ottoman nation", exemplifying the European countries and the United States. England, France, Austria, Portugal, Belgium and some other European countries were the models of such states in which differences in nationality, language and creed "can never hinder or debar unification", wrote Namik Kemal in the article "Merging of Peoples"¹⁹⁰.

The "New Ottomans", falsifying the history of the Ottoman Empire, claimed that, from the very beginning, favoring conditions had been created there for the non-Muslim peoples to develop. The "Hürriyet" stated, "Right after the seizure of Istanbul, we granted absolutely equal rights to representatives of all churches"¹⁹¹.

¹⁸⁷ M. Kaplan, Namik Kemal: hayatı ve eserleri. İstanbul, 1948, s. 45 – 46.

¹⁸⁸ R. Özdem, Tanzimattan beri yazı dilimiz. Fikri nesir dilimizin gelişmesi. – Tanzimat I. İstanbul, 1940, s. 880.

¹⁸⁹ H. R. Ertuğ, Basın ve yayın hareketleri tarihi, İstanbul, 1959, s. 160.

¹⁹⁰ M. Kaplan, Namik Kemal: hayatı ve eserleri. İstanbul, 1948, s. 110 – 111.

¹⁹¹ Hürriyet, 1869, No. 50.

The pivotal idea of the concept of "Ottoman nation" was to incorporate all the nations of the Ottoman Empire into one, and at that, as İbrahim Şinasi tried to indirectly assert, only Turks were meant to be "first-grade" Ottomans¹⁹². Consequently, the Christian nations of the empire were its integral parts, or "components". In fact, the concept of "Ottoman nation" retained the subordinated status of the Christian nations, which aggravated their situation still further.

The "New Ottomans" found that there were quite a few factors, contributing to the unity of the elements of the "Ottoman nation". From their perspective, here belonged:

- likeness of "geographical conditions";
- coincidence of "interests", economical included;
- presence of the "all-Ottoman" idea.

The analysis of these factors allows a better understanding of some peculiarities of the ideology of the "New Ottomans".

A major precondition for the existence of the "Ottoman nation" was the geographical environment. Namik Kemal, most likely under the influence of Montesquieu's well-known viewpoint, was inclined to make a special emphasis on that factor. He wrote, "All the components, residing in our country, geographically make parts of one body... therefore, they have completely lost their capacity to exist separately, as well as their force, essential for attaining freedom"¹⁹³. Thus, the non-Turkish peoples were denied the right to independent existence from the very outset, with the reasoning that they were not able to separate from the Ottoman Empire.

The "New Ottomans" believed that, as a result of long existence in similar geographical conditions, common interests had developed among the "components of the Ottoman nation". The "Muhbir", addressing non-Muslims, emphasized that their interests coincided with the interests of Muslims¹⁹⁴. Namik Kemal wrote about "commonness of interests" of the constituents of the "Ottoman nation"¹⁹⁵.

In Âli Suavi's political essay, the thesis of commonness of the interests of the "components of the Ottoman nation" was made specific. He wrote about the commonness of "material interests", which connected the peoples of the empire

¹⁹² H. R. Ertuğ, *Basın ve yayın hareketleri tarihi*, İstanbul, 1959, s. 160.

¹⁹³ E. Z. Karal, *Namik Kemal ve Şark Meselesi*. – Namik Kemal hakkında. İstanbul, 1942, s. 289.

¹⁹⁴ *Muhbir*, 1868, No. 28.

¹⁹⁵ M. Kaplan, *Namik Kemal: hayatı ve eserleri*. İstanbul, 1948, s. 110.

even stronger. So the "New Ottomans" tried to convince the readers that for the non-Turkish peoples – from the "material" point of view – it would be more advantageous to be integrated into the "Ottoman nation", than to create their own national states.

The leaders of the "New Ottomans" attached a great importance to the factor of unity. Different authors named it differently: Namik Kemal wrote about the unity of "ideas"¹⁹⁶, Ziya Paşa – about "Ottoman allegiance"¹⁹⁷. The latter was regarded as the background for the uniting goal of all the "Ottomans": to work for the welfare of "Ottomanism".

This did not explain the fact of existence of the national-liberation movement of the Christian peoples. The leaders of the "New Ottomans", in an attempt to find a way out, announced that said unity among the "Ottomans" had existed in the past, at the times when the might of the empire was at its summit. This approach was reflected, for instance, in the book "The Basis of Revolution" by the renowned journalist and author Ahmet Midhat, who, as a member of the "New Ottoman" movement, conveyed their views. The author tried to prove that, from its very foundation, the sultanic empire was not just an Islamic or Turkish state, but a "common homeland" for all the Ottomans, irrespective of their religious or national affiliation¹⁹⁸, and at that time, all the peoples of the empire lived in a complete "spiritual unity".

The "New Ottomans" considered that later on, said "unity" stopped existing. Namik Kemal wrote, "We (meaning the "Ottomans") failed to reach ideological unity"¹⁹⁹. This was the exact cause of liberation movements of the Christian peoples.

In the opinion of the "New Ottomans", the reasons for the failure of the "spiritual unity" were: the purposeful provocative policy of the European states, Russia in the first place, towards the Christian subjects of the Sublime Porte, and the betrayal (granting too many privileges to non-Muslims) by the Ottoman functionaries of the Tanzimat period of the principles of the Sharia.

In order to restore the "spiritual unity", the leaders of the "New Ottomans" suggested introducing changes in the state and legal systems, meant to reconstitute the Sharia (i.e. to abolish the pro-Western novelties of the Tanzimat period). They also insisted that, under the circumstances, the only way of solving

¹⁹⁶ B. Boran, Namik Kemal'in sosyal fikirleri. – Namik Kemal hakkında. İstanbul, 1942, s. 272.

¹⁹⁷ Ş. Kurgan, Ziya Paşa: hayatı, sanatı, eserleri, İstanbul, 1962, s. 121.

¹⁹⁸ Ahmet Midhat, Üss-ü inkılâp. K. I, İstanbul, 1294, s. 9–11.

¹⁹⁹ B. Boran, Namik Kemal'in sosyal fikirleri. — Namik Kemal hakkında. İstanbul, 1942, s. 272.

the national problem was to declare the Constitution with some bourgeois reforms to follow. The necessity of Constitutional reforms they substantiated by the laws of the Islamic faith.

These were not the only ways towards the consolidation of the "spiritual unity" of the "Ottoman nation", proposed by the "New Ottomans". Among other methods supposed fostering the spirit of loyalty to the "Ottoman nation" in non-Muslims, instilling in them "Ottoman patriotism". To that end, a network of "mixed" Christian-Muslim educational institutions was to be created for the Muslim and Christian children to attend together and be educated in the spirit of "unity". In that way, allegiance to the "Ottoman nation" would be injected into the children of all nationalities from the school desk.

Here is what Namik Kemal wrote in the article "Merging of Peoples", printed in the "İbret" newspaper: "The spiritual merging of people begins in childhood, namely at school, as a result of communication. That is why we need to work towards creating such schools that would admit representatives of all the nations and creeds"²⁰⁰. Identical thoughts were promulgated by Âli Suavi on the pages of the "Muhbir": "Istanbul must adopt the Constitutional form of governance; the same kind of schools must be opened in the country, where teaching must be conducted in the same way. All must finish the same kind of school. Thereby, representatives of different nations will develop the same kind of worldview. Every individual will say, "I am Ottoman..."²⁰¹

As an instrument of merging, the language was also prioritized by the "New Ottomans". In the article "Some Contemplations on Literature", Namik Kemal inferred that the language gave rise to the national unity. The language was regarded there as a means to "influence" the society, to control the people's activity, to inspire the desired ideas²⁰². In their opinion, the language, capable of accomplishing all these functions, was the Turkish language. Only Turkish could become a common language for the "Ottoman nation". Therefore, Âli Suavi, who rated Turkish "superior to all the other languages"²⁰³, proposed to make it the only teaching language at all the schools of the empire. In the view of the "New Ottomans", dissemination of the Turkish language among the subject peoples would gradually eliminate the differences among them. Âli Suavi's

²⁰⁰ Ibid., s. 274.

²⁰¹ C. O. Tütengil, *Yeni Osmanlılardan bu yana İngiltere'de Türk gazeteciliği: 1867-1967*. İstanbul, 1969, s. 42.

²⁰² B. Boran, *Namık Kemal'in sosyal fikirleri. - Namık Kemal hakkında*. İstanbul, 1942, s. 273-274.

²⁰³ H. Dizdaroğlu, *Ali Suavi'de dil anlayışı*. — *Türk Dili*, 1958, c. VII, No. 80, s. 376.

statement: "Who speaks Turkish is a Turk", makes obvious that he was well aware of the end result of his proposal.

The leaders of the "New Ottomans" often wrote about the "greatness", "civilizing mission" of Turks. The readers were inspired the idea that Turks, being endowed with exceptional qualities, were those who must govern the Ottoman Empire. The "Turkish component" should become a dominating force over the other representatives of the "Ottoman nation" – such was the ultimate goal of the "New Ottomans" in the national problem.

The other major ideological-political concept of the "New Ottomans" was the concept of the so-called "Ottoman patriotism". Its main mottoes were: "Ottoman homeland", "love of homeland", "faith and patriotism".

The first of these, "Ottoman homeland", geographically encompassed the whole of the Ottoman territory, including the regions, free of Turkish population. The loss of a smallest plot of land, which had nothing to do with the true Turkish regions, was looked upon as high treason. Islam Bey, the leading character in Namik Kemal's play "Fatherland; or, Silistria", expressing the author's attitude, exclaimed, "If we lose the Danube, there will be no homeland any more! Our homeland is the Danube"²⁰⁴. From this perspective, the forced "surrender" of the Citadel of Belgrade by Âli Paşa and Fuat Paşa was nothing but high treason against the "Ottoman homeland".

For Namik Kemal and other "New Ottomans", love of homeland was first of all conditioned by belonging to Islam. Typical is the title of the editorial, printed in the first number of the "Hürriyet" – "Love of Homeland Is a Result of True Faith".

Basically, the aforementioned concepts exhaust the ideological content of the "New Ottoman" teaching. Their political trend is apparent: to form the "Ottoman nation" as an initial step on the way to Turkization of the multi-ethnic population of the Ottoman Empire. The measures to put this into effect were also meant to strike a "peaceful" blow against the national-liberation movement of the Christian nations.

The crisis of the mid-70s in the Ottoman Empire favored the intensification of the activity of the "New Ottomans". They directly struggled for promulgation of the Constitution and implementation of the other items of their program.

In the Constitution of 1876²⁰⁵, some theses of the "New Ottomans" of ideological nature were formulated. Thus, all the subjects of the empire were

²⁰⁴ Namık Kemal, Vatan, yahut Silistre. - Külliyyat. I, Ankara, 1960, s. 21.

²⁰⁵ A. Ş. Gözbüyük, S. Kili, Türk Anayasa metinleri. Ankara, 1957, s. 25–38.

declared "Ottomans" (Article 8), who, irrespective of their national and religious identity, were thenceforth entitled equal rights (Article 17). This was a step towards the formation of the notorious "Ottoman nation". Superiority of Turks and of the Islamic faith was reinforced: Turkish was announced the state language, and Islam – the state religion (Articles 16 and 1). In both Houses of the Parliament, Turkish was announced the only working language; not knowing Turkish was one of the obstacles to being elected to the Parliament (Articles 68 and 57).

The repressive aspect of the "New Ottoman" teaching was also reflected in the Constitution. According to Article 16, all the schools of the empire, including those of the Christian peoples, were put under the state's direct superintendence.

TURK CONSTITUTIONALISTS AND ARMENIAN LIBERALS

The liberal trend in the socio-political life of Armenians of the Ottoman Empire appeared in the 40s of the XIX century. It had been an established movement in the period when the formation of the Constitutional movement of the "New Ottomans" was still in progress. The consolidating Armenian national bourgeoisie served as a solid foundation for it: a considerable portion of the periodical press and social organizations in Constantinople and Smyrna were under its directorship. Many of the Armenian Liberals held high positions in the Ottoman state. Grigor Aghaton, a representative of the Armenian liberal circles in Constantinople, was the first Christian in Ottoman history to be appointed minister (1867)²⁰⁶. This fact gives a clear picture of the significance and place Armenians occupied in the Ottoman political system.

Not going into further details of the ideological-political views of the Western Armenian Liberals, we would only notice that they hoped to improve the state of the Armenian people within the Ottoman Empire, through reforms after the Western model. So they supported in every way the policy of the pro-Western Tanzimat reforms. In foreign policy, they were oriented towards the Western countries. Here are some typical examples from the liberal press on that

²⁰⁶ Before he would assume the office, he died in Paris a few months after the appointment. See: H. Asatur, *Ashkharhabar matenagitutyan patmutyun* [History of Bibliography in New Armenian], p. 177 (manuscript). – Ye. Charents Literature and Art State Museum of RA, Fund T. Azatyan, B. 1, 17.

issue. The authoritative "Arshaluys araratyan" [Ararat Sunrise] magazine in Smyrna wrote, "... Of all the nationalities of Turkey (meaning non-Muslim – R. S.), Armenians are the most loyal, the most active and the most civilized nation, therefore Muslims love and respect them very much"²⁰⁷. The most influential liberal periodical of the XIX century for decades, the "Masis" newspaper, considered "the strengthening unbreakable ties with the Ottoman government"²⁰⁸ an issue of top priority for Ottoman Armenians, and assured its readers that "... the Ottoman nation has absolute confidence in the Armenian nation"²⁰⁹. H. Voskan, a renowned liberal figure in those years, had even drawn up a comprehensive program of reforms in the Ottoman Empire, which would "revive the Turkish Empire", and thereby improve the situation of the Armenian people²¹⁰.

In the European press of 1867, the open letter of the high-ranking Ottoman officer Mustafa Fazil Paşa to Sultan Abdul Aziz was printed²¹¹. It contained a program of reforms after the Western model, and found a broad response in the Turkish press, which heralded the formation of the Constitutional movement within the Turkish environment. It was perceived as the first policy document of the oppositional "New Ottoman" movement.

The Armenian liberal press also responded to Mustafa Fazil Paşa's letter, the metropolitan "Masis" among the first²¹². It commended Fazil Paşa, for he, unlike other Turkish reformers, wrote nothing about the leading role of Islam and Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. The "Masis" wrote that, judging by Mustafa Fazil Paşa's letter, the "New Ottomans" at last understood that the times, when Muslims did not allow Christians to govern the country, were gone, and that Christians should have equal representation in the Ottoman government²¹³.

It is worth to notice that the "Masis", in contrast to other Armenian conservative newspapers, also elucidated the political and social essays of the young journalists such as Namik Kemal and Âli Suavi, who, after departure for Europe, became the leading core of the "New Ottomans" – the first Turkish

²⁰⁷ *Arshaluys Araratyan* [Ararat Sunrise], 1861, No. 655.

²⁰⁸ *Masis*, 1867, No. 786.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

²¹⁰ C. Oscanyan, *The Sultan and his people*. New York, 1857, p. 444 - 448.

²¹¹ *Ebuzziya* Tevfik, *Yeni Osmanlılar tarihi*. İstanbul, 2006, s. 27 - 40.

²¹² For examples, see: *Masis*, 1867, No. 12; No. 783; No. 784.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 784.

Constitutionalist organization. The “Masis” periodically informed the readers about the most interesting – in its opinion – publications in the “Tasfir-i Efker” (editor Namik Kemal), and the “Muhbir” (editor Âli Suavi). Detailed retellings of their articles sometimes appeared in the newspaper. Thus, it rated high and retold the article from “Tasfir-i Efker”, which said that, at that time, it was difficult to fully reject Europe’s interference in the domestic affairs of the country, hence the Sublime Porte should try to the extent possible to adapt the Europeans’ requests to the Turkish laws²¹⁴.

Some materials in the “Masis” in a way echoed the ideas of the “New Ottomans”. Thus, describing the formidable conditions of the population of the city of Sebastia, it wrote that “poverty and need have already rooted themselves among both Muslim and Christian residents of the city”²¹⁵ – thereby conforming with the known thesis of the “New Ottomans” regarding the “similar exactions from Christians and Muslims”²¹⁶.

The “Masis” did not pass by any positive opinion of the “New Ottomans” about Christians and Armenians, and always found a way to respond it. Thus, it was “happy” to read the lines in an article in the “Tasfir-i Efker”, expressing amazement as to how the Turkish people could ever oppress Christians in that enlightened age?²¹⁷ In the same number it noted that both the “Tasfir-i Efker” and the “Muhbir” commended the Armenian people’s “loyalty”²¹⁸.

Sometimes the striving of the “Masis” to avoid direct debates with the “New Ottomans” was apparent. For example, they retold Namik Kemal’s thesis about the possibility to employ Christians as public servants, making no comment regarding the requirement to master the “official” language of the empire²¹⁹.

In some cases, the Armenian Liberals openly disagreed with the ideas of the “New Ottomans”. Here is an example: as is known, the “New Ottomans” spoke for maintaining the Sharia – considering it as a way for reaching legal

²¹⁴ Ibid., No. 786.

²¹⁵ Ibid., No. 784.

²¹⁶ At times, especially in the beginning of their activity, they also wrote “about a more formidable conditions of the Muslims of the empire compared with the Christians”.

²¹⁷ *Masis*, 1867, No. 786.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ In the Ottoman Empire there was no state or official language until the declaration of the Constitution in 1876.

equality of Muslims and Christians. The "Masis" opposed by that the principle of equality of Muslims and Christians contradicted the Sharia²²⁰. Here is another example: we have already mentioned in this book that the "New Ottomans" advocated the policy of merging of the Ottoman nations. The "Masis" commented on it as follows: "Every nation has its own ethnicity, language, customs, centuries-old traditions, thousands of own features and its own religion"²²¹.

The "Masis" did not leave unnoticed the persecutions of Namik Kemal and Âli Suavi at the governmental level; it informed the readers that the "Muhbir" periodical was banned for "the severe criticism of the government"²²². In the next number it wrote that editor of the "Muhbir" Âli Suavi was exiled to Kastamonu²²³. It also informed that Namik Kemal, the former editor of the "Tasfir-i Efker", was appointed *muavin* (assistant) of the vali (governor) of the Erzurum vilayet²²⁴.

The cited facts allow us to conclude that, at the initial phase of the movement, the "New Ottomans" did attract the Armenian Liberals' attention. The publications of the former were carefully studied, retold and commented on in their press; at times, however, the Liberals would counter the "New Ottomans" with a back strike.

At that period, the Armenian Liberals did not show any intention to set up relations or to cooperate with the "New Ottomans". We see two reasons for that. Firstly, they thought it was a weak movement and did not represent any serious political force: the "Masis" once noted that "Young Turkey" is not so influential²²⁵.

Secondly, the Liberals thought that the favorable for Armenians political outcome of the policy of reforms, pursued by the Sublime Porte, was still possible. Incidentally, to this contributed also their personal friendly relations with the leaders of the country – Âli Paşa and Fuat Paşa, against whom the "New Ottomans" spoke openly. At that period the "Masis" emphasized yet another

²²⁰ *Masis*, 1867, No. 787.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, No. 779.

²²² *Ibid.*, No. 16.

²²³ *Ibid.*, No. 17.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 20.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 784.

time: "All our hopes and good expectations for our own land are only associated with the imperial government"²²⁶.

After the departure of the "New Ottomans" for Europe, the Armenian Liberals' interest in their activity and propagated ideas abated. Neither did it grow after the reformers Fuat Paşa's (1869) and Âli Paşa's (1871) death.

On the whole, the Armenian Liberal press, aware of Midhat Paşa's cooperation with the "New Ottomans", rated positively his activity as the vali of the newly established Danube vilayet. The "Masis" wrote in particular that during those two years he had been able to achieve "certain results"²²⁷.

Here, too, personal relations of the Armenian Liberals played a significant role. When young, still in Constantinople, Midhat Paşa made friends with the leaders of the Armenian Liberals G. Aghaton and G. Otyan²²⁸. The latter was one of Midhat Paşa's most trusted persons and coworkers: he was "director of external affairs" of the Danube vilayet in 1864-1868²²⁹.

G. Otyan's cooperation with Midhat Paşa continued beyond that period and played an instrumental role in maintaining close relationships between the Armenian Liberals and the Turkish Constitutionals during the struggle for the declaration of the Constitution.

The Armenian sources tell about another representative of the Armenian Liberal movement, the agricultural specialist G. Stimarajyan, who worked with Midhat Paşa and held the position of "director of trade and agriculture" of the Danube vilayet²³⁰.

No wonder that Armenians rejoiced at Midhat Paşa's appointment as Grand Vizier in 1872. The "Arevelyan mamul" [Oriental Press], printed in Smyrna, wrote that a new era in the reconstruction of Turkey had started with

²²⁶ Ibid., No. 786.

²²⁷ Ibid., No. 18,

²²⁸ H. M. Nurikhan, *Zhamanakakits patmutyun* [Modern History], 1868-1878, Part 3, Venice, 1907, p. 354.

²²⁹ A. Beylérlian, Krikor Odian (1834-1887): un haut fonctionnaire ottoman, homme des missions secrètes. – *Revue du Monde Arménien*, 1994, Tome I, p. 45-86.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 48.

that appointment²³¹; patriarch Mkrtich Khrimyan related with it his hopes for better conditions of Armenians in the vilayets of Western Armenia²³².

These expectations were groundless.

An advocate of Constitutional reforms, Midhat Paşa at the same time adhered to anti-Christian views, which from time to time were becoming predominant in his political career²³³.

In 1875, Midhat headed the conspiracy against Sultan Abdül Aziz, which goal was to enthrone the protégé of the Turkish Constitutionalists, a member of a mason organization, Prince Murat. That would announce the beginning of the Constitutional reforms. The Armenian Liberals not only participated, but played an active role in that plot and the subsequent Constitutional struggle. Several trends of their participation may be distinguished.

First and foremost, one should mention their – often off-stage and anonymous – work on various documents of the Constitutional movement, on drafts of the Constitution. Grigor Otyan is the first to be named in this connection. The Russian Ambassador to Constantinople found out that he was the co-author of the “Manifesto of Muslim-Patriots”, one of the key documents of the period of Constitutional struggle²³⁴. Or, as the Armenian sources report, he was the author of the articles, published in Paris and London under Midhat Paşa’s signature²³⁵. There are evidences about his decisive role in drafting the final text of the Constitution²³⁶. This fact is noted by Turkish historians as

²³¹ Arevelyan mamul [Oriental Press], 1872, No. 8, p. 357-358.

²³² Divan hayots patmutyan, [Archives of Armenian History], book XIII: Persecutions in Turkish Armenia (documents 1801-1888). With supplements, annotations and glossary. Publ. G. Aghanyants, Tiflis, 1915, p. 247.

²³³ See the subsequent chapters.

²³⁴ N. P. Ignat’ev – N. K. Girsu, Konstantinopol’, 24 maya/5 iyunia 1876 goda [N. P. Ignat’ev – to N. K. Girs, Constantinople, May 24/June 5, 1876]. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria MID, file 25, sheet 204.

²³⁵ Minas Cheraz, Kensagrakan missioner [Biographical missioner], Paris, 1920, p. 21.

²³⁶ H. M. Nurikhan, Zhamanakakits patmutyun [Contemporary History], 1868-1878, Part 3, Venice, 1907, p. 355.

well²³⁷. Interestingly, even Sultan Abdülhamid II wrote in his diary that Otyan was Midhat's "compass" in the Constitutional struggle²³⁸.

In the period of Constitutional movement, Grigor Otyan fulfilled important tasks of diplomatic nature, like, for instance, he was sent by Midhat Paşa with a secret mission to Paris²³⁹.

Among the off-stage activity of Armenians at that period was funding of the Turkish Constitutionalists by liberally oriented *sarafs* (moneylenders)²⁴⁰. According to the Turkish specialist M. J. Kuntay, the man of fortune of Armenian origin Mkrtich Muradoghlu was the personal banker of Prince Murat and Namik Kemal, and at that, he was said to lend money on acceptable terms and often not take back. Mkrtich adhered to Liberal views and shared the Constitutionalists' approaches. It is probable that these sums were assigned for funding the protest marches of the *sofya* (students of Muslim educational institutions) against Sultan Abdülaziz and Christians²⁴¹ (these actions are discussed in Chapter 4).

Grigor Otyan actively participated in the public political struggle for declaration of the Constitution – both in the anti-sultan actions²⁴² and in the sessions of the Constitutional committee²⁴³.

The support of the Armenian Liberals to the Turkish Constitutionalists was elucidated in the Armenian newspapers of 1875-1876. They began to speak more openly about the necessity to implement radical reforms in the Ottoman Empire. The metropolitan "Noragir" [Newsletter] noted, "The ultimate goal of an Armenian is to see the triumph of equality and dignity in Turkey"²⁴⁴, while the

²³⁷ E. Z. Karal, Non-Muslim representatives in the first constitutional assembly. – Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the functioning of a plural society. Ed. by B. Braude and B. Lewis, vol. I: The Central Lands, New York – London, 1982, p. 391.

²³⁸ [Abdülhamit II], İkinci Abdulhamidin hatıra defteri. İstanbul, 1960, s. 117.

²³⁹ B. S. Baykal, Midhat Paşanın gizli bir siyasi teşebbüsü. – III Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 15-20 Kasım 1943. Ankara, 1948, s. 470 - 477; Beylérlian A. Krikor Odian (1834-1887): un haut fonctionnaire ottoman, homme des missions secrètes. – Revue du Monde Arménien, 1994, No. I, p. 54-55.

²⁴⁰ M.C. Kuntay, Namik Kemal devrinin insanları ve olayları arasında. C. 1, İstanbul, 1944, s. 262-263.

²⁴¹ Y. T. Öztuna, Başlangıcından zamanımıza kadar Tütkiye tarihi, C. 12, 1967, s. 54.

²⁴² Minas Cheraz, Kensagrakan missioner, Paris, 1929, p. 23.

²⁴³ R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876. Princeton, 1963, p. 48.

²⁴⁴ *Noragir* [Newsletter], October 23, 1876.

"Masis" wrote about the necessity to introduce the principle of "balance of the authorities"²⁴⁵.

At the same time, the Liberal press was cautious as to the promises of the Turkish 85

Constitutionalists. Thus, the "Arevelyan mamul" reported in 1875 that the sultan's manifesto about the declaration of the Constitution might only be useful if actually put in practice²⁴⁶.

After the official recognition by the Turkish government of the necessity of Constitutional reforms, not only the Liberal, but all the Armenian newspapers welcomed the soonest possible declaration of the Constitution. At the same time, the "Masis" spoke about the prospects of the Constitution with restraint, observing that the Constitution would herald a "new era" only if "effected most accurately"²⁴⁷.

At the period under consideration, the Liberals also kept assuring their readers, and, incidentally, the Turkish power, that Armenians had linked their destiny with the Ottoman Empire²⁴⁸, and that they could only defend their rights "in a tight union with Turkey and co-citizenship with the Turkish people"²⁴⁹. The Armenian patriarch in Constantinople Nerses Varzhapetyan, who was under the Liberals' influence, in the summer of 1876 sent an address to the Armenian people, persuading them to do their best to help the Ottoman government, which had chosen the way of reforms²⁵⁰.

This notwithstanding, the Armenian Liberal press was still able to realistically assess the situation in the country. The "Masis", for instance, communicated that in the Turkish newspapers, a stronger than usual "religious fanaticism" was noticed²⁵¹. The young Liberal Minas Cheraz wrote in August,

²⁴⁵ *Masis*, 1876, No. 1835.

²⁴⁶ *Arevelyan mamul*, 1875, No. 12, p. 480.

²⁴⁷ *Masis*, 1876, No. 1894.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 1848.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 1895.

²⁵⁰ Sarukhan, Haykakan khndirn yev Azgayin Sahmanadrutyuny Turqiayum [The Armenian question and the National Constitution in Turkey] (1860-1910), H. A., Tiflis, 1912, p. 115-117.

²⁵¹ *Masis*, 1876, No. 1841.

1876, that Armenians had more reasons to rebel than the Balkan nations, yet they also knew that "time can cure many a disease"²⁵².

The Armenian Liberals did not give up the hope that cooperation with the Turkish Constitutionalists would make feasible secularization of the state Constitutional system, and limitation of the sphere of application of the Sharia. In the summer of 1876, the usually careful "Masis" subjected the Sharia to severe criticism and warned the authorities that it "can break the peoples of the country into two hostile armies"²⁵³.

The ideological background for the cooperation of the Armenian Liberals and the Turkish Constitutionalists was "Ottoman patriotism". Both movements accepted it, although with different interpretations. The Armenian Liberals criticized the great-power tendencies in it, and sincerely believed that the declaration of the Constitution would make possible the establishment of true "fraternity and equality" of the Ottoman nations. The "New Ottomans", as was shown in the previous Chapter, regarded the Constitution as a means to maintain the predominant position of the Turkish power over the subject Christians by way of their "Ottomanization" and "merging".

In this respect, notable is the speech of the renowned politician S. Papazyan at the Session of the National Assembly in December, 1876, in which the mentioned ideological controversy was clearly stated. Papazyan said, "We shall be outspoken with our Ottoman fellow tribesmen and exert ourselves for them to understand that we are Armenians and that we shall maintain our nationality even under the Ottoman flag. The striving for merging will be useful for neither of us..., despite this, we (meaning the nations of the Ottoman Empire – R. S.) have community of interests. That is why we, as citizens of the Ottoman Empire, form a united wholeness..."²⁵⁴

²⁵² A. Alpoyatjyan, Minas Cheraz: ir kyanqy yev gortzy: ir 60amya hobelyani ativ [Minas Cheraz: his life and career; to his 60th anniversary]. Cairo, 1927, p. 114.

²⁵³ *Masis*, 1876, No. 1841.

²⁵⁴ *Atenagrutyunq Azgayin zhoghovo* [Minutes of the National Assembly], 1876-1877, Constantinople, 1876, p. 326.

PREREQUISITES FOR FORMATION OF A PROTO-GENOCIDAL SITUATION

THE GENESIS OF THE OTTOMAN STATE

The problem of the genesis of the Ottoman state is important, as many modern researchers point out, by that the specifics of the further historical development of the state are largely conditioned by the specifics of its genesis²⁵⁵.

There are two basic theories, explicating the problem. Even though proposed in the last century, they still retain their significance. The author of the first theory is the British specialist in Ottoman Studies Paul Wittek. In his opinion, the Ottoman state in its first phase was a *Ġazi* state, which means that the ideological unity, based on the militant interpretation of Islam, was prioritized as the principal state-forming factor²⁵⁶.

In the 80s of the last century this standpoint was rigorously criticised by Turkish and a few western specialists in Ottoman Studies. They mainly produced the following – not conforming with the historic reality – argument: how could the founders of the Ottoman state be fanatic militant *ġazis*, intolerant of Christians, if that state of the Ottomans' was conspicuous for its "religious tolerance"²⁵⁷?

Paul Wittek's theory has supporters among specialists in Ottoman Studies of today. Here belongs the Turkish-born American historian Cemal Kafadar. Partly agreeing with Wittek's theory, he makes a special emphasis on that the genesis of the Ottoman state should be regarded as a long-lasting process of full one hundred and fifty years, over which period the Ottoman conquerors, in order

²⁵⁵ W. Pfaff, *The wrath of nations: civilization and the furies of nationalism*. New York, 1994, p. 102.

²⁵⁶ P. Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London, 1938.

²⁵⁷ H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: the classical age, 1300 -1600*. London - New York, 1973, p. 7.

to attain and maintain hegemony, employed a lot of means, the *gazi* ideology and policy being one of them²⁵⁸.

The other theory was created by the Turkish historian Fuat Köprülü. According to him, the origination of the Ottoman state was conditioned by the Turkish ethnic factor in the first place²⁵⁹. The theory has numerous adherents, mostly among Turkish historians²⁶⁰.

Giving preference to P. Wittek's theory, the author emphasizes that it should be complemented with observations on the specificities of using force. Beginning from the earliest period of their history, Ottoman Turks perceived themselves as the vanguards of the struggle against Christians. This gave rise to a unique atmosphere of militant fanaticism among them, and dictated the one and only top priority – conquests under the guise of *jihad* – the more so as the requisite traditions and institutions already existed. In the XIII-XIV centuries, the Ottoman state was characterized by relative homogeneity, religious fanaticism and super-militarization. Its existence for the most part depended on armed robbery, while its state ideology was *jihad* – both internal and external.

During the XIV-XV centuries, the basic constituents of the Ottoman state structure and social composition had been formed, a number of political and ideological peculiarities developed, which had had a strong impact on the entire course of Ottoman history.

The Ottoman Empire stemmed from a small *üç bey* – border principality in the decaying Seljuk sultanate of Iconium in the XIII century. It belonged to the Osman dynasty, who were members of the *Kay* branch of *Oğuz* Turkic peoples. As S. Shaw described them, said nomadic tribe lacked any roots and was ready to serve the master, who would offer a bigger gain²⁶¹. They had migrated from Central Asia. The Seljuk sultans of Iconium gave a principality with Christian population in the northwest of Asia Minor into possession of one of the tribal chiefs Ertuğrul, the father of Osman.

At the beginning, the number of *Osmanlı* did not exceed 400 families²⁶². The main source of their existence, as well as their main occupation were raids and robbery of the local peaceful rural Christian population. As was the custom with nomads, the entire tribe was involved in the raids, including women and

²⁵⁸ C. Kafadar, *Between two worlds: the construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley, 1995, p. 121.

²⁵⁹ F. Köprülü, *Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşu*. Ankara, 1959.

²⁶⁰ M. T. Gökbilgin, *Rumelide cler, Tatarlar ve Evlâd-ı Fatihan*, İstanbul, 1957.

²⁶¹ St. J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey*. Vol. I: *Empire of the Gazis: the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*. Cambridge, 1977, p. 13.

²⁶² D. Avcioğlu. *Türklerin tarihi. Birinci Kitap. Dördüncü Basım*. İstanbul, 1982, s. 162.

children. Back in Osman's days a decision was made to better organize the military actions, for which reason the *aqinci* mounted troops were formed. These irregular detachments were nothing but well-armed gangs of savage robbers. Later the *aqincis* grew into weighty divisions of the Ottoman army; they usually started their actions two days prior to the principal army²⁶³. Their primary task was to destroy and plunder the enemy's possessions²⁶⁴, to set to fire their towns and townships²⁶⁵, then to scatter in small groups all over the adversary's country and terrify the population²⁶⁶.

The principalities did not have clearly demarcated borders, so the Christians under their rule, as well as the subjects of other principalities and neighboring Byzantium fell victim of the Ottoman's raids.

Initially, the Ottoman principality did not differ from others in the western frontier zones of the Seljuk Sultanate of Iconium²⁶⁷. Here predominating were the *aşiret* (dynastic-tribal) forms²⁶⁸ of governance, which corresponded to the then level of Turkic tribes. Their objective was to more optimally organize armed plunders. The social structure of the Ottoman principality was simple; in fact, the ruling elite embraced the whole of the tribe; they were group oppressors of the local Christian population²⁶⁹. The entire territory was divided among its members into *ıqtas* (conditional possessions).

Taking advantage of the geographical location – bordering on Byzantium, the leading force of the Christian world of the time, the Ottoman *beys* managed to impart to their aggressive actions an appearance of jihad, or *ğazavat* ("holy war against infidels"), and act as representatives of the entire Muslim world.

²⁶³ İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti teşkilatından kapukulu ocakları. II. Ankara, 1944, s.255.

²⁶⁴ Ş. Sami, Kamus-i Türki. Dersaadet, 1318, s. 45-46.

²⁶⁵ Ahmet Rasim, Resimli ve haritalı osmanlı tarihi. 2. Cild, 2. Tabı, İstanbul, 1328-1330, s. 149 -150.

²⁶⁶ M. Z. Pakalın, Osmanlı tarih deyimleri ve terimleri sözlüğü. I, İkinci Basılış, İstanbul, 1971, s. 39.

²⁶⁷ R. A. Guseynov, Uji – voenno-feodal'nyi institut v Maloy Azii v XI-XII vv. [Uji – military-feudal institute in Asia Minor in the XI-XII centuries]. – Collected works on Turkic studies 1974, M., 1978, p. 213-229.

²⁶⁸ İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, Osmanlı devleti teşkilâtına medhal. İstanbul, 1941, s. 143.

²⁶⁹ S. F. Oreshkova, Gosudarstvennaya vlast' i nekotorye problemy formirovaniya sotsial'noy struktury osmanskogo obshchestva [State power and some problems of formation of the social structure of the Ottoman society]. – Ottoman Empire: the system of state management, social and ethno-religious problems. M., 1986, p. 5.

This enabled them to concentrate significant power in their hands and to prepare foundation for a large-scale expansion.

The Ottoman principality became a gathering place for *ğazis* – fanatic and adventurous vanguards of the armed struggle against “infidels”, their various groupings, who were mixing there from other principalities of Asia Minor²⁷⁰. The medieval Turkish historian and poet Aşık Paşazade in his chronicle, besides the *ğazis*, mentioned three other groupings of that kind – *derişes*, *akhis*, and *women-warriors*²⁷¹ – well organized, widely spread all over the Muslim world, and enjoying great renown. Numerous representatives of various *tariqats* (mystic brotherhoods) may also be added here²⁷².

Each of these cohorts played their part in the formation of the Ottoman statehood. The *akhis* were instrumental in establishing Turkish control over the towns which had avoided destruction²⁷³. The others were completing the rows of the *ulema* class – Muslim fanatic clerics, who headed most of the just establishing state structures. Their major target, however, was to “spread Islam among the infidels” by force of arms. Many of them participated in military actions and, as the Turkish historian put it, “with a handful of *mürids* (pupils – R. S.) were squishing thousands of enemies”²⁷⁴. The *akhis* and the clerics constituted the core of the first semi-regular and regular troops of the Ottoman army. In particular, under the guidance of the *cadi*, the first *yaniçeri* corps was formed²⁷⁵.

The Ottoman beys officially turned to other Turkic leaders in Asia Minor with a request to provide military aid for them to wage “holy war” in the west, and received such from many²⁷⁶.

No less important for strengthening of the Ottoman principality were *Yürüks* and *Tatars* (nomadic Turkic tribes), who massively moved here from

²⁷⁰ P. Wittek, *The rise of the Ottoman Empire*. London, 1938, p. 41.

²⁷¹ Shamsutdinov A. M., *Problemy stanovlenia osmanskogo gosudarstva po turetskim istochnikam XIV-XV vv.* [Problems of formation of the Ottoman state according to Turkish sources of the XIV-XV centuries]. – *Ottoman Empire: the system of state management, social and ethno-religious problems*. M., 1986, p. 36-37.

²⁷² F. Köprülü, *Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşu*. Ankara, 1959, s. 95-102.

²⁷³ S. Yerasimos, *Azğelişmişlik sürecinde Türkiye*. 1. Cilt: *Bizanstan Tanzımata*. İstanbul, 1977, s. 194.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, s. 101.

²⁷⁵ I. E. Petrosyan, *K istorii sozdania yanycharskogo korpusa* [On the history of formation of the Janissary corps]. – *Collected works on Turkic studies* 1978, M., 1984, p. 194.

²⁷⁶ M. Akdağ, *Türkiye'nin iktisadi ve içtimai tarihi*, C. 1: 1243-1453. İstanbul, 1974, s. 153.

Asia Minor, attracted by the potential big loot. According to a Turkish historian, the fanatic dervishes were most active: they became spiritual leaders for these nomads, who were on a very low level of development and still under the influence of shamanism²⁷⁷. The renowned connoisseur of the Ottoman early Middle Ages Fuat Köprülü's description of the members of the *Qalandariyah* tariqat may give some idea of the dervishes: they were known for their "nihilism" and "horrible immorality"²⁷⁸.

The Ottoman *beys* and, subsequently, the sultans succeeded in employing Yürüks and Tatars, as another Turkish historian noted, "...in the most favorable way for the state"²⁷⁹. One of these "favorable ways" was their use in colonization of the occupied lands, the other – as the main military force. Yürüks and Tatars were allotted *çiflik*s (small plots of lands) with obligation to cultivate; in case of need, they were also obligated to participate in military actions within the newly formed detachments of the *yayas* and *müsellems*, which exempted them from taxes. During their participation in military actions, they were paid a salary²⁸⁰. These detachments were formed in accordance with a program, previously drafted by the representative of the ulema Çandarlı Kara Halil, who was connected with the akhi brotherhood²⁸¹. It was not accidental that *yayas* and *musellems* received a *special uniform*, which replicated that of *akhis*. The uniform, ulema Hoca Sadeddin wrote, was indicative of their *privileged status*²⁸².

The formation of the mentioned divisions was a meaningful development for the early period of the Ottoman state, as they had increased the fighting capacity of the army, allowed to involve nomads in state structures, facilitating their transition to settled life. Thus the Ottoman peasantry came into being.

As early as in the XIV century, the Ottoman *beys* took up the policy of enslavement and Turkization of Christians under the veil of Islamization. The Ottoman nomadic dynasty turned out exceptionally fanatic and consistent in that cause. They employed the concept of *jihād* to impose and retain their power over the indigenous settled Christian peasantry²⁸³.

²⁷⁷ F. Köprülü, *Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşu*. Ankara, 1959, s. 97-102.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, s. 99.

²⁷⁹ M. T. Gökgilgin, *Rumelide Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlad-ı Fatihan*. İstanbul, 1957, s. 19.

²⁸⁰ I. E. Petrosyan, *K istorii sozdania yanycharskogo korpusa*. – Collected works on Turkic studies 1978, M., 1984, p. 192.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*

²⁸² D. Avcıoğlu. *Türklerin tarihi*. Birinci Kitap. Dördüncü Basım. İstanbul, 1982, s. 163.

²⁸³ S. F. Oreshkova, *Gosudarstvennaya vlast' i nekotorye problemy formirovaniya sotsial'noy struktury osmanskogo obschestva* [State power and some problems of

In the period of rule of Sultan Murat I, the system of *pençik* was introduced, according to which one fifth of the number of Christian captives were sent to join the Turkic tribes in Asia Minor for 2-3 years, where they were converted, taught Turkish and used for physical toil²⁸⁴. Thereupon, they were returned to the sultan's palace as a complement of his personal servants or of the newly set up Janissary corps²⁸⁵. *Pençik* was in line with the precept of Koran, "And know, if you take booty, one fifth is Allah's and the ones' sent by him..."²⁸⁶. By the Sharia taxation system, it was one of the most important taxes, collected from Muslims by the state²⁸⁷. It was collected in other Turkic principalities of Asia Minor too²⁸⁸. The Ottomans, however, managed to adapt it to military needs, which gave them enormous privileges over the other principalities.

Further on, when the flow of war prisoners subsided, roughly in the mid-XIV century, the system of *devşirme* (recruiting youths) was administered: male children of Christians under the Ottoman power were taken away, enslaved, and Turkized²⁸⁹. In many scholars' opinion, *devşirme* contradicted the Sharia²⁹⁰. Nevertheless, it allowed the first Turkish sultans to solve two most important problems – reinforcement of the army and retention of the power over the Christian population. The Janissaries served the same objective – they turned out to be useful in the Islamization of the Balkans²⁹¹. In general, forcible Islamization of the subject peoples was part of the policy, followed by the

formation of the social structure of the Ottoman society]. – Ottoman Empire: the system of state management, social and ethno-religious problems. M., 1986, p. 6.

²⁸⁴ W. Eton, A survey of the Turkish Empire. London, 1798, p. 62.

²⁸⁵ I. E. Petrosyan, K istorii sozdania yanycharskogo korpusa. – Collected works in Turkic studies 1978, M., 1984, p. 193-196.

²⁸⁶ Sura 8: Dobycha, 42 [Surah 8: Booty, 42]. – Koran. Translation and comments by I. Yu. Krachkovskiy. M., 1986, s. 157.

²⁸⁷ G. M. Kerimov, Shariat i ego sotsial'naya suschnost' [The Sharia and its social essence]. M., 1978, p. 173-179.

²⁸⁸ K. A. Zhukov, Egeyskie emiraty v XIV-XV vv. [Aegean Emirates in the XIV-XV centuries]. M., 1988, p. 126.

²⁸⁹ M. K. Zulalyan, Devshirmen (mankahavaqy) Osmanyany kaysrutyunum yst turqakan yev haykakan axbyurneri [Devşirme (recruiting youths) in the Ottoman Empire according to Turkish and Armenian sources]. – Historical-philological Journal, 1959, 2-3, p. 247-256.

²⁹⁰ M. K. Zulalyan, Arevmtyan Hayastany XVI-XVIII dd. [Western Armenia in the XVI-XVIII centuries]. – Yerevan, 1980, p. 328.

²⁹¹ E. Werner, Die Geburt einer Grossmacht - Die Osmanen (1300-1481). Berlin, 1966, S. 12-14.

Ottoman authorities. According to an expert in Ottoman Turkey, after the seizure of Constantinople, it transformed to its finalized form – a system of “organized fanaticism”²⁹².

Unlike the later periods of the Ottoman Empire, the population of the principality was more homogeneous. The elite consisted of representatives of various Turkic tribes – the *ğazis*, as well as the members of the Ottoman dynasty and of diverse brotherhoods and *tariqats*. The bulk of war booty accumulated in their hands. They owned continually expanding land and human resources of the country through *iqtas*; they were the military and spiritual leaders in the just establishing state. Acceptable is Köprülü's statement that *all the prominent state figures in the XIV century came from Turkic tribes*²⁹³. This is how the ruling Ottoman military-feudal class began to take shape. In the XIII-XIV centuries, involvement of converted Christians into the ruling elite was but rare.

The power of that class rested upon the most brutal use of armed force. As an auxiliary, yet effectual means was extensive forcible Islamization of Christians. Inconsistent with the reality is the other statement by the same author about the “limited scale and slow progress” of Islamization at that period of time²⁹⁴. As one of the Turk medievalists marked, 10-15 years after the Turkish conquest, the Balkan cities looked Turkish²⁹⁵. A certain amount of Christians was left for purely economic reasons: the Turkic nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes still lacked the skills of household management.

Çiftçis (owners of *çiftlik*s), represented, as mentioned above, by Turkic tribes of a lower level, constituted the intermediate social stratum. Subsequently, when the detachments of *yayas* and *musellems* lost their military significance, they were deprived of their privileges and joined the ranks of Muslim peasantry.

The lowest stratum made the surviving Christians. Their number at that period was relatively small, since in conditions of vast booty and simple social and state structure, the Ottoman ruling class showed little interest in the result of their work.

Thus, let us sum up. From the earliest period of their history, Ottoman Turks considered themselves as the vanguards in the struggle against Christians. The already existing requisite traditions and institutions did not only favor the formation of the atmosphere of anti-Christian militant fanaticism in their

²⁹² R. R. Madden, *The Turkish Empire in its relations with Christianity and civilization*. London, 1862, p. 7.

²⁹³ F. Köprülü, *Osmanlı devletinin kuruluşu*. Ankara, 1959, s. 83.

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, s. 82.

²⁹⁵ İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*. I. Cilt: kuruluşun İstanbul'un fethine kadar. Ankara, 1947, s. 267.

environment, but dictated the one and only top priority – conquests under the guise of jihad. In the XIII-XIV centuries, the Ottoman state was characterized by relative homogeneity, religious fanaticism and super-militarization. Its existence for the most part depended on armed robbery, while its state ideology was the concept of jihad – both internal and external. One cannot agree with H. Inalcik's statement about the religious tolerance, characteristic of the Ottoman principality²⁹⁶. Like other Turkic principalities in western Asia Minor, it was a Ğasi state²⁹⁷, but it was the only Ğazi principality to have grown into an empire and retain its gist. Over centuries, it went through numerous transformations, yet retained its fanatic and militant nature. Hardly discernible at some historic periods, at others its brutal image would fully reveal itself.

Thus happened, for instance, in the reign of Sultan Selim Yavuz I in the beginning of the XVI century, when by his orders, the governors of the Asian regions of the empire made up lists of the *kizilbaşes*. I. H. Uzuncarşili, one of the founders of “official historiography”, could not but admit that, based on those lists, 40 thousand people were almost simultaneously arrested and killed – for the fear lest the *kizilbaşes* might support the Safavid dynasty in the war, preparations to which had already been underway²⁹⁸. From the perspective of modern Genocide Studies, this act can be defined as a manifestation of genocidal policy: firstly, it was premeditated (official lists were prepared in advance), and, secondly, it was coordinated. This act of genocidal nature is principally different from the mass slaughters, periodically committed by Ottoman Turks in the Middle Ages as a means of maintaining the territorial integrity of their country, and to a bigger extent reminds of the Armenian Genocide of the late XIX – early XX centuries.

It is not accidental that its initiator was Sultan Selim: in contrast to many Turk sultans, “in state affairs he was guided by a certain program”, and, like Sultan Abdülhamid II, had a well “organized” network of spies inside and outside the country²⁹⁹.

Armenian sources evince that the danger of identical acts persisted in the later periods of the Middle Ages³⁰⁰.

²⁹⁶ H. Inalcik, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London and New York, 1973, p. 7.

²⁹⁷ The author of this notion is P. Wittek.

²⁹⁸ İ. H. Uzuncarşili, *Osmanlı tarihi. II. Cilt: İstanbulun fethinden Kanunî Sultan Süleymanın ölümüne kadar*. Ankara, 1949, s. 246.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, s. 289.

³⁰⁰ A. M. Aivazian, *The Armenian rebellion of the 1720s and the threat of genocidal reprisal*, Erevan: AUA, 1997.

The medieval Ottoman autocrats widely applied the policy of forcible deportation of peoples, thereby changing the ethnic and confessional composition of different regions, and facilitating their Turkization. In the Middle Ages, this measure was mostly administered towards the Balkan Christians. Vast masses of population were deported. Turkish historian M. T. Gökbilgin, having done some preliminary calculations, wrote that after the capture of the Balkans, only during the first 80-90 years, the Ottomans settled there 3.5 million Muslims, but he preferred not to disclose the number of Christians, exiled to Asian regions³⁰¹. The policy of forcible deportations enabled to swiftly change the ethnic image of the occupied regions. Turkish historians proudly noted that 10-15 years after the Turkish conquest the Balkan cities looked "Turkish"³⁰².

Turkish historians reported that Arabs also fell victim of that policy: in some territories they were replaced by Turkic nomadic tribes³⁰³. Later such policy was also exercised towards the indigenous Armenian population³⁰⁴.

Forcible deportations were called *sürgün* – exile. The Turkish historian C. Orhonlu defines it as a policy of organized settlement, intended to "mix" different groups of the population³⁰⁵. It is interesting to note that the deportations of Armenians – a form of Genocidal policy, aimed to exterminate, not to mix the exiles – were also called "sürgün".

Thus, the policy of genocide in the Ottoman Empire had deep historical roots, both in form and in content. Midhats, Abdülhamids and Talâts were not just diligent pupils of their predecessors – they far and away surpassed their medieval teachers...

³⁰¹ M. T. Gökbilgin, *Rumelide Yürükler, Tatarlar ve Evlad-i Fatihan*. İstanbul, 1957, s. 18.

³⁰² İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi. I. Cilt: Kuruluştan İstanbul'un fethine kadar*. Ankara, 1947, s. 267.

³⁰³ N. Sevinç, *Gaziantep'de yer adları ve Türk boyları, Türk aşiretleri, Türk oymakları*. İstanbul, 1983, s. 17.

³⁰⁴ See about it: Melkonyan A. A., *Egherni qaghaqakanutyan dzevavorman akunqnerum* [At the roots of formation of genocidal policy]. – *The Armenian Genocide (studies)*. Ed. by P. H. Hovhannisyan, Yerevan, 2001, p. 35-34

³⁰⁵ C. Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Derbend teşkilâtı*. İkinci baskı. İstanbul, 1990, s. 101.

INTENSIFICATION OF ANTI-CHRISTIANITY

The pro-Western reforms were negatively accepted by the Turkish population of the Ottoman Empire. The Tanzimat leaders' declarations and attempts of reforms towards establishing formal equality of rights between Muslims and Christians caused the most resentment. This political trend was regarded as excessive concession to the subject Christian peoples, who had been conquered by Turks, and thenceforth lived in the Ottoman Empire as representatives of a subordinate class³⁰⁶.

In the atmosphere of overall discontent, the anti-Christian movement was gaining form and power, manifesting itself differently (particularly, as anti-Slavic and anti-Russian), intermingling with Muslim radicalism and ideas of pan-Islamism. With time, it grew into a most significant factor, which left its imprint on many developments of the Tanzimat period and the subsequent years. Its logical offspring was the principally new political situation, formed in the Ottoman Empire in 1876, and qualified by us as proto-genocidal.

Up to date, all the causes of said phenomenon have not been thoroughly studied³⁰⁷. The facts extant evidence that it had deep roots and broad coverage. It was based on the anti-Christian precepts of Islam. Thus, according to contemporaries, Muslims, especially in provincial areas, behaved as though only Muslims were human beings – in accordance with Mohammed's well-known definition³⁰⁸. The Tanzimat Hatts of 1839 and 1856 considerably facilitated the intensification and "ideologicalization" of the existing anti-Christian moods. That process was directed by certain groups of the Muslim clergy and the ruling elite. Later, anti-Christianity became an important component of the ideology of such oppositional actions as the "*Kuleli Event*" or the conspiracies of the "New Ottomans".

At the initial phase, the most active reaction to Tanzimat was displayed by the Muslim clergy. They agitated the population against Tanzimat in mosques,

³⁰⁶ R. Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat. Ankara, 1954, s. 189; Cevdet Paşa, Tezakir 1-12. Ankara, 1953, s. 8.

³⁰⁷ R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876. Princeton, 1963, p. 270-278; I. L. Fadeeva, Novye tendentsii v politike Porty nachala 70-kh godov XIX v. [New trends in the policy of Porte in the beginning of the 70s of the XIX century]. - Collected works in Turkic Studies 1878, M., 1984, p. 229-234; I. L. Fadeeva, Ofitsial'nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoy imperii (osmanizm - panislizm): XIX-nachalo XX v. [Official doctrines in the ideology and politics of the Ottoman Empire (Ottomanism - pan-Islamism): the XIX - beginning of the XX century]. M., 1985, p. 97-100.

³⁰⁸ L. Farley, Turks and Christians. London, 1876, p. 153.

even alluded to Mohammed's alleged discontent, who was said to have come in their dreams³⁰⁹ and encouraged not to obey the Tanzimat Hatts and various firmans, keep up their dominating position over Christians in conformity with Mohammed's precepts and the laws of the Sharia³¹⁰. The consul of Great Britain to Karin related that, when in 1841, the Greeks of Trabzon, in compliance with the Tanzimat reforms, were allowed to renovate their church (the Sharia prohibited it), and exercised that right, the Turkish mob, led by the *cadi*, ruined the renovated part of the church. This was a manifestation of violent disobedience and determination to acknowledge the Sharia as the one and only source of law³¹¹. The British diplomat continued that Governor Osman Paşa also incited Turks: he sought "to teach the Christians a lesson, as they profited profusely from the Hatt-i Şerif"³¹².

Similar diplomatic messages were received from the European regions of the Ottoman Empire. Turk citizens, representing various strata of the society, openly announced that they do not acknowledge "the freedoms or equality of rights of the reaya with the 'true believers', and will not in the future", communicated the Austrian consul to the Bulgarian city of Ruse³¹³.

In 1865 the next in turn sultanic edict was promulgated – the *Hatt-ı Hümayun*, planning farther reaching pro-Western reforms. This caused the Muslims', particularly the local governors' much more pronounced resentment. The consul of Prussia reported about a typical case that happened in the city of Vidin during the public reading of the Hatt-ı Hümayun: the Turkish *zaptiye* (gendarme) beat a Christian only because the latter had shown signs of rejoicement related with the Hatt³¹⁴.

³⁰⁹ R. Kaynar, Mustafa Reşit Paşa ve Tanzimat..., s. 187.

³¹⁰ F. Bianconi, La Question d'Orient dévoilée ou la vérité sur la Turquie. Paris, 1876, p. 39-40, 42-43.

³¹¹ Brunt to Palmerston, Erzeroom, July 22, 1841. – Armenian National Archives, Fund 450, The Armenian question, list 2, D. 196, Public Record Office (FO 195/812, x/p 9440), p. 1. (copy).

³¹² Ibid., p. 3. (copy).

³¹³ Rössler - An den Graf Buol, Ruße, 19. August 1853. – Dokumenti za bylgarskata istoria. T. VI: Dokumenti za Novata istoria na bylgarskia narod iz Vienskite dyrzhavni arkhivi: 1830-1877 [Documents on Bulgarian history. Vol. VI: Documents on New history of the Bulgarian people from the Viennese State Archives: 1830-1977]. Part II. Comp. by P. Nikov. Sofia: 1951, p. 67.

³¹⁴ M. Kalish – Vildenbrukhu, Ruse, 12 marta 1856. – Dokumenti za bylgarskata istoria iz germanski arkhivi (1829-1877). [M. Kalish to Wildenbruch, Ruse, March 12, 1856. – Documents on Bulgarian history from the German archives (1829-1877)]. Comp. and ed. Khr. Khristov i V. Paskaleva, Sofia, 1963, p. 288.

The opposition to Tanzimat and anti-Christianity was becoming more and more organized; a conspiracy was devised against the sultan and the Tanzimat leaders; it was designated as the "Kuleli Event".

The history of the Ottoman Empire abounds in conspiracies, attempts of successful and failed revolutions. Yet, none of them caused such scientific and political interest and a flow of contradictory interpretations as the exposed conspiracy against Sultan Abdul Mecid in September, 1859, in Constantinople.

In mid-September, in the capital, a group of plotters were arrested, imprisoned in the "Kuleli" barracks, interrogated for three or four weeks and hastily tried by the court with a special degree of jurisdiction, consisting of high-ranking state figures. Four of the group were sentenced to death, the rest – to different terms of imprisonment or exile. By the order of Sultan Abdülmecid I, death sentences were substituted for exiles.

The interest of scholars in this conspiracy, which at first glance was very much the same as lots of previous ones, is conditioned by that the conspirators had founded the first in Turkish history political organization – in today's interpretation. It possessed a political program, around which the members of the organization grouped³¹⁵.

The sources, elucidating this significant event, are surprisingly scarce. Even the text of the program of the conspiracy has not been found yet. The German researcher B. Stern in his book, devoted to the reform movement, launched and expanded in the Ottoman Empire, quoted the program, yet did not mention any source³¹⁶.

The bulk of the sources, known to scholars, was put into scientific circulation in the 30-60s of the last century and has not been significantly supplemented since then. The first to refer to a source was the Turkish historian Uluğ İğdemir, in whose monograph published are the texts of the official minutes of the trial of the conspirators, found by the author in the "*Hazine-i Evrak*" [Treasury of Documents] of the Ottoman State Archives³¹⁷. A few years after the publication of İğdemir's book, works of generalizing nature by the well-known historians Tarik Zafer Tunaya, Enver Ziya Karal and İsmail Hani Danişment, based on the Ottoman sources, followed each other. The "Kuleli Event" was given a special place in those books³¹⁸.

³¹⁵ T. Z. Tunaya, *Türkiye'de siyasi partiler (1859-1952)*. İstanbul, 1952, s. 89 – 90.

³¹⁶ B. Stern, *Jungtürken und Verschwörer. Die innere Lage der Türkei unter Abdul Hamid II*. Leipzig, 1901, S. 110.

³¹⁷ U. İğdemir, *Kuleli Vak'ası hakkında bir araştırma*. Ankara, 1937.

³¹⁸ T. Z. Tunaya, *Türkiyede siyasi partiler (1859-1952)*. İstanbul, 1952, s. 89 – 90; E. Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*. VI cilt: *Islahat Fermanı devri, 1856 -1861*. Ankara, 1954, s. 95 –

In the subsequent years, foreign scholars also turned to the study of said conspiracy to complement the framework of its primary sources with western and Russian archive materials. The specialist in Turkish Studies from Moscow Vera Shpil'kova was the first to investigate the sources of Russian diplomacy³¹⁹. The outcome was but one short publication, which, however, has not lost its scientific significance to date. Later on, Irma Fadeeva cursorily turned to Russian diplomatic documents³²⁰.

The American specialist in Turkish Studies Roderick Davison studied the correspondence of the Western diplomats related with the "Kuleli Event". He investigated the British, French, Austrian, Swedish and American archives, memoirs of contemporaries and publications in the press. In the fundamental monograph, authored by R. Davison, the concise, yet important description of the Ottoman reforms is given³²¹.

The source frame of the "Kuleli Event" is mainly based on the mentioned works. It is far from being complete: the Ottoman archives have not been studied sufficiently; many of the contemporaries' evidences and those from the press still remain unknown. The sources already in circulation are insufficient. Thus, in U. İğdemir's book, the answers of the conspirators at the court trial are incoherent and desultory³²². It is not impossible that their significant portion was later destroyed by the authorities. The diplomatic documents are also often of little help, as the reports of foreign offices in Constantinople to their governments at times were based on dependable sources of information. This fact was recorded by such an expert of western diplomatic archives as abovementioned R. Davison. He wrote that the embassies received "contradictory" messages on the conspiracy³²³. Such conclusion of his is confirmed by the fact that V. Shpil'kova and I. Fadeeva, having studied the Russian diplomatic correspondence, arrived at vastly different conclusions.

All the following researchers, based on the works, cited above, and depending on their historiographic approaches and political preferences, offered their own interpretation of the "Kuleli Event". Source shortage is a serious

97; İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. Cilt: 4, 1703 – 1924. İstanbul, 1955, s. 188–190.

³¹⁹ V. I. Shpil'kova, *Antimonarkhicheskiy zagovor 1859 g. v Turtsii* [Anti-monarchic conspiracy of 1859 in Turkey]. – *Problems of Oriental Studies*, 1959, No. 1, p. 100–104.

³²⁰ I. L. Fadeeva, *Ofitsial'nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoy imperii (osmanism - panislamism): XIX – nachalo XX v. M.*, 1985, p. 76.

³²¹ R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1976*. Princeton, 1963, p. 100–103.

³²² U. İğdemir, *Kuleli Vak'ası hakkında bir araştırma*. Ankara, 1937, s. 34–37.

³²³ R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1976*. Princeton, 1963, p. 102.

obstacle for a deeper and better substantiated analysis of that significant historic episode.

To a certain extent, this gap may be bridged by the Armenian press of those days. In some cases, the publications reiterate the already known facts, yet there is a considerable amount of fresh noteworthy communications. Thus, from the news in the "Masis" weekly of Constantinople it becomes apparent that, at the period, preceding the conspiracy, increase of anti-Christian sentiments was observed among the Turkish population of the Ottoman Empire, which at times grew into bloody fights with Christians³²⁴.

The "Masis" also reported about cases of mass uprisings, usually headed by representatives of the Muslim clergy, against the adopted by the government policy of pro-Western reforms. From that perspective, worth noticing are the developments in the township of Akn in the Kharberd province. According to the "Masis" (the news was reprinted from the Turkish "Mecmua-i Havadis", issued in Armenian script), the Muslims of Akn, led by the *mufti*, rebelled against the governmental edict, allowing to ring the bells in local churches. The edict was part of the policy, exercised within the frame of the Tanzimat reforms, and contradicted the Sharia. The mufti seized the opportunity and instigated the mob against the Christians and the pro-Western government. The weekly reported that the mob demanded to destroy not only the churches of *giaours*, but also the governmental orders and those who put them into practice³²⁵. Detailed descriptions of such developments give clear understanding of the atmosphere in the Ottoman Empire that influenced the mindset of the conspirators.

The debate around the nature of the "Kuleli Event" continues to date. Many of scholars, following the "super-westernized paradigm" of modern Turkish history, characterize the conspiracy as "anti-monarchic"; they point out that the participants shared "liberal" and "constitutional" views, and consider it as the first manifestation of the Constitutional movement in the Ottoman Empire³²⁶. This approach, approved of by Atatürk, was included in the official history, issued by Turkey Historical Scientific Society³²⁷.

³²⁴ See, for example, *Masis*, 1859, July 23.

³²⁵ *Masis*, 1859, August 13.

³²⁶ V. I. Shpil'kova, *Antimonrkhicheskiy zagovor 1859 g. v Turtsii. – Problemy vostokovedeniya*, 1959, No. 1, s. 100-104; N. Berkes, *Türkiye'de çağdaşlaşma*. İstanbul, 1978, s. 241-244; R. Karadağ, *Muhteşem imparatorluğu yıkanlar*. 4. Baskı. İstanbul, 1991, s. 177, 85-93.

³²⁷ *Tarih III: Yeni ve Yakın Zamanlar*. T.T.T. Cemiyeti tarafından yazılmıştır. İstanbul, 1933, s. 252.

About the Constitutional views of the conspirators wrote some contemporaries too. They, however, did not base on trustworthy facts. Thus, the then French consul to Belgrade E. Engelhardt, having studied the 1859 conspiracy, published a voluminous book of memoirs, where France's official policy towards the Ottoman Empire was supported. Said policy was meant to maintain the territorial integrity of the empire by way of pro-Western reforms. As is mentioned in the memoirs, the goal of the conspiracy was to proclaim parliament, which was to consist of both Muslims and Christians³²⁸. The source of this important news, according to Engelhardt, was an "anonymous publicist"³²⁹. Unfortunately, this suspicious information had been used in professional literature many a time - without in-depth analysis.

Some researchers see connection between the conspirators and the secret organization of the first Turkish Constitutionalists – the "New Ottomans", or even regard their conspiracy as an event, heralding the initiation of the revolutionary Young Turk movement³³⁰.

A big group of scholars find that the main goal of the conspirators was to put an end to the pro-Western reforms of Tanzimat and to restore the laws of the Sharia in their "pure" form, according to which the Christians of the Ottoman Empire were to return to their legally subordinate status³³¹. The supporters of these views base on the testimonies, given by the arrested conspirators, as well as on the fact that their majority came from Muslim clerics. The latter interpretation is indirectly confirmed by a publication in the Armenian press. Thus, in the "Masis", an interesting material was printed, which said that right after the conspiracy had been exposed, Sultan Abdülmecid I, who was the

³²⁸ E. Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat ou histoire des réformes dans L'Empire Ottoman depuis 1826 jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris, 1882, p. 159.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

³³⁰ A. B. Kuran, *İnkılâp tarihimiz ve İttihad ve Terakki*. İstanbul, 1948, s. 20; A. B. Kuran, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde inkılâp hareketleri*. İstanbul, 1959, s. 62.

³³¹ L. Collas, *Histoire de L'Empire Ottoman jusqu'à la revolution de 1909*. Paris, [s.d.], p. 139; R. Davison, *Turkish attitudes concerning Christian-Muslim equality in the nineteenth century*. – *The American Historical Review*, 1954, Vol. LIX, No. 4, p. 861; İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. Cilt: 4, 1703-1924, İstanbul, 1955, s. 188-189; R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1976*. Princeton, 1963, p. 102; F. H. Tökin, *Türkiye'de siyasî partiler ve siyasî düşüncenin gelişmesi, 1839-1965*. İstanbul, 1965, s. 16-17; M. Türköne, *Siyasi ideoloji olarak İslamcılığın doğuşu*. 2. Baskı. İstanbul, 1994, s. 145; H. Çelik, *Ali Suavi ve dönemi*. İstanbul, 1994, s. 21; M. Bardakçı, *139 sene önceki şariat komplosunun hikâyesi*. – *Hürriyet*, 8 Kasım 1998.

main target of the conspirators, hastily held in Top Kapu Saray the pompous solemn religious rite “Golden Tube Change”³³², in order to restore in the eyes of the faithful Muslims his reputation, marred by the Tanzimat reforms³³³.

The conspirators were well organized and had lots of adherents. According to the testimonies of the arrestees, thousands of soldiers and members of religious organizations were ready to involve in the plot³³⁴. It was exposed as a result of delation, and arrests followed. The “*Masis*”, still lacking any official numbers, cautiously wrote about “numerous” arrests³³⁵. Based on Russian sources, the weekly “*Meghu Hayastani*” [Armenia Bee], issued in Tiflis, spoke about two hundred “convicts”³³⁶. Nevertheless, the government recovered soon enough and tried every way to conceal the real scale of the conspiracy, so in the official communications, the numbers of the arrestees were apparently understated. The “*Masis*” reported that, according to the official data, that number only amounted to 34³³⁷.

One of the communications in the “*Meghu Hayastani*” showed how quick the Ottoman government was in finding a way out of the situation and spreading news, favorable from their point of view. The newspaper wrote that the Turkish embassy in Paris, hardly two days after the exposure of the conspiracy, received a dispatch from Constantinople, where it was emphasized that the conspiracy was targeted at the sultan and that there was “nothing special” in it, that the number of the conspirators did not exceed forty, which majority were “Circassians and Kurds”³³⁸. Unfortunately, such reports, vastly different from the testimonies of the conspirators and from other evidences, later on were based on for the official interpretation of the “Kuleli Event” and exerted influence on the approaches of some researchers³³⁹. Thus, the abovementioned communication in the Armenian newspaper, considering the difficulty accessing the Ottoman archives and the foreign press of the time, is a contribution to Source Study.

After the exposure of the conspiracy, non-official sources told about a few events that shed light on the actual goals of the participants. The “*Meghu Hayastani*” wrote about one of them, saying that in the European district of the

³³² In that tube, the “holy” raindrops from the roof of the mosque in Mecca were kept.

³³³ *Masis*, 1859, September 10.

³³⁴ U. İğdemir, *Kuleli Vak'ası hakkında bir araştırma*. Ankara, 1937, s. 59–63.

³³⁵ *Masis*, 1859, September 10.

³³⁶ *Meghu Hayastani*, 1859, October 10.

³³⁷ *Masis*, 1859, September 17.

³³⁸ *Meghu Hayastani*, 1859, October 17.

³³⁹ According to official data, the final number of the arrestees totaled 41. See: İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. Cilt: 4, 1703 – 1924. İstanbul, 1955, s. 189.

capital a "firing vehicle" was seen, which aim was "to set the Franks' neighborhood to fire"³⁴⁰. This proves yet another time that the conspiracy was in essence anti-Christian and anti-Western. It also evinces that, after the conspirators were arrested, their followers remained at large and attempted acts. Some Turk authors also mentioned this fact³⁴¹.

A few weeks following the exposure of the plot the extremely tensed situation in the capital persisted. Experiencing serious pressure from the great powers, the government, headed by *sadrizam* Âli Paşa, hurried to calm both the foreign embassies and the Christian subjects, asserting that the conspirators, although acting against the pro-Western reforms, did not mean any harm to Christians. To that end, prior to the official announcement of the results of the prosecution, the authorities organized a news leak. The pro-governmental "Masis", making no mention of the source, remarked that "this conspiracy was an act of people with obsolete mindset, nonetheless, [the conspirators – R. S.] did not intend any harm to the Christian nations of the empire"³⁴².

The results of the prosecution, conducted by the commission, set up by the order of the sultan and headed by Âli, were not fully published. Instead, they were summed up in a special bulletin and handed to Sultan Mecid. The "Masis" wrote that the "voluminous book" contained details of the prosecution, materials of interrogations of the arrestees, and conclusions about the nature of the conspiracy³⁴³. The newspaper made a guess that it would be published in full a few days later³⁴⁴. But the government only authorized to publish a small fragment from the book with the names of the arrestees and some information about them, which, incidentally, had been known long before³⁴⁵.

The disclosure of the conspiracy the Ottoman authorities administered rigorous measures to rule out such incidents in the future³⁴⁶. The publications in the Armenian press about it are interesting, firstly, because in some cases the facts related there were not to be found in any other source and remained unknown to researchers. For instance, the "Masis" noticed that, by the instruction of Şeyhülislam, a new "recommendatory committee" had been set up to keep an eye on the behavior of the *sofa*, and on that basis to provide

³⁴⁰ *Meghu Hayastani*, 1859, November 7.

³⁴¹ The number of those, who evaded arrests, remains unknown. See: İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı Osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. Cilt: 4, 1703 – 1924. İstanbul, 1955, s. 189.

³⁴² *Masis*, 1859, September 19.

³⁴³ *Masis*, 1859, September 29.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁴⁵ *Masis*, 1859, November 5.

³⁴⁶ R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1976*. Princeton, 1963, p. 102.

appropriate references. Those with negative ones were to be immediately expelled from school and returned to their place of birth³⁴⁷. This unprecedented decision documents how serious the anxiety of the authorities was over the situation among the softa.

The publications in the Armenian press of that period of time corroborate that the acts of the "Kuleli" conspirators were conditioned by anti-Tanzimat and anti-Christian senses.

The Russian consuls noted that, after the "Kuleli" conspiracy was disclosed and Abdülaziz was enthroned in the beginning of the 1860s, in the European regions of the country the most fanatic elements, such as dervishes, became more active and vigorously agitated against Christians³⁴⁸. Carnages of the peaceful Christian population in remote regions of the empire were the outcome of the increasing anti-Christian sentiments among Muslims. Thus, in 1867, in the memorandum, prepared by Russian diplomacy, the carnages in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Syria were pointed out³⁴⁹.

The carnage in Damascus of 1860 is worth dwelling upon. The facts bespeak that it was organized by the Turkish authorities. The same opinion was held by foreign diplomats and informed witnesses. The Russian Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, for instance, was convinced that the actions of the slaughterers were secretly guided from the capital³⁵⁰. Well informed contemporaries wrote that the "Syrian killings" were premeditated and prepared in the capital of the empire – by "most important persons"; they were incited by the feeling of aggressive anti-Christianity³⁵¹. Reportedly, in the Ottoman government there were people who dreamt of the times when "no giaour will be

³⁴⁷ *Masis*, 1859, November 19.

³⁴⁸ M. Khitrovo – Lobanovu-Rostovskomu, Monastyr (Bitolya) [M. Khitrovo – to Lobanov-Rostovskiy, Monastyr (Bitolya)], June 30, 1861. – AVPRI, Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1881, file 1415, sheets 1412-1426.

³⁴⁹ Zapiska (bez podpis) "Zamechania na frantsuzskiy proekt reform" [Note (unsigned) "Remarks on the French project of reforms" [1867]]. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (On Turkish Hatt-i-Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 60.

³⁵⁰ M. T. Panchenkova, *Politika Frantsii na Blizhnem Vostoke i siriyskaya ekspeditsia 1860-1861 gg.* [The French policy in the Near East and the Syrian expedition of 1860-1861]. M., 1966, p. 111.

³⁵¹ S. N., *Konstantinopol'skie pis'ma* [Letters from Constantinople (1861-1864)]. – The Russian bulletin, 1867, vol. 69, May, p. 36.

left on the orthodox soil"³⁵². One of them, Rustem Paşa, was appointed grand vizier³⁵³.

The English witness, Colonel Churchill, communicated that 11 thousand Christians fell victim to the slaughters of 1860 in Syria and Lebanon³⁵⁴. The same observer wrote that the slaughter was organized by Governor Hurşid Paşa, who, in fact, realized the idea of Necib Paşa, governor of the same province twenty years before him: to Necib Paşa, the Turkish power could only be maintained in Syria through "slaying" Christians³⁵⁵.

Simultaneously with the reforms, cases of Islamization of Christians, encouraged by the laws and authorities, were recorded. Thus, the Russian consul to Bitola noted in 1861 that one of the six cases of Islamization was definitely forced³⁵⁶.

The central and local governments, clericals and intellectuals, masses of Muslim population played their own parts in that – each with their own *modus operandi*. The leading role was certainly played by the authorities. One of the British consuls in the Ottoman Empire, Mr. Senior, also adhered to the opinion that the brutal outbreaks of religious fanaticism among the masses of the Turkish people were conditioned by "fanatic aspirations" of the governor of the given province³⁵⁷.

In the official documentation the authorities continued to call Christians "giaours"³⁵⁸.

The most horrific events of that kind took place in the territory of Bulgaria. Here, cases of kidnapping and Islamization of little children were becoming more and more frequent, at that, the authorities used to leave such

³⁵² Ibid.

³⁵³ Ibid., p. 58.

³⁵⁴ J. H. Tashjian, Turkey: author of genocide. The centenary record of Turkey, 1822-1922. Boston, 1965, p. 7.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ M. Khitrovo – Lobanovu-Rostovskomu, Monastyr (Bitolya), 30 iyunia 1861 g., June 30, 1861. – AVPRI, Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1881, file 1415, sheets 1412-1426.

³⁵⁷ V. Denton, Khristiane v Türtsii [Christians in Turkey]. – The Russian bulletin, 1864, No. 3, p. 117.

³⁵⁸ Zolotarev, Adrianopol', 14/26 dekabria 1866 g. [Adrianople, December 14/26, 1866]. – AVPRI, Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (On Turkish Hatt-Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 145, rev.

cases without consequences³⁵⁹. Moreover, the Bulgarian scholars put into circulation the order of the governor of the Danube vilayet to the *mütasarrıfıyah* in Sophia, instructing that the ceremony of "volunteer" Islamization was made even easier³⁶⁰. The Armenian press spoke about growing Muslim fanaticism in Western Armenia. The "Mshak" of 1872 provided facts of "barbaric behavior of the Turkish people" against Armenians in Van³⁶¹.

The anti-Christian attitudes, described in this Chapter, influenced the ideology of the leaders of the oppositional "New Ottoman" movement, and through numerous journalistic publications permeated into the sphere of social-political ideology, thus initiating the formation of radical political Islamism in Turkey. The militant, or *ğazi*, version of this movement served as a basis for the first genocidal program in the Ottoman Empire.

³⁵⁹ Po sledite na nasiliето: dokumenti i materiali za nalagane na islyama [Consequences of violence: documents and materials on forcible Islamization]. Comp. by P. Petrov, Part 1, Sofia, 1987, p. 182.

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 182-183.

³⁶¹ Mshak [The Laborer], 1872, No. 28, p. 4.

PROTO-GENOCIDAL SITUATION

CHOOSING THE VICTIM

During the first phase of Tanzimat, the Ottoman government attempted to carry out certain limited reforms in Bulgaria, and thus to restrain the mounting liberal movement of Bulgarians. This policy failed because of the large-scale armed resurrection against the Turkish tyranny, burst out in 1850. Enormous efforts were exerted to quell it: involved were both the regular army and *başıbozüks* (armed bandit gangs); the authorities did their utmost to keep the Muslim population from involvement in the armed actions against the rebels. The just appointed vali of the Vidin vilayet Âli Rıza Paşa was given relevant instructions in writing.³⁶²

Thenceforward, Bulgaria remained the focus of the Turkish authorities. That is why, during the second phase of Tanzimat, the initiators of the policy of “merging” decided to test it at full scale in Bulgaria.

This choice was not accidental. In case of success, the Sublime Porte would prove to the West and Russia that they had been able not only to keep the promises, given in Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856, but to implement effective governance in one of the most developed and highly explosive regions in European Turkey. Âli and Fuat sought also to test in practice the new methods of struggle against the national-liberation movement of Bulgarians, which was on the rise. Another argument, favoring that decision, was that Bulgaria lay not far from the capital, which enabled the center to control and coordinate the activity of the local government.

The policy of alienation started in Bulgaria with the introduction of the new vilayet system. On November 8, 1864, by the sultanic irade, the Danube

³⁶² See in the text of the document, given by the sultan to Rıza Paşa and containing “supreme instructions”; published by the renowned Turkish medievalist Halil İnalcık: *Ferikan-ı kiramdan bu defa memuriyet-i mahsusa ile Vidin canibine izam buyrulacak Rıza Paşa hazretlerine talimat-ı seniyye mîsvedesi*. - H. İnalcık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi* (Doktora Tezi’nin 50. yılı, 1942-1992). İstanbul, 1992, *Vesikalar V*, s. 124.

vilayet substituted for eyalets of Nish, Vidin and Silistria³⁶³. It embraced most of the former Bulgarian Kingdom: Danubian and Western Bulgaria, including the Kŏstence region³⁶⁴. The vilayet occupied 86,000 sq km with population about 3,700,000 people³⁶⁵, mostly Bulgarians³⁶⁶.

Midhat Paşa was appointed the vali of the Danube vilayet. It was not a chance appointment. Midhat had already attained renown as an energetic and active governor with "Europeanized" views – a most essential quality for Âli and Fuat. They had even involved him in drafting the law on the Danube vilayet³⁶⁷.

There was yet another factor that influenced the decision about the appointment of the young paşa to such an important post: in his time, he had been able to win the sympathy of Bulgarians. "There was no Bulgarian institution, where the Bulgarians' favorite – Midhat Paşa's portrait would not hang on the wall", a contemporary told. The people even made a song, which began "Midhat Paşa, kindly soul..."³⁶⁸. He won his fame when in 1857, as inspector with special powers in the city of Tŭrnovo, he released from prisons "many innocently convicted Bulgarians"³⁶⁹, and called the attention of the authorities to the abusive acts of the local orthodox eparch. His appointment inspired in Bulgarians great expectations of improvement of their conditions; they even wanted to see Midhat as head of the independent Bulgarian principality to be³⁷⁰.

Those hopes were absolutely groundless...

³⁶³ Loi Constitutive du Département formé sous le nom de Vilayet du Danube. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (On Turkish Hatt-i Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 73-86.

³⁶⁴ F. Kanits, *Dunaiskaya Bolgaria i Balkanskiy poluoostrov*. Transl. from Germ, S.-Pb., 1876, p. 120.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁶ A. A. Popova, *Politika Tŭrtsii i natsional'no-osvoboditel'naya bor'ba bolgarskogo naroda v 60-kh godakh XIX veka* [The Turkish politics and the national-liberation struggle of the Bulgarian people in the 60s of the XIX century]. – *Voprosy istorii*, 1953, No. 10, p. 53.

³⁶⁷ Midhat Paşa, *Hayat-ı siyasiyesi, hedi'matı, menfaa hayatı*. K. 1: *Tabsıra-ı İbret*, İstanbul, 1325, s. 23.

³⁶⁸ P. P. K., *Midkhat Paşa i opitvanneto mu da poturchi bylgarskit uchilischa*. – *Bylgarska sbirka*, 1898, year V, kn. I, s. 57.

³⁶⁹ P. Kisimov, *Metkhad Pasha. Pyrvii turski reformator* [Midhat Paşa. The first Turkish reformer]. – *Bylgarska sbirka* {Bulgarian Collection}, year V, book II, p. 800.

³⁷⁰ P. P. K., *Midkhat Paşa i opitvanneto mu da poturchi bylgarskit uchilischa*. – *Bylgarska sbirka*, 1898, year V, kn. I, s. 56.

The very name of the new vilayet bespoke the desire of its initiators (Midhat among them) to obliterate the vaguest allusion to independence of Bulgaria. The authorities chose the small town of Rusçuk (Ruse) as the capital, whereas by location and significance, more suitable would have been Tynovo – Bulgaria's flourishing in those days commercial and cultural center. Besides, in the eyes of Bulgarians Tynovo – the last capital of the Bulgarian Kingdom – was the symbol of their independence. Obviously, no less important was that the city was the center of the Bulgarians' struggle for the independence of their church³⁷¹.

The main idea of the sultan's irade, as well as of the law on establishing the Danube vilayet was to intensify the process of "merging" of the Christian population in that region. The irade, which Midhat solemnly proclaimed before the citizens of Rusçuk and foreign consuls, said that it was necessary to "centralize" the administration, and that "all the political, fiscal and administrative institutions must be unified, well-coordinated and permanently controllable"³⁷².

Such were the instructions Midhat had received. With inherent enthusiasm and perseverance he had done his best to bring them about during his governance. His primary task was, as he wrote later, to achieve an unbreakable union of all the nations, to create for them a "common homeland... that would protect them from foreign influence"³⁷³.

To reach that goal, Midhat put together a social body, consisting of Bulgarian *çorbacıs* (representatives of upper commercial and usurer bourgeoisie). He desired to connect them still tighter with the authorities of the vilayet. Property qualification was as high as that for the meclis candidates.

Foreign consuls to different towns of the vilayet reported that the goal of the Turkish authorities was to hinder those, who would truly defend the interests of the Bulgarian citizens, to be elected to the meclis. The Russian consul M. Baykov described the elections in Vidin (the main city in the *sancak* of the same name) as follows: first *myüdir*s (administrators of the *nahiyes*) made a list of candidates from the local "trustworthy" well-to-do persons, then coerced the villagers to vote for them, then chose candidates for members of the meclis from that list at their own judgment and sent to the *kaymakam* (administrator of the

³⁷¹ Ibid.

³⁷² *Düstür*, Cild-i Evvel, İstanbul, 1289, s. 515.

³⁷³ Midhat Pacha, *La Turquie: son passé, son avenir*. Paris, 1878, p. 14.

kaza) for approval³⁷⁴. The diplomat imparted also that kaymakam Sabri Paşa chose from the list the ones with the least number of votes, which meant the least known to the citizens.

The description of the election procedure, given by Sankey, the British vice-consul to the port city of Köstence, coincides with the one cited above: the *mutessarif* (administrator of the sancak) made up a list of candidates, distributed it all around the sancak, then held elections, in which only select voters participated, and at that, they were prohibited to enter new names in the list³⁷⁵.

Elections for the mixed Muslim-Christian commerce court members were conducted in the same way³⁷⁶. The Russian consul to Rusçuk V. Kozhevnikov in one of his reports wrote, "The Turkish policy will never allow that an intelligent, impartial person, who realizes the desperate conditions of his compatriots and enjoys their respect, be elected a court member on behalf of the Christians: such persons present a danger to local authorities"³⁷⁷.

No wonder that "for the most part, those, who did not enjoy the citizens' respect, instead – enjoyed the confidence of the Turkish authorities"³⁷⁸ would be elected members of meclis or courts. These positions were state-paid. As the winners owed their election to the Turkish kaymakam or mutessarif, they were but pure tools in the hands of the latter – and of no avail at all for their own people. There are lots of evidences of contemporaries, according to which Christians – administration, court or meclis members – would never dare to contradict the representatives of the local governments: they would sign under any resolution without even looking through the paper³⁷⁹.

The situation was very much the same with the elders' councils, which fulfilled the functions of community councils in the regions with overwhelming

³⁷⁴ M. Baykov, Vidin, 16 fevralya 1867 g. [Vidin, February 16, 1867]. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (On Turkish Hatt-i-Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheets 216-216 rev.

³⁷⁵ Reports Received from Her Majesty's Ambassador and Consuls relating to the condition of Christians in Turkey, 1867, London, 1867, p. 4.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ V. F. Kozhevnikov, Ruschuk (Ruse), 7 yanvaria, 1867g. – [Rusçuk (Ruse), January 7, 1867]. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (On Turkish Hatt-i-Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 187.

³⁷⁸ M. Baykov, Vidin, 16 fevralia 1867 g. – [Vidin, February 16, 1867]. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (On Turkish Hatt-i-Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 216 rev.

³⁷⁹ Reports Received from Her Majesty's Ambassador and Consuls relating to the condition of Christians in Turkey, 1867, London, 1867, p. 4.

Bulgarian population. At their meetings, problems of tertiary importance were being discussed³⁸⁰. This is how the Russian consul to Vidin M. Baykov described those councils, "The *ihitiyar meclis* (i.e. village councils – R. S.), set up in the villages of illiterate members, were not only inefficient, but made the Turks feel even more confident as, by having those wealthy elders among the management, they kept the Bulgarians' mouths shut"³⁸¹.

In general, the diverse mixed councils, created in compliance with the Law on vilayet of 1864, turned into additional tools in the hands of the government for oppressing Bulgarians.

Involvement of the Bulgarian *çorbacıs* in the administrative machinery, and their appointment to insignificant posts became a style of Midhat Paşa's governance. Thus, *müavins* (assistants of the valis) were assigned from *çorbacıs*. For the most part, they performed the job of official informers; the Turkish functionaries called them nothing but *muhpırs* (snitchers)³⁸². There were cases when, by Midhat's order, Bulgarians were appointed kaymakams, which had never happened in the past³⁸³. But generally, Midhat did not have confidence in Bulgarians, and among his closest assistants in the administration there was none. But he was very much "concerned" about the "equality" of Muslims and non-Muslims. Bulgarians in public or governmental service were honored to be called *ağa* and *effendi*, thereby made "equal" with Turk officials³⁸⁴.

Midhat focused his attention on "Ottomanization" of Bulgarian schools, which was the principal component of the solemnly aired by the Sublime Porte policy of "merging". On the one hand, it would be a severe blow at the educational system of the Bulgarian people, which had made substantial progress during the Tanzimat period and, on the other, would contribute to fostering the spirit of allegiance to the "Ottoman homeland" in Bulgarians, thus integrating them in the "Ottoman nation".

³⁸⁰ S. G. B. St. Clair and Brophy, *Residence in Bulgaria or notes on the resources and administration of Turkey*. I, 1869, p. 380 - 381.

³⁸¹ M. Baykov, Vidin, 9 marta 1867 g. (Dopolnenie k predyruschemu). – [Vidin, March 9, 1867 (Supplement to the previous)]. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (On Turkish Hatt-i Hümayuns, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 226.

³⁸² P. Kisimov, Medhad Pasha. *Pyrviy turski reformator* [The first Turkish reformer]. – Bylgarska sbirka, year V, book II, p. 804.

³⁸³ P. P. K., Midkhat Pasha i opitvanneto mu da poturchi bylgarskit uchilischa. – Bylgarska sbirka, 1898, year V, book. I, p. 57.

³⁸⁴ P. Kisimov, Medhad Pasha. *Pyrviy turski reformator*. – Bylgarska Sbirka, 1898, year. V, book II, p. 801.

At first, the Turkish authorities under Midhat's guidance chose unconcealed compulsion as a mode of action. In the summer of 1865, the citizens of Tyrnovo were "offered" to build a Muslim-Christian school. They were ordered to close the local national school, and thenceforth the means, collected from the community for its maintenance, to transfer to the city education administration's discretion³⁸⁵. As a result, Bulgarians, who made 65 percent³⁸⁶ of citizens, were deprived of the right to have their own school. No wonder that the Bulgarian community in Tyrnovo exhibited unprecedented perseverance and unitedly rejected that demand of the authorities³⁸⁷. Midhat had to temporarily withhold his initiative.

Then the vali began to act in a more "tactful" way. He decided to involve the representatives of the Bulgarian population in the mixed Bulgarian-Turkish committee, established for drafting the project of the future reform³⁸⁸. Yet, even though specially chosen individuals participated in the sessions of the committee, it took Midhat long to reach consensus. He exerted serious pressure on the Bulgarian members to get the project approved³⁸⁹.

That bulky document consisted of 72 paragraphs and was based on the governmental decree of 1860 on mixed education. Some of the provisions were authored by Midhat himself. For example, he proposed to eliminate all the Christian schools and only leave the so-called "Lancastrian" first level ones. Upon finishing these, Christian children would continue their education in the mixed Muslim-Christian schools. Their building was to be provided by the community, not the government. In case of shortage of means, Midhat suggested imposing an additional tax³⁹⁰.

Midhat's proposals were unequivocally anti-Bulgarian and were intended to destroy the branched system of the second-level Bulgarian educational

³⁸⁵ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, Ruschuk (Ruse), 23 yanvarya, 1866g. [Rusçuk (Ruse), January 23, 1866. – AVPRI, Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Consulate in Rusçuk), sheet 25.

³⁸⁶ N. Todorov, *Balkanskiy gorod XV-XIX vekov. M.*, 1978, p. 316, Table 24.

³⁸⁷ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, Ruschuk (Ruse), 23 yanvarya, 1866g. – AVPRI, Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Konsul'stvo v Ruschuke), sheet 25.

³⁸⁸ P. P. K., *Midkhat Paşa i opitvanneto mu da poturchi bylgarskit uchilischa*. – *Bylgarska sbirka*, 1898, year V, book I, p. 59.

³⁸⁹ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, Ruschuk (Ruse), 23 yanvarya, 1866g. – AVPRI, Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Konsul'stvo v Ruschuke), sheet 24.

³⁹⁰ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, Ruschuk (Ruse), 23 yanvarya, 1866g. – AVPRI, f. Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Konsul'stvo v Ruschuke), sheet 24 rev.

institutions. Such was the novelty, introduced by Midhat into the governmental decree of 1860.

The project passed, and Midhat left for Constantinople to report on it to the Sublime Porte. It was met with approval³⁹¹.

After returning to Rusçuk, Midhat undertook the implementation of the project. In his speech before the representatives of the Bulgarian and Turkish communities he said that the soonest possible accomplishment of the project would bring happiness both to the Turkish and Bulgarian children, which exactly was "the Ottoman government's concern"³⁹².

A few mixed schools were set up in the vilayet; the best known among them was considered that in Rusçuk, although the contemporaries' descriptions bespeak that the teaching level at that "exemplary" school was incredibly low, that there was shortage of teachers and textbooks, that the curriculum was developed hastily, and that in general it was much worse than the Bulgarian schools³⁹³. Incidentally, the Bulgarian language as a school subject was removed from the curriculum – with Midhat's grounding that only mastering Turkish could guarantee a happy future for the Bulgarian children...

The schools, founded in the 60s, continued to function for another decade (up until Bulgaria's liberation from the Turkish yoke), during which the number of Bulgarian children in those schools was decreasing drastically. In an attempt to prevent this, the vilayet authorities passed a law in 1872, which stipulated that only non-Muslim individuals with a graduation certificate from mixed schools would be permitted to public service³⁹⁴.

The authorities somewhat succeeded in creating mixed schools, yet the situation was totally different with elementary schools. Midhat drew up a project for reforming the system of elementary education, designed for 8 to 10-year-old children, and "seriously set to creation of elementary schools in the big cities of

³⁹¹ G. Pletn'ov, *Syprotivata na bylgarskia narod protiv ozmaniziraneto na rodnite uchilischa v Dunavskia vilaet*. [Resistance of the Bulgarian people against Ottomanization of Bulgarian colleges in the Danube vilayet]. – Works of Veliko Tŭrnovo "Kiril i Metodiy" University, 1974-1975, Vol. XII, book 3, Department of history, p. 124.

³⁹² V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, *Ruschuk (Ruse)*, 23 yanvaria, 1866g. - AVPRI, f. Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Konsul'stvo v Ruschuke), sheet 28.

³⁹³ G. Pletn'ov, *Syprotivata na bylgarskia narod protiv osmaniziraneto na rodnite uchilischa v Dunavskia vilaet* [Resistance of the Bulgarian people against Ottomanization of the schools Bulgarian schools in the Danubian vilayet]. – *Trudove na Velikotŭrnovskia Universitet "Kiril i Metodiy"*, 1974-1975, vol. XII, book. 3, Fakultet za istoria, p. 142-144

³⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

the vilayet"³⁹⁵. But the resistance of Bulgarians was no less serious, as the majority had read the true intentions of the government. The resistance was so determined that the authorities had to give up the project.

Neither did the vilayet governance succeed in creating mixed Muslim-Christian military divisions – one of the principal aspects of “merging”. Midhat did plan to create mixed military units, yet failed to³⁹⁶. He created a well-equipped army of 40 thousand. Ten years later that army was suppressing the April insurrection of Bulgarians and committing carnages.

Along with the abovementioned new trends, some phenomena of the policy of the vilayet authorities indicated that they had not abstained from the traditional methods of keeping the subject nations under the sultan's power.

Forcible Islamization of Bulgarians continued; numerous cases of Turkization of young girls and boys were recorded³⁹⁷. According to the facts, Islamization was often well-organized and patronized by the vilayet authorities, as well as by representatives of the Turkish administration in sancaks and kazas³⁹⁸. In those years, exactions from Christians by “gangs of Turks”, acting under the immediate protection of the Muslim clergy³⁹⁹, mounted to a “horri-fying” scale.

When the policy of “peaceful merging” did not work and Bulgarians resorted to weapons, the authorities did not hesitate to apply the severest methods. Midhat Paşa, famous for his “progressive” views, became especially known for his brutality⁴⁰⁰. This explains why, by the end of his governance, he had lost the massive support he had been enjoying in the beginning of his

³⁹⁵ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, Ruschuk (Ruse), 12/24 yanvaria, 1866g. - AVPRI, f. Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Konsul'stvo v Ruschuke), sheet 13.

³⁹⁶ Dokumenti za bulgarskata istoria. Vol. IV: Documents from the Turkish State Archives. Part II: 1863-1909. Comp. by P. Dorev. Sofia, 1942, p. 187.

³⁹⁷ Assimilatorskata politika na turskite zavoevateli [Assimilation policy of the Turkish occupants]. Collected documents. Sofia, 1964, p. 256.

³⁹⁸ Po sledite na nasiliето. Dokumenti za pomohamedanchvania i poturchvania [Consequences of violence. Documents on Islamization and Turkization]. Comp. by P. Khr. Petrov, Sofia, 1972, p. 58-59.

³⁹⁹ V. F. Kozhevnikov, Ruschuk (Ruse), 7 yanvaria 1867 g. – AVPRI, Fund Glavnyi arkhiv, II-18, 1855-1867, file 1 (O turetskikh Hatt-i Humayunakh, 1855-1857, 1866-1867), sheet 183.

⁴⁰⁰ I. E. Fadeeva, Midhat-Pasha: Zhizn' i deyatel'nost' [Midhat Paşa: life and career]. M., 1977, p. 37.

activity. Only some representatives of *çorbacıs*, "in fear for their position", still adhered to Midhat's policy of "merging"⁴⁰¹.

This notwithstanding, the followers of the reforms in the central government rated Midhat's activity high.

In one of his memoirs, Fuat Paşa particularly dwelled on his successes in the Danube vilayet⁴⁰². The supervised by the government press did its best to praise the new vilayet system, saying that it as though "ensures equality between the peoples"⁴⁰³. The experience was recognized as positive, and thereupon the vilayet system was being gradually introduced into other provinces of the empire.

The "New Ottomans" also spoke highly of Midhat's policy. Namik Kemal remarked in the "*Hürriyet*" that Midhat had put into practice the new vilayet system superiorly⁴⁰⁴. In his opinion, the all-Bulgarian rebellion had been prevented due to Midhat's policy⁴⁰⁵.

A few years later, his lack of foresight became apparent.

After Midhat's departure, the policy of "merging" stopped being implemented that purposely, and with the death of the authors of the concept and policy of "mixing and merging" Âli Paşa and Fuat Paşa, the Tanzimat reforms were over.

The analysis of the outcomes of the policy, pursued by the Turkish authorities in Danubian Bulgaria, shows that its goal was not attained. The rise of the national-liberation movement did not stop. Neither did the measures meant to "foster" the spirit of loyalty to the sultan in Bulgarians and to "merge" them in the "Ottoman nation" achieve any remarkable success. The Bulgarian people responded by intensification of their liberation struggle. In 1867 and 1875 armed insurgences against the Turkish tyranny broke out, which were brutally quelled.

The British vice-consul to Adrianople related that even though the revolt was suppressed, the authorities still continued taking "active measures"; in

⁴⁰¹ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat'evu, Ruschuk (Ruse), 12/24 yanvaria, 1866g. - AVPRI, Fund Posol'stvo v Konstantinopole, 1866, file 2182b (Konsul'stvo v Ruschuke), sheet 14 rev.

⁴⁰² A. Schopoff, *Les réformes et la protection des chrétiens en Turquie, 1673-1904*. Paris, 1904, p. 56.

⁴⁰³ N. P. Ignat'ev – A. M. Gorchakovu, Konstantinopol', 7/19 marta 1867 g. [N. P. Ignat'ev – to A. M. Gorchakov, Constantinople, March 7/19 1867]. – AVPRI, Kantselaria, 1867, file 31, sheet 65 rev.

⁴⁰⁴ *Hürriyet*, 1868, No. 22.

⁴⁰⁵ *Hürriyet*, 1868, No. 4.

particular, they began "recruiting armed people"⁴⁰⁶. In another report, the same British diplomat notified that the Turkish authorities in Yeni Zagra had fully armed the local Muslim men⁴⁰⁷.

Apparently, it was such messages that urged Great Britain's Ambassador H. Elliot and Russia's Ambassador N. P. Ignat'ev to Constantinople to take decisive measures to avert the disaster they felt had been hovering over Bulgarians. They exerted pressure on Sultan Abdülaziz and Grand Vizier Mahmud Nedim Paşa, encouraging that the supreme imperial bodies relied on the reforms rather than the policy of physical extermination⁴⁰⁸.

The sultan's response was a special Manifesto, in which he declared his will to carry on the reforms, while the grand vizier sent a dispatch to the valis and ordered to quit persecuting Christians⁴⁰⁹.

The high-ranking political figures of those days Hüseyin Avni Paşa and Midhat Paşa expressed their disagreement with that decision of the grand vizier and resigned. Both adhered to the policy of violent force in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria⁴¹⁰. Later on, as is shown below, these politicians were reestablished in the government and developed the program of extermination of Bulgarians.

As is seen from the report of the Russian vice-consul to Philippolis, Hüseyin Avni and Midhat were not alone in their wish to get quit with Bulgarians through the policy of physical extermination. The local authorities, and especially the *zaptiyes*⁴¹¹, not only disobeyed the order from the capital, but

⁴⁰⁶ Rev. J. Clarke to Vice Consul J. H. Dupuis, Samakov, October 15, 1875 (Extract). – British documents on foreign affairs: reports and papers from the foreign office confidential print. General editors: Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt. Part I: from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War. Series B: the Near and Middle East, 1856-1914. Editor: David Gillard. Volume 2: the Ottoman Empire: revolt in the Balkans, 1875 - 1876. Bethesda, 1984, p. 137-138.

⁴⁰⁷ Vice Consul J. H. Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot, Adrianople, October 13, 1875. – British documents on foreign affairs: reports and papers from the foreign office confidential print. General editors: Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt. Part I: from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War. Series B: the Near and Middle East, 1856-1914. Editor: David Gillard. Volume 2: the Ottoman Empire revolt in the Balkans, 1875 - 1876. Bethesda, 1984, p. 135.

⁴⁰⁸ R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. Princeton, 1963, p. 315 - 317.

⁴⁰⁹ N. Gerov – N. P. Ignat'evu, 3 noyabria 1875 g. – *Dokumenti za bylgarskata istoria*. T. 2: *Arkhiv na Nayden Gerov*. Part 2, Sofia, 1932, p. 126.

⁴¹⁰ R. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire: 1856—1876*. Princeton, 1963, p. 317.

⁴¹¹ Members of armed divisions of the police.

intensified the violence against Bulgarians⁴¹². The report made a special emphasis on that the number of murders, committed by the zaptiyes, had reached unprecedented levels. The orders from Constantinople removed the last feeble barrier, and they got down to their business, which outcome was tens of thousands of innocently killed Bulgarian children, old men, women...

That namely the Bulgarian people had been chosen by the Ottoman government as a target for committing a genocidal program was a situational response to the April revolt and (as is shown in this and previous chapters) to the developments that had been taking place for two long decades in the Ottoman Empire, and in Bulgaria as part of it in particular.

CRISIS

In the beginning of the 70s of the XIX century important shifts took place in the political life of the Ottoman Empire. The relatively stable situation, established in the country after the conference of 1869 in Constantinople, and owing to the flexible home and foreign policy of Fuat Paşa and Âli Paşa, who succeeded each other in the position of grand eparch, was over⁴¹³.

After their death (Fuat passed away in 1869, Âli – in 1871), a fierce struggle began between different groupings of officials, representing the governing bureaucratic elite. It reached its summit in 1876, when one of the three sultans, who reigned that year, was ousted as a result of conspiracy and later killed, while the second was announced incapable and deposed. Only sly and brutal Abdülhamid II managed to retain the throne.

• As the central power in the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empire was dismembered and weakened, the numerous social-political and other diverse conflicts, the national-confessional in the first place, aggravated.

Quite a few leading specialists in Ottoman studies turned to the situation of 1871-1875. Some define that period as a “period of chaos”⁴¹⁴, others, giving an overall fair characteristic of those years as of a period, when new trends in the

⁴¹² N. Gerov – N. P. Ignat'evu, 3 noyabria 1875 g. – Dokumenti za bylgarskata istoria. T. 2: Arkhiv na Nayden Gerov. Ch. 2, Sofia, 1932, p. 126.

⁴¹³ [Ignat'ev N. P.], Zapiski grafa N. P. Ignat'eva, 1864-1874. [Count Ignat'ev's notes, 1864-1872]. – Russkaya starina [The Russian antique times], 1915, Vol. 162, book 4, p. 15.

⁴¹⁴ R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876. Princeton, 1963, p. 270.

internal political life of the Ottoman Empire emerged, still either fail to name the most important of them, or leave some of them unnoticed⁴¹⁵.

The approaches and assessments brought above can only be accepted with big reservations. In the depths of the outwardly chaotic political life, processes were taking shape, which in the nearest future were to become a determinant factor in the formation of the proto-genocidal situation of 1876.

These viewpoints were based on the interpretation of the post-Tanzimat period of Ottoman history, proposed by the pillar of Turkish official historiography Enver Ziya Karal back in the middle of the last century, according to which, of the leading politicians and grand viziers of that period, it was Mahmud Nedim Paşa who put an end to the policy of the Tanzimat pro-Western reforms to gain Russia's "trust and goodwill"⁴¹⁶. This historian of Republican Turkey, owing to his numerous works on the developments of the period in question, managed to make his viewpoint acceptable for many scholars⁴¹⁷.

In our opinion, this approach overestimates the subjective factor in historic processes and neglects the violent reaction to Tanzimat, especially to its fundamental idea of equality of the rights of Muslims and Christians, that caught the elite and the broadest circles of the Turkish society. This phenomenon is termed by us as anti-Christianity. The reaction showed itself in full after Âli Paşa and Fuat Paşa had left the political arena.

Anti-Christianity was inherent in the Ottoman Empire all through its history, beginning from the theory and practice of jihad, the state ideology in the *gazi* period, when in the territories, seized from Christians, the foundation of the Ottoman statehood was being laid, and going on through other historic periods.

⁴¹⁵ Such approach is typical for the works by the specialist in Ottoman Studies from Moscow Irma Fadeeva. See: I. L. Fadeeva, *Novye tendentsii v politike Porty nachala 70-kh godov XIX v.* [New tendencies in the policy of Porte in the beginning of the 70s of the XIX century]. – Collected works on Turkic studies, 1978, 1984, pp. 224-336; I. L. Fadeeva, *Ofitsial'nye doktriny v ideologii i politike Osmanskoy imperii /Osmanism-panislamism/: XIX-XXv.* [Official doctrines in the ideology and politics of the Ottoman Empire /Ottomanism and pan-Islamism/ XIX-XX centuries]. M., 1985, pp. 97-129.

⁴¹⁶ E. Z. Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi. Cilt VII: Islahat Fermanı Devri, 1861-1876.* Ankara, 1956, p. 70.

⁴¹⁷ E. Z. Karal, *La transformation de la Turquie d'un empire oriental en un état moderne et national.* – Cahiers d'histoire mondiale, 1957, Vol. IV, No. 1, p. 426-441; E. Z. Karal *Obstacles rencontrés pendant le mouvement de modernisation de l'Empire Ottoman. – Economie et sociétés dans l'Empire Ottoman (Fin du XVIII-e - Début du XX-e siècle). Actes du colloque de Strasbourg (1-er - 5 juillet 1980). Publiés par J-L. Bacqué-Grammont et P. Dumont, Paris, 1983. p. 11-12; E. Z. Karal, *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayununda Batının etkisi.* – Belleten TTK, 1964, No. 112, p. 581–601.*

The developments during the years of crisis intensified anti-Christianity to the level of jihad. Many common Turks began to perceive themselves as *ğazis*, who waged holy war against the internal enemy – Christians. In the previous subchapter we spoke about the conditions which facilitated focusing of these extreme anti-Christian sentiments on Bulgarians.

The analysis of the period between 1871 and 1876 allows us to distinguish the phenomena that had directly contributed to the emergence of the genocidal program.

In the beginning of the 1870s, the ideas of pan-Islamism were being disseminated in the Ottoman Empire. At that time the activity of Jamaluddin Afghani in the capital might be conducive to it. Pan-Islamism had not yet become state policy by that time, as it happened in Abdülhamid's rule, but was one of the manifestations of anti-Christian sentiments. Ideas of pan-Islamism were also characteristic of some of the "New Ottoman" leaders, such as Âli Suavi and Namik Kemal. The latter printed an article in the "İbret" newspaper, entitled "Unity of Islam", where he inferred that the might of the Ottoman Empire could be restored through unification of the entire Muslim world under the aegis of their "elder brothers" – Ottoman Turks⁴¹⁸.

The most read newspaper in Constantinople in those years was the "Basiret", which achieved that fame due to a mass of articles, praising pan-Islamic and anti-Christian ideas⁴¹⁹. Essad Bey, the editor, authored the first book on pan-Islamism in Turkey, in which he called for the Muslims throughout the world to gather in Mecca and begin spreading Islam far and wide.

Beginning from 1875, Muslim fanaticism was gaining momentum in the Ottoman Empire. The German "Allgemeine Zeitung" reported that evidences about it were arriving from different provinces of the empire⁴²⁰. For example, the adherers of anti-Christianity wrote, "We (i.e. Muslims – R. S.) have subdued Christians and captured countries with a yatağan. We do not want to share with them the governance of the empire"⁴²¹.

Such was the situation when a new phenomenon emerged – the political activity of the softas. Their mass marches in the capital were unambiguously anti-Christian. The witnesses said that during the marches, the softas threatened

⁴¹⁸ Ş. Mardin, *The genesis of Young Ottoman thought: a study in the modernization of Turkish political ideas*. Princeton, 1962, p. 332.

⁴¹⁹ [A. D. Mordtmann], *Stambul und das moderne Türkenthum (Politische, sociale und biographische Bilder von einem Osmanen)*, Leipzig, B. 1, 1877, S. 241-242.

⁴²⁰ *Meghu Hayastani*, 1875, December 6.

⁴²¹ Le Baron Lermot, *La Turquie demasque et rehabilitation de l'Europe*. Paris, 1877, p. 51, n. 1.

to do away with the *giaours* in the country⁴²², committed acts of violence against Christians. The *softas* were armed⁴²³, and the risk that their actions might expand into large-scale carnages of Christians was always present. Midhat and his environment employed the *softas* to attain their political goals. They openly paid them⁴²⁴.

In 1875-1876 the empire was on the verge of collapse. The disastrous famine, which caused death of tens of thousands of people mainly in the European region, the severest financial crisis, due to which the state declared bankruptcy, and, of course, the rebellions of Christians in the Balkans – Hercegovina, Bosnia, later in Bulgaria – were signs of it.

The Turkish society responded to the desperate situation, as was mentioned above, by expanding the existing radical anti-Christian sentiments, while the government – by arming the Muslim population in the Balkans and creating armed detachments. These were later used against the rebel Christians.

The next Bulgarian insurrection broke out in 1875. To suppress it, the authorities not only used army divisions, but handed out weapons to the Muslim population to involve them in the operations⁴²⁵. This is an indirect evidence that the authorities had been ready for much more extensive activities than just suppression of an insurrection.

The foreign witnesses attested that the Turkish authorities had ordered the Muslim villagers to kill their Christian neighbors long before the April rebellion. A British witness cites in his book a story of a Muslim woman, who told that her husband had received an order of the sultan to kill his neighbors, and he could not disobey the order⁴²⁶. Gangs of *başibozuks* were also involved by the Turkish authorities in committing mass killings of the peaceful Bulgarian population⁴²⁷.

⁴²² E. A. Ragozina, *Iz dnevnika russkoy v Turtsii pered voynoy v 1877-1878 gg.* [From the diary of a Russian woman in Turkey before the war of 1877-1878]. – *Russkaya starina*, 1915, Vol. 162, book 4, p. 94.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁴²⁴ A. V. Clician, *Son Altesse Midhat-Pacha, grand Vizir*. Paris, 1909, p. 44.

⁴²⁵ See above.

⁴²⁶ E. Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople*. London, MCMXVI (1916), p. 16.

⁴²⁷ Vice Consul J. H. Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot, Adrianople, October 13, 1875. – *British documents on foreign affairs: reports and papers from the foreign office confidential print*. General editors: Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt. Part I: from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War. Series B: the Near and Middle East, 1856-1914. Editor: David Gillard. Volume 2: the Ottoman Empire revolt in the Balkans, 1875 -1876. Bethesda, 1984, p. 135.

These communications come to prove that the rudiments of premeditation to pursue a policy of large-scale violence began taking shape in the Turkish ruling elite. It still lacked the factor of "genocidal intent", yet signaled the transformation to the "traditional" medieval policy of carnages – the policy of genocide.

Months later, by the order of the authorities, armed bands of *başbozüks* were set up which, besides Turks, consisted of Albanians and of refugees from the Northern Caucasus; they were subordinate to the command of the armed forces, deployed in that area, and were used against Bulgarians – to suppress the April revolt of 1876. These detachments were close replicas of the ones that participated in medieval Turkish conquests. The European press of the time gave an extensive coverage of their brutality.

Well informed British witness wrote, that the intent of Turks was to crush the spirit of Bulgarians and thereby to prevent the rebellion⁴²⁸. In his two letters, printed in the "Daily News" of London, he listed the names of 60 Bulgarian villages, which population was annihilated.

The most murderous slaughter with horrible atrocities took place in early May of 1876 in the Bulgarian village of Batak, of which eight thousand peaceful villagers, mostly women, children and old men, fell victim. The American orientalist, specialist in Genocide Studies James Reid, who had specifically investigated the massacre in Batak, defined it as genocidal⁴²⁹.

Coincidentally, the first program of genocide was adopted in the capital in days following the slaughter in Batak. Its discussion and adoption by the government took place on May 12 when, under the pressure of armed detachments of the *softas*, who occupied the central streets of the capital and demanded to include Midhat in the government, the sultan forcibly dissolved the existing government and formed a new one, with Mehmet Rüşdi Paşa as its leader⁴³⁰. A week later Midhat was included there and became the factual head the government. Thereupon, Midhat Paşa performed a decisive role in the internal life of the empire and, apparently, facilitated the emergence of the proto-genocidal situation.

Midhat is considered as the most positive and progressive politician in Ottoman history of the New Age, an individual of liberal and pro-Western views,

⁴²⁸ E. Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople*. London, MCMXVI (1916), p. 17.

⁴²⁹ J. M. Reid, Batak 1876: A massacre and its significance. - *Journal of Genocide Research* (2000), 2(3), p. 375–409.

⁴³⁰ H. Maynard to H. Fish, 1876, December 26, Constantinople. - *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 3, 1877*. Washington, 1877, p. 550.

whose talent as a politician made possible the declaration of the first Ottoman Constitution.

However, his activity in the Danube vilayet, intended to "merge" Bulgarians, the unspeakable atrocities he displayed at quelling the revolts of Bulgarians, make us disagree with such assessments. In fact, he was a high-ranking official of the declining Ottoman Empire, distinguished not for his progressive views, but, first and foremost, for his cruelty and slyness, the latter – to the extent of utter cynicism. At the same time, he stood out for his well-coordinated mindset and consistency – rare qualities among the ruling Ottoman elite. The book of the Frenchman Benois Brunswik, who used to know Midhat Paşa in person, gives some insight into his views. The author writes that in reality, Midhat's opinion was that the "forefathers" of the present generation of the Turkish leaders "made a mistake not to have forced our subjects... to turn Mohammedan. This has to be started. Henceforth, all the opportunities should be employed to change the numerical ratio of the two religions [*Islam and Christianity* – R. S.] in our favor"⁴³¹.

Midhat was the politician, who had played a critical role in adopting genocide as state policy in Ottoman Turkey. He was the first in the file of Abdülhamids and Talâts.

THE FIRST GENOCIDAL PROGRAM

In Chapter 1 of this book we have already studied the theoretical definition of proto-genocide, according to which the political situation in a country attains proto-genocidal nature when a program of committing genocide exists.

As is shown below, such program was adopted by the Ottoman government in May of 1876. The original of the program has not been discovered yet. We only have at our disposal a communication about its main points, found in the Archives of Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire, which copy was in the personal archive of the Russian diplomat, who authored said communication. Juxtaposition of the main points of the latter with the facts, known to us, confirms its trustworthiness.

The author of the communication was the Russian vice-consul to Philippolis Nayden Gerov. In mid-May of 1876, during his sojourn in the capital, he managed to use his personal contacts with a government member (of Albanian background) and obtain important news, unequivocally confirming the

⁴³¹ B. Bruswick, *La vérité sur Midhat Pacha*. Paris, 1877, p. 4.

existence of the program of extermination of Bulgarians – the first program of genocide – and shed light on some important details of it. Its detailed analysis is given below.

The first program of genocidal nature was directed against Bulgarians and, in essence, was a response to the April revolt. Earlier, the report on this program was put into scientific circulation by us⁴³².

That a program like that should have existed, we inferred from the relatively recent disclosure of the English diplomatic documents. Before, they were considered confidential and were not placed in the known “Blue Books”. Thus, according to the report, received by the British vice-consul to Adrianople, the government dispatched instructions to local authorities to “decimate the Bulgarians” and kill all male children under six years of age. Such actions were meant to “exterminate the race and compel the rest to emigrate”⁴³³. The information was dated May 19. The Bulgarian politician and publicist Todor Burmov, quite knowledgeable about the details of the measures, taken by the Turkish authorities to suppress the April revolt of Bulgarians, stated that “the mass killings of the wretched people is taking place to a previously developed plan”⁴³⁴. At that time he was in Constantinople and worked as translator for the Russian Embassy. Clearly, he shared this observation with Ambassador Count N. Ignat’ev, although no archive document about it exists.

The document we put into circulation not only confirms the information, provided by the Ottoman official, and the result of the situational analysis, conducted by the Bulgarian politician, but also points out a number of factors of

⁴³² R. Safrastyan, *Turqakan ishkanutyunneri hakazdetsutyuny 1876 t. bulgharakan apstambutyany. nor motetsum* [The response of the Turkish authorities to the Bulgarian revolt of 1876: a new approach]. – *Journal on Oriental Studies*, vol. V, Yerevan, 2004, p. 310-318.

⁴³³ Vice Consul J. H. Dupuis to Sir H. Elliot, May 19, 1876, Adrianople. – *British documents on foreign affairs: reports and papers from the foreign office confidential print*. General editors: Kenneth Bourne and D. Cameron Watt. Part I: from the mid-nineteenth century to the First World War. Series B: the Near and Middle East, 1856-1914. Editor: David Gillard. Volume 2: the Ottoman Empire: revolt in the Balkans, 1875-1876. Bethesda, 1984, p. 234.

⁴³⁴ See his letter to the historian, Professor Nil Popov, who at the same time was secretary at Moscow Slavic Committee: Letter of the Bulgarian journalist T. Burmov to N. A. Popov, 1876, May 15. – *Liberation of Bulgaria from the Turkish yoke: documents in three volumes*. Vol 1: *Liberation struggle of southern Slavs and Russia, 1875-1877*. Edited by S. A. Nikitin, V. D. Konobeev, Al. K. Burmov, N. T. Todorov. Moscow, 1961, p. 222.

genocidal nature. It is a narration of the resolution, passed at the session of the Ottoman government. The text of the communication is brought below:

"The Turkish government, under the pretext of suppressing the revolt, has made a decision to fully destroy the Bulgarian... settlements, which residents are more advanced; to demolish the remaining villages and cities with the hands of başbozüks; to exterminate the best representatives of the urban population in one way or another; to eradicate the entire intelligentsia; not to leave alive a single teacher, educated in Russia; to close the schools and exert a pressure on the people so that they can never recover and re-establish themselves in the current position, when they present a danger for the Turkish state; and, eventually, to Turkicize part of them, i.e. to weaken them even more"⁴³⁵.

The Russian diplomats managed to find out that the program was authored, besides Midhat, by Hüseyin Avni Paşa, and the final resolution was passed at the session of the government⁴³⁶. They also reported that the governmental resolution was not only about the extermination of Bulgarians, but "systematic slaying" of all the Slavic nations in the Balkans⁴³⁷.

The young Russian Turkologist Vasili Smirnov⁴³⁸, who was in Constantinople in those months, based on the evidences, received from "persons, well-informed about the Istanbul relationships", gave the names of the three Turkish political figures, who constituted, as he put it, "the hellish triad of Bulgarian horrors". They were Midhat Paşa, Ahmet Vefik Paşa, prominent statesman of the time and renowned lexicologist, and Âli Suavi, one of the leaders of the "New Ottomans"⁴³⁹. According to Smirnov, they intended to

⁴³⁵ Vitse-konsul v Filippole – Poslu v Konstantinopole [Vice-Consul to Filippole to the Ambassador to Constantinople], May 17 /May 29, 1876, copy, suppl. to prev. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria MID, 1876, file 25, sheets 159 rev.-160.

⁴³⁶ Ibid., sheet 159 rev.

⁴³⁷ Iz donesenia N. Daskalova (Varna) general'nomu konsulu Rossii v Ruse V. T. Kozhevnikovu, 24 avgusta 1876 g. [From N. Daskalov's (Varna) report to Consul General of Russia to Ruse V. T. Kozhevnikov, August 24, 1876]. - Consequences of violence: documents and materials on forcible Islamization. Part 1, Comp. by Petr Petrov, Sofia, 1987, p. 184.

⁴³⁸ Upon returning home, V. Smirnov launched efficient scientific-pedagogic activity and was rated among the renowned figures of Russian Turkic Studies. About his scientific career and historiographic views see: A. S. Tvertinova, V. D. Smirnov – historian of Turkey (to the 125th anniversary of birth). – Sovetskaya Tyurkologia [Soviet Turkic Studies], 1971, No. 4, p. 103-114.

⁴³⁹ V. Smirnov, Ofitsial'naya Turtsia v litsakh [Official Turkey in persons]. – Vestnik Evropy, 1878, book 1, p. 311.

“systematically extirpate the hateful Bulgarians and... stubbornly pursued their program...”

The Russian diplomats continued their interested research and discovered some other details of that genocidal program. Consul General to Ruse V. F. Kozhevnikov was reported that in the capital of the empire, the secret committee “*Süpürge*” [Broom] operated, which head was Midhat Paşa. The goal of “*Süpürge*” was to exterminate all the Christians of the country, not just Bulgarians⁴⁴⁰.

The activity of this felonious group became known to Russian diplomacy in November, 1876, yet, most likely, it had been founded earlier, in May of the same year, when the government, under Midhat’s and Hüseyin Avni’s pressure, passed the resolution on extermination of Bulgarians. After Hüseyin Avni’s assassination (June 15 of the same year) it was completed with new members (known are Vefik Paşa’s and Âli Suavi’s names). According to the communication on the activity of “*Supurge*”, Midhat Paşa had retained his leadership.

Of the members of that criminal group of four, only Vefik escaped violent death. Midhat was killed by the order of his sworn enemy Abdülhamid; Avni was assassinated about a month after the notorious governmental session; Suavi was killed two years later during the uprising against Abdülhamid.

Let us turn to the documents. It is easy to infer that the points, brought above, in essence were nothing but a program aimed not only to suppress the rebellion, but to eradicate Bulgarians to a man. Both the topmost goal and the concrete actions towards attaining it were indicated there. The actions were as follows:

- to annihilate the residents of the rebellious Bulgarian settlements and to level the latter;
- to expose to raids of *başıbozüks* the remaining Bulgarian settlements;
- “in one way or another”, to destroy the political, economic and intellectual elite of Bulgarians;
- to make the intellectuals, particularly the teachers educated in Russia, the main target of this policy;
- to close Bulgarian schools;
- to possibly intensify the process of Turkization of Bulgarians.

⁴⁴⁰ V. F. Kozhevnikov – N. P. Ignat’evu, 12 noyabria 1876 g., *Prilozhenie. – Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot turetskogo iga: dokumenty v trekh tomakh. Tom pervyi: Osvoboditel’naya bor’ba yuzhnykh slavyan i Rossia, 1875-1877. Pod red. S. A. Nikitina, V. D. Konobeeva, Al.K. Burmova, N. T. Todorova. Moscow, 1961, p. 501.*

Proceeding from modern perceptions, these actions reveal the intent of the state power to annihilate a certain ethnic group, and may be defined as genocide. Since its goal was to annihilate the group in the territory of own homeland, it may be qualified as a genocide with the intent of deportation.

The program failed. The year 1876 was exceptionally unstable in political sense. Suffice it to say that during that year, the Ottoman throne was successively occupied by three sultans. The year ended by declaring the Constitution, which, in fact, became an alternative for the policy of genocide. Midhat Paşa with the small group of his followings, who in those years represented the main ruling force of the Ottoman Empire, had at last heeded the opinion of Great Britain's Ambassador, and gave preference to maintaining the territorial integrity of the empire through constitutional reforms.

In those months there was another tide in the political life of the empire, which made it possible to take measures towards commitment of the genocidal program by the government led by Midhat Paşa. The Russian Ambassador Count Ignat'ev was able to sense that such intention existed. In October he notified Chancellor Aleksandr Gorchakov that "the fears of internal carnages are fully grounded"⁴⁴¹.

The main feature of the proto-genocidal situation of 1876 was the fast and unstoppable growth of anti-Christian tendencies in the country. To a greater extent, it ensued from the anti-Christian propaganda, intensively conducted by Muslim clerics. This fact was fixed by the press of the time⁴⁴².

The propaganda gradually transformed to calls for physical destruction of Christians. The Russian diplomats did not miss that fact. Ambassador Ignat'ev wrote to the Tsar, "The *hocas* openly call to destroy giaours"⁴⁴³.

Some kind of coordination was observed in the actions of top authorities and the Muslim clergy, although, beyond any doubt, the initiator was the government, and the reason was not only and not so much Muslim fanaticism, which over centuries had existed among Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, but the new policy of the supreme power towards Bulgarians and other Christians. This important viewpoint was accentuated by an author and contemporary of those events, so far unknown, who wrote anonymously to Ambassador Ignat'ev, "In

⁴⁴¹ N. P. Ignat'ev – A. M. Gorchakovu, Konstantinopol', 13/25 oktyabrya 1876 g. [N. P. Ignat'ev to A. M. Gorchakov, Constantinople, October 13/25 1876]. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria, 1876, file 32, sheet 27.

⁴⁴² See for example the *Meghu Hayastani*, July 3, 1876.

⁴⁴³ N. P. Ignat'ev – Tsaryu, Konstantinopol', 21 maya/2 iyunia 1876 g. [N. P. Ignat'ev to the Tsar, Constantinople, May 21/ June 2, 1876]. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria MID, 1876, file 25, sheet 153 rev.

old times, Christians were oppressed and slaughtered by Muslims; now they are oppressed and slaughtered by the government"⁴⁴⁴. Ignat'ev shared that opinion. In a report to Petersburg, he pointed out that the cause for expanding Muslim fanaticism were the actions of the majority of the Turkish governing system – from the topmost down to the lowermost level⁴⁴⁵.

The facts attest that in the last months of 1876, the Turkish authorities were also planning a large-scale massacre against the Armenian people. In early October, the Armenian press reported about the intensification of Muslim fanaticism against Armenians, cautiously surmising that it might be happening with the permission of the local governance⁴⁴⁶. At the same period of time, the Turkish press, particularly the trumpet of the government, the "Basiret", accused Armenians of preparation for an armed revolt under the guidance of the patriarch of Constantinople⁴⁴⁷. That was a pretext for committing massacre.

The sources of Russian diplomacy give some insight into the details of the program. In the October report to Gorchakov, Ignat'ev, based on the information he had received from the Armenian patriarch in Constantinople, wrote that Midhat had accused Armenians of buying weapons in large quantities and preparing for a revolt in the regions bordering on Russia – to "ensure Russia's interference"⁴⁴⁸.

The similarity to the *modus operandi* of the "Young Turk", or the "New Ottoman" leaders, is apparent. Interestingly, Russia's factor played a key role also in Midhat's anti-Bulgarian programs. In one of Ignat'ev's reports, Midhat Paşa's words addressed to Bulgarians were cited, "You put your hopes on Russia, yet when they eventually come, they will only find ruins"⁴⁴⁹.

At the end of November, the Russian Ambassador to Constantinople informed Petersburg one more time that the consuls communicate about ongoing

⁴⁴⁴ Zapiska (bez podpis) "O smysle krizisa, proiskhodyaschego v nastoyaschee vremia v Turetskoy imperii i o vliyanií proiskhodyaschikh v nei reform na ee gosudarstvennyi stroi". - State Archives of RF, Fund 730 (Fund of N. P. Ignat'ev), list 1, u.s. 706.

⁴⁴⁵ N. P. Ignat'ev – A. M. Gorchakovu, Konstantinopol', October 18/30, 1876. – AVPRI, f. Kantselaria, 1876, file 32, sheet 150.

⁴⁴⁶ *Meghu Hayastani*, October 2, 1876.

⁴⁴⁷ The *Meghu Hayastani* communicates about it in the issue dated October 31, with reference to the *Noragir* of Constantinople.

⁴⁴⁸ N. P. Ignat'ev – A. M. Gorchakovu, Konstantinopol', October 18/30 1876. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria, 1876, file 32, sheet 137 rev. – 138.

⁴⁴⁹ N. P. Ignat'ev – N. K. Girsu, 24 maya/5 iyunia 1876 g. [N. P. Ignat'ev to N. K. Girs, May 24/ June 5, 1876]. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria, 1876, file 25, sheet 153 rev.

“vociferous pressure” upon Christians all over the Ottoman territory, at that, not only on Slavs, but also on the “Christians of Asia Minor”⁴⁵⁰.

Such were the conditions when the known arson of Van happened on December 1. It was organized by the local Turkish government. That event has been referred to by Armenian historiography many a time, yet was viewed as an isolated case. Meanwhile, the secret agent P. Anino (Midhat’s assistant and personal translator, well familiar with the developments in the country, including the ones the authorities kept secret) in his confidential report to Ignat’ev notified that almost at the same time, the Turkish regular army perpetrated “atrocities in the Armenian villages of c”⁴⁵¹. Beyond any doubt, the army had received appropriate orders. The danger of the impending massacre of Armenians was quite real.

The conclusions are as follows: in 1876, the Ottoman Empire was close to launching the process of what in modern perception would be called a large-scale genocide. There was the perpetrator – the group of high-ranking state officials, the victim – Bulgarians, the intent to commit genocide – the program drawn up by the mentioned criminal group. It was intended, circumstances permitting, to execute identical actions against other Christian peoples of the Empire, namely Armenians. However, the favorable conditions did not occur. The essentially genocidal program was carried out but partly. The Bulgarian people escaped extirpation. In other words, the proto-genocidal situation did not degenerate into genocide. The genocide took place later, under Abdülhamid’s direct guidance, when the large-scale massacres of the 1890s marked the launch of the Armenian Genocide, which lasted full two decades.

⁴⁵⁰ N. P. Ignat’ev – A. M. Gorchakovu, November 18/30 1876. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria, 1876, file 32, sheet 539-539 rev.

⁴⁵¹ P. Anino – N. P. Ignat’evu, 1876 g. [P. Anino to N. P. Ignat’ev, 1876]. – State Archives of RF, Fund 730 (Fund of N. P. Ignat’ev), list 1, u. s. 917.

GENOCIDAL PROGRAMS AGAINST THE ARMENIAN PEOPLE

THE HAMIDIAN AND THE YOUNG TURK PROGRAMS

In this section of the monograph examined are the state genocidal programs, targeted at the Armenian people and created during the last decades of the existence of the Ottoman Empire.

The first anti-Armenian program of genocidal nature appeared in the mid-90s of the XIX century. Its implementation ended in mass killings of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire, which victims totaled 300 thousand. The text has not been found, but the juxtaposition and the analysis of the facts, the data from Turkish sources, and the statements of eyewitnesses make it possible to restore certain factors and to elucidate some very important issues.

Planning of the policy of genocide was launched when the Armenian Question was made an issue of international concern at the Conference of Berlin, when the problem of reforms in Western Armenia became a major international problem. Sultan Abdülhamid II and the leadership of the empire considered that the reforms would lead to autonomy of Western Armenia and further to its independence. Therefore they, under the pressure of the Great Powers, were compelled to formally adopt the program of reforms in the vilayets of Western Armenia, while in reality they did their best not to put them into practice. Worth noticing is the revelation of Abdülhamid to German Kaiser, "I prefer to die, rather than to adopt reforms leading to autonomy of Eastern Anatolia [Western Armenia – R. S.]"⁴⁵² Avoiding reforms was possible through annihilation of the Armenian population of Western Armenia. Thus, the extirpation of the Armenian people on the historic Armenian soil became the topmost goal of Abdülhamid's policy.

The preparation of the Hamidian phase of the policy of Armenian Genocide had several peculiarities. The most important of them was that it took place in the absence of a ruling political party – as distinct from the Young Turk

⁴⁵² See: Z. Danişman, Sultan İkinci Abdülhamid Han, İstanbul, 1966, p. 145.

phase. The entire preparatory work was carried out not by the leadership of the ruling party, but in the depths of the supreme body of the state. It is known that Abdülhamid exercised one-man rule, i.e. the important political decisions were made by him alone. Hence he led the policy towards the Armenian people as well. His attitude toward Armenians is clearly expressed in the following phrase, cited, incidentally, by Turkish authors, "Armenians are a degenerated nation... They have always been servants"⁴⁵³. It is not unexpected that a Turk sultan with such standpoint would choose "Armenia without Armenians" as a way to solve the Armenian question. His personal secretary for many years Tahsin Paşa acknowledged in his memoirs that the sultan had decided "to pursue policy of oppressions against Armenians"⁴⁵⁴. Amazingly, the author of such policy of oppressions wondered in his written recollections why he would be labeled "Red Beast"⁴⁵⁵.

Abdülhamid's ruling system reminded of a pyramide with the sultan's palace Yıldız Köşkü at the top. The foreign and home policies of the immense empire were developed in Yıldız. The government was but a executor. According to the documents from the Ottoman archives, Abdülhamid also guided the performance of local authorities: via telegraph, he dispatched instructions regarding the policy towards Armenians that should be pursued; thus he bypassed the government⁴⁵⁶.

For drafting important resolutions, special offices were set up in the sultan's palace, heads of which enjoyed the sultan's full confidence. One of those offices officially consisted of two commissions, responsible for the construction and financial issues of the Hicaz railway, while in reality they, in conditions of top secrecy, were engaged in the Armenian Question. That office was led by İzzet Paşa – a man of influence in Abdülhamid's ruling system. He performed the role of a mediator between the sultan and the high-ranking state officials, conveying to them the sultan's orders⁴⁵⁷, some of them referring to Armenians, Tahsin Paşa related. According to well-informed sources, İzzet Paşa thought that the Armenian Question might be put an end to by eliminating Armenians⁴⁵⁸.

⁴⁵³ See: E. Z. Karal, *Osmanlı tarihi*, VIII cilt, Ankara, 1988, s.484.

⁴⁵⁴ [Tahsin Paşa], *Sultan Abdülhamid: Tahsin Paşanın Yıldız hatıraları*. İstanbul, 1990, s.182.

⁴⁵⁵ [Abdülhamid II]. *İkinci Abdülhamid 'in hatıra defteri*. İstanbul, 1960, s.130.

⁴⁵⁶ C. Eraslan, *I. Sasun isyanı sonrasında Osmanlı Devleti'nin karşılaştığı siyasi ve sosyal problemler. – Kafkas araştırmaları*, II, İstanbul, 1996, s. 76.

⁴⁵⁷ [Tahsin Paşa], *Sultan Abdülhamid: Tahsin Paşanın Yıldız hatıraları*. İstanbul, 1990, s. 28.

⁴⁵⁸ T. Akçam, *Siyasi kültürümüzde zulüm ve işkence*, İstanbul, 1992, s. 301.

Hence he was in full concord with the bloodthirsty sultan. Such attitude was shared by many of the top officials of the empire. Thus, shortly after the Conference of Berlin, the eminent Ottoman political figure and sadrazam of many years Kamil Paşa maintained that, in order to avoid reforms in Western Armenia, forced by the Great Powers, the "Armenian nation" must be destroyed⁴⁵⁹.

The authors of the first phase of the Armenian Genocide employed the social-political doctrines of Pan-Islamism and just shaping Pan-Turkism.

The sources of the Hamidian interpretation of the doctrine of Pan-Islamism date back to anti-Christianity – the political trend, spread among the Turkish population of the empire from the mid-XIX century. It came into existence as a result of violent opposition against the pro-Western reforms of Tanzimat⁴⁶⁰. Thereafter, Abdülhamid, already a sultan, invited the ideologist of Pan-Islamism Jamaluddin Afghani and, by combining the latter's ideas with Turkish anti-Christianity, tried to create the official ideology of the Ottoman Empire.

The Hamidian version of Pan-Islamism had two aspects⁴⁶¹. The foreign aspect implied consolidation of all the Muslims throughout the world under the aegis of the Ottoman Empire (based on the fact that the Turkish sultans had usurped the title of caliph back in the Middle Ages) to withstand the Great Powers. The internal aspect implied application of it as ideological means for maintaining the territorial integrity of the empire. This was much written about by foreign authors of Turkish origin, yet they omitted the fact that Pan-Islamism was also a means to incite Muslim Turks and Kurds against Armenians as Christians. The Austria-Hungarian Ambassador to Constantinople, an eyewitness of Armenian carnages, defined them as "a crusade of Muslims against Christians"⁴⁶².

The campaign for Pan-Islamism was carried out both openly and secretly; in the latter, heads of the Muslim mystic brotherhoods – sheikhs and mullahs – were employed⁴⁶³. They roamed around the country and instigated the Turks and

⁴⁵⁹ See: Phorts [Experience], 1879, 7-8, p. 204.

⁴⁶⁰ See: R. Safrastyan, *Osmanyan kaisrutyun: tseghaspanutyun tzagragi tzagumnabanutyuny* [Ottoman Empire: the genesis of genocidal program] (1876-1920), Yerevan, 2009, p. 117-132, 149 – 156.

⁴⁶¹ A. Özcan, *Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (1877 - 1924)*, Leiden-New York-Köln, 1997, p. 46.

⁴⁶² See: T. Akçam, *İnsan Hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu: İttihat ve Terakki'den Kurtuluş Savaşı'na*, Ankara, 2002, s. 93.

⁴⁶³ İ. S. Sırma, *II. Abdülhamid'in İslam birliği siyaseti. 4. Baskı, İstanbul, 1990.*

Kurds against Armenian "giaours". The Armenian population of the empire was viewed as part of the hostile to the Ottoman Empire Christian world, subject to annihilation. Later on, during the carnages, Muslim fanaticism became the principal tool for instigating the mob against Armenians.

During the Hamidian period, some elements of the doctrine of Pan-Turkism also began to shape, which in the days of the Young Turk rule grew into state ideology. One of said elements was the concept of "Turkish Anatolia", the latter substituting for the term "Asia Minor". Anatolia was propagated as the most important region of the Turkish Homeland, belonging exceptionally to Ottoman Turks. In old times, Armenia used to occupy part of that land. Some authors asserted that Armenians of today have nothing in common with Armenians of old times, who were Turks; some others – that in reality, the Christians of Anatolia are Turks of different religion⁴⁶⁴.

The British diplomatic and the Turkish sources evidence that back in the early 1890s, the sultan and his closest surroundings undertook the planning of mass slaughters of Armenians. For instance, the English clergyman Malcolm McCole, having studied the communications of the British consuls in the Ottoman Empire, came to the conclusion that drafting of the program of slaughtering Armenians had begun in the summer of 1890⁴⁶⁵. Mustafa Nedim, a personal secretary for Sultan Abdülhamid, noted in his recollections that on July 27, 1890, some time after the known Kum Kapu demonstration, the "Hamidiye" cavalry detachments of Kurd bandits began to form.⁴⁶⁶ This proves that the program of the first phase of the Armenian Genocide had been basically completed, since later on, the "Hamidiye" homicidal formations were used by the sultanic authorities as the main executors of the mass slaughters of the peaceful Armenian population.

The most significant feature of that program was that it designed brutal carnages of Armenians, when not a single case of mass insurgency against the Turkish authorities had been recorded. It had become apparent even to contemporaries. The Russian Vice-Consul to Rize Alexander Gippius wrote in his analytical essay, that it would be incorrect to define the carnages, organized

⁴⁶⁴ D. Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876 – 1908*, London, 1977, p. 52 - 53.

⁴⁶⁵ *İ. İakkol, İtvetstvennost' Anglii pred Armeniyye. – Polojeniye armjan v Turcii do vmeshatel'stva derjav v 1895 godu* [M. McCole, *Responsibility of England before Armenia. – Conditions of Armenians in Turkey before the Great Powers interference in 1895*], Moscow, 1896, p. 158.

⁴⁶⁶ M. Nedim (Nakhkin qartughar Sultan Hamiti), *Hay Egherny (im vkayutyunnery)* [Former secretary for Sultan Hamid], *Armenian Genocide (my testimonies)*, Sofia, 1936, p. 12.

by the Turkish authorities, as a response to the vigorous activity launched by the Armenian "agitators"⁴⁶⁷. Having analyzed a great number of facts, the Russian diplomat inferred that the oppressions of Armenians by Turks made integral part of their internal policy and, in mathematical terms, were a "constant magnitude", which meant they would continue regardless of what the Armenians would undertake⁴⁶⁸. Essentially, A. Gippius identified that the Hamidian policy of Armenian carnages had been premeditated. This is also evidenced by the documents of British diplomats⁴⁶⁹.

Hamid's monstrous program was launched in one of the main centers of Armenian liberal movement, in Sasun, in 1892⁴⁷⁰. Two years later, in 1884, the prisons of the empire were packed with Armenians⁴⁷¹.

Bloody mass carnages were still ahead.

The genocidal nature of Abdülhamid's anti-Armenian policy is beyond any doubt. Juxtaposing it with the program of 1876 against Bulgarians, we may assert that, over the past two decades, the Turkish state machinery had become more skillful in organizing mass slaughters of peaceful people. However, the fact that up to date, no official document, reflecting the genocidal programs of Hamidian authorities, has been discovered, makes it impossible to conduct a more elaborate analysis of the state policy of the period at issue from the perspective of genesis of the genocidal program in the Ottoman Empire.

⁴⁶⁷ A. I. Gippius, *Revolutsionnaya agitatsia sredi turetskikh armian i byvshie v Aziatskoy Turtsii v 1895-1896gg. besporiadki, zapiska* [Revolutionary agitation among Turkish Armenians and the disorders of 1895-1896 in Asian Turkey, notes], St. Petersburg, July 16, 1897. – Armenian National Archives, Fund Qaghvatqner [Passages], Fund 339, sheet 134, 135.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, sheet 146.

⁴⁶⁹ See, for example, *The Massacre at Egin: How it was planned and carried out*. By Mrs. Rendel Harris. From the "Daily News", December 11th, 1896. – Armenian National Archives, Fund 411, H. F. Lynch, list 1, D. 230, sheets 1-2.

⁴⁷⁰ See, L. H. Mkrtchyan, *Arevmtahayutyan tseghaspanutyun Abdülhamidyan qaghaqakanutyuny: – Hayots tseghaspanutyuny (usumnasirutyunner)* [Abdülhamid's policy of Genocide of Western Armenians: – The Armenian Genocide (studies)]. Edited by P. H. Hovhannisyan, Yerevan, 2001, p. 75.

⁴⁷¹ [Smirnov, sekretar' posol'stva], *Zapiska ob armianskom voprose, Depesha Nelidova – Shishkinu*, 23 fevralia/7 marta, 1895, Pera [Smirnov, secretary at the Embassy], A note on the Armenian Question, Dispatch of Nelidov to Shishkin, February 23/March 7, 1895, Pera. – Armenian National Archives, Fund Qaghvatqner, D. 35, On the Armenian Question and Western Armenians, 1895-1908, sheet 40.

Let us examine the state program of genocide during the Young Turk rule, which target were also Armenians. The program comprised three documents. In all three, both the intent to commit genocide and the means to commit it are present.

The first of these documents is the record of the resolutions, passed at the secret meeting of a group of leading figures of the Ottoman Empire, headed by Talât, during World War One. The document is known as "10 Commandments".

It became known to general public in 1919 from the Armenian newspapers of Constantinople, where the Armenian translation of the document was printed⁴⁷². The renowned Armenian historian Leo⁴⁷³ reprinted it from the "Verjin lur" [Latest News] newspaper in one of his monographs; later, the French historian of Armenian origin Arthur Beylerian placed the French translation in the introduction to the collected French archive materials⁴⁷⁴. The Armenian-born American specialist in Genocide Studies Vahagn Dadrian at the end of the last century scrutinized thoroughly the British archives and discovered a number of important facts, related with the origination of said document and the circumstances of finding it⁴⁷⁵. In particular, it became known that at the meeting present were Foreign Minister and member of the Central Committee of the Young Turk party Talât; members of the Central Committee, leaders of the "Special Organization" Bahattin Şakir and Nazım; head of the Internal Affairs Administration for Social Security İsmail Janpolad, and Chief of the Political Administration of General Headquarters of the Ottoman army, Colonel Seyfi. Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Colonel Esad, the secretary of the meeting, documented the resolutions.

Below presented is the text, published by Dadrian.

⁴⁷² The print of "Tchakatamart" [Battle] see: M. Hovsepyan, HYD K.Polsi parberakan mamuly [ARF periodical press in Constantinople] (1909-1924), Yerevan, 2009, p. 69.

⁴⁷³ See the reissue of the work, published in Paris in 1934: Leo, Tiurqahay heghapokhutean gaghaparabanutiuny [The ideology of Turko-Armenian revolution]. Volume B. Yerevan, 1994, p. 151-152.

Lately in Armenia the Armenian translation of that valuable collection has been published, where presented is the Armenian translation of the program. See: The Great Powers, Ottoman Empire and Armenians in French archives. Volume 1. Owing to Arthur Beylerian's assiduity. Foreword by Jean Baptiste Duroselle. Translated from French by Varuzhan Poghosyan. Yerevan, 2005, p. 27-28.

⁴⁷⁵ V. N. Dadrian, The secret Young - Turk Ittihadist conference and the decision for the World War I Genocide of the Armenians. – Holocaust and genocide studies, 1993, Volume 7, No. 2, p. 173–201.

1. Profiting by Arts: 3 and 4 of Comite Union and Progres, close all Armenian Societies, and arrest all who worked against Government at any time among them and send them into the provinces such as Baghdad or Mosul, and wipe them out either on the road or there.
2. Collect arms.
3. Excite Moslem opinion by suitable and special means, in places as Van, Erzeroum, Adana, where as a point of fact the Armenians have already won the hatred of the Moslems, provoke organized massacres as the Russians did at Baku.
4. Leave all executive to the people in provinces such as Erzeroum, Van, Mamuret ul Aziz, and Bitlis, and use Military disciplinary forces (i.e. Gendarmerie) ostensibly to stop massacres, while on the contrary in places as Adana, Sivas, Broussa, Ismidt and Smyrna actively help the Moslems with military force.
5. Apply measures to exterminate all males under 50, priests and teachers, leave girls and children to be Islamized.
6. Carry away the families of all who succeed in escaping and apply measures to cut them off from all connection with their native place.
7. On the ground that Armenian officials may be spies, expel and drive them out absolutely from every Government department or post.
8. Kill off in an appropriate manner all Armenian in the Army – this is to be left to military to do.
9. All action to begin everywhere simultaneously, and thus leave no time for preparation of defensive measures.
10. Pay attention to the strictly confidential nature of these instructions, which may not go beyond two or three persons.”⁴⁷⁶

The document is not dated. The English officer, to whom Esad had handed it, set an approximate date between December 1914 – January 1915⁴⁷⁷. In the light of the facts, known today, these dates are acceptable, since in February, signs of implementation of some points of the program were already observed. Thus, well-informed German Lieutenant-Colonel Stange⁴⁷⁸ reported that on

⁴⁷⁶ . N. Dadrian, *The Secret Young-Turk Ittihadist conference and the decision for the World War I Genocide of the Armenians. – Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 1993, Volume 7, No. 2, p. 174–175.

⁴⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 174.

⁴⁷⁸ He was one of the leaders of the “Special organization”. See: V. N. Dadrian, *Documentation of the Armenian genocide in German and Austrian sources*. New Brunswick, 1994, p. 110. The military rank of Stange is mistaken here for colonel.

February 10, deputy director of the Ottoman Bank of Armenian origin was killed for “political reasons”, and a few days before or after – the Armenian bishop of Erzincan⁴⁷⁹. Then dismissals of Armenian-born officials from public service began, then – disarmament of Armenian-born private soldiers of the Ottoman army, then – arrests of officers⁴⁸⁰... All these actions were included in the document under consideration.

Some scholars assert that the final decision about mass killings of Armenians was made by the Young Turk Central Committee in the middle of the same month of 1915⁴⁸¹. This is indirectly confirmed by the published by Aram Antonyan letter from the Central Committee of the Young Turk party to the responsible representative of the Central Committee in the vilayet of Adana Kemal, written on February 18, where it said that a decision had already been made to ruthlessly extirpate all Armenians, and that requisite orders from the government would be shortly sent to governor-generals and army commanders⁴⁸². So we may infer that in the frame of preparatory work for making the final decision on the Armenian Genocide, the “10 Commandments” represent the phase when an integrated and coordinated program of acts and measures towards fulfilling concrete tasks was completed.

The guilt of Talât, Bahattin Şakir and Nazım in organizing and perpetrating the Armenian Genocide has long been known and documented, and there is no need to refer to it yet again. Janpolad’s Armenociding activity is also well-known. In particular, he was the chief responsible figure for arrests and exiles of the Armenian intelligentsia and the representatives of other social strata in Constantinople. He was noted for his inhuman cruelty and bloodthirsty inclinations even among his own party members, and thus had earned the epithet “murderous soldier”⁴⁸³. English officer Andrew Ryan, who interrogated the arrested Young Turk leaders, admitted that he felt the least empathy for him

⁴⁷⁹ Der deutsche Oberstleutnant Stange an die deutsche Militärmission in Konstantinopel, Erserum, den 23. August 1915, Geheim. - DE/PA-AA/BoKon/170, www.armenocide.net - 1915-08-23-DE-013Geheim!

⁴⁸⁰ Ch. J. Walker, *Armenia: the survival of a nation*. London, 1983, p. 200.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

⁴⁸² See in the text of the letter: A. Antonyan, Metz Votchiry [The great crime]. Yerevan, 1990, p. 130.

⁴⁸³ O. S. Kocahanoglu, İttihat-Terraki’nin sorgulanması ve yargılanması: Meclis-i Mebusan tahkikatı, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Ermeni Tehcirinin içyüzü, Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi muhakemesi. İstanbul, 1998, s. 629.

compared with the others⁴⁸⁴. Mustafa Kemal, instead, not only sympathized with the “murderous soldier”, but spoke highly of him as a “statesman”...⁴⁸⁵

The fifth member of that criminal group – Colonel Seyfi of General Headquarters, also belonged among those who were responsible for the Armenian Genocide. His role has not been fully disclosed yet. The facts bespeak that he headed the detachments of murderers, the so-called *fidais*, who acted within the scope of the “Special Organization”. (This was confirmed by German Colonel von Lossof⁴⁸⁶.) Yet, due to his vast experience in secret operations, that murderer managed to avoid appearing at the postwar Ottoman military tribunal. After the war, Seyfi initiated a zealous and often invisible activity at various fronts of the Kemalist movement. Thus, he was among the leaders of the secret “Hamza” group, active at the Western front, which goal was to ensure succession of the Young Turks and the Kemalists⁴⁸⁷; thereupon, he commanded one of the Kemalist army divisions, stationed in Trabzon⁴⁸⁸.

Of all the members of that criminal group, only Seyfi died a natural death. Talât and Bahattin Şakir were shot by avengers; Nazım and Janpolad were convicted of preparing an attempt on Mustafa Kemal’s life and hung in 1926 along with a number of other former İttihadists.

Criminals normally try to conceal the traces of their crime. Such was the case with the developers of the Armenian Genocide. In May of 1915 the Ottoman authorities passed a Law that was to serve as a “legal” disguise for the premeditated mass extermination of the Armenian people, or genocide. They failed to realize that said Law was nothing but one more proof of their felonious programs. Indeed, it appeared to be one of the bloodiest and most brutal laws in human history. In special literature, devoted to the history of the Armenian Genocide, it is often referred to as “Law on Deportation”⁴⁸⁹.

The prehistory of passing that law is brought below.

⁴⁸⁴ British Foreign Office dossiers on Turkish war criminals. By Vartkes Yeghiayan. La Verne, 1991, p. 52.

⁴⁸⁵ O. S. Kocahanoglu, İttihat -Terraki'nin sorgulanması ve yargılanması: Meclis-i Mebusan tahkikatı, Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, Ermeni Tehcirinin içyüzü, Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi muhakemesi. İstanbul, 1998, s. 630 – 631.

⁴⁸⁶ V. N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Oxford, 1995, p. 220.

⁴⁸⁷ E. Şimşek, İ. Bahar, Türkiye’de istihbaratçılık ve MİT. İstanbul, 2004, s. 186-187.

⁴⁸⁸ E. J. Zürcher, The Unionist factor: the role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National movement, 1905 – 1926. Leiden, 1984, p. 128.

⁴⁸⁹ Turk historians call it either “Tehcir kanunu” (“Law on Deportation”), or “Sevkiyat kanunu” (“Law on banishment”).

On May 24, 1915⁴⁹⁰, the three powers of the Entente – Russia, Great Britain and France – came forth with a joint note, in which the mass slaughters of Armenians were severely condemned and qualified as “a new crime... of Turkey against humanity and civilization”. They underscored that the members of the Ottoman government would be recognized as personally amenable to law for that crime⁴⁹¹. On the same day, the French text was submitted to the “Hava” telegraph agency on behalf of the Foreign Ministry of France, and was immediately dispatched to Constantinople and Berlin.

The official presentation of the note to the Ottoman government took place not long after, via a third party, as between the Entente countries and Turkey diplomatic relations did not exist. The published documents allow us to retrace the entangled progress of that procedure. At first, the copy of the note was handed via US Ambassador to Paris W. Sharp to State Secretary W. Bryan in Washington, at the request of French Foreign Minister Delcassé⁴⁹². It happened on May 28.

A day later, on May 29, the latter telegraphed it to US Ambassador to Constantinople H. Morgenthau⁴⁹³, who eventually submitted the note to sadrazam Said Halim Paşa.

The response of the members of the Ottoman government to the note was quite hot. Ambassador of Austria-Hungary Johann Pallavicini reported to Vienna

⁴⁹⁰ Here and hereunder, all the dates in the article, except those specially noted, are in the Gregorian calendar.

⁴⁹¹ See in the text of the declaration: Notification of the Department to the “Hava” agency, Urgent, Paris, May 24, 1915. – Great Powers, Ottoman Empire and Armenians in French archives. Volume 1. Owing to Arthur Beylerians’ assiduity. Foreword by Jean Baptiste Duroselle. Translated from French by Varuzhan Poghosyan. Yerevan, 2005, p. 99.

⁴⁹² Sharp – to Secretary of State, Paris, May 28, 1915. – Documents: The State Department File. – A. Hayrapetyan, «Race Problems» and the Armenian Genocide: The State Department file. – Armenian Review, Spring 1984, Volume 37, No. 1, p. 64; US Ambassador in Paris Mr. W. Sharp to Foreign Minister Mr. Delcassé, Paris, May 28, 1915. – Great Powers, Ottoman Empire and Armenians in French archives. Volume 1. Owing to Arthur Beylerians’ assiduity. Foreword by Jean Baptiste Duroselle. Translated from French by Varuzhan Poghosyan. Yerevan, 2005, p. 101.

⁴⁹³ Bryan – to Amembassy, Constantinople, Washington, May 29, 1915. – Documents: The State Department file. – A. Hayrapetyan, «Race Problems» and the Armenian Genocide: The State Department file. – Armenian Review, Spring 1984, Volume 37, No. 1, p. 65.

that it drove sadrazam Said Halim Paşa furious⁴⁹⁴. US Ambassador H. Morgenthau described in his diary Said Halim Paşa's state after he had familiarized with the note as "very much annoyed"⁴⁹⁵.

Turkish historians in their turn gave the name of Internal Minister Talât Bey, one of those threatened with the note, as by his orders deportations and massacres had started and were in progress. The latter obviously feared lest the whole burden of guilt should be laid onto his and only his shoulders. In an attempt to avoid it, he initiated a process aimed to disperse the guilt for the crime among the government members, making it a matter of collective amenability, rather than his personal⁴⁹⁶. Worth noticing is that the criminal realized very well the measure of his responsibility. Talât's unique confession on that subject has been preserved in the memoirs of his close friend Halil, a leading figure in the Ottoman Empire and in the "Committee of Union and Progress". According to him, Talât once acknowledged that he was the one to make the decision about the deportation of Armenians⁴⁹⁷.

Following Talât's initiative, the Turkish leadership hastily passed a series of resolutions, which in the course of a week ended in publication of the "Law on Deportation".

The documents, published in Turkey, show that after the declaration came out on May 26, Chief Commandment of the army addressed the Internal Ministry, proposing to begin the deportation of Armenians from the "eastern vilayets, Zeytun, and other places with overwhelming Armenian population"⁴⁹⁸. Turkish historians prefer not to publish the photocopy of that important document, neither do they disclose the full text in Osmanlı; its obviously distorted version appeared in the monograph by the late ex-ambassador Kamuran Gürün, one of the pillars of the official Turkish historiography, inclined to falsify

⁴⁹⁴ Pallavicini – an Baron Burian, Constantinopel, an 18. Juni 1915. – K. u K. – Dokumente: Armenien in Österreichischen Archiven (Fotokopien). Band II: 1915 – 1917. Herausgeber: Artem Ohandjanian. S. 884.

⁴⁹⁵ June 7, Monday. - [Henry Morgenthau], United States Diplomacy on the Bosphorus: The Diaries of Ambassador Morgenthau 1913 – 1916. Compiled with an Introduction by Ara Sarafian. Princeton and London, 2004, p. 249.

⁴⁹⁶ Y. H. Bayur, Türk İnkılabı tarihi. Cilt: III: 1914 -1918: Genel Savaşı, Kısım III: 1915 – 1917 vuruşmaları ve bunların siyasal tepkileri. Ankara, 1983, s. 39; Y. Halaçoğlu, Die Armenierfrage. Klagenfurt, 2006, S. 66.

⁴⁹⁷ [Halil Menteşe], Osmanlı Mebusan Meclisi Reisi Halil Menteşe'nin anıları. Giriş: İsmail Arar. İstanbul, 1986, s. 216.

⁴⁹⁸ See the text of the document, published by the Turkish historian K. Gürün: K. Gürün, Ermeni dosyası. İkinci Baskı. Ankara, 1983, s. 213.

the real facts of the Armenian Genocide⁴⁹⁹. It seemed that the publication of said document would convincingly reassert the official Turkish version that the deportation of Armenians was an operation arising from merely military necessity. This makes us think that Gürün published not only the abridged, but the falsified document. The latter surmise is confirmed by that the document suggested to begin the deportation of Armenians of Zeytun, while by the orders of Talât it began back at the end of March, was underway all through the month of April, and besides, the regular Turkish troops were already deployed in Zeytun. This proves that the abovementioned document, authored by Chief Command, had been written much earlier than Gürün wanted to present it – most likely, in the period between April – early May. The reason for that falsification might be that the document contained a reference to a “verbal decision” about deportation⁵⁰⁰. In our opinion, this was a deliberate “oversight” by Enver, since it enabled the War Ministry to avoid the responsibility for initiating the deportation.

In response to that note, Talât addressed the government on behalf of the Internal Ministry with a secret report, demanding that the Armenian population of the war regions be deported⁵⁰¹. This document, despite the series of falsifications and lies it contains, at the same time reasserts the genocidal intent of the Turkish authorities. In H. Ghazaryan’s translation it is formulated as follows, “This concern⁵⁰² is an important component of the state’s vital efforts towards its radical solution, putting an end to it and getting rid of it⁵⁰³. We have taken care about the means and the preparedness for it, and we keep it under control”⁵⁰⁴. This last sentence may be interpreted as a reference to the “10 Commandments”, well familiar to us.

⁴⁹⁹ See for example: Y. Halaçoğlu, *Die Armenierfrage*. Klagenfurt, 2006, S. 65, or: Y. Ercan, *Ermeniler ve Ermeni Sorunu*. – *Yeni Türkiye*, 2001, ocak-şubat, yıl 7, sayı 37: *Ermeni Sorunu özel sayısı I*, s. 48 - 49.

⁵⁰⁰ K. Gürün, *Ermeni dosyası*. İkinci Baskı. Ankara, 1983, s. 213.

⁵⁰¹ The text of that secret report in Armenian translation was first published by the Genocide survivor and ardent researcher Haykazn Ghazaryan. See: H. G. Ghazaryan, *A Turk – perpetrator of genocide*, Beirut, 1968, p. 324-328.

⁵⁰² As it follows from the context of the document, Talat’s “concern” was the striving of the Armenian people to effect reforms in Western Armenia.

⁵⁰³ The translator, considering the significance of this paragraph, cites the Turkish expression in Armenian letters: *kulliyen izalesi*.

⁵⁰⁴ H. G. Ghazaryan, *Tseghaspan turqy* [A Turk – perpetrator of genocide], Beirut, 1968, p. 325.

The authorities were in such a panic that even violated the regular procedure of passing a law. Without convening a session of the government, without discussing Talât's report and without the requisite resolution of the government, it was hastily passed on the next day, May 27; on June 1 it was published and enforced immediately under the title "Temporary Law on Measures to Be Taken from Military Point of View Against Those Who Act in Opposition to the Government's Activity in Wartime". It was signed by the sultan and Minister of War Enver⁵⁰⁵. As has been mentioned, it is also known as "Law on Deportation".

On May 30, prior to the promulgation of the "Law on Deportation", a session of the government was convened. It discussed Talât's report and adopted a resolution to begin the deportation. The text of the resolution is published⁵⁰⁶. It is entitled "Protocol on Discussions of the Council of Ministers" and consists of two parts: "Brief Description"⁵⁰⁷ and "Resolution". The document is signed by several members of the Ottoman government. We were able to decipher Grand Vizier Said Halim Paşa's, Enver's, Talât's and Nasmi's signatures. The segment "Resolution" also contains a statement which reveals the genocidal intent of the Ottoman government – the "necessity to completely destroy and put an end" to the Armenian movement ("imhâ ve izâlesi kat'iyen muktezi")⁵⁰⁸.

Let's turn to the "Law on Deportation".

Up to date, many aspects, related with the content and the specifics of publication, remain unclear in Armenia and abroad, which entails contradictory approaches.

One of the controversial issues, for instance, is the date of passing and publishing the Law. Even such an outstanding scholar in Genocide Studies as Vahagn Dadrian brings two different dates of publication in his two fundamental studies, at that, both incorrect. The first, published in 1995, May 26 of 1915 is

⁵⁰⁵ See the text: Vakt-ı seferde icraat-ı Hükûmete karşı gelenler için cihet-i askeriyece itihaz olunacak tedabir hakkında kanun-ı muvakkat. - Takvîm-i Vekâyi', 18 Receb 1333 / 19 Mayıs 1331, 7. sene, nr. 2189.

⁵⁰⁶ Meclis-i Vukelâ Mûzâkerâtına Mahsûs Zabıtnâme: Hûlasâ-i me'âli, 17 Mayıs 1331. - BOA. Meclis-i Vukelâ Mazbatası, 198/163. - <http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/kitap/pdf/2/17.pdf>

⁵⁰⁷ Obviously, it should have been "Concise description of the discussion of the problem".

⁵⁰⁸ Meclis-i Vukelâ Mûzâkerâtına Mahsûs Zabıtnâme: Hûlasâ-i me'âli, 17 Mayıs 1331. - BOA. Meclis-i Vukelâ Mazbatası, 198/163. - <http://www.devletarsivleri.gov.tr/kitap/pdf/2/17.pdf>

indicated⁵⁰⁹. Four years after, in another book by the same author, we read that the Law appeared in the press on May 27 of 1915⁵¹⁰.

Meanwhile, the Turkish official documents evidence that the first date refers to Internal Minister Talât's mentioned secret report, whereas the second is the date of passing the Law, and not appearing in the press, which happened 5 days later. On June 1 of 1915 it was placed on the first page of the official "Takvim-i vakayi" newspaper. This clarification is important because, according to Article 3 of the Law, it was to be enforced as of the date of publishing.

The above cited mistake occurs in a number of other studies on the history of Armenian Genocide. Thus, well-known to us Haykazn Ghazaryan and Levon Vardan in their monographs also confuse the dates of passing the Law and appearing in the press⁵¹¹.

The dates are misrepresented by some Turkish historians too. Mehmet Hocaoglu mistakenly wrote that the Law was put into practice on May 14, 1331 (according to the Rumi calendar system used in the Ottoman Empire's official paperwork)⁵¹², which coincides with May 27 of 1915, whereas the Law was officially put into effect as of the date of printing in the press, which was June 1, 1915.

The Turkish historian Ismail Hami Danişmend also mistook the dates of adopting the Law and publishing it. His four-volume "Explanatory Chronicle of Ottoman History" has been a table-top book for researchers of Ottoman history for decades now. In volume 4, the author wrote that the "Law on Deportation" was published on May 27, 1915, confusing that date with the date of passing the Law⁵¹³.

We come across yet another misrepresentation in one of the books on the Armenian Genocide by the Turkish historian, residing in the USA, Taner Akçam, where he, giving the correct dates of passing the "Law on Deportation" and publishing it (May 27 and June 1), wrote that they refer to the governmental

⁵⁰⁹ V. N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*. Providence, Oxford, 1995, p. 400.

⁵¹⁰ V. N. Dadrian, *Warrant for genocide: key elements of Turko - Armenian conflict*. New Brunswick, 1999, p. 123.

⁵¹¹ H. G. Ghazarian, *Tseghaspan turqy*, Beirut, 1968, p. 324-328. L. Vardan, *Haykakan tashningy yev hayeru lqal goiqery (Qnnakan aknark yst trqakan vaverageru)* [The Armenian Fifteen and the abandoned estates of Armenians (Essay-Analysis according to Turkish documents)]. Beirut, 1970, p. 117.

⁵¹² M. Hocaoglu, *Tarihte Ermeni meزالimi ve Ermeniler*. İstanbul, 1976, s. 645.

⁵¹³ İ. H. Danişmend, *İzahlı osmanlı tarihi kronolojisi*. Cilt: 4. M. 1703 - 1924 H. 1115 - 1342. İstanbul, 1955, s. 428.

resolution on beginning the deportation. It is apparent that he identified the "Law on Deportation" with the governmental resolution on beginning the deportation of Armenians, which is incorrect⁵¹⁴. The governmental "Resolution on Deportation" was passed, as was mentioned, at the session of the Council of Ministers on May 30, i.e. three days after the "Law on Deportation" was adopted. T. Akçam was conscientious enough to correct his mistake in one of his later books⁵¹⁵.

The very content of the Law, in particular, the number of Articles, needs to be clarified, as in historiography there is some discord about it too. Very few are the monographs, giving the correct number of Articles of the Law, which is four. Here belongs the interesting book by Armenian-born American Gricor⁵¹⁶ – one of those few authors, who may have been familiar with the version of the "Law on Deportation", printed in the official "Takvim-i vaqayi", which explains his correct assessment of the content of the Law, the dates of passing and publishing it⁵¹⁷. The same may be said about the renowned Turkish historian Tarik Zafer Tunaya⁵¹⁸.

Most of the Turkish scholars prefer to underline that the "Law on Deportation" contained three Articles. They also do not mention whose signatures were put under the Law. Such was the approach of Esat Uras⁵¹⁹ and Kamuran Gürün⁵²⁰, the pillars of the Turkish official negationist concept as to the Armenian Genocide.

Subsequently, the distorted version of these popular in Turkey historians was put into circulation and accepted unreservedly by quite a few Turkish scholars, who referred to it in their research work⁵²¹ and political essays⁵²². Even

⁵¹⁴ T. Akçam, Türk ulusal kimliği ve Ermeni sorunu. 2. baskı. İstanbul, 1993, s. 109.

⁵¹⁵ T. Akçam, İnsan hakları ve Ermeni Sorunu: İttihat ve Terakki'den Kurtuluş Savaşı'na. 2. Baskı. Ankara, 2002, s. 317 - 318.

⁵¹⁶ Yeozghati hayaspanutean vaveragrakan patmutiuny [Documental history of Armenocide in Yozgat]. Prepared by Gricor. New York, 1980.

⁵¹⁷ Ibid., p. 37-38.

⁵¹⁸ T. Z. Tunaya, Türkiye'de siyasal partiler. Cilt I: İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi, 1908 - 1918. Genişletilmiş ikinci baskı. İstanbul, 1988, s. 580.

⁵¹⁹ E. Uras, Tarihte Ermeniler ve Ermeni Meselsi. Yeniden gözden geçirilmiş ve genişletilmiş 2. Baskı. İstanbul, 1987, s. 605.

⁵²⁰ K. Gürün, Ermeni dosyası. İkinci baskı. Ankara, 1983, s. 214.

⁵²¹ See for instance: Y. Ercan, Ermeniler ve Ermeni Sorunu. – Yeni Türkiye, 2001, ocak-şubat, yıl 7, sayı 37: Ermeni Sorunu özel sayısı I, s. 49.

⁵²² See for instance: S. Kaplan, 1915'teki trajedi işte bu tehcir kanunuyla başladı. - Hürriyet, mart 3, 2005.

the experienced historian Bilyal Şimşir, who has attained renown of one of the best “researchers” of the Armenian Question in today’s Turkey, when printing the text of the “Law on Deportation”, neglects the fact that the officially published text of the Law contained four Articles, and confines himself to quoting only three⁵²³.

Following their spiritual fathers, the younger generation of Turkish historians keeps on disguising the true content of the “Law on Deportation”. For instance, Hasan Babacan, professor at Süleyman Demirel University, employing tricks of “scientific” jugglery, in his reference to the text of the Law, printed in the “Takvim-i vaqayi” on June 1 of 1915, cites only two Articles, having incorporated the content of Article 4 into Article 2 and left totally unnoticed Article 3⁵²⁴. When doing so, he must have been positive that the issue of the “Takvim-i vaqayi”, dated June 1, 1915, would never be available to non-Turkish scholars...

Recently, a new approach to that ill-fated Law is being observed: official Turkish historiography simply neglects its existence. Such was, for instance, the attitude of the group of authors of the book “Armenians: Exile and Displacement”, published by the Turkish Historical Society (THS). It is only noted there that the abovementioned resolution of May 30 of the Council of Ministers “approved the resolution of the Internal Ministry and its ongoing implementation”⁵²⁵. Thereby the authors, among them the “leader” of the new generation of “researchers” of the history of Armenian Genocide and President of THS Yusuf Halacoğlu, tried to avoid expressing their opinion regarding the Law in question. It is apt to observe that Professor Halacoğlu states in the “Introduction” to the book that it is based on the “principles of scientific criteria and study of history”⁵²⁶. It is hard to comprehend how the neglect of the key official document on Armenian Genocide correlates with the “scientific criteria”.

Two years later, in another book, authored by Yu. Halacoğlu alone, he not only mentioned the “Law on Deportation”, but reproduced its content – certainly, in compliance with the established in Turkish historiography tradition of omitting the name of the person, responsible for enforcing said Law, i.e. Enver⁵²⁷. Unlike his many colleagues, when speaking about the Law, Halacoğlu

⁵²³ B. N. Şimşir, *Ermeni Meselesi: 1774 – 2005. Üçüncü basım.* Ankara, 2006, s. 299.

⁵²⁴ H. Babacan, *Ermeni Tehciri hakkında bir değerlendirme.* - *Yeni Türkiye*, 2001, ocak-şubat, yıl 7, sayı 37: *Ermeni Sorunu özel sayısı I*, s. 410.

⁵²⁵ H. Özdemir, K. Çiçek, Ö. Turan, R. Çalık, Y. Halaçoğlu, *Ermeniler: sürgün ve göç.* İkinci Basım. Ankara, 2004, s. 64.

⁵²⁶ *Ibid.*, s. VII.

⁵²⁷ Y. Halaçoğlu, *Die Armenierfrage.* Klagenfurt, 2006, S. 68.

made references to works by historians of elder generation, such as Yusuf Hikmet Bayur⁵²⁸ and Kamuran Gürün⁵²⁹, and to the official "Takvim-i vaqayi" newspaper with the "Law on Deportation", dated June 1 of 1915. This notwithstanding, he, however, did not name the person, personally responsible for enforcing the Law, confining himself to a vague remark that, as a result of the Law, the "displacement of Armenians was shifted from the Internal Ministry onto military authorities"⁵³⁰.

Investigation of the Turkish materials enabled us to find out the source of the "tradition" of falsification, adopted by contemporary Turkish historians. It began back in 1916, at the time when the Armenian Genocide was still in progress. The Ottoman government, seeking to mislead the world community and avoid the potential responsibility, at first in Turkish, then in the European languages published a massive reference book, in which the reality is impertinently falsified and an attempt is made to shift the responsibility for the Armenian Genocide onto Armenians. The distorted text of the "Law on Deportation" with only three Articles is brought there; Article 4 is missing, as well as the last paragraph. The names of those who signed the Law are not brought either⁵³¹. And this was done when all the aforementioned information was available from the text, published in the official governmental newspaper the previous year.

It should be noted that the Ottoman government did attain its goal. Many of the contemporary and future historians based their works on the version of the "Law on Deportation", placed in the governmental reference book, not the one in the official newspaper. Johannes Lepsius, eyewitness and researcher of the Armenian Genocide, was one of those who did so: in the compiled by him German diplomatic documents, he included the version of the Law from the French edition of the governmental reference book⁵³². Haykazn Ghazaryan printed the Armenian translation of the three Articles of the Law, also based on

⁵²⁸ Y. H. Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı tarihi*. Cilt: III, Kısım 3. Ankara, 1983.

⁵²⁹ K. Gürün, *Ermeni dosyası, İkinci Baskı*. Ankara, 1983.

⁵³⁰ Y. Halaçoğlu, *Die Armenierfrage*. Klagenfurt, 2006, S. 68.

⁵³¹ *Ermeni komitelerinin âmâl-i ve harekât-i ihtilâliyesi ilân-i meşrutiyetten evvel ve sonra*. İstanbul, 1332, s. 237-238.

⁵³² *Deutschland und Armenien 1914 - 1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke*. Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Dr. Johannes Lepsius. Potsdam, 1919, S. 78.

the aforementioned version, although his source was the Turkish edition of said book⁵³³.

A question arises, what was such approach of the authorities of the Ottoman Empire conditioned by? The Ottoman official documents, presently in circulation, do not give a clear answer. We may only presume that it is because the then ruling Turkish elite, namely Enver Paşa, strived to shake off the responsibility for the deportation of Armenians, cost what it might.

As was mentioned, the mass deportation of the Armenian people had started long before passing and publishing the Law, and it was carried out by the initiative and under the guidance of Internal Minister and the factual leader of the Young Turk party Talât. Interestingly, Talât, in his desire to evade responsibility, wrote in his memoirs that the army leadership considered the Armenian population as representing a danger from the military point of view and demanded to begin the deportation, while he personally was against it; for that, he was accused of disloyalty to homeland by his colleagues⁵³⁴. As he presented it, since the situation was getting worse and worse, and the army was able to take "necessary measures" even without a requisite law, there was "no use" in delaying the adoption of the law on deportation⁵³⁵.

Talât maintained that the text of the "Law on Deportation" was drawn up by the General Staff and sent to the government⁵³⁶. His narration, however, does not make clear to what extent the draft served as a basis for the final version of the Law. Neither do the recently published in Turkey official Ottoman documents shed light on the issue.

Noteworthy is the fact that not a single governmental official document, related to the Law in question, has come out to date. Turkish historians have only put into circulation the photocopy of the first page of the "Takvim-i vakay", dated June 1, 1915, where the Law is printed. It is hard to say how it complies with the final version, adopted by the government. Whatever the case, Haykazzı

⁵³³ In H. Ghazaryan's book the translation of the Law is given two times. See: H. G. Ghazaryan, *A Turk – perpetrator of genocide*, Beirut, 1968, pp. 69-70 and 180-181. There are differences between the two texts.

⁵³⁴ [Talât Paşa], *Talât Paşa'nın hâtıraları: Sadırazam Talât Paşa'nın tarihin bir çok gizli taraflarını aydınlatan şimdiye kadar neşredilmemiş şahsi notları*. İstanbul, 1946, s.63 - 65. It is necessary to take into account that Talaat's memoirs were published altered and edited, which fact was admitted even by Yusuf Hikmet Bayur. See: Y. H. Bayur, *Ermeni Meselesi, kaynaklar, II: hatıralar*. - Cumhuriyet, Salı / Cuma Kitabı, 26 haziran 1998.

⁵³⁵ [Talât Paşa], *Talât Paşa'nın hâtıraları: Sadırazam Talât Paşa'nın tarihin bir çok gizli taraflarını aydınlatan şimdiye kadar neşredilmemiş şahsi notları*. İstanbul, 1946, s. 65.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63-64.

Ghazaryan wrote that in reality, the Law contained eight articles, five of which were kept secret⁵³⁷. The issue needs further investigation.

The best way to put an end to the misrepresentations and confusions, brought above, was to publish the translated version of the official text of the "Law on Deportation". It only proved feasible after the photocopy of the official "Takvim-i vaqay", dated June 1, 1915, became available. All the translations into Armenian, done to date, were based on distorted versions⁵³⁸.

The official version of the "Law on Deportation" documents that the Law consists of four Articles, was passed on May 27, 1915, enacted on June 1, 1915, and Enver was personally made responsible for the enactment. The Law is signed by Sultan Mehmet Reşad V, Grand Vizier Mehmet Said Halim Paşa, and Deputy Commander in Chief, War Minister Enver.

The translation of the text of the Law is given below:

Article 1. In the wartime, army, troop and division commanders and their deputies, commanders of individual positions, upon seeing any manifestation of opposition by the population against the governmental orders, actions and measures towards ensuring the defense and calm in the country, as well as any attempt of armed assault and resistance, are authorized and obligated to immediately, by force of arms and most rigorously, bring them back to mind and destroy the assault and the resistance.

Article 2. Commanders of armies and individual troops and divisions, based on special military laws, at suspecting espionage or betrayal, may send the residents of villages or townships, singly or massively, to other settlements and resettle them.

Article 3. The Law is enacted as of the date of publishing.

Article 4. The responsible person for implementation of the provisions of this Law is Deputy Commander in Chief, War Minister⁵³⁹.

I deigned to order that, in order to ensure lawfulness, the text of this Law be presented at the session of the General Assembly⁵⁴⁰, be enacted temporarily and added to the laws of the state power.

⁵³⁷ H. G. Ghazaryan, Tseghaspan turqy, Beirut, 1968, p. 328:

⁵³⁸ H. G. Ghazaryan, Tseghaspan turqy, Beirut, 1968, p. 69-70, 180-181. L. Vardan, Haykakan tashhingy yev hayeru lqal goiqery (Qnnakan aknark yst trqakan vaveragrery) [The Armenian fifteen and the abandoned estates of Armenians (Essay-Analysis according to Turkish documents)]. Beirut, 1970, p. 117.

⁵³⁹ These posts were occupied by Enver Paşa.

⁵⁴⁰ The joint session of the upper and lower houses of the Ottoman Parliament is meant.

13 Recep 1333, May 14, 1331⁵⁴¹

Reşad⁵⁴²,
Sadrazam Mehmet Said⁵⁴³,
Deputy Commander in Chief, War Minister Enver.”

As has already been mentioned, the Law, according to its authors, was to disguise the genocide. Yet the following provision: “Commanders of armies and individual troops and divisions, based on special military laws, at suspecting espionage or betrayal, may send the residents of villages or townships, singly or massively, to other settlements and resettle them,” reveals their striving to employ the army in committing genocide against Armenians. This Article is consistent with the fact of large-scale involvement of the Turkish military in the genocide⁵⁴⁴.

Having analyzed the three aforementioned documents, we may emphasize that, in essence, they are nothing but a program for committing Armenian Genocide – a program, adopted by the Ottoman government and ratified by the sultan, thus appearing a law.

THE PROGRAM OF THE KEMALISTS

The Kemalists decided to accomplish the cause initiated by the Young Turks – this time enslaving the Republic of Armenia and subjecting to genocide Armenians in East Armenia. About this evidences the official document, which detailed analysis is conducted below.

The document was created in November, 1920. Its prehistory is as follows:

November 1920 proved fatal for the Republic of Armenia. On October 30 the Turkish army captured Kars, predetermining the military defeat of the Armenian side in the Turko-Armenian war. The weight of the struggle moved to the sphere of diplomacy. As a result of intense multilateral negotiations of nearly

⁵⁴¹ Corresponds to May 27, 1915.

⁵⁴² Sultan Mehmet Reşad V.

⁵⁴³ Grand Vizier Mehmet Said Halim Paşa.

⁵⁴⁴ See about it: V. N. Dadrian, The role of the Turkish military in the destruction of Ottoman Armenians: a study of historical continuities. – Journal of political and military sociology, 1992, Vol.: 20, No. 2 (Winter): p. 257 – 288.

one month's duration, the Treaty of Aleksandropol was signed on December 2, documenting Armenia's military and diplomatic defeat.

The Turkish documents of that period are of key importance, since they provide information about the real goals of the policy towards Armenia, pursued by the "founding fathers" of Republican Turkey and taking shape on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Most of those documents, which revealed the approaches, judgments, as well as the *modus operandi* and the means, applied by the politicians, were confidential, therefore the authors did not have to hide behind roundabout diplomatic statements, which skill had long been mastered by Turkish governance of all times, hence were free to formulate their thoughts quite explicitly.

In particular, the documents irrefutably evidence that Turkey's foremost goal in the last phase of the war was to destroy Armenia. According to the clear statement in the encryption, sent by Ahmet Muhtar, Acting Foreign Minister of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) government, to Karabekir, "It is an absolute necessity that Armenia be politically and materially removed from the arena"⁵⁴⁵. This is an unconcealed statement of the genocidal intent, directed not as much against the people as the country where said people resided. By destroying Armenia as a state, both "politically and materially", the Turkish nationalists prepared the ground for physical extirpation of the surviving Armenians.

Unfortunately, the Armenian political elite was unable to timely discover that intention, which fact to a great extent conditioned Armenia's defeat also at the political front. For the peace negotiations with Turkey, a delegation was established, headed by former Prime-Minister and Foreign Minister Aleksandr Khatisyan, who later in his memoirs admitted, "...Our delegation thought that, as the Turkish statesmen would continually assert, Turks wished to see the establishment of viable Armenia, which would be favorable for their own state interests"⁵⁴⁶.

Below presented is the translation of that important document.

Encryption of Acting Foreign Minister Muhtar Bey⁵⁴⁷

⁵⁴⁵ Hariciye Vekili Ahmet Muhtar, Şark Cephesi Kumandanlığına, Ankara, 8/11/1336. - K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*. İstanbul, 1959 – 1960, s. 901.

⁵⁴⁶ Al. Khatisean, *Hayastani Hanrapetutian tşagumn u zargatsumy* [Al. Khatisyan, *Origin and development of the Republic of Armenia*]. Athens, 1930, p. 263.

⁵⁴⁷ Ahmet Muhtar, later on took Mollaoğlu as last name (1870-1934). Diplomat, Deputy Foreign Minister, in 1920-1921 often substituted for the first Foreign Minister of Kemalist Turkey Bekir Sami, who had often been on long business trips abroad. Was Ambassador

to Commander of Eastern Front Kazım Karabekir Paşa
(November 8, 1920)⁵⁴⁸

Ankara
8/11/1336

To Eastern Front Command

There is no doubt that Armenia's proposal of armistice at this moment, when it is isolated both from the western and the eastern worlds, is aimed at avoiding the impending disaster. Upon gaining strength, Armenia, naturally, will strive to discharge the obligation to quit the relations with us, imposed by the Treaty of Sevres, as well as jointly with Greeks will hamper our life and progress. It is impossible that Armenia, being located in the center of the great Muslim circle, would ever decline at its own convictions the obligation of a severe gendarme and decide to fully relate its fate with Turkey and Islamism. Because of that, it is an absolute necessity that Armenia politically and materially be removed from the arena. At the same time, since attainment of that goal depends on the potential, which our might provides, and on the favorableness of the overall political situation, coordinated preparation of the abovementioned preconditions is quite urgent. Hence, our withdrawal because of a simple armistice Treaty with Armenians is beyond discussion. The provisions of the armistice to be submitted to Armenians shall be directed at deluding Armenians and appearing peaceful before Europe, rather than at withdrawing from Armenia. Yet in reality, they shall be aimed at step by step preparation and maturation of the preconditions, necessary for us to attain our true goal.

of the Ottoman Empire to Greece, the Ukraine; in the Republican years held the position of Ambassador to Moscow and Washington. Many times was elected delegate for Turkey's Grand National Assembly.

⁵⁴⁸ Kâzım Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*. İstanbul, 1959–1960, s. 901. The document is printed in Armenian for the first time. The Armenian translation of some passages were printed by Ye. Gh. Sargsyan. See: Yervand Sargsyan, *Hayadavutyun* [Conspiracy against Armenia]. – *Hayastani ashkhatavoruhi*, 1991, No. 3, p. 1-2; Yervand Sargsyan, *Davadir gortzarq: Hayastan, Rusastan, Turqia*. [A conspiracy: Armenia, Russia, Turkey]. Yerevan, 1995, p. 170-171. These two translations differ vastly from each other and digress from the original. Vahakn Dadrian also referred to the document, having printed the English translation of one passage. See: Vahakn N. Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*. Oxford, 1995, p. 358.

At present, it is an absolute necessity to demobilize the Armenian army and to confiscate the arms, thereby to deprive them of the possibility to restore their military structure. Under the pretext of keeping the railways under control and defending the rights of the Muslim population, it is essential to establish our military control over the entire territory of Armenia and thus to keep in our hands all the routes connecting Turkey with Azerbaijan. The goal, mentioned above, shall be attained covertly and softly, meaning both the text of the Treaty and the actions proceeding from it – to appear unfailingly peaceful in the eyes of Armenians.

The adoption of the principle of a referendum on borders, stipulated by the first point of the conditions of armistice⁵⁴⁹, sent to You today for handing over to the Armenian government, proceeds from our wish to prevent the final demarcation of the borders. You may temporarily accept the Brest-Litovsk borderline, since the goal set is, first of all, to receive a written proposal from Armenians concerning the border, and thus to avoid reaching a cul-de-sac at the talks. Yet, it is necessary to pave the way for never-ending interference under the pretext of defending the rights of the Muslim minority, remaining on the other side of the border. Paragraphs must be included in the treaty, that would ensure the soonest possible confiscation of arms from the enemy and demobilization of the army. Special efforts are needed towards stepwise arming of the Turks of the region and creating national armed forces. They shall connect the East and the West, and make Azerbaijan an independent Turkish state power.

This instruction, containing the true goal of the government, is confidential. It is intended only for You.

Please, inform in writing about complete deciphering of this encryption.

Acting Foreign Minister
Ahmet Muhtar.”

This and other Turkish documents at our disposal show that the true conceptions of the Kemalists regarding Turkey's state interests are diametrically opposite to what the Armenian leaders thought. Mustafa Kemal's speech at the closed session of TBMM on November 18, 1920, is important for disclosing their true goals. Based on the conclusions of General Officer Corps, he marked that the military operations against Armenia were to obtain dry land communication with Azerbaijan⁵⁵⁰. This refutes the “official” interpretation of

⁵⁴⁹ The document to be handed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia is meant.

⁵⁵⁰ [Atatürk], Erzurum Mebusu İsmail Beyle Rüfekasının, Ermenistan Sulh Şeraiti Hakkında İstizah Takriri ve Hariciye Vekâleti Vekili Muhtar Beyin Cevabı Münasebetiyle

the reason of the war against Armenia, declared to the world in Atatürk's famous "speech" later in 1927: "The destructive actions of Armenians in the autumn of 1920 became unbearable. We have made a decision to advance on Armenia"⁵⁵¹.

Some well-informed Turkish authors write that the developer of the program of military operations against Armenia was nobody but Mustafa Kemal. Back in February of 1920 he came to the conclusion that the "Caucasian wall", implying Armenia, should be destroyed from behind⁵⁵². The unconcealed pan-Turkist aspirations of the Kemalists are proved by the abovementioned document too. It is apparent that the secret encryptions, arriving from Ankara under Acting Foreign Minister Muhtar Bey's signature, first of all reflect Mustafa Kemal's approaches and judgments.

The Turkish documents evince that, when the Turkish leaders launched the war, they pursued a somewhat "humbler" goal – to destroy Armenia's armed forces, not Armenia as such. This is documented by the order to invade Armenia, issued by Chief of General Officer Corps Isnet Bey on September 20. He wrote to the command of the Eastern Front, "Our paramount goal is to destroy Armenian armed forces"⁵⁵³. The order also said that the document was based on the appropriate resolution of TBMM, approved ÇÇby the government.

Thereupon, having inflicted several defeats on the Armenian army, seeing that Armenia was isolated and forsaken by allies, the Turkish leadership began revising its plans. Said process can be considered as one of the pivotal moments of the Turko-Armenian war. It lasted a few days and stirred up arguments among the leading circles of the Kemalists. Turkish sources give some details on it.

From Kazım Karabekir's recollections it becomes clear that on October 31, the day after the seizure of Kars, he related the details of the victory in a dispatch to Kemalist War Minister Fevzi Paşa (Çakmak), indicating in particular that the loot was big enough to wage a ten-year war⁵⁵⁴. On November 2, two days after Karabekir had received the dispatch, the government of TBMM

Sözleri. - [Atatürk] Atatürk'ün T.B.M.M. açık ve gizli oturumlarındaki konuşmaları. Yayına hazırlayan: Kâzım Öztürk. Ankara, 1990, s. 322.

⁵⁵¹ Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk. Cilt: II, 1920 – 1927. İstanbul, 1961, s. 486.

⁵⁵² T. Bıyıklıoğlu, Atatürk Anadolu'da (1919 - 1921). Ankara, 1959, s. 19.

⁵⁵³ The unedited version of this interesting document is published by İsmet in his memoirs. See: İ. İnönü, Hatıralar: 1. kitap. Yayına hazırlayan: Sabahattin Selek. Ankara, 1985, s. 222.

⁵⁵⁴ K. Karabekir, İstiklâl Harbimiz. İstanbul, 1959-1960, s. 898.

addressed the Armenian government proposing to immediately begin peace negotiations⁵⁵⁵. The document is written in a delicate manner, free of any statements of ultimatum; indeed, it is nothing but a proposal to begin peace negotiations.

That the Kemalists turned to Armenia with a cautious proposition to begin peace negotiations is indicative of their serious fear lest Kars' seizure should entail diplomatic problems. That is why they attempted to mitigate their claims on the Armenian territory. As İsmet writes in his memoirs, the approaches of the political circles of Ankara to Karabekir's army's swift advance in Armenia were not uniform. There were politicians, who assessed that march as detrimental for the future comprehensive and final victory⁵⁵⁶. On those days, a few TBMM delegates even came up with an interpellation, requesting explanations as to the expansion of war against Armenia without TBMM's permission⁵⁵⁷. All of this comes to prove that controversies regarding the further actions towards Armenia had crawled into the Kemalist leading circles.

But hesitations were not for Karabekir. He was convinced that penetration into the depths of the Armenian territory, towards Aleksandropol, should be continued, and only after that peace negotiations might be launched. And he decided to act on his own. On November 3 Karabekir leaves in Kars an armed detachment of one thousand "volunteers", who arrived from Sasun a day before to join the regular army in quest of loot. With the combat-ready divisions under his command, he launched an attack on Aleksandropol to capture that city of huge importance⁵⁵⁸.

The Armenian troops had not lost their combativeness by that time. On the following day, in the battle at Kizilçapçah, the Armenian army offered fierce resistance and inflicted significant losses to the enemy. It was not until nighttime that they left their positions and withdrew⁵⁵⁹.

⁵⁵⁵ See the text: Al. Khatisean, *Hayastani Hanrapetutean tzagumn u zargatsumy* [Al. Khatisean, The origin and development of the Republic of Armenia]. Athens, 1930, p. 245-236.

⁵⁵⁶ İ. İnönü, *Hatıralar: 1. Kitap*. Yayına hazırlayan: Sabahattin Selek. Ankara, 1985, s. 222.

⁵⁵⁷ *Siyasi kırınlıklar: 15 gün gizli tutulan görev*. – Tercüman, 4 mayıs 1993.

⁵⁵⁸ K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*. İstanbul, 1959 – 1960, s. 899.

⁵⁵⁹ E. A. Zohrabyan, *1920 turq-haykakan paterazmy yev terutyunnery* [The Turko-Armenian war of 1920 and the Great Powers]. Yerevan, 1997, p. 273-274.

Karabekir's advance had not been preliminarily coordinated with Ankara: here is what he wrote in his recollections about the assault on Aleksandropol: "I notified (underscore mine – R. S.) General Officer Corps Command"⁵⁶⁰. At that moment, he might not be positive that the government would authorize his further aggressive acts.

The reason of cautiousness of Ankara was the foreign factor. The Kemalist leaders were reckoning with the positions of the three countries – Great Britain, Soviet Russia and Georgia. Undoubtedly, most important were Great Britain and Soviet Russia. However, at that time Georgia's stand was not quite clear. The ruling circles had the suspicion that Georgians would take advantage of the situation and seize unprotected Kars. Especially as, according to Karabekir, on November 3 he received an ultimatum from the commander of the Georgian army, stationed in Ardahan, which said that if Turks left Kars and passed the line marked by Georgians, the latter would attack them⁵⁶¹.

Taking into account the circumstances, mentioned above, General Officer Corps, having received the report of Karabekir Paşa about preparations for advancing on Aleksandropol, ordered: "That operation is dangerous. Georgians' assault on Kars cannot be ruled out. Therefore, it is necessary to return to Kars without delay"⁵⁶². Karabekir disagreed with that order of General Officer Corps, did not submit to it and went on in the direction of Aleksandropol.

This exchange of encrypts between Ankara and Karabekir took place on November 5. As a result, the Turkish troops, not submitting to the order of General Officer Corps, on the same evening occupied positions on the heights west of Aleksandropol, representing immediate danger to the city. The next morning Karabekir received the Armenian government's offer to declare an armistice, which was sent on November 3. Karabekir communicated it to his leadership and, before he would receive requisite instructions, offered an ultimatum to the Armenian party with a number of demands. The next day, on November 7, the Armenian party accepted the conditions of the ultimatum and ceded Aleksandropol to Turks. Thus, Karabekir's unauthorized actions were crowned with unprecedented success. In fact, the war was over.

⁵⁶⁰ K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*. İstanbul, 1959 – 1960, s. 899.

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² Ibid.

This success of Karabekir's accelerated the process of rewording by Turkey's government and General Officer Corps of the ultimate goals in the war against Armenia. Concisely, it was presented in the texts of two ultimatums on armistice, submitted to the Armenian party⁵⁶³. The first one, dated November 6, contained less rigorous demands than the second, presented only two days later, on November 8. The first was a result of Karabekir's "unauthorized activity", most likely, based on the mentioned note of November 2 from Ankara with relatively delicate demands, while the second was written after the leadership of the Kemalist movement had reassessed the situation. The latter was based on the highly confidential encryption of Ahmet Muhtar, Acting Foreign Minister of TBMM government, dated November 8, which we have already referred to.

It would be instructive to compare the encrypted document with the one, signed by the same leader on the same date – sent to Armenia Foreign Ministry and containing general conditions of peace, offered by Turkey, the latter representing a document of diplomatic nature, designed for "external use"⁵⁶⁴.

Thus, if the first paper specified that Armenia should be destroyed as an independent factor, the second read that Turkey would do its utmost to provide Armenia with food and promote its economic progress. In the letter to the government of Armenia it was indicated that "the Turko-Armenian border shall be an issue of plain statistics and referendum", while the encryption explicated to Paşa, who was far from diplomatic tricks, that the goal of the proposal "ensues from the desire to hamper the process of demarcation"...

Based on the instructions from Ankara, Karabekir proposed the second ultimatum, containing extreme demands.

Characterizing Karabekir's actions during the Armeno-Turkish war, one must not forget that he was playing a double game: showing loyalty to Mustafa Kemal, he at the same time did not quit his relationships with one of the Young Turk leaders, infamous Enver Paşa⁵⁶⁵, who was quite active at that time. In some

⁵⁶³ See the texts of the ultimatums: S. Vratsyan, *Hayastani hanrapetutyum* [The Republic of Armenia]. Yerevan, 1993, p. 511-513.

⁵⁶⁴ See the text: *Sulh Şartlarımız*, Ankara, 8/11/1920. – K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*. İstanbul, 1959 – 1960, s. 900.

⁵⁶⁵ The numerous letters Karabekir and Enver had exchanged at that period are placed in one of Karabekir's books: K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat Terakki erkânı*. İstanbul, 1967.

cases he even fulfilled Enver's instructions⁵⁶⁶. Enver in his turn supported Karabekir in every way. In particular, Fuat Sabit⁵⁶⁷ (Ağacık), a Young Turk member, one of those who had founded under his guidance the "Turkish Communist Party" in Baku, acted as an "orderly official" for Karabekir and sent him reports⁵⁶⁸.

The bulk of the documents we have contemplated are taken from the books, authored by Kazım Karabekir Paşa, commander of the Eastern front, set up to wage war against Armenia. The troops under his command, together with armed gangs, invaded Armenia, causing death and ruins all over. For that "heroism" Karabekir was conferred the military rank of *ferik* (Lieutenant General)⁵⁶⁹, while after the war he was awarded the "Medal for Independence with Green and Red Bands"⁵⁷⁰ and went down in the official history of Turkey as "Conqueror of the East"⁵⁷¹. The Turkish historian Cemal Kutay, conspicuous for his independent views, had given a more realistic assessment to Karabekir's activity, designating it as "destruction of Armenia"⁵⁷².

This ambitious Turkish Paşa was not content with the awards, conferred on him by the state. He decided to study the history of the people he had put to the sword and to explain them "where they come from and where they go"⁵⁷³. He was self-confident enough to assert that had familiarized with the mass of

⁵⁶⁶ M. Çulcu, *Spekülatif marjinal tarih tezleri*. 6. Baskı. İstanbul, 2000, s. 281-282.

⁵⁶⁷ D. Avcıoğlu, *Millî kurtuluş tarihi 1836'den 1995'e*. İstanbul, 1976, s. 487.

⁵⁶⁸ Doktor Fuad Sabit, *Kâzım Karabekir Paşa Hazretlerine*, Bakû, 25 Teşrinisani 1920. – K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimizde Enver Paşa ve İttihat Terakki erkânı*. İstanbul, 1967, s. 78-80.

⁵⁶⁹ M. Erat, *Kâzım Karabekir Paşa'nın Ermeniler üzerine harekâtı* (1920). – *Kafkas Araştırmaları*, II, 1996, s. 102.

⁵⁷⁰ M. Erat, H. Yılmaz, *Kâzım Karabekir'in hayatı ve Çanakkale savaşlarındaki rolü*. - T.C Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Tarih Öğretmenliği, 4: *Çanakkale Savaşı Semineri*, 2003, s. 17.

⁵⁷¹ Ş. Turan, *Türk Devrim tarihi II: ulusal direnişten Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne*. İstanbul, 1992, s. 202.

⁵⁷² C. Kutay, *Karabekir Ermenistan'ı nasıl yok etti?* İstanbul, 1956.

⁵⁷³ In 1946, when the Armenian Question became an issue of the time again, Karabekir finished the handwritten version of his book about Armenians, entitled "Armenians: where did they come from and where they go". This and other books, authored by him, were out decades later under the heading "Armenian dossier". See: K. Karabekir, *Ermeni dosyası*. Yayına hazırlayan Prof. Faruk Özerengin. İstanbul, 1994.

existing literature about Armenians⁵⁷⁴. The “conclusion” he arrived at stands out by its exceptional cynicism even among the views, expressed by different representatives of the Turkish elite for decades. The Turkish Paşa, who had “penetrated” into the depths of Armenian history, found out that “there are proofs that Armenians derive from Turks”⁵⁷⁵, and demanded, “Armenians shall do the following: they shall disseminate love for Turks in their press...”⁵⁷⁶.

Such Armenian-hater was entrusted by the Kemalist leaders to continue the genocide of the Armenian people and destroy Armenia.

But this time, the plans of the Turks remained unaccomplished. True, Armenia had sustained incredible losses, yet was not “removed from the arena”; it was integrated into the Soviet Empire, owing to which part of the Armenian people avoided physical extermination.

⁵⁷⁴ K. Karabekir, *Ermeni dosyası*. Yayına hazırlayan Prof. Faruk Özerengin. İstanbul, 1994, s. 29.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

In Lieu of Afterword

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAMS AND CONCLUSIONS

In modern Genocide Studies, comparative analysis of genocides has become a marked tendency. As a result, a special attention is devoted to the methodology of comparative studies. In particular, a "matrix for comparing and studying different cases of genocides"⁵⁷⁷ has been proposed. At the same time, no comparative studies of genocidal programs or other identical documents, prepared by supreme governmental bodies, have been conducted. Hence, neither does any appropriate methodology exist. This induced us to propose our own, the so-called *comparative-structural* method, which includes both elements of comparative analysis and analysis of concrete texts. This provides an opportunity in the best possible way to consider the three basic components of genocidal analysis – definition, factual material, interpretation – suggested by the American sociologist Steven Katz⁵⁷⁸.

Comparing the program of 1915 with the document of 1876 from that perspective, we may conclude that, during the four decades in between, the Turkish elite had refined its skills in preparing genocide and drafting requisite programs to commit it. In the documents of 1915, the destruction of a whole nation was programmed to be carried out, employing diverse well-coordinated activities of respective state bodies, guided from one center. Among these activities were forcible deportation, meant to disguise physical extirpation, mass destruction or forcible Islamization of previously selected groups of Armenians, etc. Also specified was, which particular power structure was to carry out

⁵⁷⁷ W. K. Ezell, Investigating genocide: a catalog of known and suspected cases, and some categories for comparing them. - Remembering for the future: working papers and agenda. Volume III: the impact of the holocaust and genocide on Jews and Christians. Oxford, 1989, p. 2880 – 2892.

⁵⁷⁸ S. T. Katz, Quantity and Interpretation: Issues in the Comparative Historical Analysis of the Holocaust. - Remembering for the Future: Working Papers and Addenda. Volume III: The Impact of the Holocaust and Genocide on Jews and Christians. Oxford, 1989, p. 2510.

extermination of which particular segment of the population. The factor of time was taken into account too – accentuated was the necessity to act simultaneously.

Special attention was devoted to measures of disguise and top secrecy of the plan. Noteworthy is that the mentioned genocidal acts were to be perpetrated not only in Western Armenia, but all over the empire.

The 1876 program lacks all these components. It contains an aggregate of genocidal acts – in today's understanding – to be only executed in the territory of Bulgaria. The means of implementation and the necessity of coordination are not specified, neither is the time factor taken into account. As distinct from the 1915 program, the aspects of secrecy and concealment of the true purpose of the genocidal actions are overlooked. Furthermore, Russian diplomatic sources communicated that the main developer of the program, Midhat Paşa, did not conceal the existence of such program and "openly spoke about it".⁵⁷⁹

Among the principal differences between the two programs was also that the 1876 program was adopted as a result of discussions and debates at a session of the government. It had an opponent in person of the Foreign Minister of the empire. The first of the three documents, constituting the 1915 program, is a result of a secret meeting, details of which remain completely unknown to date. The document was not disclosed not only to public at large, but even to some members of the government; at the beginning it was put into practice in conditions of secrecy, as stipulated by the last paragraph.

This notwithstanding, the incredibly brutal massacre of the peaceful Armenian population all through the empire was impossible to keep secret long. The governments of Russia, Great Britain and France sent a note to the Ottoman government, making the members of the latter personally responsible for the perpetrated by Turkey crimes against "humanity and civilization". The leadership of Turkey – the actual authors of the genocidal program – to disguise their crimes and avoid responsibility, represented the slaughter of Armenians as deportation from war zones. On Talât's initiative, from the next day after the note had been published, the Turkish authorities began undertaking actions that would make the forcible displacement post factum appear "legal".

Thus, the principal organizers of the Armenian Genocide, fully conscious of their own guilt, in the first phase of carnages were already exerting themselves to avoid responsibility. From the genetic-contextual analysis of the presently known documents, reflecting the last phase of making a decision on the

⁵⁷⁹ Vitse-konsul v Filippole – Poslu v Konstantinopole [Vice-Consul in Philipple to Ambassador to Constantinople]. – AVPRI, Fund Kantselaria MID, 1876, file 25, sheet 160 rev.

Armenian Genocide, it follows that, unlike the year 1876, now the Young Turk perpetrators were contemplating falsification of the reality and concealment of their actions at the very start.

The programs contain some apparently identical provisions. For instance, both in the 1876 and 1915 programs, the necessity of total extermination of a definite social-professional stratum – Bulgarian and Armenian *teachers*, is emphasized. In both documents, forcible Islamization is viewed as an additional instrument to eradicate a nation.

Generally, the 1876 program is an intermediate phase between the policy of massacres, widely applied in the Ottoman Empire against Christians as a means of punishment, and the policy of large-scale genocide. That is why it is “incomplete” as a document determining concrete genocidal actions. Whereas the paragraphs of the 1915 program clearly determine the goals and the thoroughly elaborated in conditions of secrecy actions towards their attainment. The state program of 1915 makes apparent that the Turkish elite “mastered” the skills in organizing mass slaughters of representatives of other ethnicities and confessions, and in that aspect that document can be only juxtaposed with the documents, planning the genocide of Jews in Nazi Germany. In any case, it is one of the most atrocious documents of the last century, a condensed manifestation of absolute evil.

Between the documents of genocidal nature, analyzed by us, there is yet another principal difference. The one from 1876 offered radical means to *react* to the ongoing Bulgarian armed rebellion, while that from 1915 is a result of preparatory work of long years, launched back in 1910⁵⁸⁰; no armed rebellion of Armenians was underway at that time in the Ottoman Empire. Besides, from the 1890s, the Turkish powers had been practicing the severest means of perpetrating Armenian massacres, so in 1915 they certainly took advantage of the “experience”. With Bulgarians such experience was but limited.

The program of 1876 was not fully realized. Despite the fact that the April insurgence was severely suppressed, Bulgarians still resided in their own territory, and shortly were able to build up prerequisites for becoming independent. The 1915 program had been “a great success”, since the Armenian people was totally eradicated from the bigger part of its historic homeland.

Year 1920 stands apart because the target was not a subject people, but an independent state, which factual destruction would lead to physical annihilation

⁵⁸⁰ See: R. Safrastyan, *Inchpes er nakhapatrastvum tseghaspanutyuny: yeritturqery 1910 t.* [How the genocide was prepared: Young Turks in 1910]. – Iran-Name, Arevagitakan handes, 1997, 4-5-7, p. 7.

of the remaining Armenians, thereby “remove the wall” and establish a through access to Azerbaijan – part of the “Muslim world”. That would continue and accomplish the policy of Armenian Genocide.

In the abovementioned document Armenia’s “removal from the arena” was grounded as follows, “It is impossible that Armenia, being located in the center of the great Muslim circle... decline at its own convictions the obligation of a severe gendarme and decide to fully relate its fate with Turkey and Islamism”⁵⁸¹. In another place of the same document it said that “keeping in our hands all the roads, connecting Turkey with Azerbaijan,” was essential⁵⁸². These statements explicate the motivation of the Kemalists’ genocidal program.

Described are also the means to attain the goal: force and diplomacy. Thus, the encryption underlined, “At present, it is an absolute necessity to demobilize the Armenian army and confiscate the arms, thereby making impossible the restoration of its military structure. Under the pretext of keeping the railways under control and defending the rights of the Muslim population, it is necessary to establish military control over the entire territory of Armenia”⁵⁸³. In another passage we read: “You may temporarily accept the Brest-Litovsk borderline, since the goal set, is first of all, to receive a written proposal from Armenians concerning the border, and thus to avoid reaching a cul-de-sac at the talks. Yet, it is necessary to pave the way for never-ending interference under the pretext of defending the rights of the Muslim minority, remaining on the other side of the border”⁵⁸⁴.

The encryption also reveals the ideological background of the Kemalist policy. Having adopted the political preferences of the Young Turks, they relied on the ideological-political teaching of pan-Turkism: “Special efforts should be exerted towards deliberate arming of Turkic peoples of the region and creating national armed forces. They will connect the East and the West and make Azerbaijan an independent Turkic state”⁵⁸⁵.

Some statements in the document evince that the authors paid special attention to disguising their criminal actions. In the encryption we read: “The goal mentioned above shall be attained covertly and softly, meaning both the text of the Treaty and the actions proceeding from it – to appear ever peaceful in the eyes of Armenians”⁵⁸⁶. In another passage of the document the striving to

⁵⁸¹ K. Karabekir, *İstiklâl Harbimiz*. İstanbul, 1959 – 1960, s. 901.

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

disguise the reality is more open: "The provisions of the armistice to be submitted to Armenians shall be oriented towards deluding Armenians and appearing peaceful before Europe, rather than withdrawing from Armenia. In reality, they shall be aimed at stepwise preparation and maturation of preconditions for attaining our true goal".⁵⁸⁷

The program drawn up by the Kemalists bespeaks that they had done their best to learn the "genocide" lessons, delivered by the Young Turks. Furthermore, they demonstrated even greater "skills", ready to export the genocidal policy and to implement it beyond their borders, against an independent state. The latter circumstance compelled them to be more resourceful in disguising the crime.

Summing up the results of the analysis conducted, we can note that the existence of genocidal programs against two different nations, programs, separated by a time period of over four decades, proves that the ruling circles in the Ottoman Empire regarded the policy of genocide – deportation being a version of it – as a radical means of transformation of the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional empire into a homogeneous state, and maintaining its territorial integrity, whereas the guided by Kemal Turkish nationalists, who had rebelled against the sultan's imperial government, were ready to also apply the genocidal policy against an independent state. In essence, preparation and implementation of the crime of genocide became an integral part of state functions. According to some scholars, in cases like that in question we may even speak about certain *persistence* in pursuing genocidal goals, shown by the governing elite of the given state power for years, even if said goals were not always formulated properly.⁵⁸⁸

This conclusion reinforces the position of those researchers, who suggest characterizing the Ottoman Empire during the last half-century of its history as a "genocidal" and "criminal" state. This approach is shared by such renowned specialists in Genocide Studies as Leo Kuper⁵⁸⁹, Irving Louis Horowitz⁵⁹⁰, Yv Ternon⁵⁹¹, and others. We also support this approach⁵⁹².

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁸ F. Chalk, Definitions of genocide and their implications for prediction and prevention. - Remembering for the future: working papers and agenda. Volume III: The impact of the holocaust and genocide on Jews and Christians. Oxford, 1989, p. 2382.

⁵⁸⁹ L. Kuper, Genocide: its political use in the twentieth century. New Haven and London, 1981.

⁵⁹⁰ I. L. Horowitz, Taking lives: genocide and state power. New Brunswick-London, 1997.

⁵⁹¹ Y. Ternon, L'Etat criminel: les génocides du XXe siècle, Paris, 1995.

At the same time, the comparative-structural analysis and identification of the regularities of transformation of their concepts over time, exemplified by the genocidal programs, drawn up at state level in the Ottoman Empire, enables us to lay foundation for a serious scientific investigation of a number of significant conceptual issues of genesis of a "genocidal" state. Thus, specified is the role of the ruling party. If it is authoritarian and with seizing the power equates itself to the state, disregards the principles of democracy and creates a despotic system of management, as the "Committee of Union and Progress" had done⁵⁹³, then even in conditions of presence of oppositional parties, the chances to develop a political trend other than genocidal are insignificant⁵⁹⁴. As was shown in the previous chapters, the Turkish opponents of the Ottoman Empire – the "New Ottomans", the Young Turks, the Kemalists, right after coming into power, were undertaking drafting of programs of genocidal nature.

The most important conclusion of this monograph is that in the Ottoman Empire, preparation and implementation of the crime of genocide constituted a significant segment of the functions of the state power. Certain elements of such modus operandi passed via the Kemalists to republican Turkey.

⁵⁹² R. Safrastyan, Tseghaspanutyun akunknery mijnadaryan Osmanyan kaysrutyunum. [Sources of genocide in the Ottoman Empire]. – Patma-banasirakan handes, 1998, No. 1-2 (147-148), p. 105-112.

⁵⁹³ R. Safrastian, The political party and genocide: the Committee of Union and Progress at the threshold of the "Final Solution". - Problems of genocide: proceedings of the international conference on "Problems of Genocide", April 21-23, 1995, Toronto, 1997, p. 191 - 200. R. Safrastyan, Inchpes er nakhapatrastvum tseghaspanutyuny: yeriturtqery 1910 t. – Iran-Name, Arevelagitakan handes, 1997, No. 4-5-7, p. 7.

⁵⁹⁴ R. Safrastyan, Natsional'nyi vopros v programmnykh dokumentakh parti y "osmanskikh demokratov" (1909-1911) [The national question in program documents of parties of "Ottoman democrats" (1909-1911)]. – Patma-banasirakan handes, 1996, No. 1-2 (143-144), p. 65-72; R. Safrastyan, Turetskie oppozitsionnye partii i natsional'nyi vopros v Osmanskoy imperii v 1908-1909 godakh (analiz partiynykh dokumentov) [Turkish oppositional parties and the national question in the Ottoman Empire in 1908-1909 (analysis of party documents)]. – Lraber hasarakakan gitutyunneri: NAS RA, 1998, No. 2, p. 80-90.

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TRANSLITERATIONS

Russian-English:

е – ye / e

ё – yo / e

ж – zh

й – y / iy (-ий) / yi (-ый) /

х – kh

ц – ts

щ – sch

ю – yu / u

я – ya / ia / a

Armenian-English:

լ – y

ժ – zh

խ – kh

տ – tz

ծ – dz

ղ – gh

ժ – tj

յ – y / i

ռ – r

ց – ts

Bulgarian-English:

ъ – y

щ – sht

х – kh

й – y / i

RUBEN SAFRASTYAN
OTTOMAN EMPIRE:
THE GENESIS OF THE PROGRAM OF GENOCIDE
(1876-1920)

ՌՈՒԲԵՆ ՍԱՖՐԱՍՏՅԱՆ
ՕՍՄԱՆՅԱՆ ԿԱՅՍՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ՝
ՑԵՂԱՍՊԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԺՐԱԳՐԻ ԱՌԱՋԱՑՈՒՄԸ
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