Confiscation and Destruction

The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property

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'Mal sahibi mülk sahibi, hani bunun ilk sahibi?'

— *Yunus Emre (1240–1321)*

The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the French President Charles de Gaulle, and Stalin are showing off their expensive gifts. Churchill displays an expensive snuff box with an inscription reading, 'To dear Winston, from your loving wife.' De Gaulle has a distinctive pipe that reads, 'To our beloved De Gaulle, from a patriotic Frenchwoman.' Then Stalin pulls out a gold cigarette box encrusted with diamonds with an inscription that reads, 'To Count Uvarov, from Grand Prince Sergei Alexandrovich.'

— *Evgeny Andreevich,* Kreml i narod

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Preface

This book is a study of the mass sequestration of Armenian property by the Young Turk regime.[1] It details the emergence of Turkish economic nationalism, offers insight into the economic ramifications of the genocidal process, and describes how the plunder was organized on the ground. This book will shed light on the interrelated nature of property confiscation initiated by the Young Turk regime and its cooperating local elites. It will also offer new insights into the functions and beneficiaries of state-sanctioned robbery. This study builds upon the work of other scholars who have worked on partly overlapping subjects such as the fate of Ottoman Armenians during World War I, Turkish economic nationalism, genocide theory, and local histories of Ottoman towns and Turkish cities.

There are two boundaries that delimit the scope of this book in time and space. Geographically, the book will address the confiscation of Armenian property in two major provinces, Adana and Diyarbekir. These choices were not arbitrary: these provinces are situated in the eastern provinces and share certain characteristics. None of these provinces were a direct battlefield during World War I; Armenians historically played important roles in their economies, and in both of them Armenian popular resistance against the genocide was negligible. Even though each of these provinces had disparate economic contexts, they were affected in similar ways by Young Turk persecution: disruption of commerce, stagnation of economic output and pauperization of the victims. Similarities and dissimilarities will be discussed in the respective chapters. Chronologically, this book will refer to 'the Young Turk era' as an operational periodization but will exclude the Young Turk confiscations of non-Muslim property under the Wealth Tax during World War II and the fate of Armenians' property during the Istanbul pogrom of 6–7 September 1955.

Quantitatively, there are clear restraints on this study as well. Estimating Armenian wealth quantitatively has proven to be impracticable without systematic investigation of the proprietorship certificates at the land register office, in church records, local archives or the records of the Ottoman Bank. Most important, the highly politicized archive of the land registers (*tapu kayıtları*) remains closed due to Turkish fears of potential Armenian material claims. These records, stored at the Land Register General Directorate (*Tapu Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü*), contain the (presumably) highly detailed account books of confiscated Armenian

property. In August 2005 Turkey's powerful Council for National Security (*Millî Güvenlik Kurulu*) strongly and confidentially admonished the archive staff not to disclose their material because 'the data could be abused for the purpose of unfounded genocide and property claims'.[2]

Even then, the poorly registered records of the rural economies that most Ottoman Armenians inhabited offer little in way of complete statistical data and are of questionable accuracy. An additional problem that clouds the issue even more is that considerable Armenian possessions were stolen by Young Turk satraps and went unrecorded amid the mists of corruption. Therefore, definitive conclusions can unfortunately not be drawn in this book regarding this important dimension of the problem. Future studies will have to confirm or challenge the vision we propound and provide new details of the economic ruination of Ottoman Armenians.

Despite its limitations, this study argues that the Young Turk political elite launched a process of societal and economic transformation in order to establish a Turkish nation state with a robust economy consisting of ethnic Turks. In this process of persecution, the ethnically heterogeneous Ottoman economic universe was subjected to comprehensive and violent forms of ethnic homogenization. The distribution of Armenian wealth was a central part of this process. The genocide ripped and tore apart the fabric of urban, provincial, and national economies, destroying market relationships and maiming economic patterns that had endured for many centuries in the empire. The structure of these sequestration policies involved the whole range of Ottoman society, from top to bottom. The Young Turk political elite played the decisive role in the subjugation of the Ottoman Armenian economy to an ideologically legitimized process of mass pillage. Local elites collaborated in this endeavour by assisting the militias that came to deport and murder Armenian shopkeepers, manufacturers, craftsmen, peasants. Moreover, ordinary Turks, such as direct neighbors, bazaar merchants or refugees from the Balkans, profited from the confiscation policy in different ways. Altogether, these classes and groups contributed to the economic destruction of Ottoman Armenians and the construction of a Turkish national economy.

The field of Armenian genocide studies is rapidly developing. The publication of several important monographs in the past decade has covered new ground on the organization of the mass violence, the international context of imperialism and national context of nationalist homogenization, and rescue efforts. But so far there exists no detailed treatment of the expropriation of Ottoman Armenians as a functional component of the genocide. This significant aspect of the genocide still needs to be properly understood. This study aims to fill that gap by looking at the confiscation process from the theoretical perspectives gleaned in the discipline of genocide studies. It will tackle the subject through a combination of approaches, focusing on the development of the legal process, explaining the Young Turk ideology of

economic 'Turkification' and concretely demonstrating the policy on the ground through three case studies. Thus, it will approach the problem both by concentrating on the top-level organization (law, ideology), and the destruction process from below (the actual confiscation process in the provinces). The main themes in this book will be ideology, law and mass violence. Of particular interest is the relationship between genocide and property transfer, that is, the coherency of economic destruction and construction: how did the dispossession of Armenians serve the interests of the Young Turk regime?

This book aims to problematize the major issues in a systematic way in order to gain a better understanding of Young Turk sequestration policies. It aims to be more than impressionistic and less than exhaustive, at once tightly focused and broadly conceived. Its main objective is to form a modest contribution to the academic scholarship that might expand the boundaries of our knowledge. It aims to weave institutional and biographical material as well as case studies together to form a multifaceted history of this subject. The book is based on a wide range of original documentation from Ottoman Imperial and Turkish Republican archives as well as major European and North American collections, memoirs, oral histories and secondary studies. For the German and American archival materials we quote we have used the document collections edited by Wolfgang Gust and Ara Sarafian, respectively.[3]

In the course of researching and writing this study, we have had the privilege to meet and benefit from a great number of individuals and institutions. We would like to thank the staff of the various archives and libraries for their assistance. Special thanks goes out to the faculty of the Comparative Studies in History and Society program of Koç University, the Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam, the faculty of the Department of History of Utrecht University, the journal *Toplum ve Kuram*, members of the Study Group of Kurds in Ottoman Sources, NAASR and Project SAVE. We also owe gratitude to Continuum staff who supported this project, Benjamin Hayes, Nicola Rusk, and Claire Lipscomb.

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Illustrations

Photos

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Maps

Abbreviations

ABCFM	American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
AMMU	General Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants (*Aşair ve Muhacirîn Müdüriyet-i Umûmiyesi*); before 1916 known as İAMM
BCA	Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (Republican Archives, Ankara)
BOA	Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (Ottoman Archives, Istanbul)
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*)
İAMM	Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants (*İskân-ı Aşair ve Muhacirîn Müdüriyeti)*
NAASR	National Association of Armenian Studies and Research (United States of America)
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration (United States of America)
NAUK	National Archives (United Kingdom)
PAAA	Politisches Archiv Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office Archives)
RPP	Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)
TL	Turkish lira(s)

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Introduction and Problematization

This chapter will introduce the problem from a theoretical and comparative perspective. It will problematize the issue of property in genocidal processes: how did genocidal elites deal with victims' property? How does expropriation precede or accompany destruction? In which ways does it have explanatory value? We will discuss several theoretical views on collective expropriation and its relationship to perpetration in genocide.

STATE FORMATION AND LOCAL ELITES

This section will explore national–local interaction as a changing structure of state formation processes. What are the interdependencies between local state elites and central authorities? From a functional viewpoint, local elites are mostly interested in communal benefits, such as favourable treatment over tax assessments, help with the cost of the maintenance of public works, protection for a local trade or industry, privileges for certain markets and especially access to offices, licenses, titles, pensions, exemptions and other benefits. The other way around, central authorities need figures of sufficient legitimacy and loyalty for the effective implementation at the local level of their policies, such as tax collection, enforcement of the rule of law, suppression of state-undermining politics, etc. Historically, an important aspect of this relationship was the attention given to special interest groups, such as specific religious, military and economic classes.[1]

We shall examine theories that analyze state formation processes and relations between state and society in order to understand these interactions in the Ottoman Turkish case. The statist approach, by Theda Skocpol, for example, considers states as 'organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society'.[2] This approach emphasizes the autonomous power of the state and its insulation from society. It also criticizes Marxist approaches, which mainly focus on the state as an instrument of a particular class (the bourgeoisie). Michael Mann claims that Marxist, liberal and functionalist theories of state formation interpret the state 'as a place, an arena, in which the struggles of classes, interest group and individuals are expressed and institutionalized, and

they are united in denying significant autonomous power to the state'.[3] Both Skocpol and Mann argue that these kinds of approaches ignore the autonomous power of the state and reduce it to either to an instrument of interest groups (in the case of pluralism) or to class domination (in the case of Marxism). These statist approaches see the state as *sui generis* and ignore the importance of society as a factor during the formation process.

Critics of these statist claims view the state from the prism of society. According to this model, the state is not independent from society but constrained by it: 'states are parts of societies. States may help mold but they are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded'.[4] This approach emphasizes the role of social forces and the interactions between the state and these forces. It recognizes that 'if states have to be viewed in their social contexts, it is important to study not only the peak organizations of states and key social groups, often located at the center of the polity in the capital city but also state-society interactions at the periphery'.[5] Another point in this approach is about the mutual advantage of the interactions between states and social forces. These kinds of interactions may create more power for the state and particular social segments, that both benefit from these interactions. A corollary to this conclusion is that state–society relations are not zero-sum.

Another important framework for this thesis is the relationship between war and the state. Charles Tilly explains the formation of European nation states and demonstrates the impact and contribution of war to this formation. Tilly emphasizes that in order to survive, states have to achieve state making, war making, protection and extraction. In the European state formation experience, these four activities were interdependent. War-making led to increased extraction of the means for war, such as manpower and arms. Extraction then entailed the elimination, neutralization or cooptation of rival or dominant classes such as landlords. Tilly notes that 'war making likewise caused state making through the expansion of military organization itself, as a standing army, war industries, supporting bureaucracies and (rather later) schools grew up within the state apparatus'.[6] In this study, we will apply this model to the Ottoman Empire in terms of the effects of World War I and the policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

Tilly claims that organic relations between state and society emerged during this process, and he discusses the negotiations and bargaining processes between state and society. Bargaining processes created individual and collective claims on the state, and obligations of the state to its citizens.[7] In order to finance war and secure consent from society, according to Tilly, during periods of war 'a population divides into enemy classes and the state extends its favors partially to one class or another, state making actually reduces the protection given some classes'.[8] These negotiations and alliance processes are directly related to the consolidation of state rule. As Anthony Marx argues, the state should ensure consent,

yet without constantly resorting to force. He points out that 'internal conflicts and diversity remained or grew within large scale polities, with the political incorporation of new territory, peoples, immigrants, or factions into states, threatening political unity'.[9] Thus, the state needs to consider this diversity while consolidating its rule. According to Marx, the state uses inclusionary and exclusionary tools to provide cohesion and allegiance. Its rulers can come to exclude an internal 'other' as a common enemy while encouraging and supporting an included group which allies itself with the state. In this process, the state rewards and encourages these groups for legitimacy, its preservation and centralization.

Tilly also discusses these relations between top-down and bottom-up power and claims that these arguments 'failed to recognize negotiated character of power'.[10] In other words, the state creates interaction with society through these processes in order to generate its policies. Anthony Marx recognizes the importance of this bargaining process and claims that the state cannot dispense with consent from below. Indeed, 'to build national cohesion came not only from power above needing to reach down but also encountered assertions from below fed by linguistic and economic developments'.[11] This shows that the state should bargain with some groups within society because its use of force to prevent resistance and discontent might not be enough. Therefore, these processes will be used to explain the state and society relations in the late Ottoman Empire and early Republican period. Consequently, through analysis of bargaining and negotiating processes between state and society, we will cover the interplay between top-down and bottom-up power in Turkey.

The discussion about state–society relations means that the state has to establish alliances with certain groups or classes in society. In light of this theory, we will try to understand how the CUP financed the war and how it established its alliances. The relation between top-down and bottom-up power will be discussed as a part of the theoretical framework of this study. This theory suggests that the confiscation of Armenian property offered the Young Turk political elite opportunities to restructure Ottoman society by forging alliances and eliminating opponent groups. Conversely, it can suggest that establishing alliances with different social classes proved necessary for the Young Turks' political objectives. This book will discuss to what extent in the Turkish state formation process the political elite forged alliances with some groups within the society at the expense of others.

Finally, we will examine the relations between rulers and elites, because ultimately it is they who are influential in carrying out state policies. Elites will be divided into two categories: state elites and local elites. We aim to focus on alliances between these elites and on intra-elite conflicts within and between them. Local elite is a broad category and consists of different classes, namely, landowners, commercial bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, peasants and workers. Mann defines state elites, or bureaucratic elites, as officials 'separated from ownership of

office by an employed, salaried status and appointed, promoted, and dismissed according to impersonal criteria of competence . . . [T]heir offices are rationally arranged by function and hierarchy, and are similarly arranged into a single, centralized administration'.[12] This analysis can help us understand relations between the state and dominant classes. Despite instrumentalist approaches to the state, the attempts of state rulers to perform state functions may create conflicts of interest with the dominant classes. Sometimes the state has its own distinct interests *vis-à-vis* subordinated classes. The interests of the state and the dominant classes converge at one important point: they both share an interest in keeping subordinate classes in place in society and at work in the economy. In order to maintain law and order, the state may offer concessions to subordinate classes' demands, concessions that may be at the expense of the interests of the dominant class.[13]

These insights can be useful in understanding the expropriation of Armenians. We will attempt to examine how the Ottoman state functioned during the process, and how it changed as a result of it. This aspect of the issue also raises questions on the institutional, organizational and bureaucratic dimension of the confiscations. Which bureaucratic structures did the Young Turk dictatorship use and spawn to orchestrate the dispossession of Armenians? How and why did civil servants in those institutions collaborate in the persecutions? These and other questions may generate important insights into the early twentieth-century state formation process in Turkey.

GENOCIDE AND PROPERTY TRANSFER

Genocide can be defined as a complex process of systematic persecution and annihilation of a group of people by a government. In the twentieth century world, approximately 40 to 60 million defenceless people have become victims of deliberate genocidal policies. The twenty-first century has not begun any better, with genocidal episodes ongoing in Darfur and Congo. We can speak of a genocide when large numbers of individuals are targeted, persecuted and murdered merely on the basis of their presumed or imputed membership in a group, rather than on their individual characteristics or participation in certain acts. Although it makes little sense to set limits of any 'minimum of victims', it is clear that a genocidal process always concerns an entire society and always destroys a significant and often critical part of the affected victim community.

Three main questions are central in the field of genocide research. First, what are the causes of a genocidal process? In other words: how does a process of systematic destruction of a category of people begin? Second, how does the genocidal process develop once it is launched? There are strong indications that when such a

process has been put in motion, it develops its own dynamic. How does that exactly play out, from the most collective to the individual level? Finally, it is important to investigate the consequences of genocide. How do perpetrator, victim and third party groups go about after a genocide? How do they process the traumatic events? In the growing interdisciplinary field of genocide studies, much useful research has been conducted into the evolution of separate genocides, such as the destruction of Ottoman Armenians in 1915, the Holocaust in Europe, the Great Terror in the USSR, the Cambodian genocide, and the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia. Much is also known on specific aspects of genocidal processes. For example, there is both separate and comparative research on the overturn of a more or less 'normal' civic society to a destructive society, the motives of the ordinary killers, the power and operation of charismatic leaders, the gender-specific aspects of violence, and indeed the dispossession of the victims. In all genocides, the possessions of the victims, both individually and as a group, play a role in the initiation, development and aftermath of the destruction.[14]

This book will tackle the dispossession of Ottoman Armenians from 1915 on from three perspectives: the short-term context of the genocide, the long-term context of the Young Turk regime, and implicitly and explicitly in comparison with other cases of genocide. In this section we will discuss six theoretical problems: vocabulary, the axis of tension between economy and ideology, the axis of tension between national policy and local consequences, the locus of the dispossession process, the circle of profiteurs and the importance of 'normal' social and political processes in the dispossession process.

The first theoretical problem that surfaces in our discussion is vocabulary. How do we begin naming the process of state-sponsored, organized, collective theft? Do we employ legal and academic terms such as expropriation, confiscation, sequestration, spoliation and dispossession? Or do we rather seek recourse to more mundane and unequivocal terms like theft, plunder, pillage, larceny, robbery, looting? This debate is interminable because it is unterminable. Choosing a concept for a morally charged event requires taking a position on the meaning of legal versus legitimate and the nature of what is 'just' in a justice system. An analogy with the concept of 'war' might clarify the problem. According to one expert, during wars, 'the term is usually sought out by insurgents in search of legitimacy, and denied by incumbents who label their opponents "bad guys", bandits, criminals, subversives or terrorists – and describe the war as banditry, terrorism, delinquent subversion and other cognate terms'.[15] For example, during the occupation of the Soviet Union, 'for psychological reasons', the Nazis replaced the term 'partisan' with 'bandit'. Accordingly, antipartisan operations were to be called 'antibandit warfare' and areas of suspected partisan presence were referred to as areas 'contaminated with bandit groups'.[16] In other words, the state has the 'power of definition' (*Definitionsmacht*) to delegitimize its contenders.

Therefore, we will have to avoid one pitfall unconditionally: the political vocabulary of the regime itself needs to be critically evaluated, thoroughly deconstructed and if necessary, rejected and replaced. The Young Turk regime utilized an elaborate vocabulary of euphemisms that served to legitimize and mask its policies of persecution and destruction. There was an unmistakable function to terms such as 'relocation' (*tehcir*), 'combat' (*mukatele*), 'uprising' (*isyân*), 'bandit' (*şaki* and *haydut*), 'Turkification' (*Türkleştirme*) and others. For our purposes, the significant term is 'abandoned properties' (*emvâl-ı metrûke*). This was the official euphemism and established term in Young Turk propaganda to characterize the expropriation of Armenians. One analyst has pointed out that abandonment can be interpreted as either renouncing one's rights and surrendering one's claim to the property, or giving up by ceasing to inhabit the property. Legally or sociologically, neither definition accurately describes the fate of Ottoman Armenians.[17] Contemporary politicians even recognized this. In 1915 the liberal MP Ahmet Rıza Bey (1858–1930) proposed a law to reject the Young Turk dictatorship's law on Armenian properties. Ahmet Rıza criticized the use of term 'abandoned properties' and argued forcefully that the Armenians had not voluntarily abandoned their properties, but had been forced to leave.[18]

For these reasons, this book will use the concept of *confiscation* to capture the involvement of an extensive bureaucratic apparatus and illustrate the legal façade during the dispossession of Armenians. Furthermore, it will deploy the concept of *colonization* to denote the redistribution of their property as a form of internal colonization. Together, these concepts best encapsulate the twin processes of seizing property from Armenians and reassigning it to Turks.[19]

How can the issue best be approached? Four important axes of tension need to be addressed.

The first conundrum we need to confront is the tension between economic impulses and ideological prescriptions. In other words, was confiscation of the victim group economically motivated as a mere instrument for material gain? Or was it a corollary effect of the ideology of destruction? This debate has been held in Holocaust research with different emphases but no decisive winner.[20] For example, Götz Aly has argued that the expropriation of Jews, from juridical 'Aryanization' to outright plunder, was a top-down, state-driven policy of collective appropriation. The German state was the prime interlocutor in seizing assets from the Jews and assigning them to their new German owners, who benefited from symbolic prices. But the German state itself also benefited in many ways from the process. It accumulated enormous sums of money, gold and jewellry, which it allocated to the war effort and used to alleviate the tax and requisitions burden on the Germans. The popularity of the Nazi dictatorship could be explained from the material benefits that German society drew from these policies.[21] Conversely, Frank Bajohr has emphasized that the ideological nature of the destruction of the European Jews

naturally contained their economic ruination and disappearance. Moreover, these ideological motives were not a top-down dictate but a matter of bottom-up initiative. German commercial middle classes launched their own initiatives against competing Jewish businesses, justifying their acts with Nazi ideological exegesis. These anti-Semitic initiatives from below were carried out not only independently of national policy, but provincial authorities set their own goals, quotas and limits. Depending on the local economic structures and profiles, entrepreneurs joined hands with government authorities and freely appropriated Jewish businesses, especially when the outbreak of war nullified moral inhibitions.[22] From this debate, we can conjure several questions: did the Young Turk regime distribute Armenian property to local elites in exchange for support for the genocide? In other words, did they simply buy their loyalty by appealing to their sense of economic self-interest? Or did the local elite support the destruction and expropriation out of ideological convictions?

The second, related problem is the axis of tension between national policy versus regional interpretation. Regionalism, and transcendence of regionalism, are important themes in recent genocide research. Genocide scholars have examined the relationship between central decision-making processes and their implementation at the local level. In-depth research on how genocidal processes evolve at the provincial, district, city or even village level has proven most fruitful. It can teach us a great deal about how local power shifts influence the course and intensity of genocidal processes, since we know that some genocides are more regionally varied than others. Local political or social elites can anticipate, expedite, intensify or delay and resist processes of genocidal destruction directed from above.[23] In the Armenian genocide, local Young Turk party organizations and governors played a major role in these regional disparities. Whereas some moderate governors, such as Celal Bey in Konya, Hasan Mazhar Bey in Ankara and Rahmi Bey in İzmir/Smyrna, delayed and obstructed the destruction, others – including Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda in Bitlis, Cemal Azmi Bey in Trabzon, and Dr Mehmed Reshid in Diyarbekir – accelerated and intensified it. How did the expropriation of Armenians in the former provinces differ from the latter?

Third, what was the scope of the dispossession process? In other words, how wide was the circle of profiteurs? Did just the Young Turk elite, from the imperial capital down to the provincial towns, profit from it, or did much wider classes in Turkish society benefit? If the sources allow, this discussion needs to address social mobility resulting from the redistribution of wealth, for which other cases of mass violence can act as a sounding board. For example, at the height of the 1937–1938 Great Terror in the Soviet Union, there was 'frequent house moving because every execution created a vacant apartment and dacha which were eagerly occupied by survivors and their aspirational Party housewives, ambitious for grander accommodation'. One historian called this 'terror entrepreneurialism'.[24] How did this

process evolve in the Armenian–Turkish case? One can also pose this question from the perspective of the state. What was the locus of the expropriation in the emerging Turkish nation state? Was the confiscation of Armenian property crucial for the viability of the Turkish nation state? Or did the event, catastrophic as it was for Ottoman Armenians, have a negligible impact on that state? Along these poles lies an axis of tension that is difficult to resolve without a profound quantification, which is beyond the scope of this book. Only an in-depth economic–historical cost/benefit investigation could determine the economic impact of the Armenian genocide on the Ottoman economy and state.[25]

Lastly, this book will assume that although genocide is an unusual and exceptional event, ordinary lives and structures do continue to function amidst the plunder and murder of the victims. How do these ordinary social processes function under a process of persecution? For example, the Swiss bank secret offered both Jewish refugees and the Nazi state a protective veil but after the war became an obstacle for Jews to redeem their assets. One historian of France demonstrated how ordinary fiscal structures and financial processes could offer sufficient opportunity to dispossess the French Jews without much political-legal maneuvering.[26] Pre-existing networks of organized crime can often function as catalysts in different ways due to war. War can produce opportunities for big business: rival tribes, mafia clans and other shady groups compete for more favourable conditions for illegal trade and self-enrichment, as corruption, smuggling and illegal appropriation triumph under conditions of war. For example, during the Yugoslav wars the Serb genocidal campaign in Bosnia offered Serb criminal bosses ample opportunity to enrich themselves.[27] Historians of Nazi Germany too, have found that the dispossession of various groups opened opportunity structures for corruption, embezzlement, and self-enrichment.[28] When genocide is bolted onto these existing social structures, what amalgam is ultimately its outcome? Evidence for such activities in the Armenian genocide paints a complex picture of public project versus private interest and will also be discussed.

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DEBATES

The scholarship on the confiscation of Armenian property is in its infancy. In the face of the destruction process, the economic ruination of the Armenian population has been peripheralized as a marginal problem. Nevertheless, it is possible to build upon a rich and sophisticated body of knowledge in cognate fields such as Armenian local studies and Turkish economic history. This section will review some of the main publications on the issue and identify research desiderata that will be addressed in this book. There is a direct continuity between the expropriation of Armenians, and post-genocide Armenian efforts to document the crime.

Often, survivors were committed to reclaim their own property and bring about justice. These early Armenian studies were based on Armenian local histories and survivor memoirs such as two major memorial books on the Armenians of Adana and those of Harput.[29] The studies by Kouyoumjian, Nazian, Vardan and Yeghiayan have tackled the issues from different perspectives and are a rich source of local details. They do, however, need to be subjected to cross-corroboration with other sources, in particular, Ottoman.[30]

The issues that are being debated revolve around the ideological, legal and political contexts of the process, the precise nature and magnitude of the confiscations and most importantly, their effects on the Armenian population and the Ottoman and Turkish economy. In his study of the Armenian genocide, Donald Bloxham has argued that

> 1913–14 saw a concerted CUP attempt to create a Turkish–Muslim bourgeoisie at the expense of Christians. Drawing heavily on the model of the 'national economy' devised by the German theorist Friedrich List, the CUP regarded it as essential in the formation of a centrally controlled and independent economic system that the key positions in the economy be occupied by 'reliable' citizens whose interests coincided with those of the state. The prescription was for a reorganization of economic resources in favour of 'ethnically desirable' citizens and therefore of the ethnically defined state itself.[31]

In this assessment, the Young Turk dispossession of the Ottoman Armenians was the economic consequence of an ideological quest for loyal citizens – loyalty as defined by the CUP.

Aviel Roshwald has proposed a slightly different approach, focusing on Young Turk ideology, 'a nationalist *étatisme* designed to foster the development of a strong Turkish-dominated economic system led by a Turkish technocracy and Turkish bourgeoisie that would supplant the Armenian and Greek commercial classes that had long dominated the trade and financial sectors of the economy and were seen as having benefited from the Capitulations regime'.[32] The idea was that these frontal and categorical attacks would function as a sort of ethnic protectionism that could provide an opportunity for Ottoman Muslim ('Turkish') middle classes to supplant their Christian rivals. This would unite the 'Turks' into what the Young Turk party had dubbed the 'national economy' (*millî iktisad*). Moreover, this economic nationalism destroyed vital Armenian commercial networks and 'created opportunities for rampant profiteering by a small number of well-connected Turkish merchants . . . [T]hese policies formed the basic mold for the *étatisme* and nurturance of an ethnic-Turkish bourgeoisie that became the hallmarks of the postwar Turkish republic's economic policy'.[33] Roshwald thus interpreted the process as a double-edged sword: the large-scale dispossession of Armenians served to fuel the nascent Turkish nation state's economy.

Michelle Latham has argued that economic incentives were a motive for all levels of Ottoman society: the state, bureaucratic personnel and civilians. Eliminating the Armenians as economic competition in business, trade and commerce, she argued, was expected to rid Turkey of Armenians' stronghold in these areas, thereby opening these sectors for Turks to exploit. Additionally, she continued, eliminating Armenian bankers or money lenders would eradicate any debts owed to these Armenians. These were loans to be repaid or money owed for merchandise purchased in various shops or businesses. A second point she raises is the expropriation process itself. Finally, she underlines that the acquisition of the Armenians' wealth, including their money, jewelry, livestock, clothing and numerous other valuables, were either kept by the perpetrators or sold for profit.[34] This analysis captures the complexity of the dispossession but does not offer an analytical model of the process, which gained its own dynamic.

These synthetical studies have been complemented by comparative genocide research with more intensive and extensive analysis. Christian Gerlach examined the dispossession of Armenians during World War I and Jews during World War II from a comparative perspective. He noted there is potential for relevant and appropriate comparison: the elaborate juridical apparatus erected by the Young Turks to profoundly dispossess the Armenians and the spoliation process in general seems to invite comparative research with the Nazi economic ruination of Jews. He concludes that in both cases, dispossession substantially contributed to the preparedness to commit violence against the victims. Furthermore, in both cases the state attempted to take full control of the plundered goods and to redistribute it to alleviate the costs of the war for the population. Gerlach also pointed at significant differences in the processes, such as the differing degrees of central control and the variety in their success in the execution of plans. An important aspect Gerlach discussed is the relationship between the dispossession policy and normal economic processes such as trade, price inflation, corruption and food markets.[35] Even though examining these links and influences is important, in this book we will focus mostly on the expropriation and redistribution process itself.

These broad observations can be supplemented by several in-depth studies of the actual expropriation process itself. These essays have analyzed aspects of the confiscations rather than the totality of the process. They have drawn distinctions and proposed classifications. For example, Dickran Kouymjian developed an early taxonomy of confiscated property, including gold, bank assets, insurance policies, immovable wealth and inventories.[36] A more precise analysis would not only need to categorize more precisely the kind of property (e.g. movable versus immovable), but also sketch an overview of the kinds of owners (e.g. private versus community property). Taner Akçam identified six recipients of Armenian properties in a cursory survey of the extant Ottoman documentation: the Muslim refugees, the Muslim bourgeoisie, the Ottoman army, the Armenian deportation itself, the state's own

infrastructure and militias.[37] This is a helpful point of departure that addresses the third point we raised in the previous section. Hilmar Kaiser's studies of the dispossession of Armenians has contrasted the promises of the legal veneer and the actual events on the ground. He soundly concludes that the confiscations in no way constituted a measure within the limits of Ottoman law and that the Young Turk regime did not take any precautions to safeguard Ottoman Armenians' property whatsoever.[38]

These studies provided a rudimentary structure of the dispossession process, but have not historicized them from either a long-term or short-term perspective. Bedross Der Matossian's work added more historical distinction by arguing that whereas the Committee of Union and Progress confiscated Armenian property, the subsequent Kemalist movement gladly accepted the crime as a *fait accompli* and could move towards appropriation as a matter of fact. This distinction between confiscation and appropriation is a matter of active versus passive expropriation.[39] Sait Çetinoglu has placed the expropriation of Armenians during the 1915 genocide in a much wider historical context. He argues that from the prism of the *longue durée*, the period 1895–1955 brought a complete obliteration to the economic life of Ottoman Armenians. This process moved from the 1895 Abdulhamid massacres to the Adana massacre, reached a zenith with the genocide and ultimately in the burning of Smyrna, continued in peacetime during the interwar discriminations, accelerated during the Wealth Tax launched during World War II, and found a conclusion in the 6–7 September 1955 pogrom.[40] Within only sixty years, Ottoman Armenians had been eradicated – economically and in many other ways. Nevzat Onaran's voluminous study of the confiscation of Armenian and Greek property has offered a narrative account of the dispossession of these two Ottoman Christian groups. Although the study misses the opportunity to contrast the treatment and experience of the two groups, the facts are clear: both were dispossessed, but the Armenians had no 'homeland' to be expelled to and compensated.[41]

Existing studies on the Ottoman Empire during World War I or on the historical development of the Ottoman and Turkish economy are hardly satisfactory for our theme. Interesting as they are, these histories offer very little perspective on the violence committed against minorities, let alone the massive expropriation of Armenians. Reading these studies, one cannot escape the impression that historians have failed to distinguish between the Young Turk regime's incompetence and its malevolence. In other words, they fail to take a stand in the axis of tension between a well-meaning CUP that had no control on cruel conditions on the ground, and a CUP that implicitly or explicitly intended the destruction to happen. Despite unequivocal evidence for the latter thesis, economic histories of this period circumvent the difficult questions.[42] Exemplary of these studies must be the monographs on the Young Turks' ideology and policies of 'National Economy'.[43]

No matter how solid this research on Young Turk economic policies can be, it is oblivious or blind to the violence. Peter Kenez's critique on the meanwhile extinct revisionist Soviet historians quite accurately describe this flaw:

> His choice of subject matter reminds one of a historian who chooses to write an account of a shoe factory operating in the death camp of Auschwitz. He uses many documents and he does not falsify the material. He decides not to use all available sources and dismisses the testimony of survivors as 'biased.' Instead, he concentrates on factory records. He discusses matters of production, supply and marketing. One might even say that he adds something to the wealth of human knowledge; yet, he altogether misses the point. He does not notice the gas chambers.[44]

Similarly, in the study of the Young Turk era, there is a serious fault line between the economic histories of Turkey and the monographs on the economic ruination of Turkey's minorities in the same period. This hiatus is puzzling, since the destruction of the Ottoman Christians is essential to virtually all aspects of social life under the Young Turk regime. The violence was not an epiphenomenon. Because of it, vast geographies and fast-growing economies were affected fundamentally. Because of it, the lives of millions of individual victims were destroyed or changed irreversibly. Because of it, social mobility and labour differentiation increased. Whatever topics scholars choose for inquiry, they cannot ignore the fact that those were murderous times and the Young Turk regime was a destructive regime. The genocide was a crime of *commission*, not *omission*. Therefore, this book will draw on existing insights in genocide studies and mass violence research.

STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE BOOK

This book consists of seven chapters that can be divided into three sections. Chapters 2 and 3 constitute the first section and will discuss main issues such as ideology and law. Chapter 2, 'Ideological Foundations: Constructing the Turkish "National Economy' will trace the evolution of the Turkish-nationalist ideology of building a purely Turkish 'national economy' within the multiethnic Ottoman economic landscape. It will discuss how the Young Turk party envisioned such a Turkish economy to come into being by analyzing the writings of leading Young Turk ideologues. Rather than macroeconomic analyses of Ottoman financial policy in the early twentieth century, the chapter will investigate how the party imagined the role of the state and the economic progress of the ethnic Turkish population. Immediately following it is Chapter 3, entitled 'Legal Foundations: Using the Justice System for Injustice'. This chapter will closely analyze the many laws and decrees that the Young Turk regime passed to provide a veneer of legality

to their crimes. It will seek to answer the question: Why did the Young Turk regime feel the need to pass elaborate laws on the status of wartime Armenian property? It will discuss not only the laws that were adopted by the regime, but also the legal status of Armenian property. The chapter will distinguish the legal provenance of land and immovable property versus movables.

Chapter 4, 'The Dispossession of Ottoman Armenians', constitutes a section in itself. It will examine the development of the genocide and trace Young Turk economic policies towards the Armenian population from the Young Turk coup d'état in 1913 to the fall of the regime in 1918. It will chart how this policy moved from boycott to discrimination, into confiscation and outright plunder, resulting in the mass pauperization of the victims. It identifies main currents and developments of this ruthless policy and how it affected Ottoman Armenian communities. The chapter is meant to be a general introduction to the next two important chapters.

The third and last section of the book comprises Chapters 5 and 6. They are each in-depth case studies of several important provinces in the Ottoman Empire. Chapter 5, 'Adana: The Cotton Belt', will be the first of two case studies that describe the organized plunder of Armenians and the subsequent deployment and allocation of Armenian property to Turks. It will focus on the southern city of Adana, where Armenians were employed in cotton fields, and describe how the local Young Turks dispossessed Armenians and assigned the property to Turkish refugees from the Balkans. Chapter 6, 'Diyarbekir: The Land of Copper and Silk', is the second and last case study, concentrating on the south-eastern region of Diyarbekir, famous for its copper and silk products. Here, economic life in the bazaar was dominated by Armenian artisans. The chapter will describe how the local perpetrators participated in the destruction of their Armenian neighbours and were rewarded by the central authorities. It will also focus on large-scale corruption and embezzlement.

Finally, Chapter 7, the conclusion, will re-center the main questions posed in this introduction and draw the general conclusions of each chapter together. It will report in a lucid and direct style how and why the Armenians were dispossessed during the genocide, how this affected local economies and how ordinary Turks profited from the expropriation campaign.

2

Ideological Foundations: Constructing the Turkish 'National Economy'

This chapter will trace the evolution of the Turkish-nationalist ideology of building a purely Turkish "national economy" within the multi-ethnic Ottoman economic landscape. It will discuss how the Young Turk party envisioned such a Turkish economy to come into being by analyzing the writings of leading Young Turk ideologues. Rather than macroeconomic analyses of Ottoman financial policy in the early twentieth century, the chapter will investigate how the party imagined the role of the state and the economic progress of the ethnic Turkish population.

ARMENIANS IN THE OTTOMAN ECONOMY

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire straddled three continents and encompassed remarkable diversity among the estimated thirty million people living within its borders. A military–agrarian peasant society with relatively low levels of integration in economy, administration and culture, the empire allowed for local leaders in disparate regions such as Egypt, Macedonia, the Gulf or Wallachia to operate with relative autonomy, away from each other and the authority of the Sultan. At the height of its power, the empire contained 29 provinces, organized into districts with district governors, counties with mayors, communes with directors and villages with elders. Ottoman society boasted a formidable diversity of ethnic and religious groups, small and large, scattered and concentrated, urban and rural. Religious affiliation was decisive in one's social identity. The empire was organized into the *millet* system, an official macro-organization of religious communities that were partly autonomous in their decision making.[1]

A list of group identities of people who lived in the Ottoman Empire could easily fill a paragraph. A random and incomplete list of ethnic groups would be: Turks, Greeks, Albanians, Georgians, Arabs, Serbs, Chechens, Yezidis, Bosnians, Turkmens, Jews, Lazes, Alevis/Kizilbashes, Gypsies/Roma, Macedonians, Kurds, Romanians, Azeris, Croats, Zazas, Pomaks, Montenegrins, Tatars, Armenians, Persians, Poles, Circassians, Maronites, Vlachs, Ukrainians, Assyrians/Arameans,

Bulgarians, Molokans and many others. Apart from the locally considerable overlap between some of these groups, all of these identities existed in multiple versions in various regions of the Empire. The heterogeneity of the ethnic and social composition of the Ottoman population was further complicated by two additional forms of differentiation: the vagueness of identities and the occurrence of multiple, competing loyalties. Identities were ethno-religious and local, not nationally homogeneous in the modern sense. This complex social reality of overlap and vagueness defies simple classification, because many people lived in the margins of ethnicity.

For the sake of clarity, this study will concern itself with the three most important groups: Turks, Armenians, and Kurds. Turkish-speaking Muslims, later denominated 'Turks', were the majority in most urban areas, for they had been occupying most administrative positions and engaged in domestic trade. Turkish peasants lived in the Anatolian countryside, where they lived off subsistence farming and in a good year could sell their surplus harvest. Armenians inhabiting the cities made their livings as merchants or craftsmen and in many bazaars the majority of tradesmen were Armenians. Some of these men were relatively prosperous, having family members abroad and being active in politics. But the bulk of Ottoman Armenians were peasants organized in large extended families (*gerdastan*s) in the countryside.[2] The empire's Kurdish population can be divided into several categories: tribal versus nontribal, Sunni versus (heterodox) Shi'ite, sedentary versus (semi-) nomadic, and clergy versus laymen. The dozens of large and powerful Kurdish tribes were generally commanded by chieftains, and de facto controlled extensive territories. All were able to mobilize thousands of mounted warriors, often to combat each other in pursuit of power, honour and booty.[3] In other words, Armenians, Turks and Kurds were present in all classes of society, or put differently, all classes were multi-ethnic. Sociologists have called societies wherein social stratification exists without a coincidence of social class and ethnic origin 'unranked ethnic systems'. In such societies, parallel ethnic groups coexist as each ethnic community is internally stratified by socioeconomic criteria and each has its own political elite to represent its interests.[4]

The Ottoman economy was a tapestry of trade, agriculture and manufacturing where peoples came together and depended upon each other for their livelihoods. For centuries, the economy of the Ottoman Empire was well integrated into the global economy. Historians have blamed its ultimate decline to the discovery of the New World and the resultant shift of economic activity from the eastern Mediterranean to the Atlantic.[5] For example, during the American Civil War the Ottoman cotton business experienced a surge. The sectoral employment of Armenians corresponded to the traditional dominance of industry, retail and general commerce. Two cautious qualifications need to be added to this generalization. First, considerable local diversity amplified the internal economic heterogeneity of the Ottoman

Armenian population. As Donald Quataert has pointed out, 'while there was no empire-wide division of labor, certain groups in particular localities did monopolize a particular industry.'[6] Second, the equation did not work the other way round: if in a particular city all rich jewellers were Armenians, this did not mean that all Armenians were rich jewellers, in that city or elsewhere. On the contrary, the class structure of Ottoman Armenians covers the whole range from the wealthiest urban merchants to the poorest rural peasants. The majority of Ottoman Armenians lived not in Istanbul, but in distant eastern villages amidst difficult rural conditions. These communities did not live in particular affluence. With the elites they had little else in common than an abstract overarching sense of an ethnic identity that was further complicated by regional ethnic diversity. Indeed, Armenians were demographically concentrated mostly in the Ottoman–Russian–Persian imperial borderland region. Armenian life flourished in cities such as Tblisi, Tabriz and Istanbul. In other words, as Razmik Panossian has argued, the genesis of Armenian national identity was a multipolar process.[7]

With the proclamation of an independent Greek state, Armenians were thereafter treated relatively favourably by the Ottoman government. These included the *amira*s and *saraf*s (moneylenders, industrialists, and bankers) and middle-class *esnaf* (urban artisans and craftsmen) in the undisputed centre Istanbul. Throughout the nineteenth century, this modus vivendi allowed these economic elites to accumulate wealth and subsidize community organizations – schools, hospitals and charity organizations.[8] The ascendancy was to the extent that Armenians came to run entire sectors of the state and the economy. Certain families came to be associated with specific governmental tasks: the Balians were the famous imperial architects who built most of Istanbul's gems, the Dadians were 'gunpowder chiefs' (*barutçubaşı*) and ran the official arsenal factory, the Duzians were in charge of the imperial mint, the Demirjibashians ran the shipbuilding and cannon-making facilities, and the Bezjians dominated trade.[9] Kalust Kemhajian was the most noted furniture maker in the entire empire, and his finely wrought pieces adorned the palaces and residences of sultans and princes. Kevork Tchouhadjian served as the royal watchmaker to Sultan Abdul Mejid.[10]

As a result, by the second half of the nineteenth century, as Ottoman Armenians also came to control clothing manufacturing, mining, shipping and milling, they became a virtually autarkic nation within the empire's complex social structure.[11] Subsequently, the Istanbul elites earned immense power and prestige in the eyes of the Armenian community. Armenian merchants based in İzmir or Istanbul also branched out to European cities such as London and Manchester, and founded lucrative businesses there.[12] Ayhan Aktar has added to this that 'this mosaic-like social fabric was perfectly compatible with the needs of an agrarian empire where the ruling Turkish/Islamic element in the center was content with the extraction of economic surplus in the form of taxes.'[13] By contrast, the elites lacked real political

power and could be deposed or dispossessed if they fell from grace, such as Mgrditch Jezayirlian, whose purview was silk production and custom fee collection.[14] Müge Göçek has argued that due to this incongruence between political power and economic power, the Ottoman Empire had a 'bifurcated bourgeoisie'.[15]

The panorama was diverse but similar in the provinces. In Erzurum and Diyarbekir, Armenians were famous for their copperworks. In Erzurum, the Vemian family of Garin was one of the top armament makers that supplied weapons for the sultans and the imperial court. Some industries were entirely in the hands of Armenians as an industry. For example, the characteristic pottery and ceramics works that Kütahya was known for was produced by Armenians since the sixteenth century. So was silk:

> The raising of silkworms and silk manufacturing were two related agricultural fields that Armenians helped develop, given that they had early on noted their importance. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Boghos Amira Bilezigjian and Hagop Chelebi Duzian opened the first spinning mills in the city of Boursa. The silk articles produced in their mills were widely in demand both domestically and in Europe. It was another Armenian, Mgrditch Amira Jezayirlian, who modernized the silk manufacturing process, thus expanding the scope of the industry. The silk woven in his shops won top prizes at the London Exhibition of 1851. Silkworm cultivation reached new heights when in 1888 Kevork Torkomian opened a technical school focused on silkworm cultivation in Boursa. For the next 35 years, he serves as principal and faculty head.[16]

In Diyarbekir, Armenians were involved in the entire process of silk production, from mulberry tree pruning to silkworm breeding and from manufacturing the silk products to dying the cloth and selling it.[17] The Armenians of Yozgat were renowned for their finesse in jewellry production: of the 26 jewellers in the city, all were Armenians.[18] The expertise existed in smaller towns too. The silkworm business in the town of Armaş in İzmit district was run by a handful of skillful Armenian masters.[19]

Commerce in the interior was heavily Armenian in the east (and Greek in the west), even though Turks were also involved in domestic trade. For example, in 1884, of the 110 merchants in the north-eastern provincial capital Trabzon, for domestic and international trade a vital port city, 40 were Armenian and 42, Pontic Greek.[20] According to a 1913 study on Anatolia by the Armenian parliamentarian and writer Krikor Zohrab, of the 166 importers, 141 were Armenians and 13, Turks. Of the 9,800 shopowners and craftsmen, 6800 were Armenians and 2550, Turks; of the 150 exporters, 127 were Armenians and 23, Turks; of the 153 industrialists, 130 were Armenians and 20 were Turks and finally, of the 37 bankers, 32 were Armenians.[21] In the six eastern provinces, 32 Armenian moneylenders plied their trade versus only 5 Turkish ones.[22] On the eve of the genocide, in early 1915, of the 264 Ottoman industrial establishments, only 42 belonged to Muslims and

172 to non-Muslims.[23] These figures, based mainly on Ottoman sources, do not necessarily have to demonstrate that Ottoman Armenians experienced a process of economic ascendance in the long nineteenth century. They do, however, suggest unmistakably that the economic intelligentsia of the Ottoman Empire became more and more 'Armenianized' in that period.

The Pamoukjian brothers, shoemakers in Kharpert

Armenian girls weaving carpets in Van

POLITICAL CRISIS AND ITS SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT

Perhaps the most chronic socioeconomic problem vexing Armenian communal life in the Ottoman Empire was the question of property security. It was the chief source of the Armenian 'uprisings', an important cause of inter-ethnic violence, and the origin of the transnational escalation of the conflict. The inability and unwillingness of the Ottoman government to safeguard the property of Armenians against usurpation was perhaps the major bottleneck in their relationship.

The socioeconomic problems emanated from the eastern provinces, in particular from the relationship between Kurds and Armenians. This requires a close analysis of the societal structure in which the people lived: a premodern nineteenth-century peasant society. Three aspects bear relevance in demonstrating how Kurdish–Armenian relations exposed the ranked ethnic system of Ottoman society. First and foremost, most Kurds were pastoralists, whereas most Armenians were peasants – potential conflict was already implicit in this social constellation.[24] Kurdish pastoralists would move their cattle across Armenian lands, and these contacts ranged from mutually beneficial symbiosis to head-on zero-sum collision. At micro-level they could generate frustrations among Armenian peasants who felt that Kurdish pastoralists would not compensate them enough.[25] Second, many communities in the eastern provinces lived under the supremacy of powerful Kurdish tribes that were relatively autonomous in their affairs. Tribal structures defined these relations: both the land and the peasants working on it were considered property of a Kurdish tribe. Nearly every Kurdish tribal chieftain 'owned' Kurdish as well as Armenian peasants, who were expected to deliver different kinds of tax to the tribe (apart from the state). This tax was called *hafir* and ensured the Armenians of Kurdish protection and patronage – somewhat similar to nineteenth-century Mafia practices in the Italian Mezzogiorno. The persistent economic malaise induced the chieftains to levy an extra tax on top of official taxes to sustain their dominance, threatening neglecters and resisters with dispossession and violence.[26] Third and last, Armenians' and Kurds' relationships with the state differed. As Christians, Armenians were not allowed to bear arms, whereas many Kurds were armed to the teeth. The Ottoman Empire remained an Islamic state in which structural inequalities between Christians and Muslims remained in force, despite attempts to equalize power relations more.[27]

Three important developments influenced the direction of Armenian life in Ottoman lands. First, the 1839 Tanzimat decrees that attempted to modernize the Ottoman Empire and consolidate its integrity against internal and external pressures. Second, the internationalization of the 'Armenian Question' in the Treaty of San Stefano and the Congress of Berlin, both in 1878. Third, the 1890 formation of the Hamidiye corps, irregular Kurdish cavalry formations that operated in the eastern regions of the Ottoman Empire and were intended to

securitize the area, including quelling Armenian revolutionary activity. Within half a century, these three development strained relations between the groups.

The Tanzimat reform was the Ottoman government's effort to reassert weakened intrastate control and interstate legitimization. To strengthen its control of the frail eastern borderlands, the government forcefully dismantled the relatively autonomous Kurdish emirates in a series of military campaigns in the 1840s.[28] Consequently, the territorial scope and nature of Kurdish tribal power diminished considerably as large emirates crumbled into smaller tribes. Not only did this cultural and social transformation among the Kurds cause a shift of power from chieftains to sheikhs, this decentralization of power augmented the number of tribal conflicts, since more chieftains now competed over the same territories, loyalties and resources. The Ottoman government had shot itself in the foot: by destabilizing the region it only created more chaos instead of more control. These were the unforeseen consequences of Ottoman government policies.[29]

Second, the genesis of Armenian political activity in the eastern region and internationally can be partly linked to this counterproductive policy. Armenians began organizing their defence against increased tribal harassment, abuse of power, violence, administrative corruption and expropriation. Moreover, the Armenian Patriarchate and educated Armenian elites began pushing the Ottoman government for change by demanding reforms and changes. The simmering conflict escalated in the 1860s and 1870s, culminating in the San Stefano treaty of 1878, when Armenian political elites succeeded in drawing European attention to their cause. From then on, the question of the Ottoman eastern provinces (*vilayât-ı şarkîye*) became a permanent item on the international political agenda. Local Muslim notables and urban elites feared that the government's measures for more equality and Armenian rights would undermine their own power base. This generated a polarization between Armenian urban elites and Muslim urban notables.[30]

A third development was depacification, the crossing of the threshold from peaceful politics to violent confrontation. Conventional accounts of the Kurdish–Armenian conflict in this period blame 'Kurds' for their alleged innate violent nature without critically analyzing and discussing the origins or the dynamic of the conflict.[31] From the 1880s on, Armenian revolutionary parties attempted to further the Armenian cause by spreading publications, organizing demonstrations and committing political violence. Although support for the positivist revolutionary ideas among the conservative, illiterate Armenian peasant population was very limited, the Ottoman state took radical measures anyway. Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842–1918) felt the need to counterbalance the growing activity and influence of parties and drew up irregular militias from Kurdish tribes in 1890. Chieftains were asked to provide young men for a school established in Istanbul. The 36 mounted and well-armed militia from Kurdish tribes from different areas each recruited 1,200 members and were named after the sultan: the Hamidiye regiments. It had the character of an unruly group of fighters rather than a disciplined army with a

strict hierarchy. Their performance in combat was poor and a great deal of opportunism, greed and grievance motivated the irregulars. Through the sudden empowerment and impunity vouched for by the Sultan, the Hamidiye regiments not only assaulted Armenian villages, but also Turkish and Kurdish ones. The depacification caused by the Hamidiye was a breeding ground for a wave of robberies, rapes and murders that went unpunished.[32] In their turn, some of the most activist Armenian revolutionaries pledged revenge and operated as partisans, assaulting Hamidiye chieftains. At its pinnacle, this conflict resembled an asymmetrical, low-intensity civil war.[33]

The conflict boiled over in the 1895 countrywide massacres of Armenians, a point of no return. In a macabre way, it temporarily 'settled' the Armenian question by delivering a blow so strong it crushed the community into acquiescence. The usurpations and encroachments on Armenian property had not disappeared, but only increased. Having their lands seized, the Armenian peasantry was now deprived of their source of livelihood and many fled abroad. Subsequent Ottoman governments forestalled restitution, despite attempts at restitution or compensation by the Patriarchate and Armenian political parties. In 1912 the Armenian Patriarchate appealed to the government by listing a depressing list of injustices: it decried the lack of effective reforms, discussed the lack of justice for Armenian refugees and migrants, underscored the widespread problem of robbery, questioned the legal difficulties Armenians experienced in reclaiming their 'usurped properties' (*emvâl-i mağsube*). It concluded that the long-term aggregate of these crimes amounted to 'economic carnage' (*iktisadi katliam*).[34] The report recognized that the Patriarchate was acting as interlocutor for all Armenians, but it certainly had its own bone to pick as well. It incurred losses during the 1895 massacres, the 1909 Adana massacre and potentially more. For example, in 1914 the Armenian church owned a considerable amount of property in Anatolia, including 120,000 hectares of forest land.[35] A few months later, Leon Trotski, then a correspondent for *Kievskaya Mysl*, wrote from Salonica that the government had 'appointed a commission which was to proceed to the localities concern and effect a settlement of the land question on the spot'.[36] But the outbreak of the Balkan wars precluded the commission from functioning – or served as a pretext for its abortion. From then on, Ottoman Armenian life only went downhill.

RESENTMENT: AN EMOTIONAL FOUNDATION FOR IDEOLOGY

The differential rates of economic development and modernization generated widespread resentment and jealousy among Turks, from the political elites down to the lower classes. Muslim political and economic elites at the empire's very

centre in Istanbul resented the visibility of successful and wealthy Armenian merchants. Ordinary Turkish merchants more and more came to act upon this dissimilar development. In the nineteenth century these merchants often complained about this perceived injustice and requested from the Interior Ministry, opportunities for unfettered trade. However, the government stood powerless in the face of the capitulations, and the differences endured and even increased.[37] The resentment grew commensurate with the empire's decline that spurted with every war from 1878 to 1913.

These attitudes also existed in the interior. From July 1909 to May 1910, *Tanin* journalist Ahmed Şerif travelled through the country to portray the situation after the 1908 constitutional revolution. His letters on the local conditions offer a fascinating, frank glimpse into the world of Turkish–Armenian relations in Anatolian cities, towns and villages, where he visited bazaars, schools and governmental offices. His assertion that 'nowadays, Anatolia is completely unknown to Istanbul' was fairly accurate. The political and intellectual elites of the Ottoman Empire looked down on central and eastern Anatolia, the least developed part of the country – an attitude that would radically alter after the loss of the Balkans.

Ahmed Şerif's first stop was Eskişehir, a town accessible by rail, with several factories, schools and a large governmental building. He first visited the Armenian school, which 'our esteemed countrymen managed to establish this year by collecting five [hundred] to six hundred lira'. Upon arrival, the graduation class was just enacting the Ottoman parliament in a role-playing game, with the teacher guiding the proceedings. Şerif notes: 'the cleanliness, the order, the state of the children, the seriousness and the sense of duty among the teachers, all that I saw in this school amazed me.' Apparently, the Armenian community had been entitled to only a negligible part of the sum the Ministry of Education had allocated to Eskişehir. The community then organized an effective collection that yielded enough to rent a building and employ qualified teachers.[38] When Şerif turned to the Turkish school, he found it in deplorable condition: unorganized, understaffed and under-equipped. Deeply impressed by this contrast, Ahmed Şerif continued his journey towards Ankara.

On 22 November 1909, he arrived in 'sleepy' and 'oppressive' Ankara, a 'large village' where glass windows were broken, shops closed in the afternoon, and schools were languishing. Here too, the contrast between Armenians and Turks was such that Şerif felt compelled to write an alarmistic call to the latter: 'Muslims of Ankara! I am addressing you . . . if you do not wake up . . . the future looks dark . . . here are the Christian and Jewish compatriots you always work together with . . . they educate their children as they wish . . . understand that you do not have a minute to waste, so imitate your non-Muslim compatriots.'[39] The scenario was similar in the small town of Nallıhan: the local district governor took Şerif to the Armenian school, where fifty children were taught in various subjects (geography, mathematics, Turkish,

Arabic). The district governor took several children and quizzed them on various questions that the children answered correctly. Again Şerif was impressed, but again admitted that urging the Turks to imitate these successes was more important to him than congratulating the Armenian community for their efforts.[40] As his journey continued, he was disturbed by his realization that the contrasts between Armenians and Turks was not limited to Istanbul, but was a countrywide phenomenon.

The next stop was Sivrihisar, a town consisting of 3,500 households in 26 Turkish and 6 Armenian neighbourhoods. In many ways, it was a typical town, representative of thousands of similar ones in the interior. Here he first visited the Turkish school, a squalid construction with dirt on the walls, unbearable stench and an old director who, he added, was 'sick in his head.' In the noisy classes, the children were playing and jostling instead of learning. Conversely, the Armenian schools were new, organized in classrooms, with a charming director, young teachers overseeing pupils silently absorbed in their lessons. When Şerif quizzed some of the children in the Turkish language, he marvelled at the depth and level of their knowledge, which, he added, surpassed that of the Turkish pupils. For the first time, he admitted that this 'evokes in my heart a feeling of admiration mixed with sadness' (*kalbte takdirle karışık bir üzüntü duygusu uyandırıyor*).[41] He left the school in a somber mood and noted:

> As long as the deep abyss in terms of ideas and thoughts continues among the various elements living in Turkey, I cannot fathom how unity and equality could be established. A societal danger has begun here that can plunge those interested in the future of this country into profound concern. If this continues, what will happen to us?[42]

In the port town of Iskenderun, he noticed a sharp contrast in living conditions between the affluent Christians living on the coast and the poorer Muslims living in the interior neighbourhood – 'a scene of poverty and misery . . . so dirty, you immediately feel compelled to turn your head in order not to see it.'[43]

By 7 March 1910 Şerif reached the important town of Sis (Kozan), north of Adana, the seat of the Armenian Catholicosate. Again, he witnessed a familiar scenario of a dilapidated and poorly run Turkish school, and a good Armenian school, where the children had an excellent command of the Turkish language because they were taught the Bible in Turkish. He even concluded: 'the pupils' knowledge of Turkish is of such quality they could teach the Turkish schoolmaster [a few things].' By now, Şerif's desperation in the face of the Turks' relative underdevelopment vanquished any appreciation of Armenians, 'because it shows exactly how helpless the Turks are and it also shows alarmingly that the generation that will shape the future is raised lifelessly.'[44]

In one town after the other, Şerif witnessed the socioeconomic disparity between Armenians and Turks, who, on top of it, suffered from a lack of social unity. In the central Anatolian town of Karaman he added to this observation that 'the difference begins in private life and then manifests itself in all spheres of society.'[45] But he suffered the coup de grace when he visited the school run by American Protestant missionaries in the densely Armenian-populated Cilician town of Hadjin. He fell speechless with awe upon setting eyes on the organization of the school, the cleanliness of the mess hall, the orderliness of the dormitories and most of all, the work discipline of the pupils: 'Why would I lie, I did not feel admiration but jealousy (*kıskançlık*) . . . I left, not wanting to see this anymore, and ashamed to be called an Ottoman. God knows how long would we have to wait to see Ottoman institutions like this?' After three days he left Hadjin in deep melancholy and fatalism.[46]

Ahmed Şerif's dispatches were published in *Tanin*, the mouthpiece of the Committee of Union and Progress. It is highly probable that it shocked the radical wing within the party, including those who had not travelled extensively in Anatolia. This faction must have drawn its conclusions from this panorama. The Turks were lagging way behind on the Armenians in vital societal areas such as education, industry, crafts, labour, social and political organization, health, finance, services, etc. Moreover, in Turkish eyes, the Armenians were well organized, which fueled the myth of the ostensible unity of the Other. It is important to note that these reflections were authored before the Balkan wars, which sparked a sharp radicalization of the Young Turk elite and furthered ethnic polarization in Ottoman society. It is also significant to acknowledge that these were not 'ancient hatreds', but modern ones, products of a long-term process of differential modernization. The disparity between Armenians and Turks may have generated envy and possibly resentment at local levels, but ethnic animosities cannot be reduced to these economic inequities. Moreover, for genocide to occur, the outbreak of a war was at least as important as the precondition of an existing ideology of exclusion among the political elites.

There is ample evidence for the claim that the Young Turk political elite drew sweeping conclusions from their encounter with society. Especially after their expulsion from their ancestral lands in the Balkans, their emotions included humiliation, helplessness, anger, loss of dignity, lack of self-confidence, anxiety, embarassment, shame – a toxic mix that, combined together, contributed to the growth of collective hate and destruction fantasies. The subjective perception of Ottoman losses in the minds of the Young Turks merits utmost attention. For them, the loss of power and prestige shattered the conventional myth of an Ottoman identity and Islamic superiority. One contemporary commented that for the Young Turks 'it was especially difficult to be forced to live under the rule of their own

former subjects after having been the dominant element for hundreds of years.'[47] The fear of being ruled by historically inferior and despised groups was a recurring theme. The Young Turk press published widely read articles with a deeply defeatist tone:

> Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Crete were lost. Right now the grand [dear] Rumelia is about to be lost and in one or two years Istanbul will be gone as well. The holy Islam and the esteemed Ottomanism will be moved to Kayseri. Kayseri will become our capital, Mersin our port, Armenia and Kurdistan our neighbors, and Muscovites our masters. We will become their slaves. Oh! Is it not shameful for us! How can the Ottomans who once ruled the world become servants to their own shepherds, slaves and servants?[48]

After 1913 the Young Turk nightmare indeed came true as many of them became victims of ethnic cleansing. Their behavior and political decision making, therefore, was based on fear and resentment and was aimed at securing safety for their families and ultimately, for their nation. This was no secret for foreigners as the Young Turks communicated these sentiments. The Habsburg military attaché Joseph Pomiankowski (1866–1929) served in Ottoman lands during the war. He noticed – with irony – that after the Young Turks ascertained that Armenians 'enriched' themselves, their discourse led to 'a violent displacement of the Greeks and Armenians from all professions, which offered a possibility of acquisition and enrichment (*Bereicherung*).' Pomiankowski had seen very clearly 'that the Turks looked to the flourishing settlements of . . . the Armenians in eastern Anatolia and Cilicia with envy and anger (*Neid und Wut*), in comparison with which, the Moslem homes almost everywhere constitute a picture of poverty and misery.'[49]

It is self-evident that Armenians were aware of the differential modernization process, as well as what kind of responses it triggered among the Turks. Most merchants must have thought primarily of their own business interests, with little consideration of the wider societal ramifications. But Ottoman Armenian intellectuals formulated different solutions to these problems. In a captivating study of Anatolian–Armenian thought in the early twentieth century, Ohannes Kılıçdağı makes short work of the myth that Armenian intellectuals were particularist and drifting towards nationalist separatism. Examples are plentiful. In the winter of 1909–1910 Prof. Garabed Soghigian (1874–1915), the editor of the fortnightly journal *Yeprad* and teacher at Harput's Euphrates College, reflected in his writings on the Ottoman economy. An internationally well-travelled man, Soghigian noted that the economic underdevelopment of the Ottoman interior was a source of social conflict. Communication and transportation were poor and mining was nonexistent despite the existence of rich copper and silver mines. If European capital could or would not invest in the region, Soghigian continued, then the

Ottoman nations should unite and put in a cooperative effort to develop the country's potential. His passionate plea for solidarity spoke volumes on the disparities between Armenians and Turks:

> The time has come to grasp that our improvement depends on our neighbor's improvement. Our gain will increase if that of our neighbours increases. Armenian and Turk can stand up and advance if they join hands; they can compete with Europeans if they support each other. Otherwise we cannot keep hope for a bright future . . . When the Armenians, the Turks, the Greeks and the Bulgarian[s] become united by the ties of profit they, instead of killing each other, will understand how much it is important to assist each other; and this approach will lead to the expected harmony and peace among communities.[50]

In Soghigian's mind, the coveted 'unity of elements' (*ittihad-ı anasır*) could be achieved through joint economic development, for 'if the hands of various races do not hold each other for business, their hatred and chauvinistic prejudices will not vanish.' Implicitly this was a plea for Armenians to cooperate closely with Turks in business, including the establishment of joint ventures. In this theory, economic interdependence would pave the way for more societal integration.[51] But Soghigian's fate would turn out bitterly different: he was tortured to death in 1915.

The (im)possibilities of ethnic nationalist policies in the Ottoman Empire was pondered by other thinkers as well. Whereas the Young Turks were firmly convinced it was the only road to take, opposition liberals like Lütfü Fikri Bey doubted the viability of nationalism, economic or not. In his 1913 diaries Fikri wrote, not without fatalism, that 'the emergence of a flourishing fatherland like Hungary or France, with Turkish stamped currency, Turkish discoveries and inventions and progress, Turkish houses and Turkish farms and fields' was unthinkable because the country was 'too cosmopolitan.'[52] The Armenian intellectual Aram Andonian, who was not politically affiliated, also reflected on this problem. In his 1913 book on the Balkan wars, Andonian wrote with considerable concern that 'the principle of nationality' had spelled disaster in the Balkans and was utterly untenable in the eastern provinces where most Armenians lived.[53] Andonian was never able to write the second volume to his book he had planned. He was deported in 1915 and survived by a hair's breadth.

REVOLUTION FROM ABROAD?

In the quarter century before the outbreak of World War I, Young Turk economic thought went through a process of change and fluctuation. One expert has analyzed the CUP's economic thought in two periods. The first period runs from 1908

to 1913, the second covers the period from 1913 to 1918. In the first period, the CUP adopted the English model for economic development. It tried to develop a liberal economy in the Ottoman Empire. Men like Cavid Bey advocated economic liberalism because 'capital was necessary for the state to reach civilization.'[54] However, due to the deepening political crisis of the Ottoman state, the popularity of liberal views declined. Also, the CUP had hoped that liberal policies including free trade and the encouragement of foreign investments would gain the cooperation of the European powers, which would lead to an increase of foreign investment in the Ottoman economy.

Having abandoned liberalism, the Young Turks began to adopt the model of the 'national economy', based on the thought of the German economist Friedrich List (1789–1846). List had developed this economic model by criticizing the liberal policies of British Manchesterians who had provided a framework for the English economy. According to List, the British model suited England but could not be considered a general and universal model. Rather, based on the uniqueness of England, this model offered a national economic model according to England's industrialized economy and imperialist policies. As England was a large industrialized country, and because it needed to export its manufactured products and import raw materials, a policy of free trade was beneficial for this country. However, if a country that had not established industry followed this policy, they would necessarily depend on countries like England.[55] By 1913, when the CUP had monopolized power and dominated Ottoman political culture, the decentralizing laissez-faire ideas of liberals such as Prince Sabahattin had long been abandoned for radical nationalism. One man in particular was responsible for imbuing Young Turks' thought with German-style economic nationalism –Parvus.

Israel Lazarevich Helphand (1867–1924), generally known by his nickname Alexander Parvus, was born into a middle-class Jewish family in Berezino (currently Belarus), raised in Odessa and educated in Switzerland. He was an economic theoretician, a radical revolutionary, a controversial activist and ultimately a successful entrepreneur. At the turn of the century he was engaged in political matters of German and Russian Marxism and had befriended Rosa Luxemburg, Leon Trotsky and Lenin, with whom he supported the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917.[56] At intervals, accusations of Germanophilia and embezzlement of Maxim Gorky's copyright revenues caused mistrust that chilled relations with Russian Marxists. Some historians have suggested that Parvus was promiscuous in providing sensitive intelligence to various governments, such as Britain, Germany and the Young Turks.[57] Ultimately, a poor stateless Marxist revolutionary went from rags to riches and became a millionaire arms dealer, war profiteer and speculator. His business interests discredited him among Russian Marxists and he was ostracized even by his closest friends. Trotsky considered Parvus's metamorphosis

to have been so fundamental he wrote a painful obituary entitled 'An Obituary on a Living Friend'.[58] Parvus died in 1924 in his villa on Peacock Island near Berlin.

In 1910 Parvus moved to Istanbul, where he embarked on a remarkable career: he was active in national and international politics, he became engaged in speculative business transactions involving a lucrative arms trade and most of all, he exerted a considerable intellectual influence on the Young Turks with respect to the economic problems of the Ottoman Empire.[59] His four-year residence in Istanbul coincided with a turbulent period in Ottoman history. It included mounting pressures from European powers on the Empire's peripheries and escalating tensions with the Balkan states, resulting in the catastrophic Balkan wars. Parvus expressed his sharp analytical talents in a book he published and in the many articles he authored in the Ottoman press, especially in the influential Turkish-nationalist *Türk Yurdu*. He was made an honorary member of Turkish-nationalist associations and developed close ties with leading Young Turks.[60]

In his many writings, Parvus studied three distinct problems in the Ottoman economy: First, he diagnosed that the decline of the Ottoman Empire was a result of economic, rather than cultural, political or religious factors. He urged the Young Turks to pay close attention to the wider relevance of the economy, rather than just the state finances.[61] According to Parvus, the Ottoman Empire had become dependent on European finance capital that had virtually colonized the empire's economy.[62] The agents of financial domination, he argued, were European states and companies, not the Ottoman Christians.[63] He vehemently criticized the capitulations and insisted that they made the empire vulnerable to the major European economies. In the Marxist and revolutionary tradition, Parvus offered three solutions to these problems: first, abandoning economic liberalism as an ideology, creating a strong Turkish national economy and rapid industrialization. For the Young Turk elite, these judgements formed a sharp radicalization in their thinking into a strongly antiliberal direction.[64]

Second, Parvus identified the Ottoman state's long standing neglect of the peasantry as a major problem. He urged the government to improve the social and economic conditions of the Ottoman peasants who, according to him, paid too much tax, were drafted into the army for long periods and lived in conditions of abject poverty. The peasant question, he claimed, was central to any society's economic and social stability.[65] He asked what the state could do for its peasantry, not the other way around. Ignoring the peasantry, pleaded Parvus, also caused an ideological miscarriage, namely the failure of Turkish nationalism. Popular support and mass mobilization was necessary for building a strong nationalist movement and ultimately a nation state. He demonstrated through examples that rallying mass support from the population, which consisted of over three-quarters of peasant villagers, was a sine qua non for the viability of a nation state.[66]

Third, Parvus was uncompromising in his criticisms of the Young Turk party and government. In his eyes, the CUP was a party that manifested strong antidemocratic tendencies, ruled by decree, ignored public opinion and disrespected the *trias politica* through their arbitrary, abusive and violent exercise of power.[67] Parvus defended democratic politics and when he was accused of collaborating with a brutal dictatorship, he defended himself in a long article in the journal *Die Glocke* on the grounds that he had consistently criticized the Young Turk regime's authoritarian rule. He dismissed Trotsky's insinuation that he had become a Young Turk who had become a regime apologist as 'shameless and ludicrous lies' (*unverschämte und alberne Lügen*). But he then added that amidst the Young Turks, a 'democratic movement' was intended to play a major role in reforming Ottoman political life and unifying the various nationalities that constitute the empire.[68] Among all his meticulous prognostications, in this case Parvus was wrong and gratuitously optimistic, especially as he was writing these lines amidst the fires of war and genocide.

Some historians have rightly suggested that Parvus's influence on Young Turk thought was formidable.[69] Whereas that conclusion is correct, one cannot contend ex post facto that Parvus foresaw or actively suggested the violent removal of the Ottoman Armenians as a panacea to the Empire's economic troubles. There is no monocausal, teleological line running from Friedrich List to Alexander Parvus to the Young Turk seizure of Armenian property in World War I. On the contrary, the genocide was homemade. The Young Turks' perception of the world was a blend of their own ideological calculations and their own visceral fear and hatred of Armenians. Four prominent Young Turk ideologues articulating economic nationalism were the sociologist Mehmed Ziyâ Gökalp, the writer Ömer Seyfeddin, the historian Yusuf Akçura and the publicist Munis Tekinalp.

YOUNG TURK IDEOLOGUES ON 'NATIONAL ECONOMY'

Mehmed Ziyâ Gökalp (1876–1924) was a sociologist, writer and poet from Diyarbekir. Deeply influenced by contemporary European thought on nationalism, he was most formative in the overhaul of Ottoman Muslim identity and the emergence of Turkish nationalism and his work was particularly influential in shaping Young Turk ideology. His philosophy was based on a rejection of Ottomanism and Islamism in favour of a unique synthesis of a Muslim Turkish nationalism.[70] This nationalist ideal not only entailed the dismissal of civic interpretations of nationalism, but also espoused a collective disidentification with non-Turkish Muslims such as Albanians, Arabs, Kurds and Persians living in the Ottoman Empire. Gökalp embraced the work of Émile Durkheim and reinterpreted the French sociologist's thought into a distinct set of ideas that laid the foundations of modern Turkish nationalism. Rather than a rigorous academic exercise, he took elements

of Durkheim's theories that he deemed politically useful for Turkish nation formation by selecting and applying quotes and data that seemed to confirm his positions. In other words, Gökalp was not writing out of the ivory tower. From 1902 to 1908, he held the position of secretary of the Chamber of Commerce in Diyarbekir, where he established close ties with the notables. His philosophy was not only a sociological theory of society, but also very clearly an ideological stand for corporatist nationalism and against liberal democracy. His choice to abandon pure scholarship and engage in politics as well launched him into power as perhaps the most influential intellectual of the Young Turk party.[71] As a result, he ended up articulating, underpinning, as well as legitimizing the policies of the Young Turk regime.

Gökalp's thought was a blend of ideas. He rejected the individualism of liberal capitalism (without rejecting capitalism itself) and Marxist categories of class struggle. In doing so, he followed Durkheim in believing that society is composed not of individuals, classes or other interest groups clashing and working for their own good, but of interdependent occupational segments working harmoniously for the public good. This form of 'populism' (*halkçılık*), partly influenced by the Russian *Narodnik* movement, viewed society as an organic whole and discredited the individual.[72] His ideological position on economics consisted of enlargement of the economy's scale from the local to a modern, developed, market economy spanning the entire nation, the abnegation of class struggle and pure self-interest, and neomercantilist state intervention. In other words, he never argued the suppression of the private sector. Rather, 'the state would act as an intermediary between the public and private sectors.'[73] Gökalp rejected socialism and liberalism, and argued that the ideal economic system would 'prevent usurpation of social wealth by individuals without abolishing private property, and to preserve and increase social wealth in order to spend it for the benefit of the public.'[74] Profiteering and usurpation, characteristics ordinarily attributed to Armenians and Greeks, were anathema (but would turn out rampant during the war and the genocide). The counterpart of the capitalist would be the 'national merchant' (*millî tüccar*), fostered and patronized by the state. Gökalp's utopian country was captured in his famous poem 'Homeland' (*Vatan*):

> A country, where all capital circulating in its markets,
> The technology and science guiding its craft, is the Turk's.
> Its professions always protect each other,
> Its shipyards, factories, boats, trains, is the Turk's,
> O Turk, that is where your homeland is![75]

'Turkism' was surrounded by enemy ideologies: Islamism, Ottomanism, and cosmopolitanism; and he used exactly the French term – *cosmopolitisme*. For

Gökalp, cosmopolitanism was embodied in Europeans' presence in the streets of Istanbul, Turks consuming and producing non-Turkish culture, and the non-Turks in Ottoman society. He argued that ultimately, the key changes would have to spring from raw state intervention into the economy.[76]

A second ideologue who made a coherent attempt at analyzing nationalism in the Ottoman Empire was a Volga Tatar, Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935). Akçura founded the journal *Turkish Homeland* (*Türk Yurdu*), which he saw as the major intellectual force behind the development of Turkish nationalism. His definition of the Turkish nation was more along ethnic lines and included other Turkic peoples, such as those in the Caucasus and Central Asia.[77] In 1904 Akçura published a seminal article titled 'Three Types of Politics', an assessment of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. In this pamphlet Akçura pointed out that the impossibility of forging a nation out of the Ottoman minorities precluded the ideology of Ottomanism from being successful. Akçura then targeted Muslimism and declared it problematic because of the genesis of nationalism among Muslim minorities. (In their turn, the Islamist movement criticized Turkish nationalism and argued, 'Islam does not allow nationalism.'[78]) He pointed out that 'the dominant current in our contemporary history is that of nations', signaling that Turkish nationalism was the only feasible ideology.[79] The major point of contention with his colleague Ziyâ Gökalp was the degree to which Islam was allowed to become a component of Turkish identity. But Gökalp ultimately agreed with Akçura and clearly stated that 'it becomes clear that our nation consists of Turkophone Muslims.'[80] This kind of discourse by a leading intellectual drew sharp boundaries within Ottoman society.

Much like Gökalp, Akçura also called for the creation of a 'national economy' (*millî iktisad*) that would sustain a Turkish nation state. For example, he argued:

> The foundation of our contemporary states is the bourgeoisie; the modern Great Powers have been founded resting on the artisan, merchants and banker bourgeoisie. The Turk ish national rebirth (*intibah-ı millî*) can be the platform for a Turkish bourgeoisie in the Ottoman state and . . . can ensure the solid ascendancy of the Ottoman state . . . Just as the bourgeoisie of Poland consisted only of Jews and Germans, the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie of the Ottoman state was composed of non-Turks . . . like Jews, Greeks, Armenians, who were the middlemen and agents of Western capitalism. If the Turks . . . will be unable to form a capitalist bourgeois class, for an Ottoman society purely consisting of bureaucrats and villagers to continue to live as a modern state will be obstructed.[81]

Here one can already observe the emerging contours of the core terminology of what would later be christened 'Kemalism', but was in essence Young Turk economic nationalism. State, society and economy had to become 'national' (*millî*)

and 'modern' (*muâsır*) and accord to the 'ideal' (*mefkûre*) – the latter a vague term bordering on a utopian image of a nation state.

A third thinker on the economy was the nationalist writer Ömer Seyfeddin (1884–1920). He was a disciple of Gökalp and writer of fictional and political short stories. He hailed from a military family, graduated from the Military Academy in 1903 and served, first in the guerrilla war in Macedonia, and then in the Balkan wars, when he was incarcerated as a prisoner of war for almost a year. Throughout the period, he wrote in Turkish-nationalist journals and newspapers and worked as a teacher. In his pamphlets and poems, Seyfeddin's nationalism was directed against the humanist and cosmopolitanist ideas circulating in then Salonica. He denounced them as products of Freemasonry that weakened Turkish nationalism and the Ottoman state. Many of Seyfeddin's articles were published anonymously or under a pseudonym. In his articles, Seyfeddin preaches disidentification (if not hatred) towards non-Turks. For example, in the short story 'Enemy of Boycott' (*Boykotaj Düşmanı*) he satirizes two Turks who look at Greek culture with admiration and respect.[82] The underlying message is clear: these friendly attitudes need to be discontinued in favour of social polarization and preferably action, including economic boycott. In a 1912 non-fiction article he wrote:

> Terrible dramas were being played out under the guise of Constitutional Rule. Yet the Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Armenians, Albanians had their national ideal, national literature, national language, national purpose, national organizations. And these nations are very shrewd. 'We are sincere Ottomans . . . ' they would say to deceive the Turks, and damage the Turks' language, literature, even their scientific books, even erase (*sildiriyorlardı*) from their geography and history books the words 'Turks and Turkey'.[83]

The Greeks and Armenians in particular bore the brunt of his hatred. In his important 1913 story 'Our Seven Sleepers: The Memoirs of an Armenian Youth' (*Eshâb-ı Keyfimiz: Bir Ermeni Gencinin Hatıraları*), Seyfeddin sarcastically wrote about a group of Turks who have united in the 'Ottoman Fusion Club', socializing with Armenians and still naively believing in cosmopolitanism. Importantly, the book contains scenarios of the potential disappearance of Turks as a result of Greek nationalism in the west, and Armenian nationalism in the east of the country.[84] These kinds of collective fantasies of fear and hatred contributed to a climate of increasing insecurity about the future.

About the economy, Seyfeddin wrote that the empire's 'economic slavery' was the main cause of the empire's political problems. He denounced the capitulations as keeping Turks backward and encouraged their abrogation. Only their abolition would create a new class of Turkish merchants and develop the national economy. He called for his fellow writers to write novels and stories that glorified trade and commerce so their readers would aspire to enter these professions. Regarding the

non-Muslims merchants, he was clear: they were to be fully and permanently boycotted.[85] As a result, a utopian nation state would emerge, the state of the future, ethnically homogeneous and modern.[86]

One of the staunchest Turkish nationalists and strongest proponents of List's national economy was the Ottoman Jew Moise Cohen, or as he renamed himself, Munis Tekinalp (1883–1961).[87] Before and during the war, he strongly advocated the ideology of 'national economy', following the example of Germany after 1871. In his opinion, 'Turkey' could only experience economic development in trade and industry if it developed a nationalist economic policy. He denounced the capitulations and underscored that because of them, 'most of our capital has come into possession of elements not directly interested in the homeland.' During the war, as the dispossession of Armenians escalated and the enrichment of Turks proceeded, the jubilant ideologue rejected European accusations of xenophobia and blistered them: 'The foreigners have always been used to seeing a slothful, undignified, imprudent, apathetic Turkish nation; when all of a sudden a nation sprung that is fully conscious of its right and interest, holding its honour and pride above all, they are astonished.'[88] The charged language of this discourse also demonstrates that the issue was not purely economic but a matter of national pride, or perhaps the elimination of the opposite of pride – disesteem. In a seminal German-language propaganda booklet entitled 'Turkism and Pan-Turkism' and published in the fateful year 1915, Tekinalp wrote:

> On the other hand, the Christian population of Turkey has been consistently progressing, partly by means of privileges too easily granted, and partly by their own initiative, and they are ousting the real owner of the country more and more from their heritage. Two nations, pressing upon them from either side, have succeeded in driving the old 'conquerors' more and more into the interior of the country. The Greeks from the sea and the islands have taken possession of the harbours and coast towns of Anatolia, and pressed the Turks further and further back into the salt steppes of the interior. The Armenians, who, thanks to their friendly relations with England, have become very rich, have cut off their retreat.[89]

As a result, he concluded, there was no 'internal unity'. It is not unthinkable that mythical narratives such as this had already been developed during the genocide by Tekinalp and other Young Turk ideologues to justify the expropriation of Armenians. The narrative naturalizes expropriation policies as an inevitable pendulum of historical justice that swung back and gave Turks what naturally belonged to them.

Others too wrote about the necessity of creating a Turkish middle class. The Young Turk journalist Muhittin Birgen (1885–1951) belonged to the left-wing faction in the CUP and argued in his writings that Europe's development was a result

of its strong industrial and commercial classes. In a 1913 article he made a clear-cut proposal:

> The readers of thousands of newspapers, books are people of this class. All in all, this class is the backbone of a nation, is the spirit of the state; it is they who keep the state and society alive. We on the other hand, have no education, people are poor, the treasury is empty, nobody is reading serious newspapers, buying useful books, this is all because we lack this class of people. There are some nations like us who erstwhile also lacked that class. Then the people and the state joined hands and worked, struggled; they opened banks, the government provided financial support and protected its craftsmen from the 'competition' of foreigners; factories, workshops, large businesses were established: finally that class came into being. Let us also do it like this.[90]

This quote exemplifies the ideologues's awareness of the fact that there would be no longevity for the CUP without a loyal social foundation. Yusuf Akçura too argued in April 1914: 'The foundation of the modern state is the bourgeois class. Contemporary prosperous states came into existence on the shoulders of the bourgeoisie, of the businessmen and bankers. The Turkish national awakening in Turkey is the beginning of the genesis of the Turkish bourgeoisie. And, if the natural growth of the Turkish bourgeoisie continues without damage or interruption, we can say that the sound establishment of the Turkish state has been guaranteed.'[91] The influential wartime Minister of Supplies, Kara Kemal (d.1926) discussed the problem as follows: 'Governments in Europe are based either on the working class or on the bourgeois strata. They can rely on their social assistance in difficult circumstances. On what class are we based on . . . . Is there such a strong class in Turkey? Since it does not exist, why should we not create it.'[92] During the war, he would argue for 'the creation of a bourgeois class in our country just as it is in civilized countries', which would secure 'the Committee of Union and Progress's continued existence through this class (*bu sınıf sayesinde idame-i mevcudiyetine*)'. To this end, he concluded, 'the committee is struggling for the establishment of national firms, a national bank and the unification of the Muslim tradesmen and merchants in associations.'[93] This quote reveals an additional function of the national economy program: not only would it elevate the Turkish ethnic group to middle class levels, but it would also bind those social classes to the CUP and provide the party with a loyal constituency. Kara Kemal's words would prove prophetic during and after the war when organized Muslim entrepreneurs, united in the Chambers of Commerce, served as fertile ground for recruitment by Young Turk action against Armenians.[94]

All in all, despite genuine ideological disagreement and personal dislike, all of these men agreed on the general tenets of Turkish economic nationalism. As a

result, from 1913 on, the direction of policy was never in doubt: the Armenians were to be removed from their socioeconomic niches, one way or the other.[95] Indeed, the emergent consensus was so powerful that anomalies only solidified it.

On the eve of World War I the Young Turks felt logistically and ideologically strong enough to discontinue their denial and understatements of the movement's Turkish-nationalist character. After the definitive turn to Turkish nationalism, the Young Turks openly embraced policies that explicitly excluded non-Turks. Two key leaders, the doctors Bahaeddin Şakir and Mehmed Nâzım, wrote to a party branch that the CUP could never be entrusted to 'any enemy of the Turks, Armenian or not' (*Türk düşmanı olan ne bir Ermeni'ye ne de bir başkasına*). Armenians would only be allowed to join if they pledged total allegiance to the movement's Turkish-nationalist agenda – a rather unlikely scenario. The doctors continued to declare that 'If we take a non-Muslim Ottoman into our committee, it will only be on these conditions. Our committee is a purely Turkish committee (*halis bir Türk cemiyeti*).'[96] Two years later, in a letter to Zionist leaders, Dr. Nâzım was even more unreserved in expression, leaving nothing implied: 'The Committee of Progress and Union wants centralization and a Turkish monopoly of power. It wants no nationalities in Turkey. It does not want Turkey to become a new Austria–Hungary. It wants a unitary Turkish nation state (*einen einheitlichen türkischen Nationalstaat*), with Turkish schools, a Turkish administration and a Turkish legal system.'[97] A leading Young Turk could not have been more explicit and unambiguous in describing the party's ideal vision of society.

He was not the only one. There is solid evidence that the Young Turk party elite took the exhortations of the ideologues very seriously. A younger party member recalled a conversation he had had with the most powerful man in the CUP, Mehmed Talaat Bey:

> This has not escaped my consideration: in this country there is low literacy, and in the counties and districts, medicinal, pharmaceutical, veterinary and even engineering professions, were in the hands of non-Turkish and non-Muslim Greeks, Armenians and Jews, and we, despite declaring with insistence that we are Ottomans regardless of religion, race, creed, nationality differences, among those who applied to the organization are almost none other than Turks.' When I told Talaat this impression of mine, he sighed: 'The opportunity of tying them to the Turks has been lost. Now all of them are struggling for their own race, religion, nationality and type, and they are doing this at our expense (*bizlerin sırtından*). I know, but alas, what can we do? We will be patient and we will come to our senses by seeing the truth. Let's see. Let's cross these bridges. Before we will leave, they will leave us.[98]

Talaat's conclusion reflected that of the Young Turk ideologues. The issue was not so much that Armenian elites had worked hard and earned their fortune honestly.

Not quite. The overlap of economic superiority and political inferiority generated the Turkish perception that Armenian wealth was illegitimate, or as Talaat puts it here, at the expense of the Turks. Indeed, at the height of the deportation campaign, in a telling conversation with the American ambassador Henry Morgenthau (1856–1946), Talaat said:

> We base our objections to the Armenians on three distinct grounds. In the first place, they have enriched themselves at the expense of the Turks. In the second place, they are determined to domineer over us and to establish a separate state. In the third place, they have openly encouraged our enemies. They have assisted the Russians in the Caucasus and our failure there is largely explained by their actions. We have therefore come to the irrevocable decision that we shall make them powerless before this war is ended.[99]

In a later conversation with Enver, the dashing minister of war too dismissed Morgenthau's economic arguments and said that economic conditions were unimportant, and that he had nothing else in mind than winning the war.[100]

DISCUSSION

If there is one essential quality of the historical process, it is change. As the composition and conditions of the Young Turk movement changed during and after World War I, obviously so did its ideology of economic nationalism. Parvus left Turkey, Ömer Seyfeddin died in 1920, Gökalp in 1924. But certain trends and *consensi* persisted, in particular in the ideological sphere, and scholars of this period have suggested a strong continuity between the CUP period (1913–1918) and the Republican People's Party (RPP) period (1923–1950).[101] In the armistice period in between too the Young Turks took the economy seriously. During their exile on Malta, several leading Young Turk bureaucrats toiled for hours each day to translate economics handbooks from French to Turkish.[102] These men would fulfil important political and bureaucratic roles in the early Turkish Republic. It would come as no surprise then, that a resuscitated Young Turk regime in the 1920s launched the campaign 'Citizen Use Turkish Goods!' (*Vatandaş Türk Malı Kullan!*), adamantly advocating economic Turkification. Publications would repeat the familiar mantra: 'Not using Turkish products is nothing but treason . . . Citizens! Do not forget this: use Turkish products at work and everywhere, buy at Turkish shops; do not respond to anyone who does not speak Turkish; do not forget that you have more rights than anyone in Turkey.'[103] Policies such as these continued to affect the surviving Armenian stores and businesses on Istanbul's high street.

In this chapter we have discussed the problems vexing a society that experienced rapid economic and social changes, in particular state decline and Armenian

economic ascendance. These structural changes triggered widespread feelings of resentment among Turkish nationalists in particular. As one expert on ethnicity has argued, ethnic groups that 'are more wealthy, better educated and more urbanized tend to be envied, resented and sometimes feared by others; and the basis for these sentiments is the recognition of their superior position in the new system of stratification.'[104] The concept of resentment is key for understanding the course of events in the early twentieth century. According to Roger Petersen, 'resentment is the feeling of being politically dominated by a group that has no right to be in a superior position.' As the old hierarchies of the *ancien régime* slowly gave way to Armenian social mobility, the Young Turks came to embrace a belief that 'these hierarchies can be reordered through violence and discriminatory policies'.[105] The two key catalysts in fostering the conflict were elite ambitions and differential modernization of ethnic groups. Each of these factors played important roles: differential modernization was a slow product of structural changes, but the Young Turks' ambition, that is, the conviction of their own group's necessary superiority was as important in shaping their policies.

The economic assault on Armenians struck roots in mass sentiments, apprehensions and aspirations. Young Turk nationalist ideology fed into widespread sentiments of inferiority and jealousy among the Muslim Turkish group. It was based on the principle of inequality between ethnic groups, but also promised Turks greater equality among themselves. This doctrine conceived of ethnic conflict as the antidote to class conflict by feigning unity and exploiting widespread Turkish feelings of humiliation, fear and jealousy. Donald Horowitz has argued that 'the sense of backwardness is a profoundly unsettling group feeling . . . to entertain such a feeling is for group members to be subject to anxiety-laden perceptions of intergroup relations and to pressures to end the state of backwardness.' Moreover, 'backward groups very often believe advanced groups to be more cohesive, better organized, more given to mutual cooperation and collective effort.'[106] In other words, the Young Turk elite felt that Armenians were allegedly endowed not only with superior individual attributes, but also with superior collective traits. In their minds, Ottoman Armenians were wresting from the Turkish people mastery over their future and their own fate. Backwardness prompted two different responses: the rejection of becoming like the despised and envied ethnic Other versus the realization that only emulation of their behavior and politics would offer a strong competitive base. The choice over either direction is often made by the backward group's own elite, preoccupied with 'catching up'. Preferably catching up fast, 'before it's too late', that is, before the group has been dominated by the advanced group, which has taken control of the country and subordinated the backward group, politically and economically. Horowitz concludes that 'apprehensions about survival, swamping and subordination reflect the enormous

importance accorded to competitive values: a group that cannot compete will be overcome or will die out.'[107]

This suggests that the Young Turks' economic nationalism bordered on a certain notion of redemption, articulated in their ideology as 'liberation' (*kurtuluş*). Only once they had eliminated the 'greedy and profiteering' Greeks and Armenians, who had ostensibly enriched themselves at the expense of the Turkish people and took possession of the Ottoman economy, then honest and hardworking Turks could build a happy society with a modern national economy. The salvation of the Turkish nation would follow a redemptive final reckoning with Armenians.[108] In a recent political past suffused with suffered humiliations and persisting threats, redemptive hatred of Armenians seemed to offer answers to the riddles of the time. This millenarian ideology not only pronounced a sentence on the nature of the Ottoman economy or 'cunning Armenians', but also facilitated the pursuit of power and escape from anxiety. The emotional impulses of resentment were drained off by being displaced onto symbolic enemies such as Armenians. Moreover, collective hatred of the Armenians also clarified ethnic boundaries, caused ranks among the Turks to close and thereby generated social closure.

The anthropologist Clifford Geertz defined ideology as a cultural system tantamount to a panacea to solve societal crises that generate social friction between groups or classes. Ideologies consist of a two-step process: they establish a diagnosis and offer a remedy.[109] We have seen in this chapter that these theoretical observations find support in the historical record on Armenian–Turkish and Armenian–Kurdish relations. A certain fear of extinction or disappearance took hold among the Young Turk political elite and facilitated the nascence of an ideology of economic nationalism. In the case of Young Turk economic nationalism, the diagnosis was that the Ottoman economy was dependent on European actors and dominated by Ottoman Christians. In principle, this finding was not necessarily conducive to the committing of mass crimes such as genocide and expropriation. The remedy, however, was as sweeping as alarming: an entire economic subsociety of Armenians was to be replaced by Turks. This remedy could hardly be considered outside the context of a level of coercion ranging from expulsion to mass murder. The human consequences of this implacable ideological orientation would be devastating.

3

Legal Foundations: Using the Justice System for Injustice

This chapter will closely analyze the many laws and decrees that the Young Turk regime passed to provide a veneer of legality to their crimes. It will seek to answer the question, Why did the Young Turk regime feel the need to pass elaborate laws on the status of wartime Armenian property? It will discuss not only the laws that were adopted by the regime, but also the legal status of Armenian property. The chapter will distinguish the legal provenance of land and immovable property versus movables.

INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman Armenians were traditionally subject to the jurisdiction of the Ottoman social contract. It stipulated that the Ottoman Sultan (who was also the caliph) guaranteed the safeguard of their persons, their civil and religious liberties, 'and conditionally, their properties, in exchange for the payment of poll and land taxes'.[1] This mutual understanding was a product of history, a legal foundation of a long-term modus vivendi between the state and the community. The external and internal political pressures of the nineteenth century strained this relationship to the point of disintegration. Encroachments on Armenian life by Muslims were followed by impunity, further undermining the rule of law and legal rights of Armenians as citizens of the empire. The Abdulhamid massacres shattered the illusions of equal rights and were the nadir of the Ottoman rule of law. Armenian lives and property were seen as fair game and large-scale plunder accompanied the violence.

The coming of the 1908 revolution raised hopes about the return of a solid rule of law and equality before the law in practice. But like most revolutions, its principles were betrayed afterwards as international pressure mounted on the Empire. The Young Turks' disrespect and impatience for the rule of law is exemplified by their practices, policies, and many anecdotes. The CUP used both legal and extralegal measures against its opponents. It attempted to infiltrate the legislative branch

of the Ottoman government, but it also used flagrantly illegal practices to perpetuate its political agenda. As Şükrü Hanioğlu argued,

> [T]he CUP, once in power, developed a distaste for strong legislatures . . . the CUP managed to bypass the legislature by means of the cabinet . . . The cabinet began to issue so-called temporary laws confirmed by imperial decrees at times when the parliament was not in session. Over time, temporary laws overtook legislation in the parliament as the principal lawmaking mechanism of the state. Many important decisions were confirmed as temporary laws, without any discussion in the chamber.[2]

In other words, the law became an instrument of the party's will. When he was confronted with a legal problem, Enver Pasha once famously remarked in a straightforward way: 'If there is no law, make one, and there is one.'[3]

The Ottoman Empire was tied to several international laws and conventions. It had signed the second Hague Peace Conference on 12 June 1907, in which clear rules stipulated wartime conduct regarding the property of civilians.[4] Another perceived problem of international law concerned the foreign capitulations, a set of legal concessions under which foreign subjects enjoyed privileges such as exemption from Ottoman taxes. The CUP regarded the capitulations as humiliating and in parliament, CUP members dubbed the capitulations 'satanic angels'.[5] In his memoirs Cemal Pasha confessed that for a long time they had wanted to 'tear them apart'.[6] They did not wait long to confront them: all capitulations were unilaterally abrogated on 17 September.[7] The annulment of the capitulations 'was received euphorically as a military success' by the Young Turks.[8] Together with the capitulations, the reform plan for the eastern provinces Russia had designed in 1913 mainly to curb abuses against Christians, was also de facto cancelled.[9]

The party doctrine could now be implemented, but since the party was at the zenith of political power, the implementation had to take place within a framework of legal instructions. When the war broke out, the Armenian properties became an important aspect of the Armenian 'question'. After the official decision to deport Armenians, many laws, regulations, decrees and public acts were adopted, first by the Ottoman, then by the Republican government. In particular, in 1915 the CUP adopted laws that legalized the liquidation of Armenian properties and foresaw the settlement of migrants from the Balkans and Caucasus on these properties. After World War I the new government which was established by Ahmet İzzet Pasha in October 1918 and then by Tevfik Pasha in November 1918 attempted to compensate the Armenians for the damages suffered, rejecting and reversing previous CUP laws. In contrast, the Ankara government, which ruled most of Anatolia from 1919 on, abolished the laws of the Istanbul government and reinstated the CUP laws. With the establishment of the Turkish Republic, all Armenian properties became the possession of the treasury. The Kemalists did not

allow Armenian refugees to return to their homes and reclaim their property. This, in a nutshell, was the development from 1915 to the 1930s and beyond.

Before we turn to a close analysis of these laws, it is necessary to clarify the terms concerning Armenian properties. The term 'Abandoned Properties' (*emvâl-ı metruke*) is used in Ottoman legislation, but there is no specific definition about who abandoned these properties. The state applied the laws about abandoned properties to all people including Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarian, Jews and Syriacs. However, in the legislation, there was a separation in the execution of the laws. 'Deserters and missing people' (*firari ve mütegayyib kişiler*) referred specifically to Armenians and not the others and the laws on abandoned properties were applied to Armenians only.[10] In other words, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews and Syriacs were not considered 'deserters' or 'missing' and the laws about abandoned properties would not be applied to their properties. Their conditions were defined by different categories and applied according to different laws. For instance, the laws about Greek migrants (*mübadil*) who migrated according to the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey were referred to as 'property transfer laws' (*temlik kanunları*).[11]

Despite the fact that this separation can be correct from a legal terminology point of view, the government did not use this separation regarding the liquidation of the properties. Indeed, the properties of Greek migrants were managed according to the specific treaties and contracts between Greece and Turkey. During the Republican period, in some cases, Greeks and Bulgarians were considered in the category of deserted and missing people after all, and decisions were taken accordingly.[12] In other words, in a practical sense, all properties left behind by Armenians, Greeks or other groups were managed according to the legislation on 'abandoned properties'.

'LEGALIZATION OF PILLAGE': THE WAR (1914–1918)

The deportations of Armenians began as early as February 1915. The CUP needed to legalize these deportations and therefore adopted a 'temporary law' about the deportation of Armenians on 27 May 1915. This law had four titles, one of which included government policy against opposition groups. The army was authorized to eliminate all opposition movements including armed struggle and any form of resistance. Also, the army was authorized to deport the people of villages and towns. If the army corps and commanders perceived any disloyalty by these people or when they saw it necessary, they would deport them to other places. The minister of war, Enver Pasha, was responsible for the enforcement of this law. Although this law did not directly specify Armenians, their deportations were justified according to this law. The law did not include any clauses on Armenian properties.[13]

A few days after the adaptation of this temporary law, the cabinet decided to enact a retroactive law about the ongoing deportations. The deportation decision of the cabinet was adopted officially on 30 May 1915. This decision legalized the previous temporary law and expanded its scope. This decision directly referred to Armenians. It aimed to deport Armenians that 'have engaged in dangerous activities such as collaborating with the enemy, massacring innocent people and instigating rebellions'.[14] Different from the previous decision, it included articles on property. This decision on 30 May 1915 aimed at protecting the properties left behind or returning the net value of these properties to the deported Armenians. Also, this decision anticipated the determination of the types, values and amounts of the immovable properties and land. After this, all of them including lands and properties were allocated to the migrants. In the law, the term 'migrants' was not defined, but it referred to the people who fled or migrated from the Balkans and the Caucasus. In other words, the cabinet gave the order to settle these migrants in the evacuated villages or towns with this decision. All other properties including olive orchards, mulberry orchards, vineyards, orange groves, workshops, roadhouses, factories and stores were sold at auction. The auctioned properties' values were protected by revenue authorities in order to give back to owners. Finally, the decision included the establishment of so-called liquidation commissions to implement the protection and administration of the abandoned properties and to control the administration of the settlements.

The Ottoman government adopted a secret order (*talimname*) to inform the local government about the management of the Armenian properties immediately after the deportation decision of 10 June 1915. The laws on abandoned properties were not enough for the local governments to manage the properties of deported people. Thus, the government sent this secret order to give detailed information.[15] With this secret order, the commissions were formed to carry out the management of properties and lands belonging to Armenians. In the secret order, the type, amount, value and name of the owners of the goods taken under protection would be registered in detail. The movables would be preserved in the name of the owners, but those movables whose owners were unknown would be registered and preserved in the name of the village. Perishable movables and animals would be sold at auction by the commissions. Also, the crops that would be harvested from the abandoned lands would be sold at auction. The money would be preserved in the finance office in the name of the previous owners. The goods, pictures, sacraments and holy books kept at the churches would be preserved in stores after they were registered and listed. The commissions arranged the records by the type, quantity or number and values of goods, and land deserted by the population would be registered by the local government.[16]

In this secret order, there were also articles about the resettlement of migrants from the Balkans and Caucasus on the abandoned properties. During the war

period, migrants from the Balkans and Caucasus escaped or were expelled to the Ottoman Empire. The settlement of these migrants became a problem for the Ottoman government and the deportation of Armenians provided an opportunity to solve this problem. The knife would cut both ways. At the beginning of the deportation, the government resettled the migrants in evacuated villages of Armenians by legalizing this resettlement through laws. In the secret order, many articles determined the settlement policies in detail. One of them stipulated that 'migrants will be resettled in evacuated villages and the existing houses and the land will be distributed to the migrants through temporary documents by taking into considerations the capacity of work and demands of the migrant families.'[17] The places of origin, resettlement date and locations of the migrants would be registered in detail. The migrants would receive documents which showed the quantity of land and property given to them. After the resettlement of the migrants, this secret order proposed that nomads were to be settled in the remaining villages and procedures would become similar to those of migrants. During the resettlement, the migrants would be given enough land in line with their financial and economic conditions in the past as well as their productive power. Income-generating properties such as shops, inns, factories and depots would be offered for sale by the commissions. The land that no one coveted would be leased for a maximum period of two years. Finally, the sums generated as a result of the sales would be entrusted to the financial offices in the name of original owners. However, it was not clear whether the money would be returned or not.[18]

The CUP government legalized the management of the abandoned properties mainly because of foreign pressure. Despite the empowerment that the war granted, it faced some restraints and restrictions on its executive decisions. Regarding the Armenian properties, there were pressures on the government from certain foreign countries. Hilmar Kaiser argues that it was not clear how the laws would provide for the creditors to receive their loan repayments from their Armenian debtors. Germany and Austria–Hungary had many Armenian creditors and directly intervened in the process through their consulates. Livid entrepreneurs wrote many complaint petitions to the consulates about their losses. The consulates in turn criticized the Ottoman government and wanted to end the liquidation of the Armenian properties because there were no legal articles to allow the sale of the properties.[19] The consulate of Austria–Hungary also protested to the Ottoman government and declared the sale of the properties at auction as despoilment.[20]

From then on, the direction of the process of juridical dispossession can be partly traced to the economic entanglements of German investors, Armenian businesses and the Young Turk regime. German companies and banks had ties to many individual Armenians. These ties needed to be severed before those Armenians could be dispossessed, deported and murdered. In a memorandum of 4 July 1915, the German ambassador Wangenheim warned the Young Turk government of the

losses and damage that German firms would certainly incur as a result of the persecutions. Cognizant of the fact that the Germans would defend only their own interests, Talaat temporarily postponed the deportation of those Armenians who owed money to German firms and banks.[21] But the deportation campaign continued unabated. The German government then bitterly claimed that it would hold the Ottoman government responsible for their losses. When Interior Minister Talaat ignored this protest, the Germans put in an official complaint on 13 September 1915 and exerted pressure on the CUP.[22] Talaat, in typical CUP fashion, responded by swiftly drafting the 'temporary law' of 27 September 1915. It had a long title: 'The law about the abandoned properties, debts and credits of the population who were sent elsewhere.'

In comparison with the previous secret order, there were few changes about the management of the properties of Armenians in this new law. According to this law, the commissions were established to liquidate the abandoned properties and settle the debts and credits of the persons who were 'sent elsewhere'. The Finance Office was responsible to register all properties. Different from the previous one, this law explained the details of which procedure the creditors would follow to receive their credits from deported individuals. After the enforcement of this law, the creditors would apply to the commissions to claim their rights, Ottomans within two months and foreign ones within four months. However, if disputes arose after the end of these periods, the general rules were applied to them. Thus, anyone who won a case could not apply to claim the abandoned properties liquidated according to this law.[23]

The significance of this law was that it cancelled all property transactions including cession (*feragat*) of the property up to fifteen days before the deportation date. This was to prevent preventive and fictitious transactions by future victims. In other words, in the law, the government attempted to frustrate the victims' efforts to preserve and safeguard their personal property as best as possible. In the law, the properties of Armenian foundations and associations were registered by the Ministry of Pious Foundations. However, in the law, the properties of the foundations were allocated to the migrants free of charge, as a result of the bylaws for the migrants' settlement. In this sense, the Ottoman government legalized the administration of the Armenian properties due to the pressures of foreign countries, but these laws did not satisfy these countries. The director of the Anatolian Railway Company, Arthur Gwinner, sardonically summarized the law as '(1) Armenian property is confiscated. (2) The government will or will not pay their debts'.[24] According to a German embassy official, German legal scholars and Istanbul's business circles had 'dramatically, but not inaccurately' named the law 'legalization of pillage' (*Legalisierung des Raubes*).[25] The Austro–Hungarian Chamber of Commerce reached similar conclusions, namely that the Young Turk government had abolished the rights of both creditors and debtors related to

Armenians. But since the Germans and Habsburgs were unable to make a fist, the CUP was not impressed. It overcame this last obstacle and continued to liquidate the Armenian properties through these laws.

On 8 November 1915 a new regulation was adopted to determine the practice of the items of the 27 September law. This regulation provided much more detailed information about the rules and duties of the commissions. It also gave direct information about the immovable properties of the Armenians. One of the differences was about the books (*defter*) which included the type, value and amount of the properties, as the secret order proposed. The other difference was about the properties of churches. According to the regulation, all existing goods of the churches were registered and preserved as the secret order had mandated. However, in the new regulation, usage rights of the materials of the schools and monasteries were transferred to the Ministry of Education. Also, the commissions became responsible to sell the movable properties at auction with appropriate values. Because of this objective, the commissions would now decide themselves on an appropriate time and place to define the property values. According to the law, the commissions recorded three different books for the properties. The kinds of the abandoned properties including money, movables, immovable properties, debts and credits were recorded in these books. In the regulation, the layout of the books was defined by a template of how to register the materials in a table. This means that the books were kept in a uniform way.[26]

After this law and these regulations, until 1918 only one amendment to the law about the abandoned properties was passed, adding one item to the first article of the law. According to this addition, deported Armenians were supported by the properties and lands given by the Treasury without any cost.[27] In other words: the deportation of Armenians was being funded with Armenian property.

On top of all these laws and regulations, on 11 August 1916 the government 'modified' the Armenian constitution of 1863, the official regulation on the status of the Armenian millet. The pretext was: 'This statute has been the principal cause of the power of the Armenian revolutionary organization and the effectivity of its activity.' According to the CUP, the Armenian National Assembly was an institution that 'concentrated power' in its hands, and all members of the clergy were purportedly members of revolutionary parties. One additional argument was that all ties with the Catholicosate of Etchmiadzin were broken off, as Patriarch Zaven der Yeghiayan's correspondence with his colleague in Etchmiadzin had exposed the naked realities of repression in Istanbul and the provinces. The patriarchate was abolished and moved to Jerusalem. In an apologetic publication for a European audience, the CUP tried to dispel the impression that it had violated the rights of Armenians. As a result of this measure, the Armenian millet ceased to exist as a collective institution and its members were relegated to a legal black hole.[28]

THE ARMISTICE IN ISTANBUL (1918–1923)

At the end of the war, the CUP fell from the power. The new government was composed of opponents of the CUP. Also, the Entente Powers, including France and Britain, occupied Istanbul in March 1920, which put pressure on the government. The Entente Powers established a tribunal to try the CUP as war criminals. Specifically, they defined the deportation as a war crime and anyone responsible for it was to be tried. Besides this case, the Istanbul government also judged the members of the CUP with 'regular' war crimes. In this political constellation, the Istanbul government took certain decisions about the status of the abandoned properties and the rights of deported Armenians.

The Istanbul government, which was ruled by Ahmet İzzet Pasha, issued an order which said that deported Armenians could return to their homes on 18 October 1918.[29] On 4 November 1918 the Istanbul government took an important decision: it rejected the laws passed on 26 and 27 May 1915.[30] As the CUP fell from government, the parliament was reopened and deputies who opposed the CUP began to criticize the policies of the CUP. The parliament also rejected the deportation and abandoned properties laws as a violation of the Ottoman constitution.[31]

On 8 January 1920, the Istanbul government ruled by Ali Rıza adopted a decree about the properties. Although this was adopted before the invasion of Istanbul, after World War I there were pressures on the Istanbul government by the allied powers. Specifically, Britain pressured the government to reinstate the rights of non-Muslims, to allow the return of Armenians, and to compensate the Armenians.[32] In this respect, the Istanbul government took a central decision about the abandoned properties. This decree was different from the previous ones and changed all articles and items, because this decree was issued to protect the rights of ex-owners of the properties. The decree included the return of the properties that were liquidated according to the 26 September 1915 law and the 8 November 1915 regulation. If the immovable properties of these people were transferred to someone without the approval of the original owners, the properties had to be returned to their original owners. On the other hand, the value of the properties would be given to the original owners in order to render the liquidations legal.

Moreover, if the original owners of the properties were dead and there were no heirs, the value of the properties would be given as financial aid to Armenian communal and charity organizations. If the movables that were liquidated by the government had not been sold yet, they would be given to the real owners. If they were sold, their value would also be returned to the original owners. Again, if the original owners were deceased and there were no heirs, the revenue of the sales would be given to religious leaders in order to distribute to orphans and other needy people. The money that was collected by the liquidation commissions in the name

of the deported people would be given back. Anyone who was caught destroying property had to compensate the original owners. From the deportation date to the return of the original owners, the income of the properties would be rendered to the ex-owners by extracting the expenses from the yield. In this decree, only the immovable properties that were expropriated for the benefit of the public were not returned. Rather, this expropriation transaction was seen as valid.[33] All in all, the Istanbul government's actions were a complete volte-face of CUP policies, as much as it was possible to reverse the irreversible.

THE ARMISTICE IN ANKARA (1918–1923)

With the rise of the national movement, the CUP established a new government in Ankara. This shadow government, independent from Istanbul, adopted different decisions. They established the 'Grand National Assembly of Turkey' on 23 April 1920. This Assembly ran its own legislative branch, adopting laws without consulting the Istanbul government. The country was now split in a jurisdiction battle. The Assembly adopted a law which invalidated any political and commercial treaties and contracts adopted by the Istanbul government on 7 June 1920. This law covered all treaties and transactions carried out after the invasion of Istanbul on 16 March 1920.[34] The clash between Istanbul and Ankara became clearly defined with this law. In the case of the abandoned properties, the CUP government rejected the decree of the Istanbul government which returned the properties to their original owners. The CUP government re-adopted the laws they had legislated five years before and simply changed some of their articles. The liquidation of the properties was again legal and legitimate.

The resurrected CUP government adopted many laws about the deportations and the abandoned properties, starting with the law of 20 April 1922. According to this law, the unclaimed movable properties of the population who had escaped from the places which were freed from the invasion of the enemy were sold at auction, and the immovable properties and agricultural products were owned by the government. The incomes of these properties were registered by the financial authorities. However, if these people returned, their immovable properties and registered incomes would be given back. The second article of the law stipulated that the proxy statements prepared before the publication of this law were accepted. But if they were prepared afterwards, they were not accepted and the right of using these properties would shift to the government. The articles of this law were applied to anyone who had escaped or disappeared as a result of the state of the war and for political reasons. According to this law, if someone denounced any abandoned properties that had been kept secret or were yet undetermined, they would get a

denunciation bonus.[35] During the discussions in the Assembly, there were interesting debates about the abandoned properties. These discussions provide clues as to the perceptions of the deputies regarding the properties.

When the deputies discussed the second article of the law, Konya deputy Ömer Vehbi rejected it by arguing that this was opposed to the first article since it violated the property rights of the people. However, his objection was not accepted by other deputies. Mustafa Sabri Efendi, Siirt deputy, opposed Ömer Vehbi by quoting a *hadith* (Islamic tradition): 'The blood of the ones who draw swords to their Muslim brothers is waste, their properties are sugar [fair game].' He continued to rationalize the dispossession of Armenian properties by claiming that 'anything seen as good by Muslim believers is good, not a sin'. He also argued that if this article was not accepted, the entire law would be useless, as he claimed there were many fake proxy statements. This article would prevent this kind of fraud.[36] In the same session, a speech was given by Erzurum deputy Salih Efendi, who talked about the Muslims to whom some Armenians owed money. He argued that Armenians who were dominant in the economy of the country were doing business by taking credits from Muslims. Muslims were not engaged in trade, instead lending money to Armenians to do business in their name. Because of this, Muslims were the true owners of Armenian capital. Salih Efendi asked how it would be possible for these Muslims to take their money back from the Armenians who fled. His statement was accepted by the Minister of Finance, but it was necessary to form a new regulation for this. The proposal was not included in this law.[37] These two statements indicate the way in which the CUP elite considered the Armenian people and their properties: as fair game. During all discussions on this law, they attempted to legalize the dispossession of Armenian properties by reference to quasi-religious exegesis or emphasis on the supposed baselessness of the Armenians' claims.

After the enactment of this law with unanimity, the restitution decree adopted by the Istanbul government on 8 January 1920 was rejected by Ankara on 14 September 1922 without discussion.[38] During the discussions about the enactment of the law of 15 April 1923, the Minister of Finance Hasan Fehmi Bey referred to the decree of the Istanbul government as a 'nonsense decision' (*hezeyanname*).[39] This was a frontal attack on a decree aimed to protect the rights and interests of the original owners of the property. In its place, the previous law legislated on 26 September 1915, rejected by the Istanbul government in 1918 because of violating the constitution, was adopted by the Ankara government. Ankara had now officially broken with the Ottoman constitution.

The first decree by the Ankara government was adopted on 12 March 1922. According to this law, the proxy statements of the missing non-Muslim subjects were rejected. These people, Ottoman Christians, were those accused of defending the Pontos movement during the national movement, those who escaped to Greece,

Istanbul or other places after the armistic and the Greeks of Trabzon, Samsun, Ordu and Giresun who had 'collaborated with the enemies and betrayed the government'. If they had sent proxy statements, they would not be accepted by the government.[40] The other law about the abandoned properties was adopted on 15 April 1923. This law changed some items of the law issued on 26 September 1915 and abolished the 20 April 1922 law. It became the new law about the abandoned properties for the Kemalist era. Through this law, only a few articles were changed. One of the changes was about immovable properties recorded by the Ministry of Pious Foundations and the Finance Ministry. After the liquidation of these properties, their yield was recorded as income for these treasuries in the name of the evacuated people. However, if someone claimed the properties or had outstanding debts with the deportees, after the publication of this law they could apply – within four months if they were residents of Turkey and within 6 months if they were residents of foreign countries.[41]

During the session of the Assembly, the Minister of Finance, Hasan Fehmi Bey made several significant statements about the sale of Armenian properties. During the discussion on the articles of the law legislated on 15 April 1923, Nafiz Bey, a deputy from Canik, said that the government could not manage the abandoned properties, and they were partly destroyed and 'destruction' (*tahrip*) was continuing. For example, he argued that many vineyards and houses from abandoned properties in Ankara were destroyed. He also said that there was an article in the Liquidation Law: the properties that were destroyed would be sold. He asked the Minister of Finance why these properties were not sold, because, according to Nafiz Bey, if these were sold, they would be used by locals who could work for developing the public works of the country. In this sense, he proposed the integral sale of abandoned properties in some provinces such as İzmir and Bursa. As a response to Nafiz Bey, Hasan Fehmi Bey accepted the claims about the destroyed abandoned properties, but he argued that the law of the abandoned properties restricted the attempts of the Ministry of Finance, since the law did not allow the ministry to sell the properties. According to the law, the ministry would manage the abandoned properties. Hasan Fehmi Bey said that if the law had issued rules to the Ministry of Finance, the destruction of abandoned properties could have been prevented and immigrants could have been settled in the abandoned properties. He also claimed that there was a legal conflict between the Law of Abandoned Properties issued on 20 April 1922 and the Liquidation Law of 27 September 1915. It was not easy to determine which law could be applied for such a case. In this respect, Hasan Fehmi Bey concluded that this new law would solve all these problems, and the Ministry of Finance would gain the right to sell or manage these kinds of abandoned properties.[42]

The decree issued on 12 March 1922 was changed on 28 June 1923, because people from other regions began sending proxy statements to repossess their

properties. The Ankara government changed the decree and proposed that the proxy statements from all missing non-Muslim subjects would not be accepted.[43] The Ankara government also used the first regulation of the Ottoman government. Nevertheless, on 31 October 1922 the Ankara government adopted a decree by changing some articles of the 8 November 1915 regulation. These changes included some details about the forms and rules of the commissions. Through this change, the commissions had to complete their duties within four months after the date of deportation or migration. An article was added to the regulation stating that after or before the war, all movable and immovable properties of persons who went to foreign or invaded countries for a journey were to be controlled by the government.[44]

In 1923 there were two decisions for the movable and immovable properties of people who were from occupied cities or escaped from Istanbul and disappeared. First was the ordinance (*talimatname*) adopted on 29 March 1923: The properties of the people who escaped from Istanbul were managed according to the law of abandoned properties. If their family members needed feeding, only their commercial goods were liquidated and their household goods would be given back.[45] After the enactment of the law on 15 April 1923, this ordinance was changed and the decree was adopted on 29 April 1923. With this new law, the abandoned properties of missing people who escaped from Istanbul were managed by the 15 April 1923 law.[46]

On 29 April 1923, the Ankara government adopted a regulation to determine the administration of the abandoned properties; this changed a few items of the regulation of 8 November 1915. This was also about the immovable properties and the forms and rules of the commissions. According to this regulation, in any terms, the properties of the persons who escaped to Istanbul, foreign countries or occupied territory became the possession of the treasuries of the Ministry of Finance and Foundation. Again, liquidation commissions were authorized to manage the abandoned properties. The abandoned properties of this group, except those of exchangees (*mübadil*), were seen as the immovable properties of the Treasury. The properties that did not yield income were sold at auction.[47]

Another law about the abandoned properties was issued on 13 March 1924. This law directly included articles about distribution and sale of the properties. The first article stated that abandoned properties and lands belonging to the non-exchange people could be given and distributed to the property owners whose properties were destroyed or demolished by enemies, rebels and the government. The article emphasized that anyone who received abandoned properties had to really need them. The other article stated that the value of these abandoned immovable properties that would be distributed could be provided from the state budget.[48] On the other hand, some articles of this law were changed by a new law which was adopted on 15 April 1925.[49] The government would sell the abandoned

properties and lands in the way that was formally announced. Significantly, this new law solved the ambiguity of the previous one which did not include a method of determining the value of the properties. According to the new law, the value of abandoned properties that were given and distributed would be determined according to its 1915 value, and this would be registered at the Ministry of Finance under the name of real owner.[50]

Other decrees about the abandoned properties were related to the properties of the people who left their places in Anatolia with the permission of the government. Within the scope of the 20 July 1924 decree, these properties were not regarded as abandoned properties.[51] However, the concept of 'Anatolia' created a problem, as it was not clear whether it included Thrace or not. Therefore, a new decree was adopted on 12 November 1924 suggesting that 'Anatolia' be replaced by 'Turkey', which included Thrace.[52] This decree was also changed through another decree on 18 January 1925. Within the scope of this decree, if someone left his or her property before the publication of the Lausanne Treaty, their property was considered 'abandoned property'. On the other hand, if the government or the liquidation commissions had not intervened in their properties yet, after this decree they could no longer intervene in them. Also, the property of people who left their places by permission of the Ankara government were not regarded as abandoned property.[53]

INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

The treaties and agreements of Batumi (1918), Versailles (1919), Alexandropol (1920), Moscow (1921), Kars (1921), Ankara (1922) and Sèvres (1920), all signed by the CUP government, contained specific provisions on minority properties and foresaw restitution and compensation of all kinds. But the Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923 cancelled these plans once and for all. Although there were laws to define the abandoned properties and their liquidation, the CUP government re-adopted the regulations and decrees relating to the abandoned properties. After the Lausanne Treaty of 24 July 1923, the conditions of the abandoned properties were changed. As a part of the treaty, in a separate convention concluded on 30 January 1923, a population exchange between Greece and Turkey was launched. According to the convention, the Greeks in Turkey would be sent to Greece and vice versa. With this exchange, the Greek properties became a problem and there emerged the necessity to change the law in order to include the people who were exchanged. Before the population exchange, the laws of abandoned properties referred only to Armenians. Unlike the Armenian case, the government would not easily liquidate the properties of Greeks, because it was bound to the international law of the population exchange.[54]

The properties of Armenians were discussed in the Lausanne Conference in terms of the issue of the return of Armenians under the title of general amnesty, but the Turkish Representative Committee rejected these claims. At the conference, İsmet İnönü did not allow discussion of a collective return of Armenian refugees, arguing that this would constitute a national security threat for Turkey.[55] He also separated the issue of general amnesty from Armenian refugees. According to him, in various periods hundred of thousands of people who migrated were a different problem from general amnesty and it could not be solved in the framework of a peace conference.[56] In this respect, the properties of Armenians and their return were not included in the general amnesty. However, Turkey did have the responsibility to arrange its laws in accordance with the Lausanne Treaty. Thus, the Republican government set up new decrees by changing the previous ones to be in accord with the treaty. The issue of abandoned properties entered a new phase.

The international situation was precarious. The British government had occupied Mesopotamia. Despite having detailed knowledge of which Turkish and Kurdish elites in the eastern provinces had been involved in the genocide, it did not pursue a policy of prosecution or justice out of fear of insurrections.[57] Like the British government, the French government too had understood that it should hedge its bets and was probably better off negotiating with the Young Turks. On 20 October 1921 M. Henri Franklin-Bouillon signed the Ankara Treaty with Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk – one of the perpetrators of the genocide. The Turko–French agreement formally ended the state of war between the two countries, provided for the exchange of all prisoners and demarcated the Turkish–Syrian border. Most importantly, the treaty awarded valuable economic privileges to French capitalists. Among these were the exploitation of the Ergani copper mines and the development of the cotton industry in Adana.[58] From 1923 on, the French government came to realize more and more that defending Armenian claims for *une solution équitable* in the face of the consolidation and legitimization of Turkey's international position was self-defeating. When bilateral negotiations over the issue proved fruitless, France first retaliated by confiscating Turkish properties in Syria and Lebanon, but it was a desperate measure. (From early 1929 on, the French government gave up on defending Armenian property rights on Turkish territory.)[59]

THE REPUBLIC, 1923–1930

All laws had to be in accordance with the rules of the treaty, because it was a legal foundation for the establishment of the Republic. The Ankara government changed the articles of the laws that were in conflict with the treaty. Also, the government

was obliged to give properties back to their original owners. Nevertheless, with the establishment of special laws, the government violated this condition. For example, the government did not accept the proxy statements of evacuated and missing non-Muslim subjects. With the Lausanne Treaty and the population exchange, the abandoned properties again became a problem. How would the government intervene in the properties of Greek and Armenian subjects as their status was not even clear in previous laws or decrees? Thus, the Republican Government adopted more decrees to solve this unclear situation. The first decree was adopted on 5 February 1925. This decree proposed that the properties of the people who left after the Treaty of Lausanne would not be interfered with. If these properties were liquidated, they would be given back.[60] A new decree issued on 15 July 1925 suggested that the distraint of the bank account deposit (*bakiye*) of the missing persons who were not subject to the population exchange would be abolished. They were given to the owners.[61] Another decree was adopted on 30 September 1925 about the mines owned by the missing people. The decree decided that the grants, lots and rights of the mines of the missing people were cancelled. They were now considered as mines found by the state.[62]

The Treaty of Lausanne changed the scope of the abandoned properties. The government made a decision to improve the laws according to the Treaty of Lausanne. A major decision was taken on 13 June 1926. The government accepted the ordinance which changed the 26 September 1915 law and the 20 April 1923 law. The first article of the ordinance suggested that after the publication of the Lausanne Treaty, it was necessary to seize the abandoned properties. The second article proposed that if the government was aware of the abandonment of the properties before this publication date, the government could seize them. The other articles stated that if the government discovered the properties after this date, these properties would be given to the owners. On the other hand, if the owners or their heirs were not found, the government would control the properties in the name of their owners. If these properties were given to the migrants, their values would be returned to the owners.[63] On 17 July 1927 the government adopted a decree which changed the above ordinance. This decree changed the first and second articles of this ordinance, instead proposing that the government continue to apply the laws on the abandoned properties liquidated before the Lausanne Treaty. However, if the government had not intervened in the properties, and the owners returned and managed their properties, the government could not intervene in these properties.[64]

The other laws related to the abandoned properties were adopted on 28 May 1928. The first one was about giving the title deed to exchange and non-exchange people and migrants who possessed the immovable properties in return for the transfer documents. According to this law, the immovable properties that were allocated to the immigrants or liquidated by the Treasury according to the laws of

abandoned properties would not be given to their original owners. Rather, their values (decided by the 15 April 1925 law) were paid by the Ministry of Finance. The second article of the law meant that the title deed could be given to the non-exchange people, immigrants, refugees, members of tribes and victims of fires. According to the seventh article of this law, movable and immovable properties liquidated according to the laws of 27 September 1915 and 15 April 1923 would not be given back to their owners, but their value, which was determined according to the 15 April 1925 law, would be rendered. This is significant, because the 15 April 1925 law stated that the value of the abandoned properties would be determined according to its 1915 value.[65] On the other hand, on 2 June 1929 the Assembly took a decision about the seventh article of the 28 May 1928 law. This interpretation again confirmed the value determination of the abandoned properties according to their 1915 value. The interpretation stated that restitution of the abandoned properties liquidated according to the 1915 and 1923 laws had to be fulfilled according to their 1915 value.[66]

The second law was about the current accounts (*cari hesap*) of the abandoned properties. According to this law, the balances of the current accounts of the abandoned properties were recorded as income in the income budget of the 1928 fiscal year. In addition, the amount of about 300,000 Turkish lira from this income was used by the Ministry of Finance to supply the cost of the management and organization of the abandoned properties.[67] Finally, the Ankara government adopted a law on the distribution of properties which was different from other laws in the sense that it was not related to the management of the properties. This final law for the abandoned properties was adopted directly in terms of nationalist claims. Despite the fact that the Ankara government suppressed certain former CUP members in 1926, in the same year it also declared the assassinated ex-leaders of the CUP as martyrs. Their families were lavished with Armenian property. The 31 May 1926 law was related to the Turks killed by Armenian hitmen: Talaat Pasha, Cemal Pasha, Cemal Azmi, Bahaeddin Shakir, Sait Halim, governor of Diyarbekir Mehmed Reshid, the aides of Cemal Pasha and the district governors of Urfa, Boğazlıyan and Muş. (Some of these men had not even been assassinated by Armenian hitmen.) According to the law, the families of these people were given immovable properties from the Armenian abandoned properties which were worth 20,000 Turkish lire. They also took the title deeds for these properties with the stipulation that they were not allowed to sell these properties within ten years.[68] This was a significant law since it aimed to reestablish the reputations of the old CUP leaders who had played central roles in the genocide.

In the Assembly, there was an interesting discussion that demonstrates the perception of the deputies of these former leaders as well as the continuity between the Kemalists and the Ittihadists. In the first draft of the law, the amount of money that would be given to the families was planned to be taken from the budget of

'national properties' (*emvali milliye*). While the draft was being discussed, Sinop deputy Recep Zühtü Bey objected and suggested that this money should be taken from the 'abandoned properties of deserter Armenians' instead of national properties – this would teach the Armenians a lesson, he added. He justified his suggestion as follows: 'You [Armenians] can organize an assassination and kill any Turkish person. But we will raise his children in order to gouge out your eyes and crack your head again with your own money.' His speech ended to bravos and applause, his suggestion was accepted by the assembly and the draft was legalized.[69]

DISCUSSION

The legal management of Armenian property began immediately after the decision of deportation, with secret regulations. The CUP government legalized the application of rules of the regulation with the help of external factors. Each period had its own conditions and these conditions affected the contents of the laws. From the beginning of the deportation, the CUP aimed to liquidate the Armenian properties. Some articles of laws were composed of granting the return of properties to original owners, whereas other articles did not allow to the return of these properties. The settlement of migrants from the Balkans and Caucasus on abandoned property was also managed by the laws. In addition, the return of Armenians after the war was not permitted. This demonstrates that the CUP never aimed to return these properties. The 'laws' only aimed to legalize the liquidations.

After the war the Istanbul government arranged for regulations and laws to protect the rights of deported people and solve their problems, including their properties. However, with the resurrection of the CUP in Ankara, two clashing powers dominated Turkey and their decisions differed. Moreover, the Ankara government abolished the regulations and laws of the Istanbul government and re-adopted the laws they had launched themselves in 1915. After the success of the national movement and establishment of the Republic, the Kemalists became the sole power and could freely adopt laws about abandoned properties. Although the Lausanne Treaty included some restrictions on the adaptation of laws relating to minorities, the new republic solved these restrictions by issuing special regulations. After 1925 the Kemalists began to consolidate their power into a single-party dictatorship. The Grand National Assembly easily adopted the laws. In the case of abandoned properties, the liquidated properties were registered as income in the national budget, and migrants or nomads who were settled on abandoned properties were allowed to take the title deeds for these properties.

The laws of abandoned properties were only abolished on 11 June 1986. This means that these laws had stayed in effect for 73 years.[70] The Turkish Republic continued to liquidate the abandoned properties in this period. However, the

abolishment of the law did not mean that the liquidation stopped. The 'General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre' (*Tapu ve Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü*) published a circular order about the abandoned properties on 29 June 2001. According to this order, all abandoned properties would be transferred to the state and it was made impossible to give any title deed, information or document to anyone.[71] This indicates that Armenian property had ultimately been transferred to the state and the real owners or their heirs cannot claim any rights to their properties, whether according to international law or Turkish law.

This chapter has discussed the process of legal discrimination against Ottoman Armenians. It has demonstrated how the Young Turks hijacked and utilized the Ottoman legal system to dispossess and ruin over a million of their own citizens. A central question that was posed in this context is: Having concentrated so much power in their hands, why did the Young Turks feel the need to construct such an elaborate juridical apparatus to organize the dispossession in the most minute detail? The answer has at least four dimensions. First of all, the CUP did not see all consequences of their policy coming. Some stipulations, ordinances, decrees were issued to cover open flanks and legal leaks. Second, the many orders camouflaged the plunder and lent it a juridical quasi-legitimacy. They possibly also played an important role for the officials and institutions charged with carrying them out. It structured their daily work and provided an impersonal, administrative–bureaucratic mask to hide behind. It epitomized formalism: they were dealing with documents, not human beings. Third, the pseudolegal façade fulfilled the vital function of increasing the effectivity of the dispossession measures. But it also relieved the conscience of the perpetrators by placing the ultimate responsibility with the central authorities. In this moral universe, the measures were not plunder, but legitimate government decrees; the executioners not thieves, but loyal servants of the state. Finally, the laws were also expected to lull foreign (especially German) firms and consulates' requests for accountability or compensation. It gave shape to a 'just world fallacy': if there were government laws about the dispossession, then surely they were legitimate.

Law has the power to shape morality, since both function on the premise of a bipolarity: innocent versus guilty, and good versus evil. Richard Rubenstein famously wrote that 'the Nazis committed no crime at Auschwitz since no law or political order protected those who were first condemned to statelessness and then to the camps.'[72] The Young Turks too used the affinity between legality and morality in placing Armenians in a legal no man's land. The illegality of the process was denied by Cavid Bey, who in his 1917 budget speech, argued that the economic nationalization policies had been beneficial to ordinary Turks, whom he congratulated on their accomplishments. He continued: 'Even if we accept for the sake of argument that this was illegitimate – the conclusion is that the rush felt towards the economic entrepreneurism will create such large interests that in my opinion

that illegitimacy can be dispelled.'[73] Thus, Young Turk rule and legislation epitomizes Otto Kirchheimer's concept of 'political justice', the abuse of legal systems for political ends.[74] Through their arbitrary making and executing of laws, the Young Turk party was effectively excluding the opposition and Armenian parties from representation at the government level and exacerbating the political crisis solely for the perpetuation of its own ideology and hegemony.

In May 1927 a governmental law authorized the exclusion of Turkish nationality to anyone who had not taken part in the War of Independence and had remained abroad between 24 July 1923 and 27 May 1927. This essentially sealed the fate of Armenian claims for confiscated property. Protests to the League of Nations by the Central Committee for Armenian Refugees from 1925 to 1928 were never acted on and were rejected by Turkey. The interests of the Allied Powers were no longer with Armenia, already Sovietized by that time. Diasporan Armenians and their supporters represented little more than a moral force easily ignored, and Armenian property claims were forgotten along with the Armenians. In 1929, a group of international legal scholars became engaged with Armenians' claims for restitution, lodged at the League of Nations for adjudication. The scholars discussed complex legal questions regarding the abandoned properties commission. But despite all correspondence by Mandelstam, Pachalian and Drummond, international law failed in this period to bring about justice. There was no restitution, no redress and no compensation. The Young Turk hawk Tevfik Rüşdü Aras was inexorable in his answers: he reported that the government considered the affair *définitivement liquidée*, rejected the legal arguments of Pachalian and politely thanked the gentlemen for their letters.[75] For the Young Turks, this was a fait accompli and the end of the affair. The injustice had been consummated.

4

The Dispossession of Ottoman Armenians

This chapter will summarize the development of the genocide and trace Young Turk economic policies towards the Armenian population from the Young Turk coup d'ětat in 1913 to the fall of the regime in 1918. It will chart how this policy moved from boycott to discrimination, into confiscation and outright plunder, resulting in the mass pauperization of the victims. It identifies main currents and developments of this ruthless policy and how it affected Ottoman Armenian communities. The chapter is meant to be a general introduction to the next two important chapters.

THE BOYCOTT MOVEMENT

Well before the war, the hawks within the Committee of Union and Progress urged peremptorily for the nationalist ideology to be translated into real economic action. The CUP launched a boycott movement against Western businesses as well as Ottoman Christians. In the period 1911–1914 the scope of the boycott movement gradually expanded and intensified. Initially economic boycotts were initiated against Habsburg businesses, soon to be followed by boycotts of Greek merchants, and in early 1914 ultimately also employed against Armenians.

In a painstaking study of the boycott movement in the Ottoman Empire, Doğan Çetinkaya has concluded that the boycotts enjoyed the endorsement of wide circles of supporters, including port workers, immigrants, merchants, urban notables, low-ranking officers, professional classes and peasants. The boycotts were truly a national project, a mass movement that transcended the antipathies and struggles that may have existed between classes. United in a tightly organized, empire-wide network, local trading networks and traditional guild organizations joined hands in the movement. But their different agendas also generated competition among themselves.[1] The very nature of politics was rapidly changing, for the CUP was assiduously mobilizing the masses through its nationalist organizations. 'Demonstrations, mass meetings in public squares, mass campaigns, spectacles, parades, pageants, activities of civil societies and elections became common aspects of daily life in the Ottoman Empire'.[2]

The watershed event that affected the entire empire, including the boycott movement, was the Balkan war. It generated hundreds of thousands of destitute refugees that landed first in Istanbul, then across the western parts of the empire. Another process of political brutalization was the Young Turk coup d'état of 23 January 1913, which launched the Young Turks into increasingly dictatorial powers. The restraints under which the extremists had operated thus far were now lifted. Now freed from past restraints, the Young Turk movement was taken to the streets, through banners, flags, drums and posters, exciting the imagination of ordinary Turks as to the glories and opportunities of National Economy, and vilifying Ottoman Christians for their 'treason' and 'usury'. Ottoman public space became more and more Turkish-nationalist in the months leading up to the war. Refugees from Crete and the Balkans comprised the 'street muscle': organized gangs that picketed outside shops and committed violence against the proprietors and Turkish customers who wanted to enter the shops despite the gangs' presence.[3]

The boycott campaigns after the fallout of the Balkan wars were the most comprehensive and violent. Western observers declared that during the boycott, Armenian and Greek peasants were physically prevented from delivering their goods to the local markets. In Bursa, for example, Greek villagers were not allowed to sell their vegetables in the city, or gather mulberry leaves for their silkworms. Turks patronizing Greek shops were assaulted and their goods taken by force, the packages torn and the goods damaged. In Bursa, police officers were interdicting anyone from entering Greek stores; one policeman was seen beating an Armenian boy who had just bought bread at a Greek-owned bakery. 'Armed gangs in the city . . . torched shops and beat customers and merchants alike when found in violation of the embargo.'[4] Eyewitness accounts converge on one vital point: the local CUP branches were the engine propelling the violent boycott campaigns from behind the scenes.

The propaganda for the boycotts emanated from the offices of the CUP. During one of the 1913 boycotts, the party produced a pamphlet entitled 'A Way of Liberation for Muslims' (*Müslümanlara Mahsus Kurtulmak Yolu*). It read:

> Oh my God, how are we going to celebrate the day on which Turks and Muslims buy things from each other only and consume the goods produced in Turkey as much as possible. [Gentlemen,] we are not asking for a great sacrifice from you in order to reach that day . . . In the beginning this might seem difficult. However, we shall eventually get used to it. The main task is to learn the addresses of those Muslim stores and Turkish shops that are selling products necessary for your household. And we should not be too lazy to visit those shops even for the purchase of a tiny box at matches worth 10 pennies . . . The most important task is to consume Turkish products as much as possible.[5]

The pamphlet acknowledged that Turkish products were more expensive and of inferior quality, but this was the price to be paid for 'our honour and pride'. It also scorned 'the empty-headed ladies who are proud of their nice dresses and the elegant ribbons crowning their hair', bought at Armenian and Greek shops. The boycott was fairly successful and raised awareness among different classes of Turks. Printed lists of the 500 newly established Turkish companies were circulated free of charge and readers were admonished to buy only at these shops. A certain xenophobic ostracism spread among the Turkish masses. At these moments of social closure and collective action, it was decided who was a loyal citizen and who was not.[6]

The consequences of the 1913 boycotts were disastrous enough. In a detailed study of the anti-Christian persecutions in the period 1913–1914, Matthias Bjørnlund quotes Danish diplomats, themselves also businessmen, as arguing that the 'boycott movement damaged the Empire's economy even more than had the Balkan Wars'. One of the diplomats, Alfred van der Zee, detailed the level of devastation the persecutions impacted on almost every aspect of the economy in İzmir province. The production of barley, oats, beans, sultanas, figs, tobacco, gall nuts, opium, cotton, olive oil, sugar, rice, etc. all dropped considerably. For example, the campaign reduced the 1914 tobacco harvest by an estimated 40 per cent.[7]

The boycotts were the first actual policies that the 'National Economy' had generated. Turkish nationalists gloated over their triumph. Tekinalp wrote that 'they have ruined hundreds of small Greek and Armenian tradesmen' (*hat hunderte griechische und armenische Geschäftsleute zu Grunde gerichtet*). He concluded:

> The systematic and rigorous boycott is now at an end, but the spirit it created in the people still persists. There are Turks who will not set foot in foreign shops unless they are certain that the same articles cannot be purchased under the same conditions in the shops of men of their own race, or at least of their own religion. This feeling of brotherhood has taken firm root in the hearts of the people all over the empire.'[8]

As these lines were being written, hundreds of thousands of Armenians were being dispossessed and robbed on a hitherto unimaginable scale.

WAR AND GENOCIDE

The destruction of the Ottoman Armenians can be seen as a complex result of four important factors: the development of Turkish nationalism, the loss of war and territory in the Balkans of 1912–1913, the Young Turk coup d'état of 23 January 1913,

and the outbreak of the First World War. These political forces converged to spark a severe radicalization of anti-Armenian policy by the Young Turk political elite.

On 2 August 1914, one day after the German declaration of war against Russia, a written agreement foreseeing close cooperation and mobilization was signed between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. On 29 October 1914, without a formal declaration of war, Enver Pasha ordered the Ottoman navy to bombard the Russian shore, including the port city, Sevastopol. Ottoman battlecruisers destroyed oil tanks and sank fourteen vessels.[9] The fait accompli triggered declarations of war by the Triple Entente powers. From 11 November 1914 on, the Ottoman Empire was officially at war with Russia, France and Britain.[10] World War I was not something that happened incidentally to the Ottoman Empire. Powerful cadres in the CUP's nationalist wing consciously headed towards armed confrontation, though not with one particular state. According to a recent study by Mustafa Aksakal, the CUP entrance into the war was 'part of a strategy to achieve long-term security, economic development and, eventually, national recovery'.[11] In other words, by participating in the war, it hoped to radically solve the perceived problems of the Empire. After the outbreak of the war, the Young Turk mouthpiece *Tanin* published bellicose articles, rejoicing that the war 'had come like a stroke of good fortune upon the Turkish people, who had been sure of their own decline. The day had finally come that the Turks would make an historical reckoning with those . . . whom they had been previously unable to do so.' The Turks would exact 'revenge, the horrors of which had not yet been recorded in history'.[12]

In the early winter of 1914 the groups began invading Russian and Persian territory to incite the Muslim populations to rise in rebellion and join the Ottoman forces.[13] Two operations were launched: into Persian Azerbaijan (North West Iran) and into the South Caucasus (current-day North East Turkey and Georgia). The former became a 'catastrophic success', the latter a monumental washout. The war on the eastern front gained momentum when Enver, driven by ambition and concerns of security and expansionism, attempted to attack the Russian army near Sarikamish on 29 December. Against all military advice from his strategists, Enver insisted on waging an encirclement campaign through the rugged Kars mountains. However, the Russian general Nikolai Yudenich (1862–1933) anticipated the outflanking manoeuvre, outsmarted Enver and delivered a heavy blow to his forces. Enver's attack failed miserably and the Third Army was effectively wiped out.[14] As a result, the eastern provinces were exposed to invasion and occupation by the Russian army.

The most immediate trigger of the genocide can be traced to the uncertainties of the Great War, but the genocide took on its own logic and momentum. The first phase was the genesis of the genocidal process: the threat of invasion by the British in the west and the Russians in the east. It is no exaggeration to state that the effect of these threats on the Ottoman political elite was nothing short of apocalyptic. It

fuelled a fear of disappearance that already existed among them. It also spurred persecutions in the winter of 1914–1915 when, for example, all Armenian civil servants were fired from their positions.[15] The second phase developed out of the delusional fear of an organized Armenian insurrection, which reached the boiling point when Allied forces launched the Gallipoli campaign on the night of 24 April 1915. In the same night, Armenian elites were arrested across the Ottoman Empire. In Istanbul, 235 to 270 Armenian intellectuals, clergymen, physicians, editors, journalists, lawyers, teachers, politicians were rounded up and deported to the interior, where most were murdered.[16] Other provinces followed suit. This effectively decapitated a community of their political, intellectual, cultural and religious leaders. A third phase followed when the regime on 23 May 1915 ordered the general deportation of all Ottoman Armenians to the Syrian desert. Recent research has demonstrated again that these orders served to render an existing policy of persecution more categorical and more violent, escalating into mass murder of about a million Armenians.[17] What made the massacres genocidal is that the killings targeted the abstract category of group identity, in that *all* Armenians, loyal or disloyal, were deported and massacred.

The genocide consisted of an overlapping set of processes: elite homicides, deportations, massacres, forced assimilation, destruction of material culture and our current theme, expropriation. Although these dimensions of the genocide differed and were carried out by different agencies, they converged in their ultimate objective, destruction. By the end of the war, the approximately 2,900 Anatolian Armenian settlements (villages, towns, neighbourhoods) were depopulated and the majority of its inhabitants dead. In this book we seek to develop a model consisting of two pillars: confiscation and colonization. By *confiscation* we refer to the involvement of an extensive bureaucratic apparatus that perpetuated a legal façade during the dispossession of Armenians. We deploy the concept of *colonization* to denote the redistribution of their property as a form of internal colonization. These concepts are two sides of one coin and encapsulate the twin processes of seizing property from Armenians and reassigning it to Turks.

The qualitative leap in the elimination of the Armenians from the Ottoman economy reached an important acceleration with the proclamation of war and the abolishment of the capitulations. The war disrupted international trade and production. The war requisitions, in particular, hit the peasantry hard. Disgruntled landowners, whose harvests were virtually confiscated, hid their crops, bribed officials and resisted in ways locally reminiscent of the dekulakization campaign in the Soviet Union.[18] Şevket Pamuk has argued that the shortages caused by the war provided an opportunity to the Young Turks' economic nationalism. They eliminated the low-rate ad valorem tariff structure in favour of higher specific tariffs on selected goods to support domestic industry; declared a moratorium on payments on the external debt, held by French, Germans and Britons; and abrogated the

capitulations and subjected all companies to 'Ottoman law'.[19] (We have argued in the previous chapter that law would increasingly become a political tool in the hands of the CUP.) The abrogation of the capitulations was a unilateral breach of international law and a catalyst that channelized high levels of power into the Young Turks' hands. 'Turkification' could now be systematized into a comprehensive empire-wide policy of harassment, organized boycotts, violent attacks, exclusions from professional associations and guilds, and mass dismissals of Armenian employees from the public service and plunder of their businesses in the private sector.

CONFISCATION: POLICY AND PROCESS

The confiscation process began right after the deportation of the Armenian owners. As a rule of thumb, no prior arrangements were made regarding the properties. The CUP regime launched both the deportation and the dispossession of Armenians well before the promulgation of any laws or official decrees. The categorical decree of 23 May 1915 and the deportation law of 27 May 1915 were issued after the deportations had already begun. Decrees and laws merely served to unite the hitherto diverse practices and render the overall policy more consistent. So too was the CUP's approach to confiscation. Telegrams to various provinces ordering the liquidation of immovable property were followed by the streamlined programma of 10 June 1915 that established the key agency overseeing the liquidation process – the Abandoned Properties Commission (*Emvâl-ı Metruke Komisyonu*). These were not yet christened 'Liquidation Commissions' but nevertheless mostly fulfilled that function.

Officially, there were 33 commissions across the country, and in towns without any, the local CUP chapter often took charge of the tasks. These consisted of inventorying, liquidating, appropriating and allocating Armenian property. The most detailed and reliable information we have about the commissions is from Germans stationed in the Ottoman Empire. For example, Deutsche Bank staff members recognized that the Ottoman Bank collaborated in the endeavour.[20] From its correspondence with the provinces, the German ambassador concluded that the confiscation process went through two phases: the direct liquidation of all unplundered Armenian property by the Abandoned Properties Commission, and the transfer of the revenues to the Ottoman Bank that held responsibility for the money.[21] According to André Mandelstam, in 1916 a sum of 5,000,000 Turkish lira (the equivalent of 30,000 kilograms of gold) was deposited by the Ottoman government at the Reichsbank in Berlin. This astronomic amount of money was most probably the aggregate of all Armenian bank accounts as well as the total sum gained from the liquidations in the provinces.[22] Furthermore, German diplomats

argued that the commissions worked in tandem with the Grand Vezirate, the Finance Ministry and the Justice Ministry.[23] The entire operation was supervised by the Interior Ministry, which was tasked with an enormous amount of coordination and recordkeeping. These records have survived and we will draw on them extensively to outline the process of dispossession.

At the outset, the problem of property was a concomitant effect of the deportations and there was probably no blueprint for it written by Talaat and his cohorts. Throughout 1915 and 1916, the Interior Ministry issued hundreds of directives, orders, decrees and injunctions to provincial, district and city authorities. When deportation came, it recorded the names, professions and properties of Armenians before expropriating them and liquidating their immovables. Several empire-wide decrees sketched the contours of the confiscation policy. Liquidation entailed auctioning and selling the property to the lowest, not highest bidder. To this end, on 29 August 1915 the Interior Ministry wired a circular telegram summoning authorities to auction Armenian abandoned property for the benefit of the local Turkish populations.[24] As this order sufficed for the ongoing deportations, preparations were made for future ones. On 1 November 1915 the ministry ordered the drawing up of lists of 'Armenian merchants from provinces who have not yet been transported to other regions', including details on their trading firms, real estate, factories, the estimated worth of all their belongings, information on their relatives living abroad, and whether they were working with foreign business partners.[25] To preclude jurisdictional disputes from arising, the ministry admonished that the only agency authorized to organize the expropriation was the Abandoned Properties Commission.[26]

Talaat and the Interior Ministry he presided over were soon facing two acute problems: ambiguity regarding the forms and provenance of property, and delimiting the scope of the expropriations. An example of the former trend was a question asked by the provincial authorities of Aleppo, namely whether only Apostolic Armenians were to be expropriated or also Protestant and Catholic ones. By then, the definition of the victim group had already transformed from a religious definition based on the millet system, to a national definition. Thus, the ministry arbitrated that the targets were not only Apostolic Armenians but all 'Armenians'.[27] (The German consul of Trabzon remarked that under this law, technically, 'an Armenian converted to Islam would then be deported as a Mohammedan Armenian'.[28]) Other provinces wondered what to do with the property of undeported Armenians, often military families. The ministry ordered that for now, they would be allowed to keep their property.[29] In another case, three governors asked for advice how to handle the sowed fields of Armenian farmers. The Ministry admitted that the abstract decrees did not always correspond to the existing conditions on the ground and ordered, 'These need to be reaped and threshed under the supervision of the Abandoned Properties Commissions and

provided for by the funds for the expenses of the settlers. Report within 2 days how many soldiers or labourers from the population, and which kinds of machines and tools and utensils are needed to harvest the crops.'[30]

These prescriptive provisions were supplemented by prohibitive rules. Those Armenians who anticipated that the deportations were a temporary measure counted on renting out their houses, stables, barns or shops to neighbours and acquaintances. But the ministry prohibited this practice.[31] Those Armenians who attempted to sell their property to foreigners and other Christians (such as Greeks or Christian Arabs) were also counteracted. It issued a circular telegram prohibiting 'decidedly' (*suret-i katiyyede*) the sale of any land or other property to foreigners.[32] Furthermore, the government prohibited Armenians from a whole host of strategies to avoid seizure of their property. These included transferring property to non-Ottoman Armenians, sending it abroad to family members, giving valuables to American missionaries and consuls, mailing it directly to their new residences at their final destinations. It is these kinds of prohibitions that shed light on the rationale behind the expropriations. They strongly suggest that there was no intention of either compensating Armenians fairly for their dispossession, or offering them any prospect of a future return to their homes. Hilmar Kaiser has rightly concluded that these restrictions were 'a plain admission of official criminal intent'.[33]

A more precise explanation perhaps lies in a revealing telegram sent by the government to Balıkesir district. It read that the expropriation needed to be carried out to 'ensure that the transported population will no longer have any connection to possessions and ownership' (*nakledilen ahalinin alâka-ı mülkiyet ve tasarrufu kalmamasını temîn*).[34] In other words, the relationship between Armenians and their property needed to be definitively severed to bring about a lasting 'de-Armenization' of the land. Three years later the German consul at Trabzon, Heinrich Bergfeld, correctly noted that the most important decision had been depriving the landowners of the right to dispose of their immovable property. At the end of the war he reflected on the fate of the Armenian deportees: 'If one believes they cannot be allowed to definitively return to their old homes, one should at least give them the general permission to make use of their real estate through sale or rent, and temporarily allow them to go to their homelands for this purpose.'[35] This would turn out to be a naive proposition.

CONSEQUENCES FOR ARMENIANS

For Ottoman Armenians the outcome of these policies was fundamentally disastrous. The extraordinary taxation and requisitions carried out under the 'War Taxes' (*Tekalif-i Harbiye*) and 'Procurement of Transport Vehicles' (*Tedarik-i*

Vesait-i Nakliye) decrees had already stripped all Ottoman citizens of many of their belongings. The measures generated scarcity and in some cases, poverty among the population.[36] With the deportation orders, Armenians were now singled out and robbed of their right to own any property at the snap of a finger. In some places the notices were short, in other places Armenians were given more time to prepare. In Kayseri, for example, promulgations on property were hanged in public places on 15 June 1915. The notice read:

> Leave all your belongings – your furniture, your beddings, your artefacts. Close your shops and businesses with everything inside. Your doors will be sealed with special stamps. On your return, you will get everything you left behind. Do not sell property or any expensive item. Buyers and sellers alike will be liable for legal action. Put your money in a bank in the name of a relative who is out of the country. Make a list of everything you own, including livestock, and give it to the specified official so that all your things can be returned to you later. You have ten days to comply with this ultimatum.[37]

In Sivas, announcements were made at churches that Armenians should take as little goods with them as possible and make arrangements for simple modes of transportation, such as mules or small carts.[38] At this moment of announcing the deportations, personal jealousies would locally play up in an atmosphere of denunciations. John Minassian, a survivor from Sivas, noted in his memoirs: 'If a Turk envied your success in business or did not like you, he reported a concealed weapon in your basement.'[39]

The notice given to Armenians differed from province to province. Elise Hagopian was from the town of Bandırma on the Marmara Sea coast and wrote in her memoirs:

> We were given a few days to take with us only what we could carry, leaving everything else behind. With the soldiers there came also a drove of scavenger gypsies, those who used to come to our homes for alms, to 'buy' our carpets, furniture, bedding, silverware and other items of value. And with them also came the riff-raff from the Turkish quarter. They had come not to 'buy', but in fact to plunder anything they could after we had left. It was all so pathetic, so humiliating to leave our beautiful, well-cared-for, precious homes and well-tended orchards to worthless scavengers, beggars, petty thieves and criminal elements . . . [40]

Erzincan is a city situated on the banks of the upper Euphrates. In 1915 it was home to 26,000 Armenians, mostly artisans, officials, merchants and farmers. The fertile mud brought by the river makes good soil for growing the region's famous apricots and grapes. In June 1915 the Armenians of Erzincan were deported and most were murdered in the Kemah gorge, a narrow and steep ravine downstream

where the calm Euphrates of the plain gives way to a roaring river. A Red Cross doctor in Erzincan witnessed the plunder of the locals: 'The Armenian women everywhere were sitting in front of the houses and offered all their household effects for sale. All went away for a song. Farmers and Kurds charged into the crowded Armenian quarter and dragged off household items by the donkeyloads, among which were highly loaded oxcarts. Obviously, the buyers came from the all across the city. On 10 June the picture changed. The city was empty.'[41]

In Konya, the local authorities forbade the banks to disburse to their Armenian account holders the money they had deposited in the banks. Later, the deposits were confiscated by the government under the familiar excuse that the accounts also fell under the rubric 'abandoned property'.[42] The main object of plunder was a house, both for itself and for its furniture. In Merzifon the houses of Armenian deportees were occupied by Ottoman government officials. The furniture was often stolen to furnish private homes as well as government buildings. Inasmuch as the Abandoned Properties Commission could function properly, it stored unlooted furniture in the Armenian church. 'The more common things are thrown into an empty square and auctioned or sold for a song.'[43] So too was the process in Trabzon, where approximately 1,000 Armenian households were being emptied of furniture by the police, one by one. The operation was so large that procedures or systematic methods were often not adhered to. The American consul at Trabzon, Oscar Heizer, reported, 'The furniture, bedding and everything of value is being stored in large buildings about the city. There is no attempt at classification and the idea of keeping the property in "bales under the protection of the government to be returned to the owners on their return" is simply ridiculous. The goods are piled in without any attempt at labeling or systematic storage.'[44] The Ottoman author Ahmed Refik (Altınay) travelled through Anatolia during the genocide and witnessed the process in Eskişehir: 'Their valuable rugs and property was all in their houses. But the government was incapable of protecting even those. The abandoned houses were allegedly protected by the police. But at night the rugs and cattle, valuable possessions were all stolen.'[45]

Like private property, Armenian community property was confiscated too. The Interior Ministry ordered educational commodities to be assigned to Turks.

> It is necessary to appropriate the schools of the towns and villages that have been emptied of Armenians to Muslim immigrants to be settled there. However, the present value of the buildings, the amount and value of its educational materials needs to be registered and sent to the department of general recordkeeping.[46]

This national order was a warrant for the seizure of all Ottoman Armenian schools and their conversion into Ottoman Turkish schools. School benches, blackboards, book cabinets and even paper and pens were allocated to Turks. The Armenian priest Abraham Hartunian was living in Zeitun when this was ordered. Step by step

he witnessed the expropriation process until he was evicted from his own house at the end of 1915. In his memoirs Hartunian notes that the school in Zeitun (the same one that Ahmed Şerif had visited 6 years earlier) was confiscated by the government: 'The Armenians no longer had any right to education, and the campus was now filled with hundreds of Turkish children.'[47] Another example is the fate of Armenian libraries, an interesting and understudied theme. There is strong evidence that the CUP confiscated a large number of Armenian-language works. In October 1916 Talaat was informed that the library of the Armenian school in Sivas kept 'important volumes on the condition of the Ottoman Empire' in Armenian, French, German, English, Russian and Kurdish and ordered 'the immediate seizure of these books and their dispatch to Istanbul by post.'[48] Five months later, when the books still weren't sent, he repeated his order, requesting the books to be sent 'urgently'.[49] Whatever happened to these books is unknown.

We need to bear in mind that the deportation itself also was an expropriation process. Ambivalent rumours had spread that Armenians had buried their gold in their houses or gardens, or that Armenians had taken their movable wealth with them and that the deportation convoys were walking goldmines. Empty houses of Armenian deportees were often searched, ransacked and their gardens plowed through by Turkish neighbors. These forays yielded anything from kitchenware to bedding.[50] Those on the road were robbed to the last cent. Vahram Dadrian's wealthy family from the North Anatolian town of Çorum had set out relatively comfortably, with cash, jewelry, foodstuffs and an ox cart. By the time they had reached Syria, most of their belongings had either been stolen or used as necessary bribes.[51] The young boy Vahram from the small town of Kiğı was deported and described what happened when his convoy had only travelled a small distance: 'Before I could catch my breath, a hefty Kurd appeared before me. He ordered me to take off my clothes and shoes and hand them over to him. I had no choice but to comply. I sat there dazed and shaken, but grateful that my life had been spared.'[52] Robbery was carried out before or after murder, and in many cases, corpses were burnt to retrieve any swallowed gold pieces or diamonds.[53] The plunder was so thorough that even the victims' underwear was often taken. But often the abyss was even deeper; having no financial means left, many survivors ended up indebted to both hostile and friendly local Muslims or to their escorting gendarmes. When Çerkes Ahmed, a special operative who had murdered untold numbers of Armenians, was arrested, according to a state official, 'women's rings, bracelets, earrings and jewellry were found when his bags were opened . . . this vagabond (*serseri*) had not sacrified himself for any ideal, but it was clear they had committed murders to get rich.'[54] Fourth Army Chief of Staff Ali Fuat Erden too remembered that 'among the personal belongings of the paramilitaries bloodstained gold coins were found'.[55]

Scholars of the relationship between scarcity and violence have suggested that famine is largely a consequence of politics, not exclusively of nature.[56] In a society suffering from critically underdeveloped transportation and communication

networks, wartime circumstances can drive food prices beyond the reach of the most vulnerable segments of the population (e.g. the urban poor and landless peasants). These conditions of scarcity were structural factors exacerbating acquisitive competition in the country. An example is the famine in Syria and Lebanon. A combination of state terror, farmer resistance and Allied blockade led to the great famine that caused half a million deaths in 1915 and 1916.[57] In Anatolia too, the proverbial, largely mythical but partially real image of the poor but hospitable peasantry transformed into the dog-eat-dog world that Ottoman society became in World War I.

These conditions weighed disproportionately heavily on the uprooted Armenian population. The process of pauperization was so immediate and thorough that hunger became a defining characteristic of the genocide. Ottoman Armenians had been collectively placed in a geographic and social compartment where access to food was limited by circumstance and restricted by government. The regime had pushed the Armenians into a socioeconomic abyss, the bottom of which was reached in the absolute nothing of the Syrian desert. The most striking photographs of the genocide are those of impoverished deportees, nothing but skin and bones, begging for morsels. The regime's treatment of Armenians suggests the development of an ethnic distribution of food, a food pyramid with urban and rural Turks at the top receiving the 'best' treatment, most Ottoman citizens in the middle section surviving, and Armenians starving at the very bottom. But in order to substantiate this claim, more research is needed into the phenomenon of famine.[58]

How much property was seized in total? As we indicated in the preface, in this historical-sociological study we did not set ourselves the difficult task of precise quantification. It remains to be seen whether this is even possible at all. After all, the notebooks of the 33 Abandoned Properties Commissions are 'lost' and the state of the Ottoman Bank archives is unknown to us. Undoubtedly the spoliation was enormous. For example, Table 4.1, extracted from Talaat Pasha's notebooks, summarizes 'The number of empty buildings abandoned by Armenians' (*Ermenilerden metruk boş haneler mikdarı*):

Table 4.1 Buildings confiscated from Armenians.

Name of province and district	Number
Edirne	3133
Adana	699
Ankara	2540
Hüdavendigâr (Bursa)	14,856
Diyarbekir	1055
Sivas	3000

Continued

Table 4.1 *Continued.*

Name of province and district	Number
Mamuret-ul Aziz	3500
Konya	270
Urfa	250
İzmit	3589
Eskişehir	(missing)
Canik	614
Karesi	2870
Kayseri	3000
Karahisar-ı Sahib	341
Niğde	341
Maraş	1000
Menteşe	400
Total	**41,458**

Source: Bardakçı 2008, p. 91.

These buildings included private houses and community facilities. One can speculate about the numbers somewhat. For example, it is likely that the number is Urfa is the lowest because there, the Armenian quarter was bombed and razed after the resistance movement by the local Armenians. Why there is no figure for Eskişehir might be because of the rampant corruption in that city or due to misreporting by the local Abandoned Properties Commission. Finally, some numbers are very precise, while other figures are rounded. All in all, a thoroughly quantitative study of the expropriations is needed but depends on the availability of more data.

The emotive impact of the deportations and expropriations can hardly be expressed in terms of economic value. Elise Hagopian's memoirs capture the sentiments of the dispossessed in a gripping way:

> Most turned back for a last look at homes in which they had spent a lifetime rearing families, begetting children and grandchildren, cultivating gardens and farms . . . All was now being left behind: the cattle, fowl, precious rugs and silverware, mulberry trees, stores of food and drink . . . The uprooting was complete, the severing final. The destruction of life as we had known it – home, church, school, wealth, neighbours, vineyards laden with fruit, fields ripening for the fall harvest – was total.[59]

Besides replaceable property, the expropriations also robbed hundreds of thousands of Armenian individuals of highly personal items that had emotional value to them. People lost their ancestors' heirlooms, writers and artists lost their life's work, children lost their favourite toys, women lost their precious wedding rings. In other words, the expropriations not only had quantifiable objective consequences, but also inestimable subjective effects.

The Armenian church of Trabzon, used as an auction site during the war, in 1918.

From then on, Armenians would refer to the lost world of their old neighbourhoods, towns and villages as 'the old country'. Whether in Syria and Lebanon, in the West, or in the Armenian Republic, new businesses and quarters were named after the abandoned past with the prefix 'Nor' (New): Nor Tigranakert, Nor Adana, Nor Hadjin, Nor Marash, Nor Sis, Nor Tomarza. The old had passed.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

International responses to the expropriation moved from initial shock to subsequent protest to final resignation. A large number of Ottoman Armenians were tied to international firms, companies, governments and nongovernmental organizations. The severing of these ties, at once a precondition for and consequence of the genocide, triggered the international responses.

As the Ottoman Empire's prime ally, Germany had a direct view of the day-by-day expropriation process. The economic crisis generated by the genocide was first noticed by them. When the Ottoman Empire began suffering a serious shortage of manufactured goods, German diplomats warned of the impending economic catastrophe, for many of these goods were supplied by western companies to Ottoman

Armenian retailers. The German consul wrote that he had been receiving many complaints of suppliers and manufacturers who had not received payment for the delivery of their goods as a result of the deportation of their Armenian clients.[60] By the end of the year, the Germans' biggest problem was the rights of creditors, who were facing the prospects of losing all money they had lent to Armenians. The Deutsche Bank therefore offered the Ottoman government a set of adaptations and measures to compensate the creditors. The memorandum it sent to the German embassy read that 'these proposals interfere with the purpose of the law in no way', but instead, attempt to 'eliminate the threat of formal deprivation of the rights of creditors.' The bank also admitted that the recommendations were 'only in the interest of the self-preservation of the creditors of Armenians' (*lediglich im Interesse der Selbsterhaltung als Gläubiger von Armeniern*). The office of the Reich's chancellor concurred and in a circular strongly urged for the 'safeguarding of the threatened interests of the German business world' (*Wahrung der bedrohten Interessen der deutschen Handelswelt*).[61] In other words, whatever was happening to the Armenians was unfortunate but not a priority for the German state.

But the CUP simply rejected any compensation to anyone. In January 1916 Ambassador Wolff-Metternich wrote a bitter report to Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg recognizing the powerlessness of the German government: 'As the main reason for the rejection of the obligation to compensate, the Porte avails itself of the argument that the exercise of a right can not justify compensation.' Also, since the Russians had supposedly provoked Armenians into 'rebellion', the CUP fingered them as the main parties responsible for the losses. Wolff-Metternich rejected this argument and pointed out that the expropriation decree was a state law and therefore creditors were entitled to full compensation. He then listed a long series of atrocities committed by local authorities, even naming names, to prove the opposite.[62] In a later dispatch, the ambassador provided an estimate of Armenian debtors' outstanding balances. Table 4.2 shows the extent of this indebtedness.

These formidable sums suggest that the genocide and the expropriations severely damaged German interests. But the CUP not only rejected that compensation was

Table 4.2 Armenian debts to German institutions in 1916.

Institution	Debt (in German Mark)
Deutsche Bank	1,500,000
Orientbank	2,000,000
Deutsch-Levantinischen Baumwollgesellschaft	500,000
Anatolische Handelsgesellschaft	20,000
Individual companies	5,000,000

Source: *PAAA*, R14091.

due, but even the German government's right to appeal for it. Its response to Wolff-Metternich's protest was terse and dismissive: 'First of all, it is noteworthy that the measures taken against the Armenian population of the empire lie within the field of administrative acts inside the country, they can not therefore be the object of a diplomatic step.' Ultimately, Wolff-Metternich concluded that the only venue to settle the matter was possibly when the issue of German loans to the Ottoman Empire was discussed. He recommended a lump sum compensation.[63]

In the autumn of 1915 German humanitarians responded to the genocide by writing a joint petition to put pressure on the German government. The petition was signed by 49 professors, missionaries, reverends, priests, directors, superintendents and made its way up to the chancellor. It argued that 'commerce and craftsmanship in the interior, that had almost exclusively been in the hands of Armenians, has been destroyed'. The petition urged the government to prevent the forthcoming deportation of Armenians in regions that had not yet been fully evacuated.[64] The petitioners did not appeal to purely economic arguments nor did they act exclusively on humanitarian principles. Rather, they noted that the genocide was negatively affecting Germany's reputation abroad, that is, not only in the Allied press, but also in neutral countries. Intervention was necessary to prevent a blemish on Germany's political record.

Besides foreign institutional ties to Armenians, there were individual personal ties to them. Bagdadbahn engineer Heinrich Janson was stationed in Konya during the war. In August 1915 he requested from the German embassy assistance, as the government's measures had dispossessed his Armenian wife's family. Janson had married Alice Garabedian, daughter of the rich merchant Hagop Garabedian of Eskişehir, as an 'emergency wedding' (*Nottrauung*) to preclude the family's deportation. But the measure had failed to avert catastrophe and the family was deported after all. The embassy responded it was powerless and advised Janson to apply to the local Abandoned Properties Commission to register the family's property.[65] Self-interest, indifference and naiveté paved the way for victims such as the Garabedian family to walk straight into the trap.

American interests in the Ottoman Empire were related to diplomacy, business, charity, mission and education. Many of these institutions, such as the missionaries in Kharpert/Harput and Diyarbekir, were also dispossessed. For the Americans the direct impact of the expropriations was that consulates lost qualified staff, firms lost their investors and commissioners, banks lost their debtors and colleges lost their professors. Concretely, these included Robert College (now Bosphorus University), the American Girls' School and Bible House, all located in Istanbul. In the interior of the empire there were American missionary institutions as well as companies such as Standard Oil and Singer Sewing Machine Company. Thus, the damage to American interests too, was considerable.

An interesting example is the deportation of the Armenian representatives of the Singer Sewing Machine Company. Many Ottoman Armenians worked in the

textile industry, from the extraction of cotton, wool and silk to their processing into textiles. It comes as no surprise that most representatives of the company were Armenians. Upon the commencement of the deportations, American diplomats requested from the Ottoman government their exemption from deportation, to no avail. The American consul in Mersin, Edward Nathan, for example, appealed in vain for the representative of Singer to be spared. In September 1915 he reported to the American embassy that the authorities continued to disregard his requests for exceptions in favour of teachers and merchants of American institutions and firms. Therefore, he ultimately 'informed the heads of these institutions that it is useless to apply for some. The same applies to employees of American business corporations like the Singer Company.'[66] The CUP played into this inconvenience of Armenians with international ties and sent out orders to Abandoned Properties Commissions to obviate the problem. For example, the Interior Ministry wired the Kayseri commission on 16 September 1915:

> Owing to the transfer of the Armenians of Anatolia to other regions, Armenians who worked in Singer Sewing Machine stores, after locking their shops, have surrendered the keys to the police department. Since the stores having been necessarily deserted by the Armenians, their protection has been demanded by the American Embassy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, directs that you take necessary steps, in the manner of directives issued on similar occasions, protect them in a manner not to leave any ground for the aforementioned company to demand restitution.[67]

This order demonstrates that the expropriations carried a wide fallout, or put metaphorically, the tumour had to be excised quite generously. If the genocide damaged the Singer Sewing Machines Company too, it was regrettable but taken for granted.[68]

Austria–Hungary also had many economic interests in the Ottoman Empire. Ambassador Johann von Pallavicini (1848–1941) named the deportations a 'total eradication' (*gänzlichen Ausrottung*) and a 'policy of extermination' (*Politik der Exterminierung*).[69] The Habsburgs had not forgotten the prewar boycotts of their businesses and were keenly aware of their business interests. Pallavicini wrote on 30 August 1915 that the harsh measures had damaged Austro–Hungarian trade greatly, adding, 'The largest managing directors, like Sivrissarian, Inplikdjian, and Avedikian cover their needs for the most part in Austria–Hungary, and with their storage they currently vouch for many thousands of pounds of our industry.'[70] Nongovernmental organizations and individuals suffered from the genocide the most. Austro–Hungarian creditors saw the need to lobby the Habsburg Chamber of Commerce, which in turn pressured their government to raise the issue with the Ottoman government. The embassy had studied the law and its enactment thoroughly and concluded that it was causing extraordinary damage to Habsburg economic interests. Armenians indebted to Austro–Hungarian creditors had been

unable to pay off their loans; there were no calculations and procedures in place to reimburse Austro–Hungarians who had incurred losses, nor any stipulations regarding persons with property in different locations. The Habsburg memorandum was a comprehensive legal critique of the confiscation law as well as a veiled protest against the CUP's policies.[71]

In principle it was in the interests of the Great Powers to perpetuate their business ties to Armenians. However, the genocide was a force not to be underestimated. Habsburg and German officials realized this first and ultimately decided that once it was a reality, then at least their own interests should not be damaged. One should bear in mind the importance of the development of the war and the Triple Entente alliance. As one bloody battle after the other failed miserably on the Western front, and Austria–Hungary became more and more dependent on its Germany ally, upsetting the Ottoman Empire too much could have risked it to sue for a separate peace. After the war the United States, France and Britain too forgot about their Armenian business partners and rushed to the resurrected Young Turk regime for economic rights and benefits. The position of these states was generally one of self-interest: they merely sought compensation for the financial losses caused by the Young Turk government's criminal policies. Their foreign ministries attempted to hold the Ottoman government liable for the financial damages to their citizens' companies. That this self-interest was incidentally beneficial to ordinary Armenians was a historical coincidence, not an intended objective.

COLONIZATION: PRIVATE VERSUS STATE OWNERSHIP

The confiscation of Armenian property was followed and supplemented by the colonization by Ottoman Muslims of the empty spaces they left behind. As Armenians trudged along the deportation routes southward, their property was being redistributed by the Ministry of Interior. Analytically, we can distinguish two dimensions to this process: property that ended up in private hands and property that stayed in possession of the state. We will first discuss private ownership and then turn to state control.

The CUP's new year's resolution for 1916 was 'Turkification'. It expanded its existing campaign to practically all sectors in Ottoman society. Starting with geography, the CUP began Turkifying place names. On 5 January 1916 Enver Paşa ordered the Turkification of all Armenian, Greek and Bulgarian place names, including cities, towns, provinces, districts, villages, mountains and rivers.[72] This was an attempt to wipe out the geographical imprints of non-Turkish cultures. Although the decree was suspended for reasons of military practicability, the practice was picked up after the war and continued well into the 1980s and changed tens of thousands of Armenian place names.[73] The 2,900 Armenian settlements

were now not only emptied of their population, but also stripped of their names. It was as if Armenians had never lived there. A day after Enver's decree, on 6 January 1916, Talaat issued an empire-wide decree about the businesses confiscated in the genocide. The order read:

> The movable property left by the Armenians should be conserved for long-term preservation, and for the sake of an increase of Muslim businesses in our country, companies need to be established strictly made up of Muslims. Movable property should be given to them under suitable conditions that will guarantee the business' steady consolidation. The founder, the management and the representatives should be chosen from honourable leaders and the elite, and to allow tradesmen and agriculturists to participate in its dividends, the vouchers need to be half a lira or one lira and registered to their names to preclude that the capital falls in foreign hands. The growth of entrepreneurship in the minds of Muslim people needs to be monitored, and this endeavour and the results of its implementation needs to be reported to the Ministry step by step.[74]

This order constitutes perhaps the most unequivocal document attesting to the intentions and policies of the Committee of Union and Progress. It encapsulates the ideology of 'Turkification' and 'National Economy' in a single, explicit, incontrovertible formulation.

The order was followed up by several other prescriptive ones ordering the redistribution of Armenian lands to Muslim merchants. The CUP sanctioned 'the complete transfer of business and industrial enterprises' to the upcoming Turkish middle class in each and every locality. Special care was to be taken that the workbenches, implements and furniture in the many stores and workshops were not dispersed but stayed in their places.[75] Other decrees were concerned with norms and rules for correct usage. For example, auctioning needed to be properly carried out for the long-term development of the businesses, according to the 6 January decree. During an auction in Kayseri, a Turk bought a formerly Armenian workshop for 200 Turkish lira, only to sell it for 2000 lira 2 days later and pocket the difference. The Ministry strongly condemned this act and instructed the Abandoned Properties Commission to rectify the situation.[76] After this event, a circular was wired to all provinces prohibiting similar practices and underlining again the importance of 'Muslims' familiarization with commercial life and the 'buildup of Muslim-owned business enterprises in our country'.[77] Long-term goals had absolute priority above short-term benefits. Dilapidation, waste and negligence were unacceptable too. The Ministry admonished the Abandoned Properties Commissions to take proper care and assist the new Muslim owners as much as possible. If any help was needed, the commissions should turn to the ministry.[78] As a result of this policy, a whole generation of Turkish-owned firms, 'established in 1916', mushroomed across the empire.[79]

Before the Young Turks seized power in the 1913 coup d'état, hatred of Armenians (and Greeks) was particularly widespread in the commercial middle class. Curtailing the economic livelihood of Armenians was in their interests. 'Turkification', therefore, had particularly favourable economic consequences for these (lower) middle-class Turks, as the liquidation of Armenian middle-class enterprises relieved the pressure of economic competition. It foresaw the promotion of a new generation of Turkish businessmen who enriched themselves from the vulnerability of the persecuted Armenians. The newspaper *İkdam* published an article openly exhorting Turks to 'get rich' in the 'economic revolution':

> Pharmaceutics, grocery shops, dentistry, transportation, contracting is rapidly spreading among Turks. Our friends have begun competing with many nations in employment branches that are as yet new fields of activity in our country, like electricians' work, engineering and similar . . . It is the revolution in this nation's society and economy, rather than the political changes, that will save this nation (*bu milleti kurtaracak*) and will provide him with an eternal life.[80]

The government offered ordinary Turks incredible prospects of upward social mobility. With a giant leap forward, a nation of peasants, pastoralists, soldiers and bureaucrats would now jumpstart to the level of the bourgeoisie, the 'respectable' and 'modern' middle classes. The groups who benefited most from this policy were the landowners and the urban merchants.[81] When shortages arose in 1916 the party leadership allowed that group of merchants close to the party to monopolize importation, supply and distribution. Defraudation and malpractice occurred in this alliance by individual party members and merchants who enriched themselves at the expense of the Istanbulites.

If the nascent bourgeoisie were colonization's first recipients of private ownership of Armenian property, the Muslim settlers were its second. After the loss of the Balkan wars, hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees poured into the rump Ottoman Empire.[82] Istanbul was bursting with them and the state was hopelessly overstretched in its attempt to cover the refugees' needs. The Ottoman government had to allocate an enormous array of resources to transport, house, feed, educate, equip, employ and clothe the refugees. Philanthropic associations such as the 'Association for Muslim Refugees from the Balkans' provided relief for the refugee community, which almost exclusively consisted of Muslims. Empty houses were requisitioned for the refugees, a part of whom slept in Istanbul's depots and train stations. The government saw no other choice than to temporarily transform mosques into shelters. In Istanbul more than 90 mosques were initially furnished as sanctuaries, including the Nuru Osmaniye Mosque, the Edirnekapı mosque, the Murad Pasha mosque, the Sultan Selim mosque.[83] Prominent mosques such as the Aya Sofia and the Sultan Ahmed (the Blue Mosque) were not spared, either.

Additionally, thousands of people were sheltered in makeshift huts on the outskirts of Istanbul.[84] The misery these people lived in was a harsh blow to national pride and stood in sharp contrast with living conditions of Istanbul's Christian bourgeoisie. The Russian occupation of Erzurum, Trabzon, Van and Bitlis in its turn generated tens of thousands more refugees. Together, the Balkan and eastern refugees were known as 'refugee' (*mülteci*) and 'immigrant' (*muhacir*). We shall refer to them as settlers, since they were used by the CUP as settlers for the empty Armenian spaces.

The Ottoman state agency responsible for deportation and settlement was the 'Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants' (*İskân-ı Aşâir ve Muhacirîn Müdüriyeti*, İAMM), later renamed to 'General Directorate for Tribes and Immigrants' (*Aşâir ve Muhacirîn Müdüriyet-i Umûmiyesi*, AMMU). This bureaucratic apparatus was established in early 1914 and served two purposes: on the one hand, to advance the sedentarization of the many Turkoman, Kurdish and Arab tribes and on the other hand, to provide accommodation for homeless Muslim refugees expelled from the Balkans and the Caucasus.[85] It would later be expanded to constitute four branches, namely, Settlement, Intelligence, Transportation and Tribes.[86] The most prolific name in the İAMM was Şükrü Kaya, the 'Director of Deportation' (*Sevkiyat Müdürü*), who presided over the implementation of the deportations. The rationale of the organization was articulated by one if its leaders as 'to settle the refugees in various parts of the country, to give them land and to find them work to make producers out of them'.[87]

The principles of this policy were laid out in the 1917 'Guidelines for the Distribution of Property and Land to Refugees'. One of its standing rules was the encouragement of equity between Turks. Young Turk population policy had not only established a new ethnic hierarchy which favoured Turks over Kurds and Kurds over Armenians, but it also promoted more equality between Turks. The colonization process offered an opportunity structure in which this struggle could be expressed. On October 1916 the Interior Ministry made this explicit in a central decree: 'It is absolutely unacceptable that houses are given to the notables and the elites while there are so many refugees and immigrants out there needy of protection, so these kinds of houses need to be immediately evacuated and allocated to the refugees and immigrants, without taking into consideration the intervention and opposition of any party.'[88] The decree was made public and moulded into one of the CUP's typical 'temporary laws', which stipulated precise numbers to be allocated to the refugees. Rich refugees such as Macedonian landholders were not entitled to compensations from Armenian property.[89] Instead, the poorest refugees were allocated all kinds of movable property from the central depots where confiscated Armenian property had been stored.[90]

As the genocide was raging in full force, the Muslim settlers were on their way. Local preparations were needed in order to lodge the settlers successfully. The

Ministry iterated its request for economic and geographic data on the emptied Armenian villages. In order to send settlers to the provinces, the local capacities to 'absorb' them had to be determined. The Interior Ministry requested information on the numbers of Armenian households deported, whether the emptied villages were conducive to colonization by settlers and if so, how many.[91] It also demanded data on the size of the land, number of farms and potential number of settler households.[92] The books were kept precisely. According to Talaat Pasha's own notebook, in 1915 the amount of property allocated to settlers was 20,545 buildings, 267,536 acres of land, 76,942 acres of vineyards, 7,812 acres of gardens, 703,491 acres of olive groves, 4,573 acres of mulberry gardens, 97 acres of orange fields, 5 carts, 4,390 animals, 2,912 agricultural implements, 524,788 planting seeds.[93]

Last but not least, the CUP elite took the cream of the crop of Armenian property for itself. Ahmed Refik observed the colonization process:

> Silence reigns in Eskişehir . . . The elegant Armenian houses around the train station are bare as bone. This community, with its wealth, its trade, its superior values, became subject to the government's order, emptied its houses . . . now all emptied houses, valuable rugs, stylish rooms, it closed doors, are basically at the grace of the refugees. Eskişehir's most modernized and pretty houses lay around the train station . . . A large Armenian mansion for the princes, two canary-yellow adjacent houses near the Sarısu bridge to Talaat Bey and his friend Canbolat Bey, a wonderful Armenian mansion in the Armenian neighbourhood to Topal İsmail Hakkı. All the houses convenient for residing near the train station have all been allocated to the elite of the Ittihadists.[94]

Even Sultan Mehmed Reşad V had received his share. We shall see later that this process of assigning the very best property to Young Turks was intensified after 1919 by the Kemalists.

Possibly the most important recipient of the redistribution of Armenian properties was the state itself. We can analytically divide this process into civil versus military institutions that benefited from Armenian property. The properties were converted into prisons, police stations, meeting halls, schools and hospitals; they were also generously assigned to the army.

As the expropriation process proceeded, the Interior Ministry issued a general decree to convert to prisons any large buildings 'abandoned' by Armenians. In May 1916 it wired a circular ordering research to be conducted on the state of Armenian buildings suitable to be converted to prisons and whether renovations were necessary on them.[95] Research was done in the provinces and the Abandoned Properties Commissions reported back to Istanbul. In Anteb the Armenian church was converted to a prison that was in effect until the 1970s. In Maraş the Armenian

and Catholic churches were converted to prisons with the capacity to hold up to sixty persons. Every province reported the number of buildings convenient for conversion into prisons; the numbers ran from two to eleven in different provinces and districts.[96] The Directorate of Prisons screened these provincial reports and assigned funds to facilitate the conversion of the churches into prisons.[97] Another division of the Interior Ministry that received property was the police, as Armenian property was converted into police stations. An order similar to the above relating to prisons was wired to that effect. Only stone buildings were allowed to be made into police stations, not timber ones.[98] Buildings suitable for conversion into police stations were ordered emptied. İzmit is a case in point: at least three large Armenian community buildings were turned into police stations.[99]

Education was a crucial aspect of the CUP's Turkish nationalism. The confiscation of Armenian schools then offered a unique opportunity to the Ministry of Education to appropriate these structures for Turkish pupils and students. The 8 November 1915 instructions contained a clause that Armenian educational infrastructure be placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Later, precise orders were given to various provinces to assess the regional educational infrastructure and analyze whether it would be suitable to provide for Turkish students. Importantly, the Interior Ministry also notified that the Ministry of Education would have prioritized access to that property and that no other directorate or ministry was entitled to Armenian educational buildings.[100]

For example, in Kayseri the Interior Ministry ordered that 'of the properties abandoned by deported Armenians, the school buildings and articles . . . must be delivered to the Education Department for the benefit of Muslim children. We have been informed in writing that in certain localities the commission surrenders neither school nor articles. The Ministry of Education requests that you do what is necessary concerning this matter. As in our previous message, we advise again and again the surrender of the buildings and articles to the Ministry of Education.'[101] If reassignment was needed for an optimal match between supply and demand, that was carried out as well. In Ankara province the government office was relocated to the secondary school and the latter was reshuffled to the empty Armenian school.[102] Armenian schools were also allocated to Balkan refugees, whose children otherwise risked the prospect of falling behind in their education. The Interior Ministry ordered preferential treatment to be granted to these refugees in the allocation of Armenian educational infrastructure.[103]

All in all, the various Ministries (Education, Health, Justice) greatly benefited from the colonization process. The Interior Ministry granted them permission to choose from Armenian property buildings it wanted to use as their offices. The state, led by the CUP, was lavished with property up to the highest levels. A famous example of confiscated Armenian property is the story of the Kasabian vineyard

house in Ankara. In December 1921, amidst the Greco–Turkish war, Mustafa Kemal was touring the area when he noticed the splendid house of the wealthy Ankara jeweller and merchant, Kasabian. The house had been occupied by the noted Bulgurluzâde family after the Kasabians had been dispossessed and deported. Mustafa Kemal liked the house and bought it from Bulgurluzâde Tevfik Efendi for 4,500 Turkish lira. From then on, the compound has been known as the Çankaya Palace (*Çankaya Köşkü*), the official residence of the President of Turkey.[104]

The above discussion revolved around civil authorities as recipients of Armenian property. The military wing of the Ottoman government was also generously bestowed with all kinds of movable and immovable property. The difference was that the army did not vie for Armenian property on the same level as the other ministries. It had priority because of the immediacy of the war, but even then the property did not fall into its lap.

Quite early in the confiscation process a general decree was sent through the provinces: 'Property that the Armenians will be unable to take with them that is in particular necessary from a military perspective, such as shoes, headscarves, cow leather, sandals, sheep leather and similar goods . . . need to be sent to Istanbul on account of General Supplies after being collected in a comprehensive way with special lists.'[105] In reality, the list of military necessities was more extensive and included bedware, kitchenware, and construction tools – for example, shovels to dig trenches at the front.

In some cases entire factories were assigned to the army to exploit. In Manisa, the brothers Mardiros and Vartkes Sarian operated a textile factory when the deportations put an end to their professional lives. As a result of their deportation, the factory languished and its productivity sank to zero. The Interior Ministry ordered Muslim investors to resuscitate the factory so it could produce goods useful to the war effort.[106] Governor of İzmir, Rahmi Bey, and his 'accomplices' (*avene*) Ali Fikri Bey, Zeki Bey and Ahmed Bey plundered the factory and enjoyed the financial benefits it brought them. The perpetrators kept the factory for 4 years, caused an estimated damage of 1,400,000 Turkish lira, and in November 1918 fled to Egypt to evade prosecution.[107]

Considerable cooperation was needed between the War Ministry and the Interior Ministry for this operation to run smoothly. In Kütahya, the Interior Ministry inventoried Armenian properties and offered textiles, foodstuffs and similar goods at low prices to the War Ministry. The objective was to deal with the army's shortages and provide for them first and foremost.[108] Similar orders were issued for the Thracian region. The ministry ordered a rough model for distribution: shops and stores would be given to settlers and the Muslim bourgeoisie; all other property would go to the army.[109] The Interior Ministry needed to cope with hungry soldiers and thus ordered all kinds of cereals and grains left by Armenians to be assigned to the army.[110] The Ministry of War, in short, was not forgotten during the transfer of wealth.

COSTS, CONTESTATION AND CORRUPTION

There are three important themes to the confiscation and colonization process that in fact deserve their own separate study. In this section we will discuss them briefly: the costs of the deportation process, contention and competition over sought-after properties and corruption during the redistribution process.

First of all, how much did the deportations cost? This is a question impossible to answer without a thorough quantitative study of the extant materials. There are some indications of parts of the process and from them we might get a glimpse into the overall economy of the genocide. In September 1915 the government spent 1.7 million cents for the Armenian deportees of the provinces of Konya, Adana, Aleppo, İzmit, Ankara and Eskişehir. In March 1917 deportation expenditures for the whole country amounted to 6.640 million cents. These sums suggest that the genocide was not cheap and the government spent considerable sums on the deportations that it could have used in the war effort.[111]

The allocation of funds for the deportation and the deportees was organized from the Interior Ministry. At the outset of the deportation process, its responsible parties in the provinces were ordered to meet the needs of the deportees and request assistance if need be. Throughout the deportation process, the ministry directly asked the provinces how much money was needed for the organization of the process. In its turn, provincial authorities would approach the ministry and request more funds or other resources, in which case clear-cut directives were sent. Most of these directives have been preserved and they offer an important window into the process.

There is evidence that in the early phase of the deportations, Armenians were financially responsible for their own survival. In some regions this became policy; for example, Konya province was ordered that during the deportations from Zeytun district, the local Armenians were not entitled to any government support. They would have to pay for all transportation and sustenance themselves.[112] This might have resulted from recommendations from below. For example, upon the suggestion of the upcoming Young Turk official Şükrü Kaya, Armenians were collectively to finance their own 'transportation'. In October 1915 Talaat responded to Kaya's proposal that 'your measure that Armenians can defray their own transportation costs is appropriate'.[113] This policy was changed, probably some time after the general orders of May or as a result of conclusions drawn from the feedback received from the provinces in the summer. After all, Armenians were becoming poorer and poorer during the deportation and could no longer sustain themselves. From then on the state indeed began paying for the deportation, but it was still mostly financed through confiscated Armenian property.

As some regions were underfunded, reassignments of sorts had to be organized. This was necessary because the number of Armenians to be deported (and sustained), as well as the value of confiscated Armenian wealth, varied from region

to region. With the influx of tens of thousands of wretched Armenian deportees, Aleppo soon became a problem region. To mitigate the problem, Talaat used his commanding oversight to redistribute funding from provinces where the genocide had been profitable. The plunder in Eskişehir, for example, had yielded so much that it could easily sustain the deportations in other provinces. On 8 November 1915 the Ministry organized such a financial synchronization with regard to Eskişehir and Aleppo. It ordered the Eskişehir Abandoned Properties Commission to make 'an immediate wire transfer payment by bank of 200,000 cents from the revenue of Armenian property to the Aleppo Department of Revenues'.[114] It then ordered the Aleppo Abandoned Properties Commission to apportion 600,000 cents of the total 645,810 cents, gained from the sale of animals confiscated from Armenians, for the sustenance and transportation of the local deportees.[115] A final telegram to the governor of Aleppo ordered him to oversee the process: the governor was instructed to spend the aforementioned 600,000 cents exclusively on the Armenian deportees and he was informed of the 200,000 cents that was on its way from Eskişehir for the same purpose. If the funds turned out to be insufficient, the province was entitled to more funding.[116] Ultimately, deportation director Şükrü Kaya was notified of the manoeuvre. He was the bureaucratic middleman responsible for the executive management of the deportation.[117] Other regions had to contribute to the 'collective good' as well; on 17 November 1915 the Ministry ordered 8000 lira from Bursa to be allocated to Aleppo to be spent only for the sustenance and settlement of Armenians. Again, the process developed in the same contact system: the governor was ordered and Kaya was informed.[118] This practice was necessary for an orderly development of the deportations, but fostered competition between provinces.

The redistribution of Armenian property or even the very dispossession itself became a bone of contention and a source of conflict during the process. Institutions and individuals competed to keep confiscated Armenian property for themselves and their constituency. In other words, competition within the perpetrator group existed at the institutional level as well as the individual level.

Institutional competition was the contestation between centre and periphery, as well as at the meso level within state institutions. Ministries, governorates, district governorates, cities, all had their eyes on the best property for themselves. An example of this form of competition was the clashes between the army and the Interior Ministry over Armenian land. In November 1916 the nationalist organization National Defense Society (*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*) proposed that the considerable stock of products at a textile factory in Bursa should be sent to the army. But the Interior Ministry objected on the grounds that the textiles should be distributed among the needy Balkan refugees in that province.[119] Disagreements such as these were common. After the war, the army requested a 500-meter-long strip of land, 'abandoned by Armenians' (*Ermenilerden metruk*), assigned to it for

use as a military airfield. According to the Ministry of National Defence, the plot, 1.5 kilometres east of Giresun and 500 metres from the sea, was a strategically useful point in case of a future mobilization in the east. But the Finance Ministry rejected the request for legal reasons. The land was already in use for other purposes.[120]

Individual disputes were ubiquitous, possibly more widespread than institutional contestation. The regime had successfully eliminated the Armenians from the business world through ordinances which attempted to lend the process an appearance of legality. At its climax, the policy of 'Turkification' of Armenian property created a huge opportunity structure with irresistible incentives for plunder for ordinary people. Through its (wrongly assumed) initial appearance of impunity, it set off a race for personal enrichment which affected the behaviour of both beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries of Armenian property. The orgy of plunder can perhaps be compared to the modern shopping frenzies when hundreds of people stream into department stores as they open for free shopping or extreme discounts in order to snatch up bargains. This was a reversal of how you were supposed to behave, as a neighbour, a friend or a business associate. It was a collective transgression of existing cultural norms of modesty and altruism. The logic was simple: anyone not joining in the craze was missing out on a golden opportunity.

The local Young Turk party activists openly instigated and agitated for plunder. In Ankara they reportedly distributed a pamphlet that described the alleged riches of Armenians:

> Their houses are luxuriously furnished, and during the summer, every urban family is in beautiful country houses with every comfort, while the women dressed in silk and adorned in jewels enjoy all the refined pleasures, their husbands down the morning in town, by car or mounted on horses, and at night they return home, in the freshness of the twilight, their purse full of gold and a joyful heart, while you, poor peasants are condemned because of them, to a life of misery. You live in cottages, feeding on vegetables and black bread, dressed in rags, and while they have the luxury of visits to concerts with their glistening umbrellas, you and your women, are miserable slaves of the infidels.

The pamphlet then proceeded to champion getting rid of the Armenians 'once and for all', promising anyone who joined the CUP effort a share of Armenian property.[121] Such an inflammatory text could only be aimed at mobilizing Turkish sentiments and securing their participation in the genocide. The genocide was a form of acute social mobility, or what scholars of genocide have come to term 'immediate ennoblement'.[122]

The evidence of popular participation is overwhelming. In Konya, Turkish women 'began to find great bargains and swarmed all about, getting the property of the

Armenians at a tenth of its value, compelling them to sell, and finally it degenerated into robbing right and left. This all took place under the guard of the police.'[123] Another eyewitness reported that 'great piles of baggage heaped up at the station, at least five or six hundred pieces, that had been abandoned, and was told that probably there had been three thousand in all; most of this property had been confiscated as *metrouk* (abandoned) and had been partitioned among the officials or sold, while a good deal had been stolen by the Turks in the town.'[124] In Trabzon the scenario was virtually identical: 'A crowd of Turkish women and children follow the police about like a lot of vultures and seize anything they can lay their hands on and when the more valuable things are carried out of a house by the police, they rush in and take the balance.'[125]

The situation was even worse in the villages, where the bureaucratic arm of the cities did not reach. An Armenian account from the village of Govdun in Sivas province also employs the metaphor of vultures: 'The Turkish mobs, like hungry ravenous vultures, descended on the Armenian villages, grabbing and loading their carts and animals with everything that was left behind – animals, furniture, utensils, clothing, carpets, farm implements, tools and even the beams of the houses.'[126] In Merzifon, 'real estate was put up for rent at auction and was most of it bid in at prices ridiculously low by persons who were on the inside.' The American missionary who reported this had heard it from a Turkish attorney who had done so himself, adding, 'Turks moved out of their more squalid habitations into the better Armenian houses whose owners had been "deported".'[127] In Bitlis, the very rumour that deportations would be launched in 3 days triggered collective action by the Muslim population. According to a German eyewitness, 'without even waiting for the end of this period, the Turks after two hours began to invade and plunder the Armenian houses.'[128] The American diplomat Lewis Einstein was stationed in Istanbul and later remembered that 'fresh consignments of rugs, which were really Armenian loot, reached the bazaars at Constantinople where the more decent merchants regarded such articles with disgust.'[129] Others perceived their new-found fortune with the Turkish proverb, 'Eat the grape, don't ask about its vineyard' (*Üzümü ye, bağını sorma*).

The participation of women (and children) raises questions about the truly national dimensions of the genocide: not only did the process draw participation from different classes, but it also bridged the gender gap. Women were making themselves useful in the 'national cause'. But with so much property up for grabs, conflicts and fights were just a matter of time. Baruir Nercessian was a young boy when he was deported from Shabin Karahisar. He was sold to a Turkish villager from Kuruçay, renamed Ömer, and made to do household chores. He had been in the village for some time when one day a group of armed, mounted Kurds rode into the town. The horsemen stopped in the middle of the village and yelled to the Turkish villagers that they were entitled to some of the Armenian property the

villagers had stolen. After a few threats, they rode off.[130] Examples such as these abound in the memoir literature and the official correspondence.

The third and final theme is corruption, which was rampant during the confiscation process. All over the Ottoman Empire, local elites in small towns distant from Istanbul saw opportunities to conspire among themselves to embezzle goods. What were the causes of the various forms of corruption? Apart from self-interest, there seemed to be two processes at hand. According to an American missionary who spoke to the members of the local Abandoned Properties Commission, the staff was underfunded: 'The work was in charge of a commission, the members of which I met personally a number of times. It was commonly said that the commission did not actually receive enough for the government purposes to cover its expenses.'[131] A perceived shortage of income may have generated the misappropriation of funds and goods.

Another triggering mechanism may have been the dynamic of the expropriation process itself, which engendered its own relative autonomy. The government's sweeping announcement that all Armenian property needed to be confiscated caused a sensation and created a fervour among officials. Interior Ministry officials began categorically confiscating all kinds of property of people outside the target group, including undeported Armenians, non-Armenians and even non-Ottomans. They were, to use Stalin's term, 'dizzy with success'. Officials became intoxicated by the incredible fiats and the perceived impunity, and threw all reasonable sense of proportion overboard in favour of frontal and unplanned, arbitrary attacks on Armenian property. On many occasions the Interior Ministry had to warn these officials to curb their fanaticism.[132] Several decrees were sent out to provinces admonishing them to follow procedures and not treat the process as a free-for-all plundering party.[133] (Incidentally, in Edirne the local officials, after allowing the local Armenians 30 minutes to assemble for deportation, had indeed organized parties in their empty houses, taking whatever they pleased.)[134]

In some cases Armenians were forced to sell their property, but the compensation they received for it was negligible. In Bursa, the local Young Turk committee cheated Armenians out of their property in a direct way. Armenians were taken to the office of the land registry and coerced to sign a document that stated they had sold their property voluntarily and that the compensation had been equitable. The buyers would then deliver the money to the Armenian owner, but when the latter walked out of the room, a guard would take the money back from him and hand it to the committee again, to be used in a new round of fraud.[135] A similar racket was going on in the neighbouring province of Eskişehir.[136] In the town of Mihaliç, the mayor had convened the city council during the night and an agreement was reached on forcing Armenians to undergo this form of extortion.[137] When these practices leaked out and reached the highest echelons in Istanbul, the Interior Ministry launched investigations. It inquired whether it was true that the merchants

Karamanian and Hagopian had received the above treatment and requested a list of the committee members who were involved.[138]

During the confiscation process, the German official Hugo Meyer reported that 'a large number of people here have earned an enormous amount of money as a result of the efforts to create a Turkish national trade and probably also as a result of the doubtlessly existing corruption among certain circles.'[139] He undoubtedly suggested that the corruption festered not only at the treetop but at the very roots as well. İsmail Canbolat (1880–1926), the right hand man of Talaat, was in charge of the Public Security Office (*Emniyet-i Umumiye Müdüriyeti*) from April 1914 on, the Prefect of the Ottoman Capital until April 1916, and later in 1917 when Talaat unconstitutionally worked his way up to the Grand Vizierdom, Canbolat became Interior Minister. Under his rule, corruption was so endemic that under pressure, he was forced to resign in July 1918.

But Canbolat was not alone. The editor of *Zhamanag* newspaper, Yervant Odian (1869–1926), during his long deportation process to Der Zor, identified many cases of embezzlement of Armenian property. Odian witnessed several cases of extortion of Armenian deportees by Mustafa Sıdkı Bey, police commander of Der Zor. Mustafa Sıdkı would blackmail Armenians, saying that he would have them killed in the desert unless they handed over cash or jewelry. In Sultaniye (new name: Karapınar) he met a certain Edirneli Ali Efendi, a relative of Talaat who had amassed a considerable fortune due to his position as financial director of the town.[140] In January 1919 the opposition newspaper *Alemdar* ran a series of articles on the problem of embezzlement. It fingered many CUP members as peculators: Erzurum's CUP delegate Hilmi Bey and his friend Cafer Bey had laid their hands on four Armenian trading houses in Istanbul worth 500 Turkish liras and were running the businesses with full impunity. The articles mentioned many gendarmerie commanders, police captains and mayors who had not only enjoyed impunity, but were even promoted to comfortable places.[141]

The memoirs of the Armenian pastor Ephraim Jernazian open a most informative and compelling window on the rampant corruption. According to Jernazian, a liquidation commission for Urfa arrived from Istanbul in November 1915 and called on him to translate into Turkish the Armenian-language account books of the merchants. The commission, headed by a Nebi Bey, settled in a government building and 'furnished the rooms with valuable rugs and furniture taken from Armenian homes'. It then launched the procedure of announcing to the townspeople that anyone to whom payment was due by an Armenian needed to present their petitions directly to the commission. Jernazian claims that more than 2,000 bills were presented, most of them false, but added that he was sure not a single creditor had been indemnified. The commission then commenced the huge task of auctioning the content of Armenian stores. Chairman Nebi Bey took two policemen, an auctioneer and Jernazian and went from shop to shop to break its seal, examine any merchandise that had not been stolen yet, very roughly assess its worth

and keep account records. Jernazian then found out that Nebi Bey would take the books home, juggle the accounts and pocket the difference. Jernazian ascertained that Urfa's Abandoned Properties Commission also cleaned out Armenian bank accounts at the local branch of the Ottoman Bank. The approximately 140,000 gold pieces were seized and replaced with paper money that became more and more worthless.[142]

What did the Interior Ministry and especially Interior Minister Talaat Pasha do about this pandemic corruption? There is evidence of countermeasures as well as of impunity. On 3 August 1915 the Interior Ministry prohibited all state officials, including civil servants and military staff, from purchasing Armenian property. The officials had participated in the bidding during the open auctions by saving their incomes or taking loans.[143] An example was Bursa's police captain Mahmud Celaleddin Efendi, who had bought considerable Armenian property, including houses and furniture, all adding up to 10,000 cents. When the governor summarily dismissed him from his position for the offence, Mahmud Celaleddin went over the governor's head and secured his reassignment to his old post. The Interior Ministry intervened and ordered the police captain hired again because his conduct was not serious enough to merit dismissal.[144] The signal was suggestive: theft of Armenian property was a venial sin, not a mortal one.

Those officials who were committing mortal sins were dealt with through the 'Investigative Commissions' (*Tahkikat Komisyonları*) established by Talaat in September 1915. According to him there were three commissions whose jurisdiction was limited to investigating charges of corruption. The first commission covered the provinces of Ankara, Bursa, Eskişehir, İzmit, Karahisar-ı Sahib, Karesi, Kayseri and Niğde and was led by the President of the Appeals Court, Hulusi Bey. The second commission, chaired by Appeals Court first clerk Asım Bey, covered the south: Adana, Aleppo, Maraş, Urfa and Der Zor. The third commission was supervised by former governor of Bitlis, Mazhar Bey, and dealt with Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Sivas, Trabzon, Mamuret-ul Aziz, Bitlis and Canik. In his order, Talaat made the objective clear: 'To deliver to the court martial after necessary investigations . . . those officials and gendarmes who conducted themselves contrary to the laws and whose misappropriation (*su-i istimalât*) has been noticed during the dispatch of Armenians.'[145]

The general order was followed by several precise ones in which Talaat closely micromanaged the process. He ordered the officials in Bursa to put an end to civil servants' purchases of Armenian property, declare null their contracts and redistribute to refugees and the upstart Turkish bourgeoisie. The property, especially houses, were reconfiscated and dealt with accordingly.[146] The investigations in that province yielded compromising results: a certain Albanian Numan Agha had appropriated a flock of sheep, worth 5,000 Turkish lira, by applying threats and terror to the original owner, an Armenian peasant named Haji Hagop. Investigations were carried out and the sheep were again taken by the government.[147] The

ministry also attempted to prevent monopolies to accumulate in the hands of certain men. In November 1915 it wired all provinces a circular prohibiting rich monopolists from buying up too much Armenian property at low prices and reselling them at higher prices. This was not equitable and therefore not acceptable.[148]

There is sporadic evidence that the investigative commissions were a weak form of control and did not produce compelling results. An instructive example is the case of the infamous district governor of Boğazlıyan, a town between Yozgat and Kayseri. Mehmed Kemal Bey was district governor of this town from 15 May 1915 to 23 April 1916 and was responsible for organizing the massacres in that region. Kemal Bey was known for his cruelty and was one of the very few district governors who personally participated in the mass killing in that region.[149] He also engaged in large-scale plunder and embezzlement of the victims' property. Together with the Abandoned Properties Commission men, Lütfü Efendi, Haydar Bey, commander of Yozgat's gendarmerie battalion Major Mehmed Tevfik and several mayors, they were arrested and put on trial on 22 March 1917. Having studied the paperwork, the investigative commission concluded that Kemal Bey had turned a blind eye to embezzlement and self-enrichment by government officials. Moreover, he allowed the Turkish population to engage in plunder in exchange for kickbacks. The investigative commission found him guilty and on 7 October 1917 Kemal Bey was convicted of 'misappropriation' (*su-i istimalât*), sentenced to 3 years and 4 months of imprisonment and stripped of his position. He appealed and because of a shortage of meso-level government officials, he was acquitted on 25 July 1918.[150] It is important to realize that the investigations never called for restitution of property to Armenians and therefore were a travesty of justice from the outset.

To assess the level of corruption we cannot escape from engaging in some informed conjecture based on several examples. Hilmar Kaiser uses Austro-Hungarian sources to demonstrate the magnitude of embezzlement: in Trabzon, a major centre of Armenian economic activity: the yield of the confiscation process was a mere 1,200 Turkish lira, 7500 Russian Rubles, some jewelry and a few rugs. In neighbouring Giresun, according to the local authorities' official books, the value of all confiscated Armenian property was only 102 Turkish lira, while the real value was approximately 10,000 Turkish lira.[151] In other words, 1 per cent was confiscated procedurally, 99 per cent was embezzled by local officials and notables. This figure may have been drawn from the extreme end of the spectrum of embezzlement, but in the early stage of the process it is undeniable that a large majority of Armenian properties was simply stolen.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

Like quantification and famine, pronouncing judgment on the economic consequences of the expropriations for the country is a difficult task. Contemporary

observers, including many Ottoman Turks, were unambiguous about it; the dispossession of the Armenians and their subsequent destruction was a major social and economic catastrophe for the Ottoman Empire. Already in late June 1915, the German Vice Consul Kuckhoff reported, 'Through the extermination of the Armenian element, all trade and commerce in Anatolia will be destroyed, and any economic development of the country will be impossible for years to come, for all merchants, industrialists and craftsmen are almost exclusively Armenian.'[152] Habsburg officials noticed the same: 'Through the deportation of a large part of the Armenian population, whole areas of Asian Turkey are deprived of their trader population and the economic life there is paralyzed.' The Austro–Hungarians further speculated that the dispossession of Armenians served to feed and shelter 'the numerous Turkish officials who area breadless as a result of the loss of Macedonia, Libya'.[153] Pomiankowski further added to this ascertainment that the loss of artisans, merchants, traders and farmers was a major blow to the economy. According to him, the Ottoman army suffered greatly from this loss because it resulted in shortages in grain, cattle and basic foodstuffs.[154] The Ottoman Interior Ministry ultimately admitted, in a circular, the emergence of 'an economic emptiness (*iktisâdi boşluk*) arising from the transportation of Armenian craftsmen'. Therefore, shops and tools left by Armenians needed to be taken by those Turks who had skills to continue the same crafts.[155]

By the late autumn and early winter of 1915 the results made themselves felt. The German Consul Hoffmann of Alexandrette/İskenderun wrote a report of 8 November 1915, which can probably be counted among of the most cogent contemporary accounts of the genocide. Hoffmann discussed the initiation of the measures, the transportation itself, the massacres, the concentration camps, the German position and the economy. He was surprised that despite evidence to the contrary, many Turks supported the measures: 'My Turkish friends hope that this heavy operation will affect the body of the Turkish economy positively in the end, and bring about a recovery of the empire in the Mohammedan and Turkish mind.'[156] Even Talaat denied or trivialized the self-destructiveness. Upon Morgenthau's objections that the material losses for the country would be enormous as Armenians were businessmen, industrials and taxpayers, Talaat replied, 'We care nothing about the commercial loss. We have figured all that out and we know that it will not exceed five million pounds. We don't worry about that.'[157] Morgenthau himself concluded that the CUP had signed the country's 'economic death warrant':

> These were the people . . . who controlled her industries and her finances and developed her agriculture, and the material consequences of this great national crime now began to be everywhere apparent. The farms were lying uncultivated and daily thousands of peasants were dying of starvation. As the Armenians and Greeks were the largest taxpayers, their annihilation greatly reduced the state revenues . . . [158]

Since the majority of Ottoman Armenians lived in the eastern provinces, the largest destruction may have been in that region. A German report from Aleppo on 15 August 1916 summarized the social destruction of the deportation and expropriation process there:

> Since 90 per cent of trade in the interior is in the hands of the Armenians, the result is that the country is facing ruin . . . With few exceptions, in the evacuated areas there will not be left a single mason, blacksmith, tailor, carpenter, potter, tent maker, weaver, shoemaker, jeweler, pharmacist, doctor, lawyer or any other professional or trader, the country will actually be in a helpless state.[159]

The figures were astronomic: coal production declined by 75 per cent, draught animals by 50 per cent, sheep and goats by 40 per cent , wheat production by 40 per cent, the decline in the tobacco, raisins, hazelnuts, olive oil, raw silk and cotton businesses was 50 per cent, minerals suffered a fall of 80 per cent, cotton textiles 50 per cent. Overall, the economy shrunk up to 50 per cent, the GDP 40 per cent.[160] In short, as a result of war and genocide the Ottoman Empire became almost twice as poor. Since requisitions had a hand in the sharp decline of production too, it is difficult to assess the precise damage of the genocide.

Contemporary observers saw the economic destruction at first hand. During his deportation to Der Zor, the Armenian priest Krikoris Balakian noted that 'the Turks had begun to admit that the country's blessings and abundance had gone with them.' Passing through Kayseri province, he wrote, 'The fields of Tomarza, once full of ears of wheat, and the surrounding lands that had belonged to the Armenians now lay fallow and abandoned. There was neither plow handle nor plowman; there was neither plow nor ox fit for harness.'[161] During the war, Mehmed Celal Bey (1863–1926) had served as governor of Aleppo and Konya. For his resistance against the genocide he was demoted, removed from office and marginalized. He wrote in a 1919 article that 'a significant portion of overall wealth is in the hands of the Armenians, and they own close to half of the commercial enterprises in the country. To work for their ruination is a loss for the fatherland which will be impossible to compensate for ages.'[162] By October 1918 the Young Turk government was effectively bankrupt. Life had become prohibitively expensive, even for the wealthy. By October 1918 prices had been 15 times what they had been in October 1914.[163] The hangover came not much later. The agricultural vacuum on the countryside was a long-term result of the genocide. The former secretary of Cemal Pasha wrote that the destruction of the Christians unravelled the country's economy at its very roots: 'Everywhere the crops are damaged, or olive trees are becoming wild or are cut, fishing is dying, the bazaars were closed.'[164]

How successful then was the new Turkish bourgeoisie in the short term and long term? This question deserves much more research, but according to leading

Young Turks, in the short term, little was gained. A 1924 research commission chaired by Cavid Bey concluded that the immense efforts and 'exceptional permissions' (*fevkalâde müsaadeler*) had backfired. The new proprietors had lacked 'economic education' (*terbiye-i iktisadiye*) and ended up wasting their new wealth through 'squander and debauchery' (*israf ve sefahat*). They had not followed economic trends and lost most of their acquisitions by speculating for short-term gain.[165] Although it is beyond the scope of this book, it might be worthwhile to follow the fate of these '1915 businesses' into the Turkish Republic.

RETURN AND RESTITUTION THWARTED

After 2 November 1918 the flight of the seven CUP leaders caused a massive outburst of bitter invective against the CUP. Public opinion was enraged and blamed the CUP for the country's misery. Although most Ottomans were relieved the war had finally come to an end, the opposition launched a witch-hunt against CUP leaders and loyalists. With censorship lifted, Armenian newspapers published detailed accounts of the massacres, exposing some of the CUP's most esoteric outrages. When CUP bureaucrats denied the killings, the noted Circassian activist Hasan Amca published an article titled 'Well, who killed hundreds of thousands of Armenians then?' Hasan's article unequivocally condemned the genocidal persecution of the Armenians, shedding light on shocking events the public considered beyond belief.[166] The opposition journalist Refi Cevat wrote, 'These men don't even deserve the gallows. Their heads should be ripped off and paraded around on wood blocks for days as a lesson!'[167] As parliament reopened, outrage was also vented here. Member of parliament for Sivas, Dikran Barsamian, presented the government a declaration for the enormous damage done to the Armenian religious infrastructure in the Empire. Barsamian decried the fact that, for example, in Muş and Bitlis, home to many Armenian churches, monasteries and seminaries, 'from monasteries with bells to valuable antiques in churches have been ruined and destroyed, all valuables seized'.[168]

The memoirs of Mehmed Celal Bey again shed light on the aftermath of the genocide. In 1919 the ex-governor reflected on the genocide in a long essay which was published in three instalments in the newspaper *Vakit*. Celal Bey admitted that when he received the deportation orders as governor of Aleppo, the thought that the measure was intended for the destruction of Armenians never even crossed his mind: 'I did not deem likely that any government could destroy its own citizens and its human capital, the most valuable capital in a country (*Hiçbir hükümetin kendi tebaasını ve memleketin en büyük serveti olan insan sermayesini imha edebileceğine ihtimal vermiyordum*).' The governor had truly believed that the measures were a benign attempt to temporarily remove Armenians from the war

zones. He had naively requested funds from Istanbul to construct houses and settle Armenians in them. 'But instead of those funds they sent an official named Director for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants, who was in reality on duty to deport the Armenians with their wives and children.'[169]

The CUP defended itself, denying the genocide, claiming that massive Armenian losses had never been official policy. Writing from Berlin where he had fled to, Talaat claimed in his memoirs that there hadn't been any systematic massacres and blamed the Armenians for everything that had occurred to them. In an interview he gave to a British agent after the war he tried to absolve himself from blame, trivializing the atrocities and juxtaposing them with Armenian revenge acts.[170] Cemal Pasha wrote an article for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in an attempt to rehabilitate his reputation. Cemal wrote that he had ordered the arrest, court-martial and execution of Çerkez Ahmed the very moment he had heard he had committed atrocities against Armenians.[171] This was a lie. Cemal conveniently left out the fact that he executed Çerkez Ahmed on direct orders of Talaat. Ziyâ Gökalp too denied the genocidal nature of the crimes committed during wartime and refused calling them a 'massacre' (*kıtâl*), rather, describing them as a 'combat' (*mukatele*).[172] It is noteworthy that during the armistice the massacres were only denied by CUP members and adherents.

The British government, whose 'greatest concern was to punish officials responsible for mistreating British prisoners of war', had occupied Istanbul and insisted on a trial for the dozens of CUP cadres who had been arrested and incarcerated.[173] On 5 February, the 'Extraordinary Court-Martial' was established in the capital Istanbul. The tribunal set about several series of trials in which the CUP was accused of 'deportation and massacre' (*tehcir ve taktil*), in particular, 'robbery of money and goods, burning of houses and corpses, mass murder, rape, persecution and torture'. The final verdict noted that 'these were not sporadic incidents but prepared by the forces of a center consisting of the abovementioned persons and whose implementation was ordered through oral and secret orders and instructions,' and that 'these militias were employed to murder and destroy the convoys that were subjected to deportation.'[174] For about a year the court-martial and its inquiry commissions tried to function as best as they could, as summarized by Vahakn Dadrian: 'It was able to secure, authenticate, and compile an array of documents, including formal and informal orders for massacre, implicating the Ottoman High Command, the Ministers of Interior and Justice, and the top leadership of the Ittihad Party.'[175] Negligence, obstruction by pro-CUP elements in the bureaucracy and the resurgence of the Young Turk movement in Anatolia caused the last sitting to be held on 9 February 1920.[176]

In fact, the CUP's grip on power had already been crumbling in October 1918 when the Syrian and Palestinian fronts collapsed and Bulgaria capitulated. Talaat's government was forced to resign and the government was taken over by Ahmed

İzzet Pasha (1864–1937), ex-commander of the Second Army and now Minister of Interior. As long as it lasted, his government allowed the deported Armenians to return to their homes and tried its best to remedy the past wrongs. Ahmed İzzet Pasha ordered all local authorities 'to deliver Armenian orphans to Armenian community organizations'.[177] A week later he ordered several national decrees for all land and goods to be restored to their rightful owners in the event they had returned to their homes and demanded their property. These decrees aimed to evacuate Armenian properties occupied by settlers, cover all transportation, accommodation and sustenance costs and to maintain security.[178] Armenian returnees would be accompanied by gendarmes to secure their personal safety; they were given bread, cheese and olives and extra funds were allocated for their safe return.[179]

The well-intended operation soon ran into a predictable problem: Armenian returnees were confronted with the new, Turkish owners of their properties. The unwelcoming of the survivors and competing claims for property predominated in Ottoman cities and on the Anatolian countryside. Despite the new government's efforts, many Armenians were chased out or, in the worst case, killed by the new proprietors. Those who did manage to repossess their property faced the unpleasant prospect of living side by side with the same neighbours who had robbed and killed their relatives. To preclude these kinds of incidents from becoming significant disruptions, the government intervened and ordered the settlers to evacuate the Armenian houses as soon as possible. Only houses that were not claimed back or surplus buildings could be rented from the Armenian owners. The decree was nationally announced on 18 December 1918.[180] In addition, the government began collecting intelligence from the provinces. It wired circulars around asking, 'How many refugees have been left in the open after the return of the Armenians to their homelands? How many people are needy of settlement nowadays? Where are they located? Is there any land suitable for the settlement of the refugees? If so, where and how much?'[181]

This policy of evicting Turks 3 years after they were settled in Armenian houses inadvertently bred resentment against Armenian returnees. But since the Armenians were offered protection as Ottoman citizens again, violence against them was no longer followed by impunity. The Turkish settlers therefore resorted to writing angry or desperate letters to the government. A group of Balkan refugees who had been settled in Armenian houses in Bursa petitioned the Interior Ministry in July 1919, explaining their background as destitute and penniless Balkan refugees from Western Thrace. The settlers were now again dispossessed and powerless, wandering around the city. They requested help from the government.[182] But the Ministry's hands were tied; the first offence had been done to Armenians and they were the rightful owners of the houses and the land surrounding it.[183] From then on, protests and complaint petitions poured into the

Interior Ministry. The Turkish settlers refused to evacuate houses they believed they had honestly bought from the Abandoned Properties Commissions.[184] Out of frustration and fear of loss, some settlers began burning and destroying beyond repair the houses they were living in. The government attempted to prevent and arbitrate these inevitable conflicts by issuing a national directive prohibiting the damaging of the houses.[185] In these cases, the returnees were entitled to financial compensation. For example, in 1915 an Armenag Kurkjian from Edirne was stripped of his property for an insignificant amount of money. His house and household items were taken by a gendarmerie captain who was now dispossessed and Kurkjian was additionally compensated for his losses.[186]

The government's policies on return and restitution opened a Pandora's Box and exposed the depth of the CUP's confiscation policies. For example, the Armenian Patriarchate as an institution had been abolished and moved to Jerusalem in 1916. In the interior, the entire infrastructure of the church had been usurped and confiscated. The Interior Ministry ordered all Armenian church property, including seminaries and houses, immediately returned to the church.[187] After all, the right to exist of the Armenian millet was a cornerstone of the structure of the Ottoman state. These collective social arrangements needed to be aligned again. The many factories of Armenians needed to be returned too. A general order was issued to that end and bit by bit, some returnees were restituted. Some returnees wrote to the relevant authorities even before they embarked on their journey back from Syria. Two Armenian brothers from Ezine, for example, had lost two factories, a house and land to the confiscations. They applied to the local authorities and the property was restored to their rightful owners.[188]

The process was slow. In most cases, the government had to chase the local authorities and urge them to restitute property. Yervant Odian, who had survived the genocide because of a bureaucratic mistake, was on his way back from Der Zor to Istanbul when he met İzmit Armenians on the train. When he asked what happened to their fields and goods, the refugees answered, 'They gave our houses back to us without difficulty . . . but in what state! They'd not left any glass, windows or tiles. There are houses whose staircases and shutters have been taken. And there's no sign of any furniture whatsoever. As for the goods in our shops, everything has been sold.' Odian asked about compensation and the family answered that there were no interlocutors and that no arrangements had been made.[189] This was in winter 1918, but by the spring the İzmit Armenians still had not been compensated. Due to foot-dragging by local authorities, the Interior Ministry had to order İzmit province expressly to push on and complete the process.[190]

Soon, other problems arose as well. Many Armenians had lost their title deeds and other relevant documentation and could not always prove the property was theirs. For example, the brothers Levon Margosian and Puzant Margosian had owned a shop in Yozgat worth 1,000 Turkish lira. The shop had been confiscated

and 'bought' by the Abandoned Properties Commission for only 133 Turkish lira. After the war, Puzant was the only one who returned to Yozgat as his brother Levon had been killed. Now, as the rightful heir, Puzant petitioned the authorities to claim his shop back. But he was rebuffed because he could neither produce property documents, nor was there a law or regulation about inheritance questions such as this.[191] The Ministry now had to deal with this reality on the ground and issued the ad hoc directive that only the 'real owners' (*sahib-i hakîkiler*) could reclaim property upon 'appearance in person' (*isbât-ı vücud*).[192] The same regulation came into force regarding movable property. For example, lumberman Melkon Garabedian from Kayseri was murdered in 1915 and his wife Gulezar was deported. Their workshop and the movable properties in it, including a printing press, a paper machine, boxes of printing paper, sofas, tables and tools, had all been confiscated by the local CUP branch. In 1919 their son Sarkis returned to Kayseri alone and reclaimed his parents' property. But the government refused to render him the property because none of it was registered in his name. Only after a profound background check was Sarkis Garabedian allowed to keep the printing press.[193]

The process of return and restitution bumped along for a while, but would not last very long. Intrastate and interstate developments would frustrate and ultimately terminate the process. First of all, the Young Turk movement had not collapsed, but merely suffered a setback. When the Allies occupied Istanbul the party cadre was forced to go underground. This was not a novelty for men who were used to operating clandestinely – they had done so for years before 1913. The party continued to operate secretly and the Anatolian infrastructure was still standing tall. It succeeded in launching to the interior several officers and officials who were not implicated in the genocide such as Mustafa Kemal Pasha. As the movement gained strength, the Istanbul government could no longer exert its authority over the provinces and was effectively disempowered. The resurrected Young Turks, or 'Kemalists' as they would come to be known, obstructed any and all efforts of restitution to Armenians. The regime followed a policy of expulsion in peacetime and massacre in wartime to 'mop up' Armenian returnees.[194] In 1923 hegemony was theirs again when they abolished the Istanbul government and proclaimed a Turkish nation state.

External pressure also dwindled. The British High Commissioner in Istanbul reported the government's studies on restitution of the abandoned properties and concluded that,

> Owing to the weakness and neglect of the local authorities, arrangements for the restitution of Christian property appears to have come to a standstill excepting during the temporary presence of British officers. In several districts, owing to growing insecurity, the returned Christian refugees are now showing anxiety to leave again for the coast,

> rather than to be placed in possession of their lands and houses, and in some cases where the deportation and massacre of Armenians was carried out with special thoroughness, practically no survivors are forthcoming to claim restitution. Under these circumstances it is questionable whether, in the absence of any power to enforce obedience, insistence on the execution of these measures may not act merely as an irritant, but be productive of more harm than good to returned refugees.[195]

This was the fait accompli the Young Turk leaders had hoped for; in the face of overwhelming new realities on the ground, reversing the policy would be an obstacle to 'peace', unjust or not. Ultimately, 'believing reconciliation with the Nationalists necessary, the British government in early 1921 dropped much of its policy on war crimes.'[196] Subsequently, external pressure for restitution evaporated too.

But the story does not end there. Historians have propounded the thesis that a clear continuity can be observed between the Ittihadist regime of 1913–1918 (the Committee of Union and Progress), and the Kemalist regime of 1919–1950 (the Republican People's Party). As Bedross Der Matossian has argued, whereas the former proactively confiscated Armenian property, the latter retroactively appropriated it.[197] To be sure, the line between these two acts was thin. The Republican Archives offer material to assess how the cadre of the second regime dealt with the crimes of the first, including the genocide. It becomes clear that the Kemalists offered full impunity to the perpetrators, rehabilitated their reputations and widely reimbursed their families, often specifically with Armenian property.

For example, the family of district governor of Muş, Servet Bey, who in 1915 had annihilated the Armenians of that city, was awarded a composite package of Armenian property. The family of Cemal Azmi, the murderous governor of Trabzon, was also assigned considerable 'reparation', specifically from Armenian properties.[198] Hafız Abdullah Avni, a hotel owner who had collaborated in the genocide in Erzincan, was executed for his crimes in 1920 by the Istanbul tribunal. His wife, Hatice Hanım, was compensated with a house and a field from the Armenian villages of Şuhe and Kani.[199] The fanatical district governor of Boğazlıyan, Mehmed Kemal Bey, had left behind a family in Yozgat. They received a large apartment and a house from the available Armenian property in that area.[200] Dr. Bahaeddin Shakir Bey's family received a house in the upmarket Şişli district of Istanbul.[201] The former district governor of Urfa, Mehmed Nusret Bey, had played a key role during the genocide and was executed in 1919 for his crimes. His wife, Hayriye Hanım, was compensated with a shop and a house in Istanbul's Beyoğlu district, on Cadde-i Kebîr (the current İstiklâl Caddesi) on numbers 264 and 266. The property was located in the Aznavur Han and originally belonged to a merchant named Bedros.[202] Cemal Pasha's heirs and family were compensated with the property of Vicken Hokachian, a merchant in Istanbul. A shop and a strip of land

in Beyoğlu across the French cemetery as large as 1,450 square metres, was assigned to his wife Senice, his daughter Kamran, his sons Ahmed Rüşdü, Hasan Necdet, Hasan Behçet, his big sister Şaziye and little sister Bakire.[203] The list is long. The files contain details on the original owners and new recipients as well as on the nature, size and location of the property. All are signed by President Mustafa Kemal Pasha and his cabinet of veteran Young Turks, including Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda, Mahmud Celâl Bayar and Şükrü Kaya.

From 1923 on, untroubled by restraints of any kind, the appropriation and colonization process continued behind the tightly closed curtains of national sovereignty. Turks who wanted to establish businesses and factories were assigned the necessary goods from Armenian 'abandoned property'. For example, in Akhisar the local parliamentarian, Reşad Bey, had established the Tobacconists Bank, a 'Turkish Incorporated Company' (*Türk Anonim Şirketi*), to grow tobacco. He was allocated 222 acres of formerly Armenian-owned land and a store belonging to the Armenian merchant Tomas Keserian. The store had been given to settlers, but since it was necessary for Reşad Bey's company, the settlers were moved out and the property was transferred.[204] Reorganization of this kind to bring about an economically optimal distribution of property was ubiquitous after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. A major criterion was loyalty to the Young Turk movement during the Greco–Turkish war (1919–1922) and Turko–Armenian war (1920). Thus, a certain Ali Rıza Bey, resident in İzmir on Celal Bey Street number 5, was assigned an 'Armenian house' (*Ermeni hânesi*) for his 'beneficial service to the national struggle' (*mücadele-i milliyede hüsn-i hidmet*).[205]

During these wars, an important measure the fledgling Kemalist movement took was the cancellation of paying any dues or rent to Armenians for their property.[206] This too was a signal that the property rights of Armenians were not to be respected. In this the Kemalists did not differ from the Ittihadists. The continuity between the two regimes is demonstrated most clearly in the intentions of both governments. Two weeks after the devastating Greco–Turkish war was concluded with the burning of İzmir/Smyrna, the army asked the government to create a detailed inventory of all abandoned property in the territories then under Young Turk control. The declared objective was that Greeks and Armenians' 'material ties to Anatolia will be disconnected' (*Anadolu ile maddi alâkaları kesilmiş bulunacakdır*).[207] A nearly identical order had been given in August 1915. The Turkish settlers had been dispossessed because of the return of the Armenians in 1918–1919, but after 1919 Armenians were being dispossessed again. The Young Turks again reassigned the properties and the Turkish settlers had the last laugh.

Struggles over Armenian property such as those in the summer of 1915 continued in the 1920s too. An interesting example is the correspondence between three ministries in 1925. On 22 January 1925 the Ministry of Defence appealed to the Interior Ministry to be given a plot of Armenian land in Urfa to construct a pavilion

for the 14th Squadron's artillerymen. (Ironically, artillerymen had bombed the Armenian quarter to ruin in 1915.) When the Prime Minister's Office checked with the Ministry of Economy whether this was possible, it received a negative answer. Abandoned property was not to be given away for free, even to the army, and property transfers needed to comply with the 20 April 1922 law (see Chapter 3). Consequently, the prime minister wrote to the Ministry of Defence that the land was not without cost, but could be 'transferred in return for a compensation amount' (*bedel mikdarı mukabilinde temlik*). In other words, Armenian property was no longer free of charge, but could only be bought.[208] Finally, it is also noteworthy that 'Turkification' as known in 1914 before the war continued in the 1920s. The government attempted to have not just more, but exclusively, Turks employed in the country's labour market.[209]

Struggle and consensus over Armenian property complemented each other throughout the 1920s and 1930s. This was a period of economic crisis, international polarization due to the radicalization of politics across Europe and domestic upheaval due to a series of violent Kurdish protest movements against the regime. The 'rebellions' were quelled with enormous levels of violence, including mass executions of elites, deportations and continuing persecutions. In the wake of the repression, former governor of Bitlis and Aleppo, Mustafa Abdülhalik Renda (1881–1957), advised the government on issues of property and population policy. He wrote a letter to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, arguing, 'Based on my observations and recent research, the Kurdish question can best be solved if we settle Turkish migrants in villages left by Armenians . . . Therefore, I am of the opinion that the lands of abandoned property in the provinces Diyarbekir, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, and Muş should not be sold . . . '[210]

Renda also presented an elaborate report in Ankara on 14 September 1925. He had traversed the eastern provinces and had 'determined where the Kurds live and how many they are' and 'what language the population uses'. According to Renda the registered population east of the Euphrates was 1,360,000 of which 993,000 were Kurds, 251,000, Turks and 117,600, Arabs. He charted the ethnic composition of the eastern provinces region by region, lamenting the 'dominant economic and linguistic position of the Kurds' and 'gradual growth of the Kurdish population' in most provinces, including Diyarbekir. Since 'the entire region was full of Kurdish villages and the Kurds were surging into Armenian villages,' he rejected the idea of Kurdish–Turkish coexistence and deemed it 'necessary to settle Turks in strategic axes'. An axis of settlement needed to be carved out from Antep to Diyarbekir over the Urfa road. Moreover, 'it is possible to settle Turkish immigrants on the fertile land . . . of the Armenian villages' and prohibit Kurds from living there. Renda believed that the program of deportation would be easier to implement by building railways and declaring a decade of martial law. Besides using forced population transfer as a method of 'Turkifying' the eastern provinces,

he called for forced assimilation and total disarmament 'to make Turks out of the Kurds'.[211]

By the 1940s the problem of property confiscated during the genocide had become a non-issue domestically. Armenians suffered economic destruction twice more during the Republic. The first episode of dispossession was the discriminatory 1942 Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*), ostensibly levied on Turkey's wealthiest citizens to raise funds in the case of the country's eventual entry into World War II. But this was a pretext as non-Muslims (Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Levantines) were disproportionately targeted for dispossession. Those who were unable to pay, approximately 2000 men, were deported to a forced labor camp near Erzurum.[212] Another climax of economic destruction was reached in the 6–7 September 1955 pogrom in Istanbul. A mob, carefully organized and instructed by a secret branch of the Turkish army, looted, trashed, murdered and raped their way through Istanbul's Greek district. While the main targets were Greek shops, dozens of Armenian businesses were destroyed as well and an Armenian priest was killed.[213]

If we accept this pogrom as the last in a long series of violence against Armenians, then our balance sheet is grim. Between 1895 and 1955, the time span of a human life, Ottoman Armenians have been comprehensively dispossessed and economically, culturally and physically destroyed. The consequences of this spectrum and continuum of violence were irreversible. They also undoubtedly extended beyond the Armenian community and affected Middle Eastern and Caucasian economies more broadly over the long term.

DISCUSSION

The expropriation of Ottoman Armenians was a functionally necessary phase linking persecution to destruction. Dispossessed and uprooted, the Ottoman Armenians' chances of survival and maintenance gradually shrunk to a minimum. Every step in the persecution process contributed to the weakening and emasculating of Armenians. It robbed them not only of their possessions, but also of possibilities for escape, refuge or resistance. The more they were dispossessed, the more defenceless they became against Young Turk measures.

The structure of this process can metaphorically be imagined like a three-pronged Matryoshka doll. This is a design paradigm that can be analyzed at the macro, meso and micro levels, bearing in mind the relevant connections between the three levels. The macro level concerns the context and structure of the political elite that led the empire to war and genocide. They launched the policies out of ideological conviction: the war offered an indispensable opportunity to establish the 'national economy' through 'Turkification'. They created a universe of impunity in which every institution and individual below them could think of Armenians as

outlawed and their property as fair game, up for grabs. If it is the opportunity that creates the crime, then Talaat created an opportunity structure in which ordinary Turks came to plunder on a mass scale.

Now the second Matryoshka enters into force. Within the structure of national policy were nestled developments, such as complex decision-making processes, the necessity and logic of a division of labour, the emergence of specialized confiscation units and the segregation and destruction of the victim group. This level was characterized by competition, contestation and clashes over coveted property. Local elites and state institutions, such as the army, several ministries, the fiscal authorities, the provincial government and the party, collaborated for their own reasons. The main agencies were the police, militia and civil administration. Several ministries were involved in the expropriation process and benefited greatly from it, most notably the Ministries of Education, Justice, Finance, Health and Interior. The Ottoman Bank and the Agricultural Bank exploited the process unscrupulously for their own ends. The effects of the economic war against the Armenians raises questions about the implication of these institutions.

Tucked away at the heart of the Matryoshkas lies the smallest but most venomous doll, the mass mobilization that the upper echelons brought on. At the micro level, the process facilitated hundreds of thousands of individual thefts of deported victims, carried out by ordinary Turks. The mechanisms that propelled plunder were horizontal pull factors and incentives (zero-sum competition with other plunderers), and vertical pressure (the beginning of the process did not contain precise decrees, but was open for liberal interpretation). Thus, ordinary Turks profited in different ways; considerable sections of Ottoman Turkish society was complicit in the spoliation. Whereas in the countryside a Hobbesian world of unchecked power was unleashed, in the cities the CUP launched a more careful, restrained path due to firmly established and complex social and bureaucratic structures. In this micro level it is particularly important to study the material benefits that accrued to figures within the Young Turk party. In an in-depth study of the phenomenon of class in Turkey, Keyder concluded that 'there was usually one-to-one correspondence between the roster of the Committee of Union and Progress local organization and the shareholders of new companies.'[214] Yusuf Akçura too reflected after the war on the CUP's economic policies of the past decade and concluded that in Anatolia 'the Muslim real estate owners and business elite have completely embraced the Committee of Union and Progress.'[215] These arbitrary, corrupt and nepotistic activities took place behind the juridical façade of government decree. Obviously, the criminality of the process was denied by the Young Turks. For example, Cavid Bey said in his 1917 budget speech that their wartime economic policies might not have been by the book, but they nevertheless generated the desired result of an increase of capital owned by Turks.[216]

But history is full of unforeseen and unintended consequences of policies and ideologies. The great unintended consequence of the Young Turk government's dispossession of Armenians was the opportunity it offered local Turks for self-enrichment. To the Interior Ministry this was not acceptable and was not accepted; individual embezzlers were punished by having their rights to Armenian property revoked. Those with ties to local Young Turk party bosses or enough social status and potential to mobilize people, got away with their 'crime within a crime'. One can perhaps even conclude that the Young Turk government bought the domestic loyalty of the Turkish people through these practices – initially irresponsible, then outright criminal. The Armenian genocide was a form of state formation that married certain classes and sectors of Ottoman society to the state. It offered those Turks a fast track to upward social mobility. So the knife had cut both ways, for the Young Turk movement represented the drive to couple social equality with national homogeneity and political purity.

As Armenians went from riches to ruin, Turks went from rags to riches. But Armenian losses cannot simply be expressed in sums, hectares and assets. As we argued in Chapter 2, the ideology of 'National Economy' not only assaulted the target group economically, but also their collective prestige, esteem and dignity. Apart from the objective consequences of material loss, the subjective experiences of immaterial loss was inestimable. Proud craftsmen who had often followed in their ancestors' footsteps as carpenters, cobblers, tailors or blacksmiths now lost their livelihoods. The genocide robbed them not only of their assets, but also of their professional identities. Zildjian, world's largest cymbal producer, was headed by two brothers who escaped persecution because during the war they happened to be in the United States.[217] The Zildjians are world famous and renowned. But entire generations of other famous artisan families disappeared with their businesses, extinguishing the name and quality of certain brands. Gone were the Dadians, Balians, Duzians, Demirjibashians, Bezjians, Vemians, Tirpanjians, Shalvarjians, Cholakians and many other gifted professionals.

The assets of these and other Armenians were reused for various purposes: settling refugees and settlers, constructing state buildings, supplying the army and indeed, the deportation program itself. This leads us to the grim conclusion that the Ottoman Armenians have financed their own destruction.

5

Adana: The Cotton Belt

This chapter will be the first of two case studies describing the organized plunder of Armenians and the subsequent deployment and allocation of Armenian property to Turks. It will focus on the southern city of Adana, where Armenians were employed in cotton fields, and describe how the local Young Turks dispossessed Armenians and assigned the property to the local Turkish bourgeoisie and refugees from the Balkans.

INTRODUCTION AND PREHISTORY

Not unlike the entire Ottoman Empire, the nineteenth century was significant in the political and economic life of Adana. Until the nineteenth century, Armenians in Adana were interested in mining, craftsmanship and growing horses. But as the century came to a close, this changed. With the adaptation of the new Land Code of 1858, which determined land proprietorship, Armenian landlords began to amass land. Furthermore, the increasing impact of Britain and France in Adana gave advantages to non-Muslims, who collaborated successfully in these commercial activities. Armenians can even be seen as the first Ottoman industrialists in the region. Their position as intermediary in the commerce between East and West led Armenians to take a central part in the trade on the crossroads of Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean.[1]

The Adana Armenians were engaged in the cultivation of cereals and fruits and in cattle breeding. Popular occupations were trade, crafts and business. In commerce they were interested in the manufacturing of cloth, towels, handkerchiefs, bags, carpets, earthenware and various silver adornments.[2] Armenians produced industrial crops on large estates and used special agricultural techniques to produce cotton and sesame at the same time. Armenian traders and artisans were mostly concentrated in towns, where Armenians also participated in the public life of the city and the province. Armenians were a large group in the central district of Adana and its headquarters. Considerable influence of Armenians in Adana could also be seen in Tarsus, Hadjin, Sis and Cebel-i Bereket. As a result of the millet system, two or three Armenians represented the Apostolic, Catholic and

Protestant communities on the administrative council. Krikorian argues that 'from three to six Armenians were elected to the municipality of Adana while the other municipal councils had only one or two Armenian members.'[3] The Armenians of Adana were mostly concentrated in the Khidir-Ilyas neighbourhood, around the Notre Dame church, and in the city centre, around the Saint-Etienne parish. Intellectual life flourished in the city, where the community published the bilingual newspaper *Adana* and developed several educational institutions.[4] In 1913, 1,500 students were taught at the three colleges Abkarian, Ashkhenian and Aramian. There was also a girls school, where, in the 1890s, approximately 500 girls were taught under the supervision of Sarkis Efendi.[5] According to the 1902 Patriarchate statistics, Adana had 25 schools with 1,947 boys, 808 girls, and 69 teachers. Sis counted seven schools with 476 boys, 165 girls, and 19 teachers.[6]

Possibly the most important product of Adana was cotton.[7] The region is excellent for cotton production: it has humid summers and its soil is fertile due to the mud supplied by the rivers Ceyhan and Seyhan. Its location near the ports of Mersin and Alexandrette/İskenderun invites trade. During the 1832–1833 war between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, Adana's economic structure changed as modern techniques in cotton production came into use and replaced Adana's primitive techniques. Britain and France increasingly participated in the economic life of Adana due to the American Civil War, which drove cotton prices up. Britain began to establish cotton enterprises as the first cotton gin factory was founded in Adana. This process was directly related to the commercial agreements between the Ottoman Empire and Britain, which was granted convenience taxes. The Ottoman Empire gave privileges specifically to the production of cotton. These included the allocation of empty lands to cotton producers and the reduction of custom duties for bringing machines and tools from abroad. These processes accelerated the mechanization of agriculture in Adana.[8] Interestingly, Friedrich List himself had discussed the Ottoman cotton business. He had written that the cotton business was important to the Ottoman Empire because it competed with important cotton countries like India.[9]

In the nineteenth century, the American Civil War shifted the epicentre of the global cotton industry from the American South to the rest of the world. Adana played a relevant but not pivotal role in this shift. The Ottoman loss of the Balkans also boosted the importance of the Adana cotton industry. The German economist Gustav Herlt pointed out in 1914 that having lost the flourishing cotton business of Salonica and its hinterland in 1912, the Adana region gained importance for the Ottoman textile industry.[10] As one economist described the cotton production:

> Planting takes place in March and April, picking in September and October. Cotton grows on the alluvial plains, on the sandy riverbanks, and on the higher slopes. No

> irrigation is necessary as rainfall is sufficient. Hot winds in August wither the young bolls, but insect pests are almost unknown. Pickers are entitled to one-tenth of the seed cotton gathered by themselves, and are accustomed to take their proportion for domestic use.[11]

Numbers are hard to come by. The Young Turk journalist Ahmed Şerif visited Tarsus in 1910 and wrote that the cotton business generated 30,000 bales per year, yielding 300,000 Turkish liras, followed by the sesame industry.[12] In 1914, the production of cotton in Adana had grown to 27,550 pounds.[13]

Germany was a latecomer to invest in Adana, but did so more and more. German business and government interests stretched from Adana to Baghdad. Germany held concessions for the construction of the Alexandretta/İskenderun and Mersin harbours, navigation rights in the Lake of Beyşehir, irrigation systems in the entire plain of Adana and significant mining concessions along the route of the Baghdad Railway. The German-Levantine Cotton Company (*Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwollgesellschaft*) had been actively working to promote cotton production in Adana since 1905. It also stimulated industry and commerce in the region since 1907. Its total investments ran up to 700,000 marks, whereas its rival, the Anatolian Industry and Trade Society (*Anatolische Industrie und Handelsgesellschaft*), had invested 500,000 marks.[14] In 1913, the German government wanted to establish a German school in Adana for two reasons: German educational establishments were needed in the region to train native personnel for German economic investments such as the Baghdad Railway. Furthermore, Armenian attendance at the school would muster German influence among Armenian economic elites. This would increase German prestige and German imports. Also, since the Balkan wars had just ended disastrously for the Ottomans and the future of the empire was uncertain, the Germans were hedging their bets: 'If it should become evident in future that the process of dissolution in Turkey can no longer be stopped, then it will be of great value for us in the assertion of our rights in Asia Minor to have the indigenous Armenian element behind us.' In other words, investments were seen as a win-win situation in the long term.

Many Armenians welcomed the proclamation of the constitution on 23 July 1908 with optimism and even euphoria. The era of 'tyranny' (*istibdâd*) had apparently given way to one of 'freedom' (*hürriyet*). The emblematic images of Ottomans of all religious backgrounds marching united and brotherly in the streets of major cities circulated through the empire. The atmosphere of optimism for the future was prevailing to the extent that Armenians from Adana who had migrated abroad and sworn never to return to Ottoman lands since the 1895 massacres, now filed requests to remigrate.[15] But the future did not bring the multiethnic coexistence the revolution had promised. The proclamation of equality stripped Muslims of

their superior sociopolitical position and disturbed the existing power balance between the two groups. Local Young Turk nationalists capitalized on Muslim resentment about the constitutional freedoms given to Christians. Coupled with their perception that Armenian-nationalist celebrations of that freedom was 'ostentatious', anti-Armenian hatred became widespread among (upper) middle-class Adana Turks.[16]

The revolution's principles were betrayed as Adana saw a massacre in April 1909 that shattered many illusions about future cooperation between Armenians and Turks. The 1909 Adana massacre killed 30,000 people (mostly Armenians) in the province.[17] It was a provincial outburst of organized violence that did not spread to other provinces nor could be fully blamed on the central government. Some individuals were punished and hanged, including the youth of some of the richest Muslim families,[18] yet the organizers and leaders of the massacres were left unpunished. Given the level of organization and the scope of destruction, the 1909 massacre had protogenocidal qualities. In the aftermath of the Adana massacres, Ahmed Şerif walked into a random shop and sat down to talk people to sound them out about interethnic relations. An Armenian man explained to him that what surprised the community during the massacre is that the perpetrators were mostly locals and neighbours, employed in the same crafts and same lines of business as the victims. In other words, ethnic hatred overpowered class solidarity.[19] The past was prologue: those who had prognosticated that the ominous massacre foreshadowed more violence would turn out to be right.

An Armenian family cleaning cotton on their roof in Adana.

GENOCIDE AND EXPROPRIATION IN ADANA

The confiscation of Armenian abandoned properties during World War I was carried out in Adana for the same reasons as elsewhere. According to the decrees that were sent by the Interior Ministry to various provinces including Adana, it can be argued that the state settled Muslim immigrants in Adana to replace Armenians and used Armenian property to realize their ideology of 'national economy' and to meet the needs of the state and the populace.

When the war broke out, Adana was not at immediate risk of being occupied or becoming a war zone. There were, however, rumours about possible Allied landings on the Cilician coast. But rumours were sufficient to strike fear and paranoia into the hearts of people. The CUP regime's 'Turkification' project for Adana foresaw a rapid de-Armenization of the cities of Adana, Mersin, Sis and Tarsus, as well as the plain of Adana. The empty spaces left by the Armenians would be filled by Turkish settlers from the Balkans. The genocide struck Adana in the summer of 1915, when the first deportations were carried out. On 25 May 1915 the government ordered the deportation of all Armenian villages in Adana province. The names of the villages and the number of deportees was also requested.[20] In the city, notices were posted in various quarters that anyone trying to escape deportation would be summarily executed.[21] After this order, the German consul in Adana, Büge, wrote to Ambassador Wangenheim to report on local conditions. Büge denounced the measures as 'draconic', rejected the Young Turk argument of 'military necessity', denied that there were Armenian revolutionary committees of any significance, and predicted: 'There can be little doubt that the Young Turk government is fully aware of the whole extent of the decreed measures, which if carried out, will mean no less than the violent downfall (*gewaltsamen Niedergang*) of the province.'[22]

After the decree emptying the countryside, the provincial towns were then targeted. On 17 June 1915 the complete deportation of the Armenians of Sis was ordered.[23] Other towns followed one by one. In October 1915 it was the turn of the 9000 Armenians of Dörtyol. With the exception of Baghdad Railway employees and military staff, Armenians were to be 'deported without exception' (*bilâ-istisna teb'id*).[24] The Abandoned Properties Commission of Dörtyol was authorized to proceed with the liquidation of Armenian immovable property and its transfer to the Muslim population.[25] Next was Kars-Bazaar/Kadirli, a trading centre famous for its sesame and cotton production. Manouk Chakalian, a survivor from that town, remembered that the deportations struck like a bolt out of the blue: 'On a Sunday morning when we returned from Church we found our house surrounded by gendarmes. We were told to leave and were not permitted to enter the house to pick up any belongings.' His father Arakel Chakalian, a legal scholar who had been

working for the local authorities, was taken away at gunpoint to be executed, but his Turkish colleague, Necib Bey, managed to free Chakalian and smuggle him away from a certain death.[26]

The disruption on the ground was immediate and thorough. Peasants were caught in the middle of harvest season, as a German witness observed: 'The people in the country had begun to harvest; they, who had tilled their fields with diligence, had to leave everything at the start; the gardens were tilled and the fruit trees bore rich fruit.'[27] The disruption in the industry and service sectors was so severe that the city risked coming to an economic-administrative standstill, with all consequences. Frantic requests for exemptions were sent to Istanbul, to no avail. For example, the CUP deported German consular official Agabalian, as well as Prof. Sinanian of the German school. A request to spare them was rejected and they were deported in August 1915.[28]

As the excision of Armenians from Adana's economic life bore concrete risks for everyone, some of the most vital businesses were exempted from deportation until further notice. For example, the flour mill of the brothers Aram, Mardiros and Ardashes Shalvarjian in Tarsus used to mill flour which supplied bread for the entire town, including thousands of soldiers stationed in the province. The mill was situated on the outskirts of the town and ran on electrical power generated by a nearby waterfall. The modern factory produced up to 60,000 kilogrammes of flour a day. The Shalvarjians, according to a neighbor,

> were always the most beautifully dressed. They had gone to school in Adana and then the older ones had been sent to Paris. They were the only ones in the city with a car. The chauffeur had to be imported with the car as nobody knew how to drive an automobile. It was an open car . . . It seemed more spectacular with the top down as more people could gaze at this miracle and the beautiful girls inside.[29]

In the summer of 1915, the CUP confiscated the factory but retained the Armenian mechanics and machinists for their know-how. Their skill and the cruciality of their factory had saved them for the time being.[30] The Shalvarjians also helped out many Armenian deportees by hiding them in the flour mill. For three weeks they hid the Istanbul newspaper editor Yervant Odian, who wrote in his memoirs: 'The Shalvardjian brothers had not only given us a room and beds, but had also generously provided us with meals, *oghi* [aniseed brandy], wine and cigarettes.' Later in the war, Odian also received 50 Turkish liras from them.[31]

In August the Interior Ministry sent its envoy, Şükrü Kaya (1883–1959), to Adana to coordinate the deportation process. After his arrival, German officials reported the commencement of 'the deportation without considering denomination or creed'. Some of the radicalization had come from below: the local CUP leaders 'had threatened a general massacre if the Armenians were not deported.'[32] More details on this bottom-up initiative is provided by Ali Münif Yeğenağa (1874–1951), a

highly placed Interior Ministry official who was sent to serve in Lebanon. Passing through his hometown of Adana, he encountered local CUP members İsmail Safa Özler (1885–1940) and Muhtar Fikri Güçüm. They provided a prepared list of Armenians and urged him to sanction their deportation. Ali Münif then forwarded the list to the Interior Ministry with the admonition that the Adana Armenians should be evacuated immediately.[33] Subsequently, the deportations and expropriations accelerated, as the government ordered on 16 September relevant immovable property prioritized to the Anatolian Cotton Company (*Anadolu Pamuk Şirketi*).[34] (This was a front company belonging to the CUP, since there are no records for it in the industry statistics of 1913–1915.)[35]

After this firm skimmed off the cream of the crop, the Abandoned Properties Commission was ordered to continue categorizing the properties, calculating its scope and value and reporting to what use it had been put.[36] According to an eyewitness, the houses were vacated, sealed and sold at auctions where only Muslims were allowed to bid and non-Muslims were prohibited from buying. (An official order had gone out to that effect.)[37] The prices were considerably sub-market: sewing machines sold for 1.5 mecidiyes, iron bedsteads for a few piastres, etc. According to one study, in Adana, houses that cost 1,000 Turkish liras were sold for 200 lire, furniture valued at 200 liras was sold for 10 liras.[38] 'Gold and other property deposited both in the Imperial Ottoman Bank and in the German Bank by Armenians was taken by the Government. Later, a list of all Armenian houses and vineyards was made and these were rented to the people, Turks.' Often, the houses were broken down and fruit trees were cut down to use as firewood. The Armenian church in Mersin was confiscated even though the community had a Sultanic edict, and the pastor had to rent the building back from the government.[39]

Immediately after the confiscation process, the colonization process developed in a more or less similar way to other provinces. Talaat prohibited any commercial transaction of Armenians after their deportation date. He gave this order to the province of Adana on 8 September 1915, expressing his expectation that Armenians would undoubtedly resort to 'deception and subterfuge' (*hıyel ve desayis*) by trying to sell their movable and immovable properties and 'transform it into cash' (*nakde tahvil*). In order to prevent it, any attempts of Armenians to sell their properties was to be strictly forbidden.[40] The orders made clear that all factories, shops, depots and workshops were to be transferred to Turkish firms. The objective was for Turks to gradually become versed in commerce and simply get richer.[41] The government further ordered all Armenian bank accounts to be collectively frozen and channelled to Turkish firms. The same treatment was pursued with regard to movable properties in warehouses and stores.[42]

Apart from jump-starting Turkish businesses in the region, the government also sent Balkan refugees to colonize the empty Armenian villages. Orders were sent out in November 1915 to the province that special care needed to be taken in order to feed, shelter and settle the refugees.[43] Dozens of households of immigrants

were sent to Adana in order to be settled in the province. Talaat ordered that these immigrants could be settled in the empty villages and urged the authorities that their daily subsistence expenses needed to be met from the revenue of the liquidations of Armenian properties.[44] The settlement of migrants was noticed by foreign observers in Adana. The American consul witnessed the deportation of Armenians and the settlement of large groups of Macedonian refugees, who had occupied the vacated houses.[45]

Conflicts over Armenian property, similar to the ones we discussed in Chapter 4, soon arose between individuals and institutions. For example, the Interior Ministry had to arbitrate between a cotton firm and the Abandoned Properties Commission in Adana. A conflict appeared between the firm and the commission about the cession of the properties. The commission had intervened in the situation and had not allowed the firm to take Armenian properties, since only the commissions were authorized to operate on the properties. But the firm complained to the government and the Interior Ministry chose its side: it ordered the commission that it could not intervene in the process and the cotton firm was entitled to the Armenian properties it had seized.[46]

The confiscated Armenian property was transferred to Turkish firms, embezzled by local officials and citizens and converted into prisons. According to the local authorities in Adana, six buildings in the province could be put to use as prison.[47] Several Armenian churches in the province were converted to prisons. The governor's office reported to the Interior Ministry that Adana badly needed a new prison and that with some refurbishing, a church could be transformed into a prison with three cells, a director's office, a toilet and washroom and a room for guards. The school next to the church could be made into two cells, a toilet and a washroom. An engineer drew up a designation plan and calculated that twenty thousand cents would cover the costs of the rebuilding effort. The Interior Ministry studied the accounts and authorized the governor to proceed with the plan. The church and the school were converted into prisons.[48] The existing prison in Adana was a room in an old police station, which was moved in its entirety to a different location provided, again, by Armenian property.[49]

The Armenian community of Adana was robbed of eight churches and schools that covered a territory of 14,400 m^2 with an estimated value of 46,400 Turkish gold liras. In addition, the community owned 56 buildings and plots of 16,488 m^2, worth 43,785 Turkish gold liras. Furthermore, there were four vineyards and fields of 117,000 m^2 estimated at 22,110 Turkish gold liras. The immovable property was worth 36,650 m^2 and amounted to 105,300 Turkish gold liras.[50] In 1921 this property was insured by the Adana Armenian community for 2,000,000 francs with four insurance companies: Union de Paris, London Corporation, L'Assicurazione Generale and the Société d'Assurances Générales Osmanli Milli. Other companies had insured property up to 2,065,000 francs. There was also immovable property of shops of three floors on a terrain of 1,127 pics carrés estimated at 20,000 Turkish

gold liras. All of this totals up to 185,038 m² and 1,127 pics carrés, worth 237,595 Turkish gold liras (equalling 1,475 kilos of gold).

The Catholicosate of Sis consisted of a stone building overlooking the town, with 50 rooms and halls, on an area of 1,250,000 m². The building was coated with high-quality earthenware tile from Kütahya and housed a library of 4,000 books plus 400 manuscripts and a museum with a collection of antique art. A rough taxation would amount to approximately 100,000 Turkish gold liras. Moreover, the diocese owned an area with a historical church and several residential buildings of 14,500 m² valued at 2,000 Turkish gold liras. All in all, the many shops and houses, two water mills, a garden of 10,000 m², an area of 30,000 m², a farm with buildings, depots, stables, plots, 130 cows, 30 muzzles (for the pack animals), flocks of goats and sheep kept on 10,000,000 m², amounted to 11,687,100 m² and 167,520 Turkish gold liras for the Catholicosate of Sis.[51]

The church losses in the provinces and the neighbourhoods were astronomic too. According to the archives of the Armenian Catholicosate in Antelias, Lebanon, they included:[52]

- Surp Asdvadzadzin in the Hidir Ilyas neighbourhood
- A school in the compound of that church (*Ferman* of February 1816): 6,000 m², 25,000 Turkish gold liras
- Surp Stepanos and school in the Bucak neighbourhood, burnt in 1909 (*Ferman* lost): 5,000 m², 18,000 TL
- Church in Hiristiyanköy (*Ferman* of March 1848): 1,000 m², 1000 TL
- Church in İncirlik (*Ferman*, lost): 800 m², 800 TL
- Church in Sheikh Murad (*Ferman*, lost): 1,000 m², 1000 TL
- Church in Abdo-oghlu, burnt during the French occupation (*Ferman*, lost): 200 m², 200 TL
- Church in Missis, burnt during the French occupation (*Ferman*, lost): 400 m², 400 TL

Table 5.1 shows the number of buildings confiscated in Adana province, according to Talaat Pasha's notebook.

Table 5.1 Confiscated buildings in Adana.

Name of district	Number
Tarsus	9
Cebel-i Bereket	5
Kozan (Sis)	229
Kars	22
Hadjin	50
Hadjin Shar	25

Continued

Table 5.1 *Continued.*

Name of district	Number
Hadjin Rumlar	25
Feke	30
Feke Karadere	25
Feke Karaköy	130
Feke Yerebakan	30
Feke Dikme	30
Ceyhan	86
Total	**696**

Source: Bardakçı, 2008, p. 93.

These buildings included anything from individual houses to large farms and estates. The losses in Sis/Kozan are striking: they add up to one-third of all buildings confiscated in the entire province of Adana.

CORRUPTION

The expropriation process opened the gates of corruption in Adana. Private individuals, government officials, CUP activists, police offices, gendarmes, all competed to secure their piece of the booty. German officials noted in January 1916 that Turkish military and administrative staff in Adana had received 'high bribes' (*hohe Bestechung*), in particular, governor Hakkı Bey and police captain Cemal Bey.[53] The American consul in Mersin, Edward Nathan, wrote:

> The new law concerning the real estate and personal property of deported persons is being carried out in a manner which, I fear, will leave little if anything for the Armenians. Their houses are being inhabited by mouhadjirs, officials, etc., at ridiculously low rents. The goods of deported merchants are being taken possession of by commissions designated for this purpose, and abuses of all kinds are reported. The President of the Commission, Ali Seidi Bey, was recently removed – some say because he opposed the manner in which these measures were being applied.[54]

In fact, Ali Seydi Bey was sacked because he had misappropriated properties and embezzled goods, and he was not the only corrupt official to be removed from office. The district governor of Islahiye was fired too, and only with the personal involvement of Talaat he was reappointed.[55] The Shalvarjian flour mill became the object of corruption too. CUP activists approached the superintendent of the mill, Bagdikian, and demanded he present a false inventory, showing a million pounds of flour less than was actually in stock. The conspirators pressed, threatened and

ultimately kidnapped Bagdikian, blindfolded him and placed him in a barn. Bagdikian escaped in a nighttime chase and barely got away with his life.[56]

CUP officials in Adana extorted Mateos Nalbandian, parliamentarian for Sis/Kozan as follows:

> He signed a two-year contract with the brother of the local Vali [governor], Hamdi Bey, reaching an agreement with him that the Vali's brother would have the right to half of this year's harvest in exchange for Nalbandian's enjoying complete freedom. It is said that, roughly, Nalbandian has 15,000 acres at his disposal and that he is the only large-scale Armenian landowner in Kosan, so it can be assumed that the Vali's brother has assured himself of at least 1,500–2,000 Turkish Liras worth of pure profit for this year. The Vali's brother's share also has the advantage that cheap, yes, even unpaid workers from the ranks of the workers' corps will be available for the harvest and the work in the autumn.[57]

An exceptional form of extortion was organized by Hagop Ohanian, who had reportedly amassed enormous debts due to his 'loose way of life'. Ohanian assisted Cemal Bey, who had married his sister, in squeezing Armenians for their money in exchange for delays in their deportation. Armenians received 'temporary permissions' to remain in Adana if they delivered hefty sums of 'protection money' to Ohanian and Cemal. The bribes began at 10 liras. Adana businessman Vahan Vartabedian was squeezed for 20 liras. The three firms of Topalian, Ipranosian and Mindikian had each paid at least 100 liras. A group of the richest Armenians had collectively paid a sum of 7,000 liras, ostensibly for 'municipal taxes', but in reality these were personal bribes for Cemal Bey and Hakkı Bey. These practices were meant to stave off deportations, the power to which the governor and police chief kept in their own hands – contrary to the official regulations circulated by Talaat. Once the extortion victims ran out of money to deliver, they were deported anyway.[58]

German consular staff had rightly analyzed the rub-off effect of high-level corruption: 'As the more senior officials attempt to enrich themselves in this manner, consider bribery and extortion to be a harmless and permissible act and compromise the law and the state's dignity, naturally they have no moral strength and authority to keep their subordinate officials, judges, doctors, officers, yes, even the gendarmes and ordinary soldiers in check. Every public official looks for a way to get money at his own discretion.' Thus, the gendarmes of Ulukışla simply acted as an organized crime gang, racketeering and extorting every passing deportation convoy: the convoy from Niğde gathered 200 liras, but when those from İzmit refused to pay, seven of their notables were killed. The district governor of Osmaniye, Fethi Bey and his *aide gendarmerie*, Colonel Süleyman Bey, made money by granting 'extensions' through their intermediary Khacher Karayakupian. For a two-day 'extension', Garabed Jinanian paid 25 liras, Minas Karayakupian,

40 liras and Hagop Boyajian, 30 liras.[59] When the victims ran out of money, they were no longer of use and were deported. Very few Armenians could afford to pay their entire way through the war.

GERMAN PROTESTS

In the Adana plain, German firms had made serious investments for the long-term exploitation of the cotton fields. The genocide created a situation in which the Armenian economic infrastructure was laid bare for full-scale invasion and colonization. Those who were to profit from this distribution of wealth were not German investors, but the Young Turk government and the new Turkish bourgeoisie. Careful analysis of German attitudes towards the Armenian genocide demonstrates that most German investors were dismayed and shocked by the violence.[60] Through the German consulate at Adana the news of the expropriations and corruption trickled up to the highest levels of German government, including the chancellor in Berlin. The embassy wrote a letter of protest to the Ottoman government in November 1915. It argued that German firms had contributed significantly to the economic development of the region, and were now negatively affected due to the genocide. It demanded guarantees that the companies would be compensated for their losses and not suffer further damages.[61]

In March 1916 the German-Levantine Cotton Company (*Deutsch-Levantinische Baumwoll-Gesellschaft*) this time complained to the German Embassy about the confiscations. The company was suffering enormous losses due to the genocide, mostly because of its loans to Armenian farmers – as opposed to cotton merchants. The land was either given away to Balkan refugees, or sold at 'ridiculous prices': a plot of land worth 1,000 liras would be sold for 200 liras and registered in the cadastre database in the new Turkish owner's name.[62] The company presented several tables of their Armenian debtors. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the direct and indirect loans to Adana Armenians by the GLCC.

These considerable sums were now lost to the company and could never be redeemed.

Table 5.2 Direct loans to Adana Armenians by the GLCC.

Hagop Chopurian	123.00
Hagop and Zachiaria Bizdikian, Saruk Khanum (2,639 acres mortgage)	2,550.00
Kasab Artin's wife Takuhi (32 acres mortgage)	677.16
Boghos Koubaserian (1,004 acres mortgage, 4-year lease)	2,338.75
Artin Simikian (1,401 acres)	7,905.30
Total	**13,594.21 TL**

Source: *PAAA*, Botschaft Konstantinopel 99, Bl. 96–101.

Table 5.3 Indirect loans to Adana Armenians by the GLCC.

Hovsep Khacher and Rupen Buldukian	122.36
Hagop Chopurian	123.00
Garabed Kevork and Boghos Bedikian	630.62
Samuel Bizdikian and Dikran Tartirosian	215.38
Nazaret Peltekian	102.09
Garabed, Krikor, Sarkis and Leon Arabian	404.58
Boghos Deliferian	112.60
Krikor Piloyan and Hagop Urfalian	158.13
Mekdis Avedikoglu	68.00
Hagop, Ohannes, and Roupen Mangoyan	2,066.42
Artin Simikian	5,612.34
Total	**9,615.52**

Source: *PAAA*, Botschaft Konstantinopel 99, Bl. 96–101.

Another firm that made claims to recover its losses was the Iron Foundry and Lock Factory (*Eisengiesserei & Schlossfabrik AG*). The firm wrote to the embassy, inquiring about the fate of Artin Nercessian in Adana, who still owed them 562.18 francs. The embassy answered that if Nercessian's property was not registered at any Abandoned Properties Commission, there was no way of incurring debts. But moreover, the deadline for applying for compensation had expired on 16 April 1916, so the firm was simply too late and nothing could be done for it. All the German embassy could do was to recommend a lawyer.[63] German firms did not only appeal to their government for financial capital. In some cases, human capital was at stake. In March 1916 German businessman Walther Berghaus asked the Istanbul consulate whether it was true that his employee Kevork Terjumanian had been arrested and incarcerated in Pozantı, a town north of Adana. Berghaus requested Terjumanian to be released because of the latter's skills for his firm. But the Ottoman government rejected the German embassy's attempt to have Terjumanian freed, and answered that he was deported to Der Zor.[64]

The conflict between government and the Deutsche Orient Bank attests to the damage done to German business interests. The CUP attempted to liquidate the Armenian properties in the storages of the Deutsche Orient Bank. Eşref Bey, chairman of the Adana Abandoned Properties Commission, sent a telegram to the Ministry of Interior on 26 October 1915 that the properties in the storages of the bank could not be preserved for a long time since some of them might decay and they might lose value. The chairman asked the ministry which treatment to accord to these properties.[65] As a response, Talaat ordered that for the time being, these properties could be preserved.[66] The bank ascertained that due to the deportations, economic life in Adana had come to a standstill. The bank had incurred a loss of 20,852.11 Turkish liras and had lost six employees in Adana and one in Mersin.

Moreover, to attend to the procedures, it was spending an enormous amount of time, and travel and subsistence costs to and in Adana. On top of that, 'one can characterize the attitude of the authorities in general as fundamentally antagonistic and even hostile.'[67] Consequently, a conflict arose between the commission and the director of the bank, Greuell. One building left by Aghazarian was rented by the bank. This building also included some commercial goods which were entrusted by other Armenians to Aghazarian. The commission sealed the building according to the law, but Director Greuell intervened in this process and broke the seal.[68] As a result, he had to stand trial and was interrogated by the German consulate.[69] Ultimately, the affair was swept under the rug and the commission undisturbedly continued to liquidate the Armenian properties in the storages of the bank.

The Anatolian Railway Company (*Anatolischen Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft*) had lost 16,000 liras due to the genocide and demanded that if not the Ottoman, then the German government should compensate it. Out of desperation, the chairman even suggested that the creditors of Armenians should be entitled to participate in the Abandoned Properties Commissions as 'full members' (*vollwertige Mitglieder*) in order to redeem their losses. The real estate and houses could then be sold for their real value and the creditors remunerated properly.[70]

But none of the protests and petitions of these German firms ultimately yielded fruit. The genocide was a force too powerful to withstand for these companies and as it swept away Armenian financial and human capital, the firms suffered losses. When German consular official Weber confronted Talaat with this course of affairs in Adana, Talaat did not deny that there would be economic losses, but countered that it should not detract from main objective: 'the strengthening of the Turkish national element'.[71]

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

The deportations created problems for the economy in general, and for specific industries in particular. The gaping holes in the economic life of Adana were reported most poignantly by the American consul in Adana, Edward Nathan. He reported on 26 July 1915 that 'the effect of these measures on the province is incalculable. The loss of the best commercial element and the principal handicraftsmen is bound to injure local economic conditions.' He pointed out that the various agricultural machine companies and petroleum companies had complained to the government, as well as Singer.[72] Nathan further saw that 'the greater part of all stores and bazaars are shut and it is difficult to purchase one's daily requirements. Most of the merchandise of Armenian merchants is in sealed stores . . . As the greater part of the business of this district in most lines was in the hands Armenians, the consequences of their deportations are only too apparent for the future of the Adana

province.'[73] William Chambers was a British subject who had been working for American missionaries for 37 years when the war broke out. According to him, 'it is not merely the suffering of the outlawed and deported people that is appalling, but the effect of it all on the country. Two-thirds of the business of Adana City was dependent on Armenians, and the markets seemed deserted after they were driven out. The disaster to the whole province from the material standpoint is beyond calculation.'[74]

The Armenian community of Adana, led by Mihran Boyajian, Artin Aghazarian and Hazaros Jehalian, petitioned the German government by underlining the economic importance of Armenians in Adana province. They argued: 'All measures of the government suggest that it will use all means to annihilate (*vernichten*) the Armenians in the province of Adana.' They prognosticated: 'The economic life of this country is so closely connected with the Armenians, that through their exile an economic crisis, and consequently the economic ruin (*wirtschaftliche Ruin*) of the country is caused.'[75] The Adana Armenians were not only prolific producers in agriculture and industry and active in administration, but they were also buyers and brokers. The German consul in Adana, Büge, forwarded these concerns to the German Embassy in Istanbul, adding his thoughts on changing economic conditions in his province: 'With specific regard to Adana, the image of the city after the expulsion of the Armenians will be a very sad and unfavourable one, and no longer offer the space for operation for European, including German interests in the same way.' The damage to German firms he estimated at 60,000 Turkish liras.[76]

This effect was also mentioned in the memoirs of Adana Turks. Damar Arıkoğlu (1889–1969) was a CUP representative for Adana and represented the province as parliamentarian between 1920 and 1946. In his memoirs he stated that 'after the deportations of Armenians to Syria, Adana became absolutely empty. There did not remain any bazaar, store and craftsman. Stores and workplaces were shut. The lack of even tinsmiths and plumbers became our main problems. An apprentice school was established in the yard of the Armenian Church. Turkish boys learned the work of plumbing and tinsmithery within a short period. Finally, the number of these few and necessary craftsmen increased and met the needs of the country.'[77] Conscription, deportation and genocide generated a serious lack of workers too, especially in the labour-intensive cotton industry. The Ottoman army even had to organize forced labour, whisking entire battalions of women southwards to harvest the cotton in the fields of Adana.[78] According to a British report, Adana faced a 'considerable shortage of labour' as a result of which even 'prisoners have been released in large numbers to work without pay.'[79] Young Turk propagandists in Adana, however, reported that the economic situation in Adana was sparkling:

> The mills, spinning factories, industrial enterprises have done some dazzling work . . . the cotton crops have been relatively more. This year the crops have amounted to 30,000 bales.

> Even though before it had been estimated that 50,000 bales would be produced, the deficit has been caused by the drought that has occurred this summer. Most of the cotton is being produced in the spinning and textile factories of Adana. The factories are working much much more productively than in peace time. The increase that is being witnessed in cotton prices had caused an upsurge in the cultivation of cotton. Despite the lack of workers, the production of cotton is being worked on with extraordinary fervor.[80]

This was a clear misrepresentation of the facts. The production of cotton witnessed a dramatic drop: from 43,000 bales of cotton in 1905 to 180,000 bales in 1913, and an all-time low of 30,000 bales in 1919.[81]

THE ARMISTICE

After 1918, surviving Adana Armenians tried to return to their home regions. One of their advantages was perhaps that the distance between Der Zor or Aleppo and Adana was bridgeable. Parliamentarian Mateos Nalbandian lobbied the government to facilitate the returns to Adana. By 1919 three thousand Armenian deportees had returned to Adana, and according to the British authorities in Syria, each week another thousand would return.[82] Restitution became an obstacle very soon after return. The heirs of murdered and deceased deportees encountered difficulties reclaiming property. The principle of 'appearance in person' (*isbât-ı vücud*) was in force and only the person to whom the property was registered could claim it back. But many of those people were dead and the documentation had often been lost. A survivor recalled returning to his house in Kars-Bazaar and seeing his schoolbooks thrown on the floor. A prized handwritten church songbook was stolen, and most of their household items were also gone.[83]

Pursuant to the 1916 Sykes–Picot agreement, Cilicia was occupied by the French in December 1918. When the French entered the region they were confronted with an economic wasteland. One official wrote in a report, 'There was a lack of sugar, coffee, oil, manufactured goods, coal – coal necessary for the cotton industries of Mersin, Adana and Tarsus.'[84] The French government charged Colonel Edouard Brémond (1868–1948) with the administration of the region. About the economy, he reported on 9 February 1920 to the French minister:

> Cilicia produced 180,000 bales of cotton in 1913 and in 1919 only 30,000 bales was produced. We hope this year to reach 60[000] to 100,000 bales. But we lack coal and machinery to plow, workforce, and improved seeds. 1920 will still be a year of waiting but in 1921 we hope to catch up and surpass 1913. The German surveys that we have found locally, assessed the potential crop of a well-managed Cilicia at one million bales. We

> grabbed the German cotton press of Adana. But growing cotton will deliver its full development only with powerful financial institutions capable of organizing crop irrigation and harvest transport; large amounts of capital are absolutely necessary and so far there is none in Cilicia . . . The agricultural bank, that I have improved but for lack of staff could not reorganize as I should have wished, was ready to 9 % and this rate is very moderate; this shows the need that we have of French capital. Here, it is possible to establish a domain of 30[000] to 40,000 hectares with irrigated fields without great difficulty.[85]

As the French had their own ambitions of economic exploitation, so did the returning Armenians, including a legion 'armed and hungry for vengeance'.[86]

From April 1919 on, French and British troops conducted a disarmament campaign in the districts of Adana, Mersin and Cebel-i Bereket. Brémond dismissed all Young Turk officials in the region who were resisting the Allied occupation and pursuing anti-French propaganda, including, for example, gendarmerie colonel Hashim Bey and Ali Murtaza Bey, the staunchly Young Turk public prosecutor of Adana province. In Mersin, a judicial commission led by the new prosecutor Said Bey dislodged virtually the district's entire legal apparatus in the district for 'arbitrariness': this included the public prosecutor, chairman of the court-martial and all of the judges. Similar dismissals occurred in Islahiye, Osmaniye and Bahçe. On 20 March 1919 Director of Public Education Fuad Bey was unseated for spreading Young Turk propaganda.[87]

Brémond then instituted arbitration commissions (made up of a minority of Turks and Armenians, presided over by a neutral, Greek, Arab or Catholic) to settle the disputes that arose from the complaints of Armenian returnees whose property had been confiscated. These included immovable property administrated by the Ziraat Bankası and the government. The commissions also nullified the many 'sales' of Armenian property. When François Georges-Picot visited the region on 13 March 1919 he exhorted that the Armenians' property should be restituted fully and speedily. Between April and June 1919 the French administration of Cilicia issued three decrees that served as the legal foundation for its restitution policy. But the decrees generated a torrent of litigation and bitter conflicts, and although the French authorities seemed to have resolved most of the conflicts, by 16 June 1920 it was forced to dissolve the commissions.[88] Indeed, the French authorities were caught between a rock and a hard place: on the one hand they had made promises to the Armenians, but on the other hand they had ambitions for a long-term presence in Cilicia. Alienating the Turkish population was a risky affair and the property issue was an obstacle for gaining their trust. Moreover, rocking the boat could potentially cause a security risk as Turks might pick up arms to defend their newly acquired property. Armenian notables did not accept this policy of placation and vehemently petitioned the occupying forces to return their

property. Notables wrote to the Allied authorities that the Turks needed to return the confiscated goods to their rightful owners.[89]

As soon as Armenians began reclaiming their property in the villages and neighbourhoods, conflicts erupted. In Dörtyol, armed Armenian groups assaulted Turks living in their houses. The residents were beaten with sticks and stones, and in cases of resistance, they were shot dead. The return also offered opportunities for Armenians to settle existing scores on the micro level and retaliate against individuals Turks they personally knew had collaborated in the genocide and enriched themselves. As a consequence of the violence, the local Turks began organizing themselves in bands. A certain Osmanoğlu Kara Hasan Çetin (1891–1936) was the local roughneck who was in charge of a paramilitary group (*çete*) in the region. His militia had massacred Armenians in 1915, and after 1918 persisted in maintaining, through violence, the fait accompli of the expropriations. According to a Turkish eyewitness, in the village of Ayas the restitutions had been carried out reasonably fairly and Armenian returnees had resettled without bloodshed. A Turkish landholder by the name of Şaban Agha was offering shelter to Armenians until their houses were habitable again. Kara Hasan raided the village with his 50 militiamen. One of the brigands reportedly yelled, 'I have been a butcher of humans (*insan kasabı*) for 7 or 8 years now; now I will take all of your lives!' The militia rounded up all the villagers in the square, ordered the Turks to leave the mixed group and murdered the remaining Armenians with daggers. Şaban Agha was also killed and his house was set on fire for helping Armenians.[90]

The tide turned definitively for the Cilician Armenians when the Young Turk resistance, led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, in 1920 won several decisive battles in the southern cities of Maraş, Anteb and Urfa. By 1921 Kemal's southern army reigned in most of this region. The French government threw in the towel and signed agreements with the Young Turks on 11 March and 20 October 1921 which stipulated their complete withdrawal from Cilicia in exchange for economic concessions.[91] The region was surrendered to the same officials that the French regime had arrested and incarcerated in the first place. What the CUP called the 'War of Liberation' (*İstiklâl Harbi*) can be seen as a movement to repel the Greek occupation of Anatolia. But domestically it was at the same time a continuation of policies of expulsion and persecution of Christians, including Armenians. Mustafa Kemal Pasha was launched by the CUP only after a similar proposal to Ahmed İzzet Pasha was rejected by the latter. The movement virtually overlapped with the CUP, especially in the interior where the struggle was financed by the Turkish nouveaux riche, such as landowners, manufacturers, military officers and various public officials who had made a fortune in the genocide. The muscle was provided by irregular gangs and paramilitaries such as Topal Osman, Deli Halit, İpsiz Recep, Dayı Mesut and Yahya Kaptan, who were indicted by the Istanbul tribunal for massacres.[92] In Adana, Damar Arıkoğlu was a notable who supported the CUP and

now continued to fund the underground movement. In his memoirs, Arıkoğlu confessed that whereas before 1914 he had owned 3,000 acres of land, during the war he amassed an additional 11,000 acres and even acquired the titles to the land. He also noted that the Turkish notables of Adana generously donated money to the nationalists after 1918. One notable gave 1,000 Turkish liras, several butchers in Adana donated small flocks of sheep to feed the soldiers, two other notables gave two new cars to the movement.[93] These were significant contributions to the CUP's transportation and subsistence.

Vahan Portoukalian was an Armenian in French service who was now put in charge of feverishly evacuating any existing institutions such as the orphanage in Adana, which counted 413 Armenians, 60 Syriacs, and 32 Chaldeans. Faced with Young Turk intimidation, Portoukalian had no other choice than to transfer the orphanage to Syria and Lebanon in the summer of 1922. On 21 November 1922 the Mersin police confiscated, without due process, all seats and tables of the Armenian Catholic schools and assigned them to the Ministry of Education. The campaign was coordinated at the provincial level because at the same time, the Jesuit school of Saint-Joseph de Lyon and all other Catholic schools in Adana and the Capuchin school in Tarsus were also closed.[94] The year 1923 began in the Adana region without the existence of a single Armenian school, business, publication, political party or parish of any significance.[95]

AFTER 1923

On 16 March 1923 Mustafa Kemal was in Adana and gave a speech in the Turkish Hearth (*Türk Ocağı*) club for the local Association of Tradesmen (*Esnaf Cemiyeti*). He extolled the virtues of artisanship and underlined its importance for the nation. On the Armenian issue he added:

> The Armenians have no rights whatsoever in this fertile land. The country belongs to you, the Turks. This country has been Turkish in history, and thus is Turkish and will eternally live as Turkish . . . The Armenians and others have no rights in this place. These fertile places are a profoundly and quintessentially Turkish country.[96]

For their support of the movement, the Adana Turkish Hearth was lavished with Armenian property. On 5 January 1925 Mustafa Kemal signed a decree, assigning real estate, buildings and land to the Adana Turkish Hearth for 'stimulating the national identity of the Turkish youth and the growth of its intellectual and moral qualities'. All of the property was Armenian and included a hotel and coffee house belonging to Cholak Mardirosian. The Tarsus Turkish Hearth was assigned several shops and four houses belonging to innkeeper Hampardzum.[97] A similar decree

was issued for Mersin: the houses of Ohannes Chirchirian and Victoria Savamas, as well as 1,190 acres of land, were ceded to the Mersin Turkish Hearth.[98]

With the Armenians gone, the process of colonization, redistribution and property transfer continued in Adana after 1923. During the Kemalist period, besides the settlement of immigrants, some companies were also supported by the state through Armenian property. First, the government tried to settle 3,500 migrants in Sis/Kozan, but much like Adana, Tarsus and Mersin, there were many complaints by the destitute immigrants. They were used to the climate in the South Balkans and complained about the region's humid climate, which they were not familiar with.[99] In other cases, the immigrants bemoaned the unequal distribution of the properties.[100] Those unfortunates who still had not been settled by 1924 wired complaints to the government, accusing 'usurpers' (*mütegallibe*) and state officials of occupying and hogging abandoned property. The Ministry ordered the settlement problem resolved and the names of these usurpers and state officials recorded and reported.[101] The list was produced and offers perhaps the most complete catalogue of Turkish receivers of Armenian property in Adana province (see Appendix 2).[102] Another example for the settlement of immigrants in Adana is that Resul Ağa and six families from Dagestan who immigrated through Van in 1916 settled on the Bizdikian Farm, abandoned by the famous notable family of the same name. However, after the French invasion of Adana they were forced to leave their houses. Although this farm was destroyed due to the invasion and ensuing conflicts, Resul Ağa sent a telegram to return the farm. The Ministry of Exchange, Development and Settlement then ordered that this land could be returned to Resul Ağa since he was from the needy group of Eastern immigrants.[103]

Ever since 1913 the Ottoman Empire was struggling with finding proper and affordable housing for its citizens. The quantity and quality of housing was insufficient to sustain the many refugees. An obstinate 'housing question' (*mesken meselesi*) emerged that had not disappeared by 1923.[104] As the government was gradually distributing property according to need and ideological direction, complaints and requests for free property came pouring in by ordinary people living in squalid conditions. Even the military authorities sent petitions demanding property to be assigned to their soldiers who, after all, had fought so bravely to defend the homeland. According to the Ministry of Defence, the soldiers in the Adana region were underpaid and found it difficult to get by amidst prohibitively expensive housing. Free living space was therefore appreciated. But the government had more pressing concerns, namely, the refugees, and apologized for not being able to help out the veterans and soldiers. The tone of the correspondence then turned acrid and a quibble developed.[105] This example suggests that the scarcer the abandoned property pool became, the higher the competition for it.

The very few Armenians who had stayed on were a few dozen Maronites, Greek Catholics or Cilicia's small Armenian Catholic community led by the prelate Msgr

Harutiun Keklikian. These communities were quickly dispossessed in the urban centres of Adana, Mersin and Tarsus. Their storehouses, rectories, churches, gardens, farms, houses and convents were confiscated by the government and used for state facilities. The authorities simply argued that since the Treaty of Lausanne did not mention any 'Maronite', 'Greek Catholic' or 'Armenian Catholic' communities, these groups did not exist and hence their property fell to the state. On 21 January 1926 the government ordered the seizure of all of their property. The Maronite church in Tarsus was closed, its bell tower demolished and the building converted into the district governorship from where the area was then governed from 1928 on. Maronite and Greek Catholic properties in Mersin were allocated to the Ministry of Education.[106]

Having confiscated the educational infrastructure, the Young Turk party bosses in Mersin then set their sights on the Catholic Church's property. First they bullied Father Ignace Terzian out of Tarsus and then terrorized priest Jean Khalkovian of Mersin. The nationalist newspaper *Yeni Adana* launched a campaign of defamation against Khalkovian, accusing him of cooperating with the French occupying forces. The authorities then imprisoned him for not collaborating in the economic ruination of his own parish. Khalkovian was deported to Kastamonu and ultimately expelled from Turkey on 24 November 1926. The prize in Mersin was formidable: 18 hectares of agricultural land, a storehouse, shops and many other belongings. The last Catholic Armenian in Adana, Msgr Pascal Keklikian, was renting the Catholic community's own property from the government. He desperately attempted to avert the looming catastrophe of complete dispossession, but his efforts were in vain. In January 1927 the then governor of Adana, Reşat Mimaroğlu (1880–1953), ordered the categorical confiscation of all Catholic Armenian property in that province. The community had now lost everything: its church, rectory, schools, shops, land, houses. The dispirited and defeated Keklikian had no other option than to depart for Syria.[107]

Finally, the cotton business. The government wanted to take stock of the cotton situation in Adana and try to stimulate the cotton industry. To that end, it organized a series of Adana Cotton Congresses. These were chaired by the Young Turk veteran Ali Cenani (1872–1934), a multifaceted criminal: in 1915 he was investigated for embezzling Armenian property and in 1918 he was deported to Malta for organizing massacres of Armenians in Anteb. In the Turkish Republic he became Minister of Commerce in 1923, but would later be removed from office for corruption. During the congress, the delegates, cotton producers and administrative officials discussed the cotton industry's existing problems and offered solutions. One of the central realizations was that 'the current factories aren't operating according to full capacity' (*mevcud fabrikaların tam faaliyetle çalışamamaları*). The delegates also lamented an enormous shortage of industry in the region. The problem was not only the sowing and harvesting of cotton, but also transporting and exporting

Table 5.4 Cotton production in Adana province, 1905–1923.

Year	Bales
1905	45,000
1906	50,000
1907	56,000
1908	64,000
1909	76,000
1910	45,000
1911	70,000
1912	115,000
1913	120,000
1914	135,000
1915	15,000
1916	10,000
1917	10,000
1918	10,000
1919	20,000
1920	no figure
1921	15,000
1922	30,000
1923	70,000

Source: *İkinci Adana Pamuk Kongresi Zabıtnâmesi*, pp.123–4.

it, for the harbour of Mersin had not recovered either.[108] See table 5.4 for the development of cotton production according to Ottoman Turkish figures.[109]

For the year 1910 the note 'Decrease due to the Armenian insurrection' (*Ermeni ihtilali münasebetiyle tenakis*) and for 1915 the note 'Due to the war' (*Harb-i umumi münasebetiyle*) were appended. According to these figures, the genocide set the cotton industry back exactly twelve years: the production level of 1911 equalled that of 1923. The level of 1914 was not reached until industrialization was initiated in the region in the 1930s.

To boost the cotton industry in the province, the state used the abandoned properties. Land and stores were prioritized to the cotton producers. For example, the cabinet adopted a decree, according to which the confiscated house of Simonaki Ekonomidis was assigned to the cotton exchange.[110] The CUP's front company, Anatolian Cotton Company, was renamed 'Independence Adana Cotton LLC' (*İstiklal Adana Pamuk Anonim Şirketi*) and allowed to operate with considerable freedom.[111] Another decree was about the abandoned building left by butcher Panos Baghchejian. Since this building was situated in a central location in Adana, it was suitable and practicable as an office. The building was given to Adana's Directorate

of Industry for use in the cotton business.[112] The government also intensified its international efforts to develop the industry. A British delegation of the India Office visited Adana in October 1924 to inspect the cotton fields and open an agriculture exhibition. During the visit, economic deals were made between the Turkish and British governments on the export of Turkish cotton and import of seeds from the Raj.[113] It would take a while before the genocide paid off, but a foundation was laid. An important struggle to be waged was that against the maggots that damaged the cotton plants. To combat vermin, the government ordered Zyklon B to be imported from Germany.[114] One of the world's largest producers of cotton was the Soviet Union, due to its rich cotton fields in Uzbekistan. In 1926 a cotton congress was held in Moscow, and Turkey's General Director of Commerce Ahmed Faik Bey and the Director of Ankara's School of Commerce, Ahmed Münir Bey, were sent as envoys to import know-how.[115]

The sustained discrimination of Armenians and other Christians and support for Turks was a long-term process that needed continuous attention. With a 1932 law, the Young Turk regime prohibited 'foreigners' access to employment in certain sectors of the economy. Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya explained that the law would secure the 'Turkishness' of certain businesses such as Adana's cotton industry. The law ensured that any qualified Armenians with demonstrable skills were not allowed to work in that sector because of their ethnic background.[116] At some point, the process came to a close. In July 1928 the last store from the pool of Armenian abandoned properties was distributed. A Bosnian immigrant named Osmanoğlu Ömer wrote to Adana's governor's office that he was settled in a house in 1924, but that he was not given any other property. He requested any store from the abandoned properties inventory as he was an artisan and could learn how to ply any trade.[117] After the investigation, the provincial authorities of Adana informed the Interior Ministry that there were no empty stores to distribute anymore in the province of Adana.[118] In other words, the redistribution of Armenian property had been completed.

DISCUSSION

The genocide fundamentally changed the demographic, cultural and economic structure of Adana. When the Dutch Jew Johannes Kann traveled to Palestine in spring 1907 he traversed through Adana province. He arrived on an Austrian steamship, slept at a Greek hotel, was helped by the director of the German Cotton Company, befriended an Armenian translator who was fluent in English and joined a caravan of Turkish merchants.[119] In 1918 that kind of economic cosmopolitanism had become a relic of the past.

In this chapter we have discussed the problem of unequal modernization, or put more precisely, differential development. Whereas some Armenians were reaping

the benefits of the lucrative cotton trade, many Turks had the feeling they were being sidetracked. Nobody planned or intended these economic differences to grow, but its consequences were real, breeding resentment among Turkish (lower) middle classes. When the 1909 Adana massacre was organized by the instigators, Turkish frustration, jealousy and resentment was a fertile breeding ground for violence against Armenians. Adana was in many aspects different from other provinces: there was a formidable prehistory of violence, an old Armenian-nationalist claim on the region and a visible and present Allied occupation. The conduct of Adana's Turkish local elites shaped the Armenian genocide at the provincial level. The competition *within* the perpetrator group, that is, between Turkish urban elites, for political and economic power was a structural factor easily manipulated by the CUP for its own ends. Local Turkish notables emerged victorious in this competition by volunteering for the death squads and actively collaborating in the campaign that the CUP regime deemed most salient – the murder of their Armenian neighbors.[120] In other words, the dynamics within the perpetrator group can account for variations during the genocide. They also remind us that even if the Armenian genocide unfolded on a twisted course, the result was nevertheless generalized destruction.

The expropriation and destruction of Adana's Armenians has provoked different literary responses. David Kherdian (1931) is an Armenian-American poet with roots in Adana. Kherdian has written about themes such as longing and belonging, and in his poetry, his family, generational cultural differences and the suffering of his older family members play an important role. In his book of poems, *Homage to Adana*, he writes:

> And uncle, you would tell again
> the story of how when you were three
> They placed you every noon on a donkey
> to take food to the workers in the field
> And then you would weep remembering
> your lost people and that unrecaptured life.
> I have waited thirty years to understand
> that story I first thought funny
> because of your tears, and though
> I am unable now to cry over the
> losses of our people or even your life
> I understand at last the bravery of your grief.[121]

The Kurdish writer Yaşar Kemal (1923) has written many novels with strong autobiographical overtones and observations from growing up in the Adana region. As a young man, Kemal worked in a cotton factory near Adana. His novel *Murder in the Ironsmiths Market* (*Demirciler Çarşısı Cinayeti*) is based on the oral tradition of

Adana's bazaar and richly alludes to the confiscation and colonization of Armenian property by Adana's notables. In a conversation in the book, one of the characters addresses a CUP loyalist:

> When you came to town you were barefoot. And when the Armenians fled you perched yourself on the most beautiful Armenian houses. You turned Artin Kulekyan's house into a primary school. One by one, you distributed the Armenian houses to the notables, to the nomadic Turkoman chieftains, to your acquaintances. They went from tents to Armenian mansions. How did you spill blood on Hayk Topuzyan's land and take out his title deed, Mr. Teacher, how? If you didn't see the future, show the road, who would come and live in these Armenian mansions? If it wasn't for you, who would come and take the title deeds of those Armenian lands? Who, who, who could have come up with the idea of filling those Armenian ruins, half of them settled with Kurds and the rest ruined?

In another conversation, a local notable confesses: ' "Panossian's heritage has remained to me. Not because I am Panossian's son. Because I elbowed Panossian. That's why all of Panossian's goods and chattels, mansion, field, farm, shops is all mine." He took out a piece of paper from his pocket. "And here is the document"."[122]

The cotton production witnessed a nose-down plunge after 1915. But after the 1940s it picked up again, and nowadays Turkey is one of the largest producers of cotton.[123] Table 5.5 shows the world cotton production in 2003.

In 2003 Turkey exported 200,000 bales of cotton. Although it would be quite hard to calculate exactly what percentage of this production was generated on fields confiscated from Armenians, we might get an idea of the level of economic development from one, famous example.

The Sabancı family is Turkey's modern rags-to-riches success story. Its patriarch, Hacı Ömer Sabancı (1906–1966), began working as a cotton picker in Adana. Later he became a broker for cotton harvesters and entered the cotton trade. In 1932 Sabancı became a co-owner of a cotton spinning plant, and his success took off from there. He established a cotton ginning mill in 1950. The Sabancı Holding

Table 5.5 World cotton production in 2003.

Rank	Country	Amount (bales)
1	China	25,500,000
2	United States	17,559,000
3	India	12,500,000
4	Pakistan	8,350,000
5	Brazil	4,400,000
6	Turkey	4,200,000

Source: *National Cotton Council of America*, 2004.

was established in 1966 and moved from Adana to Istanbul in 1974. Nowadays, the holding is the largest firm in Turkey. It operates in 15 countries, employs 60,000 people, owns a university, 70 leading companies and has many joint ventures with large western firms. Its revenue in 2008 was US$20,000 billion, its net income in 2009 was US$3.2 billion. Moreover, Sabancı has continued to produce textiles, including cotton products. In 1971 it founded Teksa Cotton and Synthetic Yarn, Velvet Weaving and Finishing Inc., which in 1993 merged into Bossa. Bossa is one of the largest textile firms in Turkey; its revenue in 2009 was US$164.1 million.[124]

These examples must stand for many Turkish entrepreneurs who benefited from the Armenian genocide, either directly by CUP donations or indirectly from the economic void left by the elimination of Armenian competition.

6

Diyarbekir: The Land of Copper and Silk

This chapter will constitute the second case study, concentrating on the south-eastern region of Diyarbekir, where economic life in the bazaar was dominated by Armenian artisans. In the summer of 1915 the deportation and murder of the Armenians in this region was followed by the large-scale plunder of their property by local Turks. The local perpetrators participated in the destruction of their Armenian neighbours and were rewarded by the central authorities. The result was large-scale corruption and embezzlement by state officials.

INTRODUCTION AND PREHISTORY

Diyarbekir was a relatively large province (42,100 km^2) locked in between the Euphrates to the west, the Tigris to the east, the Armenian highland to the north, and the Mesopotamian desert to the south. Its continental climate made for mild winters and hot summers. The region became part of the Ottoman Empire during Sultan Süleyman I's campaign against Iraq and Persia in 1534. The city of Diyarbekir became the administrative centre and the headquarters of the sixteenth-century governorship from where large parts of the broader region were ruled.[1] Although there were regional variations in the economic conditions of the province, generally it thrived due to its favourable location on the ancient Silk Road.[2] There were copper mines in Maden county and the border regions with Bitlis province were known for being oil-rich, though no large-scale steps had been taken to exploit either. Like the rest of the empire, Diyarbekir was a preindustrial region where subsistence farming and cyclic pastoralism were the dominant economic occupations for peasants and nomads in the countryside.[3]

The city of Diyarbekir is a turbot-shaped walled citadel, situated on a basalt plateau nested in a meander of the Tigris river. Within the city walls, the urban structure consists of a square in the centre of town, surrounded by a bazaar and a labyrinth of streets and alleys running criss-cross through the city.[4] The city consisted of several neighborhoods and although the city was known to have a Christian neighborhood and a Muslim neighborhood, the overlap of ethnicity and settlement was never complete. To a significant degree, historically the various communities lived in mixed neighborhoods. Typically, Diyarbekir's houses are closed towards the

outside world and have courtyards where social life transpires.[5] Until the 1950s Diyarbekir lacked a central refuse collection system, waterworks, underground sewerage and other services. Nevertheless, foreigners travelling to the city were often impressed and recognized that 'the streets are cleaner than those of many Turkish towns, and the houses better built.'[6] The Ottoman state made its presence felt through the governorship, the Second Army, a court-martial and one of the largest prisons of the Ottoman Empire.

Diyarbekir province boasted a formidable diversity of ethnic and religious groups, small and large, scattered and concentrated, urban and rural. Religious affiliation was decisive in one's identity within Ottoman society, which was organized into the millet system, the official macro-organization of religious communities that were partly autonomous in their decision making. Politically and economically, the three most important groups were the Turks, Armenians and Kurds. The Ottoman Muslims, later denominated 'Turks', were the majority in most urban areas, for they had been occupying most administrative positions for a long time. The Kurdish population of the province, all Muslims, can be divided into several categories: tribal versus nontribal Kurds, and (semi-) nomadic versus sedentary. The dozens of large and powerful Kurdish tribes in the region were generally commanded by a chieftain (*ağa*) and de facto controlled extensive territories. All were able to mobilize thousands, sometimes tens of thousands of mounted warriors, often to combat each other in pursuit of power, honour and booty. Nontribal Kurds could be powerless peasants (*kurmanc*) or Kurds from noted clergy families (*meşayih*). Other groups were the Jews, an unknown number of Yezidis (syncretic monotheists), Kizilbash (heterodox Shi'ites), Zaza, Arabs, Syriacs (all Aramaic-speaking Syrian-Orthodox, Syrian-Protestant, Syrian-Catholic, Nestorian and Chaldean Christians) and Gypsies.[7]

The Armenians of Diyarbekir made their livings as merchants or craftsmen and in most bazaars the majority of tradesmen were indeed Armenians. Some of these men were quite prosperous, having family members abroad and being active in politics. But the bulk of Diyarbekir Armenians were peasants organized in large extended families (*gerdastans*) in villages, most specifically in the Lice, Silvan, Beşiri and Palu districts. Estimates for 1914 of the number of Armenians in this province vary at 105,000 (German Protestant missionaries), 106,867 (Armenian Patriarchate) and 124,000 (an Armenian almanac).[8] Many Armenians worked in the textile industry, which was experiencing a significant growth. In the nineteenth century, silk producers in Diyarbekir began raising silkworms locally. In the 1860s, the workshops consumed 15,000 kilogrammes of silk and 340 bales of cotton yarn per annum. Diyarbekir produced 300,000 pieces of cloth per year, part of which was exported. The local textile producers were famous for producing handkerchiefs, shawls and sheets. Local production, instead of importation from Britain,

gave an important boost for the region's economy: in the second half of the nineteenth century, the volume of textile manufacturing more than octupled. Local production was significant, but local consumption was truly vital. Local Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish buyers of Diyarbekir textile products kept the industry running. There were hundreds of textile workers in Diyarbekir. For example, in 1864 the number included 180 cloth and linen sellers, 15 felt makers, 40 silk fringe makers, 6 silk winders, 7 pattern setters, 50 tailors, 10 dyers, 14 cotton cleaners, 26 silk sellers, and 320 weavers.[9] Diyarbekir was also famous for its watermelons, carrier pigeons, vineyards, fruit trees and tobacco.[10]

Deeply embedded within the social structure of Diyarbekir were overlapping and competing networks of rich, influential families of Muslim notables who had historically played the role of local power wielders in the city. These were, for example, the Cizrelizâde and Ekinci families, who lived near the square. The very powerful Pirinççizâde dynasty lived near the Great Mosque, the Ocak family near the Melik Ahmed Mosque, whereas the chieftain of the Cizrelizâde, Mustafa Bey, lived in a large mansion next to the Iskender Pasha Mosque. His neighbours were the powerful Yasinzâde Şevki Bey of the Ekinci family on one side, and the Iskender Pasha family on the other. Several important Kurdish dynasties such as the Cemilpaşazâde, Hevêdan, Zazazâde, as well as major chieftains from Hazro, Kulp and Lice, had houses in the Ali Pasha neighborhood. They often commuted between their region of origin and the city. The Cemilpaşazâde were particularly important as pioneers of Kurdish nationalism.[11] To various degrees, all these local elites were connected to each other through multiple familial ties: the Cizrelizâde were in-laws of the Yasinzâde, the Müftüzâde were related to and partly overlapped with the Direkçizâde, several women of the Zazazâde had married into the Gevranizâde family, the Cemilpaşazâde were relatives-in-law of the Azizoğlu and the powerful Pirinççizâde dynasty was connected to most of these families through marital ties.[12] Important Armenian families were interwoven in this social fabric too, such as the textile-producing Tirpanjians or the Dikranian bankers. The ebb and flow of Diyarbekir city's politics was often decided by the competition between these provincial elites, which could rise to boiling point as they engaged in struggles over local government. This competition was fuelled by conflict between the ethnically organized political factions. The city was characterized by considerable ethnic segmentation and shaped by economic competition between the groups. The Young Turks in the region would capitalize on this. For example, well before the war, Müftüzâde Şeref (Uluğ) had proposed declaring an economic boycott against the 'treacherous Armenians' (*hain Ermeniler*) in order to strengthen Muslim economic power.[13]

The interethnic and interfaith relations in Diyarbekir province in the years before 1914 were far from idyllic. They were frail due to the prolonged political

and economic crisis that afflicted the Ottoman Empire. The gradual crumbling of Ottoman rule in the imperial peripheries throughout the nineteenth century had co-occurred with massacres perpetrated against Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus.[14] Among Ottoman Muslims, these events began to lead them to question the loyalty of Christian citizens to the Ottoman state. Moreover, the hundreds of thousands of refugees (primarily Circassians and Chechens from the Caucasus) who poured into the eastern provinces added to the existing tensions between Muslims and Christians. Local authorities often ignored, approved or abetted encroachments on Armenians by these impoverished refugees. The Abdulhamid era massacres which struck Diyarbekir on 1 November 1895 saw massive destruction of human lives and property.[15] Approximately 25,000 Armenians were forcibly converted to Islam across Diyarbekir province, 1,100 Armenians were killed in Diyarbekir city and 800 or 900 more in the outlying villages, while 155 women and girls were carried off by Kurdish tribesmen. In Silvan district, 7,000 Armenians converted and 500 women were carried off. In Palu, 3,000 and in Siverek, 2,500 converted to escape being massacred. In Silvan, along with Palu (where 3,000 Armenians converted), '7,500 are reduced to destitution and 4,000 disappeared: killed, died of cold, etc., or escaped elsewhere.'[16] According to another source, 2,000 houses and 2,500 shops and workshops were burnt down in the province during the 1895 massacres.[17] An unknown percentage of these converts reconverted to their faiths, returned to their villages, reclaimed their possessions and rebuilt their homes and businesses once the persecution was discontinued.

The Balkan wars caused ripples all across the empire. Even in Diyarbekir, far away from the direct heat of the Balkan wars, the revanchism could be felt. In the city, national discussions on identity and ideas on population politics had already fuelled threats against Armenians. But the Ottoman police at this stage still protected Armenians as Ottoman citizens. This would change, as the radicalization of political elites heralded a general deep crisis of interethnic relations in Diyarbekir. The threshold between hatred and violence was crossed when in August 1914 the grain market of Diyarbekir became the scene of mass plunder as many Muslim merchants joined in seizing the opportunity of impunity to loot the stores of Christians and set fire to their shops. Soon it became known that the Young Turk loyalist police chief, Memduh Bey, had 'allowed Kurds and Muslims to pillage Armenian stores' (*Kürtlerle müslümanların Ermeni mağazalarını yağma etmelerine müsaade olunduğu*).[18] According to an Ottoman Armenian state official, Memduh Bey had started the fire himself to create opportunities for pillage.[19] Not only was the involvement widespread, but the inaction by local authorities implied tacit approval of the pogrom. On the eve of the war, Diyarbekir already was a proverbial powder keg.

Sarkis Tchooljian, owner of copper factory in Diyarbekir, c. 1900

WAR AND PERSECUTION

On 25 March 1915 Dr Mehmed Reshid (Şahingiray) was appointed governor of Diyarbekir. Reshid was born into a Circassian family in Russian Caucasia on 8 February 1873. When the Tsarist government intensified its campaign against the Circassians in 1874, his family fled to the Ottoman Empire. Reshid grew up in Istanbul, where he enrolled in the Military School of Medicine and joined other students to found the kernel of a secret political party that would later adopt the name CUP. In 1897 the Abdulhamid regime exiled him to Tripoli for his politically recalcitrant activities. Having made a career in the army and risen to the rank of major, he wrote a book on the CUP revolution in 1908. However, he was never influential in the CUP core and his power did not match up to that of party bosses Dr Bahaeddin Şakir and Dr Nâzım. In 1909 he relinquished his employment in the military and became district governor and mayor in several provinces between 1908 and 1914. During his professional progress, Reshid gradually radicalized and scapegoated the Christians as the reason for the Empire's erosion and wretched condition. By 1914 he was thoroughly convinced that the Ottoman Christians were abusing their ostensibly privileged positions and therefore were to blame for the Empire's depressed economy. He was delegated the task of secretary-general of the international reform plan for the eastern provinces, but it was annulled when the CUP engaged in war. In 1915 he became governor of Diyarbekir and in 1916

he was appointed governor of Ankara. When the war was over, he was arrested and incarcerated in Istanbul. With the assistance of his former loyalists, he escaped from prison and lived incognito at various Istanbul addresses. Fed up with being forced to evade the law, and fearing arrest and possible execution, he committed suicide when a police chief tracked him down on 6 February 1919.[20]

When Reshid acceded to the governorship of Diyarbekir province, he brought with him thirty to fifty mainly Circassian Special Organization operatives, such as Çerkez Harun, Çerkez Şakir and Çerkez Aziz.[21] They were joined in Diyarbekir by more troops released from the local prison.[22] This way, Reshid absorbed more effective power than the average Ottoman governor. In his case, it was certainly true that '[i]n the provinces party bosses of one kind or another often exercised substantial control, amounting in some cases [. . .] to virtual autonomy.'[23] Upon arrival in Diyarbekir, Reshid and his men faced poor rule of law, a serious desertion problem, and an anxious population. The bazaar, for example, was buzzing with rumours that the Russians had invaded Istanbul.[24] The Muslims feared an invasion of Diyarbekir by the Russian army, whose reputation as a valiant fighting corps had preceded its offensive into the south. The Christians were torn between fear and hope: whereas one moderate group (such as the clergy) was terrified that a Russian incursion might trigger reprisals, another, discordant group (such as nationalists) expressed audacious beliefs that it was possible to defend themselves against the brutal policies of the CUP dictatorship.[25] Reshid's right-hand man in Diyarbekir would be deputy Pirinççizâde Aziz Feyzi (1879–1933), a Young Turk hardliner known for his anti-Armenian sentiments. He had often verbally assaulted the Armenian deputy Vartkes Serengulian (1871–1915) in parliament and reportedly had Ohannes Kazazian, a Catholic Armenian from Mardin and his political rival in the elections, assassinated in 1913. During the genocide, Aziz Feyzi played a crucial role in the organization of the destruction process in Diyarbekir with his particularly ferocious cousin Pirinççizâde Bekir Sıdkı (1888–1973).[26]

The concerns of many young men were of a pragmatic nature. They wanted to avoid the possibility of being conscripted into the Ottoman army and being sent off to an almost certain death, at the front or in the labour battalions. Therefore, some had actually gone into hiding in the complex web of rooftops of Khanchepek, a neighbourhood with a large concentration of Armenians. Some of these draft evaders had acquired weapons.[27] Dr Floyd Smith, an American doctor of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), witnessed that at the end of February, the Armenian bishop Tchilgadian finally 'went upon the roofs and lectured the men, telling them that they were bringing ruin upon themselves and the whole Christian quarter. As a result quite a number surrendered.'[28] Still, there were a number of both Muslim and Christian deserters when Dr Reshid became governor.

In a postwar booklet titled 'Reflections', Reshid defended and sought to legitimize his wartime policies as governor of Diyarbekir. These memoirs, composed of two of his four wartime notebooks (the other two were lost), carry extraordinary importance as they allow a close look at his line of thought when he was appointed governor. From the moment he set foot in Diyarbekir, Reshid found confirmation of his prejudices of a conspiracy of disloyal Christians. In his memoirs Reshid especially targeted the Armenians. He accused them of 'high treason' and of 'pursuing the goal of an independent Armenia'.[29] In his paranoia and animosity, Reshid ignored the many Muslim deserters and imagined an army of Armenian deserters, whereas they may not have been as numerous and organized as he visualized. He believed that the Armenian draft dodgers on the rooftops were all 'formidably' organized revolutionaries and that they numbered more than one thousand. Moreover, according to Reshid, 'there was not a single Armenian in the province who was not participating in this national endeavour.'[30]

In order to deal with these perceived problems, Reshid organized a committee for the 'solution of the Armenian question'. This council was named 'Committee of Inquiry' and had a 'Militia Unit' at its disposal.[31] According to a German charity worker, the committee, drawn up of a dozen CUP loyalists, was 'a sham committee for the solution of the Armenian question' and served only one purpose: to eliminate the Armenian political parties.[32] It was headed by Colonel Cemilpaşazâde Mustafa Nüzhet Bey and consisted of deputy Pirinççizâde Aziz Feyzi, postal clerk İbrahim Bedreddin, Majors Rüşdü Bey and Yasinzâde Şevki Ekinci, his brother Yasinzâde Yahya Ekinci, representative of the the Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants and chairman of the Diyarbekir branch of the 'Society for National Defense' Veli Necdet, police chief Memduh Bey, militia commander Şevki Bey and Müftüzâde Şeref Uluğ. On orders of Reshid, they appointed three butchers, a few officials and various other men. Important names in the group were Direkçizâde Tahir and Pirinççizâde Sıdkı Tarancı, both of the influential families whose names they bore.[33] On 6 April 1915 Talaat ordered Reshid to 'appoint a capable, loyal and devout İttihadist for the vacant position of mayor' in Diyarbekir.[34] Reshid immediately fired the political moderate Cemilpaşazâde Dr Fuad Bey and replaced him with the anti-Armenian radical Pirinççizâde Sıdkı Tarancı.[35] Police chief Dersimli Hüseyin Bey was replaced by İAMM boss Veli Necdet, who had previously had occupied the office of provincial secretary.[36] All the key positions in Diyarbekir were now occupied by CUP loyalists.

In the city Reshid now embarked on a relentless campaign to find and punish enemies of the CUP. On 1 April he issued a proclamation demanding the surrender of all arms to the police.[37] When this failed to produce the results he had expected, he brutalized the arms searches from 5 April on. Aided by his gendarme

commander, Major Rüşdü, he personally supervised and participated in the warrantless searches of churches and houses.[38] Whereas district governor Hilmi in Mardin visited the Christian clergy to congratulate them on Easter,[39] Reshid's roundups of Armenian men became more and more arbitrary and categorical. He wrote: 'On a certain day I had the three or four most important streets in the Armenian neighbourhood barricaded and ordered surprise searches on every single house in the early morning, arresting more than 500 armed deserters.'[40] By 15 April Reshid had already had more than 600 Armenian notables and artisans arrested and put in jail. There he had them tortured to exact confessions on the locations of hidden arms depots. The prisoners were beaten, burnt with hot irons, had their nails pulled out with pliers and suffered prolonged bastinado.[41] Even so, Reshid was not satisfied with what had been accomplished and wired Istanbul twice to request the deployment of more manpower to assist his force of 300 gendarmes and policemen. The Interior Ministry did not comply with his requests, frustrating and galvanizing him into more severe measures.[42]

In Diyarbekir, Reshid had not distinguished between guilty or innocent Armenians ever since he had arrived. His intensive arms searches of the first 3 weeks of April had delivered some results for his militia as many arms were found. The scope of armament and the extent of its organization were blown out of proportion and photos were taken of the arms and the culprits.[43] On 27 April Reshid wired an elated telegram to Talaat summarizing and evaluating his work in Diyarbekir:

> For ten days, the pursuit of deserters has been carried out with utmost severity. As a result of yesterday's purges a significant amount of explosives, fifty bombs, lots of ammunition and various arms, and a great deal of dynamite powder was found. 120 leaders and operatives of the villages were taken into custody. Until now, in the city alone more than 1,000 deserters of different regions were apprehended, many of whom are party members. Searches and pursuit are continuing.[44]

Having incarcerated the bulk of the political elite of the Diyarbekir Christians, Reshid's militia now targeted their religious leaders. Blanket arrests of priests and monks were carried out and their houses were ransacked. The persecution was becoming more extensive and intensive.

GENOCIDE

At this stage, moral thresholds were crossed both on the national and provincial level. Talaat had assumed supervision of, and therefore responsibility for, a very risky operation: the deportation of an entire population. The murderous initiations on the plain of Diyarbekir too had crossed a boundary as entire village

populations were now targeted for destruction. The relationship between these two developments remains a chicken-and-egg enigma. However, it is possible to reconstruct at least some elements of this momentum. Rafael de Nogales Mendez was a Venezuelan officer in German service, operating in the Ottoman army as a mercenary. In the spring of 1915 he had witnessed the massacres of Christians in Van and Bitlis. He visited Diyarbekir in late June and had the opportunity to speak to Reshid in private. According to Nogales, Talaat had personally ordered Dr Reshid to unleash hell on Diyarbekir province with a telegram containing a mere three words: 'Burn – Destroy – Kill' (*Yak, Vur, Öldür*). Although this order was most probably destroyed (assuming it existed at all), there was clearly no instruction for Reshid to desist. Moreover, Reshid admitted himself that he had merely obeyed Talaat's order, who allegedly had confided to him, 'j'assume la responsabilité morale et matérielle'[45] (I assume the moral and material responsibility).

The consequences of the central government's fiat were disastrous for Armenians. By the end of May 1915 Dr Reshid had imprisoned the entire Armenian elite of that city, where some had already died under torture. Reshid administered the coup de grace to the elite in the last week of that month. On Sunday 30 May 1915 his militiamen handcuffed 636 notables, including the Armenian bishop, and led them through the Tigris Gate. On the shores of the Tigris the men were loaded on 23 large Tigris rafts under the pretext that they would be relocated to Mosul. Philibos Arpiarian was provincial director of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank who had worked in Kharpert, Trabzon, and was stationed in Diyarbekir when he was arrested in May 1915. When the deportation was announced, he sent the following letter to his family:

> My Dears,
> What is going to become of us is now clear. I will probably be sent toward Mosul, together with all my compatriots. Now it is left for you to be brave and endure every difficulty. What can we do? Fate brought us to this. Only continue to pray for us.
> As for my journey, bring me one of the boy's sheets, a small rug, pillow and two or three underclothes. My blue jacket and vest. In addition to this, my summer jacket, trousers and whatever else is suitable to wear. I must not forget, also, a lot of cheese, choerag, and prepare a box of halvah.
> Use your judgment and put all this together in the best way you can. Give these to Haji Garabed so he can bring to me. He is our servant. Bring a cognac bottle filled with oghi (raki) with you so you can pass it secretly to me. Do not be too late. All of you come so that I can see you for the last time.
> Kisses to you, your father . . . Philibos Arpiarian[46]

The goods never reached Arpiarian, but were stolen by the militia. Arpiarian was placed on a raft and taken away with the other notables. Militiamen accompanied the notables on the rafts as they sailed downstream to the Raman gorge, where the

rafts were moored by the left bank of the river near the villages of Shikefta and Bezawan. The victims were robbed of a total of 6,000 Turkish pounds, taken away in batches of six, stripped of their clothes and valuables and massacred by Kurdish tribesmen recruited by Reshid. All men were murdered with axes, daggers and rifles and dumped in the river with stones stuffed into their stomachs to make the bodies sink.[47]

Arpiarian was one of 636 victims. Among those killed were Onnik Kazazian, a wholesaler from Istanbul who happened to be visiting Diyarbekir, and his friend Artin Kassabian, the former interpreter of the French vice-consulate. Other victims were the noted bankers Khatchadur Dikranian and the Tirpandjian brothers.[48] The same fate befell Mihran Basmajian, graduate of Euphrates College in Kharput, Dikran Chakijian and Nalband Hagop, all of them Dashnak party members, as well as Hagop Hovsepian, the negotiator Stephan Matossian, former provincial interpreter and secondary school teacher Dikran Ilvanian, member of the municipal council and representative of Singer Missak Shirikjian, all of them members of the Ramgavar party.[49] The slaughter was breathtakingly fast and profound: the entire Armenian elite of Diyarbekir was effectively wiped out within a week. To the dismay of Walter Holstein, the German vice-consul at Mosul, a week later the rafts arrived empty. Holstein later found out that the Christian convoys had been 'completely slaughtered' (*sämtlich abgeschlachtet*) and he had witnessed their corpses floating downstream: 'For several days, corpses and human limbs have been floating down the river here.'[50]

After the elimination of the Armenian elite of Diyarbekir, Reshid quickly expanded the violence to genocidal proportions. Having massacred the bulk of the male elite, the rest of the Diyarbekir Armenians were now targeted categorically. On 1 June he had his militia evacuate 1,060 Armenian men and women of the Armenian neighbourhood Khanchepek and escort them to the Diyarbekir plain through the Mardin Gate. The people were gathered and a proclamation was read out loud, offering the Armenians their lives in exchange for conversion to Islam. Although the decision was not unanimous, the victims refused, whereupon they were stripped of their clothes and belongings. The militia and local Kurdish villagers then massacred them with rifles, axes, swords and daggers. Many women were raped, some were sold as slaves to the highest bidders. The corpses were either thrown in wells or trenches or left on the plain to rot, 'the men on their stomachs, the women on their backs'.[51] It did not take long for Talaat to issue the following deportation order for the Diyarbekir Armenians: 'All Armenians living in villages and towns of the province, will be resettled to Mosul, Urfa and Zor, with no exceptions. Necessary measures will be taken to secure their lives and property during the deportation.'[52] At the same time, the İAMM ordered the 'documentation of the names and places of the Armenian villages, the number of deportees, and the abandoned property and ploughland'.[53] The genocide was now fully underway.

CONFISCATION AND EXPROPRIATION

On 1 July, the CUP ordered the establishment of a Commission for Diyarbekir, appointing Nâzım Bey and Reşad Bey as its directors.[54] An additional order indicated that the local population was in no way to meddle in the property affairs.[55] Reshid quickly subordinated the two men and coordinated the organized larceny. All of the militia leaders were involved in the scheme. While the banker Tirpanjian was tortured in prison, Veli Necdet occupied his house and remained there throughout the war.[56] Police chief Memduh Bey reportedly gained 50,000 Turkish pounds in the persecutions.[57] İbrahim Bedreddin, who became district governor of Mardin, sent emissaries to retrieve valuable documents taken by Kurdish chieftains. Since the illiterate tribesmen had no means to redeem bank notes such as insurances, checks and other valuables, these were to be delivered to the authorities.[58] Churches and houses of rich Christians were converted to military hospitals, ammunition depots, state orphanages or mosques. Inventories, such as carpets, curtains, silverware, clerical clothing, closets and even sacraments, were sold or carried off by policemen and gendarmes.[59] An Arab eyewitness, Faiz Al-Ghusayn, saw the confiscation process when he was sent to Diyarbekir:

> You might see a carpet, worth thirty pounds, sold for five, a man's costume, worth four pounds, sold for two medjidies, and so on with the rest of the articles, this being especially the case with musical instruments, such as pianos, etc., which had no value at all.[60]

When minor problems arose in the implementation of the confiscations, they were dealt with swiftly. The provincial authorities queried the Interior Ministry about the procedures to follow in the case of sown fields. The ministry ordered that the Abandoned Properties Commission should harvest the fields, deduct its costs from the general revenue and transfer the rest of the amount to the army.[61]

The practice of confiscation was in fact a concrete result of the ideology of 'national economy'. After the 6 January 1916 decree urging confiscated Armenian property to be used for the long-term economic development of Turks (see Chapter 4), one of the most telling examples of this policy was the fate of Tirpanjian's silk factory in Diyarbekir. The factory used to provide work for dozens of employees, mostly Armenians but also Syriacs. Silk was woven, dyed in various colours and processed into regional clothing, characteristic for Diyarbekir. Lütfü Dokucu was the grandson of one of the employees. His grandfather was killed in the genocide when the militia rounded up the employees, executed them outside the city walls and threw their bodies in the river. Müftüzâde Hüseyin, brother of Müftüzâde Şeref, laid his hands on the factory and exploited it in the decades after the war.[62]

After the elimination of the notables, the remaining Armenians were sent off to their deaths. These were mainly women, children and the elderly, although some men were still alive as well. On 2 July a convoy of 600 men was taken away and slaughtered just outside the city walls. Before sending the victims down the Mardin road to the valley, İbrahim Bedri and Memduh resorted to large-scale extortion. On 13 July Memduh negotiated with the families of the Armenian men still in custody about a considerable ransom, which amounted to several hundreds of liras per family. The men were sent off and killed on the Diyarbekir road.[63] When the Danish missionary nurse Hansine Marcher travelled on that road, at some point she noticed five or six corpses laying by the roadside. When she asked the driver about it, he answered that they were 'rich Armenian merchants' who had disguised themselves to prevent being deported. But the men had been detected by some drivers who then killed them and robbed them of their clothes and money.[64] In Diyarbekir, Marcher walked into a café and observed the notables:

> Even though Erzerum and Bitlis had fallen, and Diyarbekir lay open to the enemy, they seemed unaffected. They drank coffee, wine, etc., smoked cigarettes and let, as was customary, the fingers play mechanically with the pearls on the bead of pearls that is always to be found in the pocket of a Turk . . . The big, impressive Gregorian cathedral had been converted into an auction room. It was here that the belongings of the banished Armenians had been brought to. A number of things, for example, linen, kitchen ware, soap, lace, jewelry, ovens, silk, pillows and blankets, honey, flour, shoe polish – everything was lying around in complete disarray and was to be sold at auction.[65]

The expropriation and dispossession of the Diyarbekir Armenians went as fast as their destruction. The movable properties were stolen or usurped by the local authorities, whereas the immovables were perched on by Muslim notables or various state institutions. On 23 November 1916 deportation director Şükrü Kaya ordered that even the possessions of undeported Armenians needed to be liquidated.[66] This was another transgression that demonstrated that one escalation only invited further ones. By the winter of 1915 all that needed to be brought to completion was the redistribution process.

COLONIZATION

Colonizing Armenian property in Diyarbekir did not differ much from other provinces. The four main recipients of Armenian property were the ministries, the bourgeoisie, the settlers and the army. Large buildings were used as prisons, police stations and hospitals. For example, the central police station of Diyarbekir was twice relocated to a new location, in both cases an Armenian-owned building suitable for the purpose.[67] The provincial authorities further reported that three

Armenian churches in Diyarbekir could be used as prisons.[68] As the state was provided for rather well in Diyarbekir, the bulk of Armenian property went to the bourgeoisie and the settlers. The Muslim settlers were to colonize the empty Syriac and Armenian villages, mostly on the Diyarbekir plain. Some were moved north and settled, others were settled on the Mardin plain. Beginning in the summer of 1915 the settlement policy continued until the end of the war.

The settlers that were sent to Diyarbekir were Muslims who had sought asylum in the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan wars. Many of them had lived in Istanbul in shabby dwellings, impoverished and traumatized. When the war broke out, the CUP pursued a policy of 'ethnic reorganization' and the settlers were incorporated in it. The Albanians were but one group to be deported and settled. In June 1915 the Interior Ministry ordered their 'scattered settlement in order for their mother tongue and national traditions to be extinguished quickly'.[69] The Albanians were to be settled all over the empire, including Diyarbekir province.[70] The Bosnian refugees were to be settled in Diyarbekir as well. On 30 June 1915 the Ministry ordered 181 Bosnian families temporarily residing in Konya deported to Diyarbekir and settled in its 'empty villages' – a euphemism for Armenian land.[71] The next day, the deportation and settlement of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria and Greece was ordered from the Ministry.[72]

As the genocide was raging in full force, the Muslim settlers were on their way. Preparations were needed in Diyarbekir in order to lodge the settlers successfully. On 17 June 1915 the Interior Ministry reiterated its request for economic and geographic data on the emptied Armenian villages of Diyarbekir. In order to send settlers to the province, the local capacity to absorb immigrants had to be determined.[73] A week later the Ministry ordered educational commodities to be provided for the settlers (see the order in Chapter 4). This national order was a warrant for the seizure of all Ottoman Armenian schools and their conversion into Ottoman Turkish schools. School benches, blackboards, book cabinets and even paper and pens were allocated to the yet-to-arrive settlers. The Commission for Abandoned Properties was assigned to carry out this operation in Diyarbekir.[74] In the village of Qarabash, for example, the local Armenian school was used as a state school for Turkish children. The building was of such quality that it could function well into the 1990s.[75]

An Armenian survivor recalled how in the late summer of 1915 Turks were settled in Palu. Local officials saw to it that the settlers were given the best houses of the deported Armenians.[76] According to a native of Palu, in the Republican period Palu had a Zaza, a Kurdish and a Turkish neighbourhood. The latter neighbourhood was populated by Pomacs from Thrace.[77] Three weeks after the massacre of the Armenian–Syriac village of Qarabash, the Interior Ministry ordered 'the settlement of the immigrants, the confiscation of movables and pack animals and the reporting of the population settled in emptied Armenian villages'.[78] Colonel Cemilpaşazade Mustafa took control of Qarabash as Pomacs and Kurds were settled in that village.[79] In Kabiye, all property of the indigenous Christians was seized

and assigned to the settlers: vineyards, watermelon fields, agricultural implements and even carrier pigeons. The few survivors who dared to return to their village were chased out by the Muslim settlers.[80] Eqsor village, on the Mardin plain, became a command post for the German army in 1917. The Germans demolished the Syriac Catholic church and built houses with its solid stones, settling Kurdish refugees from the Karahisar region in the village.[81]

The genocide opened a gaping hole in Diyarbekir's socioeconomic landscape. Reconstructing the agricultural infrastructure became a priority for the government. The village of Tell Ermen, the Christian population of which had been integrally massacred in July 1915, was repopulated with Circassians and Chechens. Since the settlers already had ploughs and oxen, all they needed for subsistence farming was seed. The Ministry of War was ordered to provide the requisite seeds, distributing 1,000 cups of barley and 300 cups of wheat from storage depots to the settlers.[82] When the Chechen population surpassed Tell Ermen's capacity, the construction of a new village for the Chechens was ordered in September 1918.[83] These agrarian policies were a knife that cut both ways: they brought manpower to the labour-intensive fields, and they addressed the rampant food shortages. Settlers were generously allocated not only Armenian land, but also seeds and implements taken from the pool of confiscated property.[84]

Besides the agrarian factor, the CUP's pursued an ethnonationalist policy of demographic engineering to fill in the blanks. Having destroyed hundreds of thousands of Armenian peasants, the peasant population of the country needed to be replenished. In the 1917 CUP congress an agreement was signed on (re)settling Muslims in Armenian villages, and refining the administration of the settlements.[85] From then on, one would find specific references to agricultural policy in the Young Turks' deportation orders. On 14 October 1916 the government ordered Kurdish tribesmen from Diyarbekir province deported to central Anatolia via Urfa, specifying that on arrival the settlers were to be employed in the 'farming industry' (*zeriyat işleri*). They were to constitute between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the local population.[86] Refugee-settlers who had fled the Russian occupation and had arrived in Diyarbekir province were supposed to work on the land too. The order read that the settlers were to be provided with pack animals and ploughs in order for them to settle down and 'begin agriculture immediately'.[87] Due to shortages in Diyarbekir, the government ordered potato seeds to be imported from the northern province of Mamuret-ul Aziz.[88]

CORRUPTION

Corruption was a sui generis of the genocide in Diyarbekir, but unlike in other regions, here it was concentrated at the most central level of provincial government: the governor. Although he denied everything in his memoirs, blaming

irregularities on his ignorance of provincial conditions and challenging his denouncers to prove their claims, the evidence of Dr Mehmed Reshid's personal enrichment in the expropriation campaign is overwhelming.[89] Even though he was ordered by Talaat to 'return the cash, jewellery and other property to the Armenians who have been attacked during their deportation',[90] Reshid went as far to even confiscate the property of the American missionaries.[91] As Al-Ghusayn observed during his brief arrest in the Diyarbekir prison, 'All money and valuables were collected by the Commandant of Gendarmerie and the Vali, Reshid Bey, the latter taking them with him when he went to Constantinople.'[92] Reshid later objected to these claims and asked the rhetorical question: 'Have those who utter this heinous slander ever thought of how it would have been possible to carry and hide 200,000 pounds and so many valuables?'[93] But this was possible. According to Dr Hyacinth Fardjalian, Dr Reshid had looted jewellery, precious stones, a pile of carpets and an assortiment of antiquities. Dr Fardjalian related, 'I myself saw Rechid Bey arrive at Aleppo by a train bound for Constantinople with 43 boxes of jewellery and two cases full of precious stones.'[94] When Reshid was assigned the governorship of Ankara in March 1916, he had amassed a fortune from the expropriations. Convinced that he could get away with the embezzlement, he responded to an advertisement in the newspaper *İkdam* for a house worth 9,000 pounds. According to Minister of Education Ahmed Şükrü Bey, 'it was suspicious that Reshid had arrived in Diyarbekir with financial straits but managed to buy that house only two years later.'[95]

Reshid was greedy and hypocritical. He dismissed the mayor of Savur, Mehmed Ali Bey, an opportunist who reportedly had profiteered from the persecution against the Christians. Allegedly, Mehmed Ali was also involved in a series of gambling and sex scandals, and what was worse, in the holy month of Ramadan.[96] The next official to be deposed was İbrahim Hakkı Bey, mayor of Silvan. According to Reshid, he 'distributed Armenian women here and there, stole Armenian property, and exempted Armenians from deportation in exchange for money'.[97] After his dismissal, Reshid appointed Adil Bey, brother of deputy Zülfü Bey, as mayor of Silvan. The militia then cooperated with the local Kurdish chieftain Sadık Bey to carry out the killings in the Silvan district.[98] Another henchman was Çerkez Shakir, who as gendarmerie commander had robbed the Greeks and Armenians of Ankara of 16 cartloads of property, 300 diamond jewels and rings, 40 golden pocket watches and other belongings. The Greek Orthodox Priest of Haymana, Yorgi Efendi, had seen him carry out these acts and attempt to sell the loot.[99] Dr Reshid was reproached not only for having expanded the genocide from Armenians to all Christians, but especially for having used the genocide as an opportunity to enrich himself and his Circassian henchmen at the expense of the creation of the Turkish national bourgeoisie in Diyarbekir. Prominent statesman, poet and publicist Süleyman Nazıf (1870–1927) succinctly commented on this: Talaat scorned Reshid the thief, but praised Reshid the murderer.[100]

The corruption extended to beyond the genocide. By 1918 inflation was rampant and the black market flourished. Fraudulent CUP officials were massively embezzling funds designated for the population. Among them was Kara Kemal, who was fiddling under the cloak of 'economic Turkification'. The misappropriation became somewhat of a sport among a privileged few, creating a stratum living in unrestrained abundance. By the end of the war the press grumbled of a 'class' of officials who had come to constitute a 'war rich' (*harb zengini*).[101] Among local AMMU officials too, corruption was expanding. Talaat considered this utterly unacceptable because it counteracted the deportations and undermined the assimilation program. In November 1916 funds were appropriated for the local AMMU branches: 30,000 pounds were sent to Diyarbekir, 7,000 to Siverek, and 7,000 to Mardin.[102] When the Ministry found out that the allotments were illegally exhausted by police chief Şeyhzâde Kadri Bey and by the vice district governor of Mardin, an investigation was ordered.[103] Another corruption scandal was uncovered in Silvan, where the civil servants had neglected their work, causing many refugee-deportees to starve and live under conditions of utter misery.[104] The Ministry soon found out that it was Silvan's conscription officer, Salih Efendi, and the town's mayor, Cemilpaşazâde Adil Bey, who were in charge of the embezzlements. They had appropriated the daily rations unequally, leaving the deportees 'in an particularly miserable and wretched state' (*fevkâlâde sefil ve perişan bir halde*).[105] Mayor Adil Bey was discharged when the ministry proved he had been secretly selling sacks of rice, designated for the starving deportees, to the population of Silvan for usurious prices.[106]

SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES

At the end of 1917 the culture of embezzlement and moral bankruptcy, combined with economic exhaustion, triggered a national famine that struck the eastern provinces in particular. Locally, prices for bread, meat, sugar, salt, rice, wheat, fat, tea and coffee quintupled. Even local products of which there had been a surplus for ages, such as Diyarbekir rice and watermelons, became very scarce.[107] Although the ministry ordered settlement officials to be cautious of shortages,[108] only in exceptional situations were the deportations cancelled or postponed. For example, only when an entire convoy from Beşiri became ill was their deportation postponed.[109] Nevertheless, because Talaat insisted on deportation, the ministry was often unable to provide even a minimal amount of food for the deportees. In Urfa, many Kurdish children died of starvation due to the too late arrival of the designated amount of flour.[110] In Sivas too, due to negligence 'hundreds of children were wandering around hungry and wretched' (*yüzlerce çocuğun aç ve perişan dolaştıkları*).[111] When there was no food at all, people ate doves, street cats and dogs, hedgehogs, frogs,

moles, snakes and slaughterhouse waste.[112] In some cases the deportees saw no other option than to eat their own relatives who had died on the road.[113] Starvation was but one side of the problem, adequate shelter was another. When an Arab and Kurdish convoy was deported from Diyarbekir westward, nearly the entire convoy froze to death in the desert night. The few remaining survivors were distributed among the local villages.[114] Diyarbekir was severely gripped by famine and local unrest too. The government had prolonged martial law in May 1918,[115] but in reality, chaos ruled the province. Ottoman soldiers who had not been paid in months raided villages, pillaging goods and engaging in skirmishes with the locals.[116] A German report paraphrased the condition of most eastern cities: 'Countless are starving. In every city in the [e]ast the unbearable images of misery are repeated in the street.'[117]

The Armenian population of Diyarbekir province was thoroughly dispossessed, deported and critically reduced in numbers. On 18 September 1915 Reshid wired a telegram to Talaat reporting that 'the number deported from the province amounts to approximately one hundred twenty thousand.' [118] According to a French priest, during the persecutions of 1915–1916 a total of 144,185 Christians disappeared, of which 58,000 were Gregorian Armenians, 11,500 Catholic Armenians, 10,010 Chaldeans, 3,450 Catholic Syriacs, 60,725 Jacobite Syriacs, and 500 Protestants.[119] A higher estimate was calculated by a British military official, who wrote that the total number of victims was made up of 45,000 Gregorian Armenians, 6,000 Catholic Armenians, 7,000 Chaldeans, 2,000 Catholic Syriacs, 96,000 Jacobite Syriacs, and 1,200 Protestants, all in all summing up to 157,000 people victimized.[120] Whatever their precise numbers, the Christian population of Diyarbekir province was all but eradicated. Entire villages, neighbourhoods, parishes and extended families were destroyed or reduced to destitution in the genocidal persecution of 1915. War and genocide had destroyed the economic fabric of Diyarbekir.

The Arpiarians had been one of the most respectable and wealthy notables of Diyarbekir. After the murder of their father, Philibos Arpiarian, whatever was left of the family was deported and ended up in Aleppo. They went from a mansion to a one-room dwelling. As the Arpiarian daughter said, it was a complete reversal in their lifestyle, 'from riches to poverty'. Arshavir did all kinds of work including sewing, handicraft, barter. The 9-year-old Nubar worked in a bakery and was exposed to various health and safety hazards. The family was ultimately dependent on help from a cousin in Beirut. The family moved to Istanbul and in 1920 migrated to the United States via the Holland America Line. On 14 August 1920 they sailed into the port of New York.[121]

The damage to the economy was unimaginable. The genocide amounted to the destruction of the middle class, eradicating entire professions. A French report stated that 'the mass exodus of Christians, most of whom were artisans and merchants, had

created a major economic crisis in the region.'[122] For example, the wine production in the region experienced a dramatic downfall: the Syriac and Armenian winegrowers had been eliminated and failed harvests only contributed to the ruination.[123] The same fate befell the popular Diyarbekir shawl (*puşi*), originally woven with red cotton cloth by Armenians and Syriacs. It disappeared with the disappearance of its producers.[124] Until recently, traditional shawl production was an extinct craft too.[125] But in recent years, Diyarbekir Kurds have tried to resuscitate the crafts their past Armenian neighbours had so skillfully practiced.[126]

A major blow had been delivered to the copper industry. Before the war, 230 copper smiths produced 65,000 to 70,000 kilos of copper in Diyarbekir province on a yearly basis. 'Six hundred masters and workers, all of them Christian, earned their living in this industry, which yielded a net profit of 25 to 30 per cent.' After the deportations and massacres only 30 smiths remained in all of the province, and production dropped to 5 per cent of its prewar volume.[127] Three weeks before the Ottoman defeat, Talaat ordered all remaining craftsmen (some of whom had been exempted from destruction because of their skills) deported to Diyarbekir, where they were concentrated in the inner city. Many of these were smiths.[128] As a result of this policy, even in the 1940s there were still a very small number of Christian copper- and ironsmiths in Diyarbekir.[129] The noted Armenian author Mıgırdiç Margosyan is a child of one of these few surviving families in Diyarbekir's Armenian neighbourhood of Khanchepek. He sketches a nostalgic picture of his youth in the 1940s, when he used to work in his uncle Khachador's smithy. His literary themes revolve around longing, ethnic competition and urban life.[130]

Intimately related to the smiths was, of course, copper mining itself. Armenians were involved in mining and ironwork through cooperating with the Ottoman government. At Ergani Maden, the Ignatiosian family was working in the industry.[131] Talaat Pasha's notebook mentions that Khazaros Chinarian held the concessions for the copper mines at nearby Palu.[132] The destruction of the Maden Armenians equalled the destruction of the Maden economy, since the copper mines were rid of almost all of its miners. Whereas Rafael de Nogales wrote around 26 June 1915 that 'the Argana-Maden mines continued normally', it did not take long for this to change.[133] By the late summer, the Austrian general Josef Pomiankowski travelled through the region and lamented that because of the elimination of the Armenians, 'the priceless ore reserve[s] of Argana are not exploited, and [are] left lying idle.'[134]

The economist Zülküf Aydın has studied the Ergani region in detail. His monograph on a Diyarbekir village followed the life and times of a Kurdish family, the Aydoğans. According to Aydın's detailed research, the head of the Aydoğan family was Zakir Bey, one of the wealthiest notables engaged in trade and moneylending. Zakir Bey was connected to the Armenian elites who were also engaged in trade and small-scale production. In 1915 'some of the rich Armenians, personal friends

of Zakir Bey and his trade partners, left their belongings with Zakir Bey on condition that they would get them back if they returned from wherever they were to be taken by the authorities. However, they never returned. With the expulsion of the Armenians the production of pottery and cotton cloth came to an end in the area.'[135] Having lost his basis for trade, but with some precious metals and money hoarded away, Zakir Bey took his family and moved to Ergani. With the departure of the last man standing of the local economic intelligentsia, any potential for developing the region economically had now been smothered.

THE ARMISTICE

At the end of the war, Dr Mehmed Reshid freely spoke his mind about the killings during his governorship in a personal discussion with CUP party boss, Mithat Şükrü Bleda. When Bleda asked Reshid how he, a doctor, had had the heart to cause the deaths of so many people, Reshid answered:

> Being a doctor could not cause me to forget my nationality! Reshid is a doctor. But he was born as a Turk. [. . .] Either the Armenians were to eliminate the Turks, or the Turks were to eliminate the Armenians. I did not hesitate a moment when I was confronted with this dilemma. My Turkishness prevailed over my profession. I figured, instead of them wiping us out, we'll wipe them out. [. . .] On the question how I, as a doctor, could have murdered, I can answer as follows: the Armenians had become hazardous microbes in the body of this country. Well, isn't it a doctor's duty to kill microbes?[136]

On Bleda's question whether he feared 'historical responsibility', Reshid had answered, 'Let other nations write about me whatever history they want, I couldn't care less.'[137]

In the turbulent period after the Ottoman defeat, the Istanbul press portrayed Dr Reshid as a monster. Süleyman Nazif emphatically wrote that Dr Reshid had 'destroyed through massacre thousands of humans from all groups and religions'.[138] Much to Reshid's chagrin, this vivid demonization was persuasive to the Ottoman population. In Istanbul, the horrors of Diyarbekir province became known and dreadful details of Reshid's reign of terror became the talk of the town. On 5 November 1918 the ex-governor of Diyarbekir was arrested and after a brief prearrest, placed in the maximum-security Bekirağa prison along with other CUP loyalists suspected of having participated in the persecution of the Armenians.[139] In an attempt to clear his name, the arrogant and proud Reshid agreed to give an interview 2 days later, only to find out that the reporter omitted any allusions and

confronted him very directly with the crimes he had committed in Diyarbekir, asking:

> They say you massacred more than 50,000 women, men, children, innocent people including three mayors, and seized 300,000 pounds worth of gold cash and an equal amount of jewels from them. How exaggerated is all of this?
> – Lies, it's all lies!
> Reportedly, you employed a murderer named Major Rüşdü Bey as commander of 30 Circassians he had selected from his clan, to have these helpless people killed.
> – I don't know.
> It is said you had the mayor of Lice town Giridî Ahmed Nesimî Bey, a distinguished reporter also famous in the world of literature and publishing, and the vice mayor of Beşiri, Suveydizâde Sabit Bey of the Baghdad elite, graduate of the School of Civil Service, assassinated when they refused to carry out your order for massacre. What is your defence?
> – It's all slander. Aren't newspapers the source of defamation and anarchy anyway?
> After your predecessor ex-governor Hamid Bey left, it is said you had the helpless people of Mardin massacred without distinction of religion and sect. Were those involved in these events your gendarmes?
> – I have no knowledge of these things. Excuse me, if it'll be like this, I'll walk away![140]

In prison, Reshid, vexed by kidney stones, gradually lost touch with reality and became a nervous wreck. His growing isolation reinforced his paranoia of Armenian and English conspiracies. He kept a diary and wrote his memoirs in response to the public disclosures on his governorship in Diyarbekir. Reshid escaped on his way to the bathhouse on 25 January 1919 and went into hiding with a CUP sympathizer. The ensuing odyssey of hiding bolstered his frustration with clandestine life. Underfed, bitter and desperate, he shot himself in the mouth on the verge of arrest on 6 February 1919.[141]

In the meantime, Armenians survivors from Diyarbekir attempted to return to their homes. As usual, the problem was again the current Muslim occupants of their houses and lands. These new owners now needed to evacuate and relocate. The government gave a clear order to that effect: 'Abandoned property that is currently occupied needs to be emptied bit by bit as the Armenians are returning. But the empty houses need to be protected from destruction.'[142] A lack of clear legislation regarding restitution meant that, in some cases, property that belonged to deceased individuals was restituted to their heirs. One reason for this ad hoc policy was that it was the lesser evil, the best way to reverse the fact of dispossession. On several accounts, the provincial authorities in Diyarbekir informed the government of its policy. In August 1919 it wired Istanbul that it had evacuated a police station and returned the building to the son of a certain Boghos, who had

been expropriated in 1915. Boghos himself had been killed and his son was now entitled to 3,140 cents of outstanding rent. The amount was sent from the Ministry and Boghos' son was refunded.[143]

Besides the return and restitution of Armenians, the government also launched the manhunt for *génocidaires* in the provinces. One of the first genocide perpetrators of Diyarbekir to be arrested after Reshid was the Circassian militia leader Çerkez Harun. Harun was arrested in Diyarbekir city but managed to flee on the way to Istanbul, but he was arrested again around Sivas.[144] Upon arrival in Diyarbekir on 14 May 1919 the Eighth Inquiry Commission ordered the arrest of the militia commanders, at that time de facto in charge of the city. When the police tracked down Yasinzâde Şevki, Halifezâde Salih and Pirinççizâde Sıdkı in front of the telegraph office, the latter opened fire on the police in broad daylight and fled to the countryside.[145] Şevki fled to Qitirbil village.[146] Müftüzâde Şeref was besieged in his house, but refused to surrender and opened fire on the police, setting off a skirmish for 4 hours. When his father, mufti Hacı İbrahim, heard of the encounter, he rushed to the scene and brokered a deal: the parties agreed that Şeref would lodge a statement at the police station in exchange for his release.[147] The mufti of Cizre, Ahmed Hilmi, one of the main organizers of the Cizre massacre, was ordered arrested.[148] However, the influential mufti enjoyed the protection of several powerful Kurdish chieftains of the Cizre region and the government was unable to undertake serious action to arrest him.[149] In the end, the pursuit for the criminals did not produce much result for the government.

When the British government realized that too many CUP members were escaping from the Istanbul prison, it decided to deport 150 of the most important ones to Malta in May 1919.[150] The citadel on the island was furnished as a prison for three groups of Ottoman prisoners: group A for officials accused of having perpetrated massacres, group B for officials accused of having condoned massacres, and group C for officials who were not directly involved in the massacres.[151] Among the Malta deportees were some of the key parties responsible for the atrocities committed in Diyarbekir. Aziz Feyzi, after Reshid, the second most important man in wartime Diyarbekir, was arrested on 15 January 1919 and deported with Diyarbekir deputy Zülfü Tiğrel, first to Egypt and then to Malta. On arrival at the island Feyzi was placed in group A where he spent 2 years.[152] According to a cellmate, Feyzi was an optimistic captive, predicting, 'We will drive our enemies into the sea, clang clang, you'll see.'[153] Ex-mayor of Mardin and Governor of Diyarbekir, İbrahim Bedreddin, was deported to Malta in February 1919 where he was surprisingly placed in group C. On 6 September 1921 Aziz Feyzi, İbrahim Bedri and 14 other inmates escaped from Malta and fled to Anatolia, where they joined the Kemalist shadow government, at that time on a meteoric rise to national power.[154] They returned to Diyarbekir and assumed their old posts.

Anyone in Diyarbekir who had committed crimes against the Christians was embarrassed by the Istanbul government's policy. Those who were utterly hostile to the non-Muslims in the province, notably CUP members, now declared loyalty to the Kemalist movement because of their mutual interests. The Kemalists too needed to consolidate their position in Diyarbekir, and the existing CUP infrastructure proved ideologically congruent and pragmatically useful. Colonel Mustafa Bey of the noted Kurdish Cemilpaşazâde dynasty (an important actor in the Special Organization militia his supervisor, the late Dr Reshid, had organized in 1915) was a capable manager of the intrigues and differences of opinion in the Diyarbekir elite.[155] On 22 May 1919 he convened the first meeting of the notables in the large salon of the town hall. The men agreed on founding a local nationalist resistance faction named 'Society for Defence of the Nation' (*Müdafaa-ı Vatan Cemiyeti*). Among its members were deputy Zülfü's brother İhsan Hamid Tiğrel, mufti Hacı İbrahim Uluğ, ex-mayor of Maden Dr Osman Cevdet Akkaynak, Hacı Niyazi Çıkıntaş, Mustafa Âkif Tütenk, Pirinççizâde Sıdkı Tarancı and Cemilpaşazâde Kasım Bey.[156] Out of protest against the occupation of İzmir and a possible Armenian state in the eastern provinces, the group sent a telegram to the Istanbul government containing the following denunciation of Grand Vizier Damat Ferit Paşa: 'The eastern provinces are no inherited property from your Albanian father for you to render to the Armenians.'[157] The Diyarbekir Society had now taken a stance and had openly flirted with the Kemalists.

It did not take long for an answer to dawn on the Kemalist shadow government. On 1 June 1919 Mustafa Kemal asked the governor of Diyarbekir, Faik Ali Bey, whether a local branch of the Society for the Defense of National Rights in the Eastern Provinces had been founded. Vice Governor Mustafa Nadir replied that no other party than the Freedom and Coalition Party existed in Diyarbekir.[158] The Diyarbekir elite now knew enough: they unilaterally had their own organization merge with the Kemalist mainstream and renamed it Society for the Defense of National Rights in the Eastern Provinces, appointing militia major Yasinzâde Şevki leader of the society. The Diyarbekir elite was now allowed to send deputies to the Kemalist power centre, which willingly accepted the allegiance. The society elected mufti Hacı İbrahim Uluğ, Nâzım Önen, Bekir Sıdkı Ocak and Circiszâde Abdülgani Göksu.[159] This political dichotomy between Istanbul and Ankara caused confusion among local officials. Vice Governor Mustafa Nadir, confronted with two governments giving contradictory orders, on 21 June forwarded Mustafa Kemal's orders to the Istanbul government and requested instructions on what to do. Istanbul answered: 'Mustafa Kemal Paşa has been discharged from office and his movement is illegal. His orders need to be rejected. Immediately report the purpose of the Erzurum congress.'[160] However, it was too late for words of reproach, since the symbiosis between the Kemalist resistance and the residual CUP elite of Diyarbekir was realized.

Ankara needed the Diyarbekir elite to implement its policy on the Armenians, which policy was marked by the equation of Armenian claims on Anatolia with 'western imperialism'. As Mustafa Kemal explained in response to a question on the Armenians, 'We cannot prohibit individuals to enter the country. Apart from the Armenians, the Chaldeans and Assyrians want this land too. If we have to provide all of them a homeland there won't be any left for us. That's how much land they are demanding.'[161] In response to Istanbul's policy, the Ankara government launched a new Turkification campaign and gradually expelled genocide survivors and returnees southward.[162] Since efforts to prosecute the Diyarbekir elite had failed, men like Müftüzâde Şeref and (after his escape) Aziz Feyzi regained local power and were employed for this purpose. The campaign began producing results in 1923 and culminated in the expulsion of thousands of Syriacs and Armenians in the summer of the following year.[163] This policy consisted of dispossession of immovable property, concentration in the major cities and summary expulsion to Syria. According to the British authorities, up to 40,000 Armenians were expelled to Syria in the 1920s. Their passports were stamped: 'never to enter Turkey again', 'return to Turkey prohibited', 'never to return again'.[164] Throughout the late 1920s, thousands of Diyarbekir Armenians left for Syria. Most of them had to abandon their property according a decree dated 1 January 1929, which stipulated that Armenians in Turkey were not allowed 'to sell or bequeath their property', which at death would be assigned to 'the state'.[165] After this final blow, the Armenians of Diyarbekir had been critically reduced and could be counted on the fingers of one hand.

These developments demonstrate the seamless continuity between the İttihadists and the Kemalists at local level. The examples of Adana and Diyarbekir must stand for most other provinces, although only more research would provide definitive answers.

THE REPUBLIC

After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the economic situation in Diyarbekir was wretched. A British agent travelled to Diyarbekir in 1920 and noticed that business was at a virtual standstill.[166] But still the Young Turks pursued policies of exclusion and economic nationalism. The regime convened an economic congress in İzmir in 1923, during which the Justice Minister, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, underlined the continuing importance of 'eliminating the non-Muslim entrepreneurs from the country's economic life and promote Turkish businessmen in their stead.'[167] In addition, the Turkish parliament on 31 May 1926 passed Law nr.882, which assigned property to the families of CUP leaders assassinated by Armenian hitmen.[168]

A striking example of these types of compensation efforts concerns governor Dr Mehmed Reshid, who had left behind a family that took on the surname Şahingiray,

derived from Reshid's nom de guerre in the CUP (Şahin Giray – after the last Khan of Crimea). In the summer of 1928 the Ministry of Economy allocated the following property to his wife, Mazlume Hanım: two shops, with a total worth of up to 15,000 Turkish liras, located on the Cadde-i Kebir,[169] numbers 105 and 187. The shops had been confiscated from the deported Armenians Anton and Abraham and their wives Sirpoohi and Astineh. Reshid's family also received two houses, worth 6,000 Turkish liras, on Rasim Paşa Street, numbers 70/144 and 70/142, located in the Osman Ağa neighborhood of Kadıköy. In addition, 1,000 Turkish liras cash was remitted to them. The order was signed 21 August 1928 by the Minister of Economy and the Governor of Istanbul.[170] A year and a half later, the Prime Ministry issued the following decree:[171]

> Turkish Republic
> Prime Ministry
> Directorate of Transactions
> Number: 2855
> *DECREE*
> Supplement to order number 5394, dated 3 July 1927
> In addition to the property worth 15,000 Lira, which was previously given to the family of the dignitary Doctor Reshid Bey, who was martyred by Armenian komitadjis, they will also be assigned: the house on Kır Street number 12/143 in Kadıköy, abandoned by Tahtaburunian, and the shop on Kurtuluş Road no.115, abandoned by Vicken Hokachian.
> General Directorate of Estates' proposal number 71877/122, dated 12 December 1929 was accepted and approved at the Cabinet's general meeting of 12 February 1930.
> *signed* PRESIDENT
> Gazi Mustafa Kemal
>
Prime Minister	Justice Minister	National Defence Minister
İsmet	Mahmut Esat	Mustafa Abdülhalik
Interior Minister	Foreign Minister	Minister of Economy
Şükrü Kaya	Tevfik Rüştü	Şükrü Saraçoğlu

These documents on Dr Reshid's family suggest (1) that the redistribution of Armenian wealth was a matter of top cabinet meetings, not lower echelons; (2) that the original owners of the property were known; and most important, (3) that the *génocidaires*' families were generously compensated from Armenian property. Moreover, this document is signed by several veteran Young Turks who had been among the arch-perpetrators of the genocide. The allocation of property to their comrades' families might have been a form of posthumous protection, as is common in organized crime.

The Pirinççizâde cousins, Aziz Feyzi and Bekir Sıdkı (1888–1973), were richly rewarded too. The cousins had recruited the perpetrators to murder the Armenian elite of the city, expanded the genocide into the vast countryside and amassed a

fortune by plundering the Diyarbekir Armenians. Following the 1918 Ottoman surrender, the Pirinççizâdes threw their lot in with the Kemalists. Aziz Feyzi was promoted to Minister of Public Works and was assigned a spacious house in Kadıköy, 'on the tram road, on the left side before Altıyol'.[172] During the 1925 Kurdish conflict and ensuing massacres and deportations of Kurdish civilians, he provided logistical support and manpower to the government. In May 1927 Aziz Feyzi was decorated with the red Independence Medal by chairman of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Abdulhalik Renda (1881–1957), for his 'devoted service (*fedakarâne hizmeti*) to the National Struggle'.[173] (Former district governor of Mardin İbrahim Bedreddin was also rewarded through a promotion and pension rights.)[174]

Cousin Pirinççizâde Bekir Sıdkı had enriched himself from Armenian property to the extent that he could afford to send his son to Paris for higher education, amidst the economic crisis of the 1930s. (The young man grew up to become Cahit Sıtkı Tarancı (1910–1956), one of the most celebrated poets of modern Turkey.)[175]According to friends of the family, in the 1930s and 1940s, Sıdkı Tarancı owned apartments and shops in Istanbul's Eminönü and Beyoğlu districts, where all property accorded to 'the fashion of the day: seats, comfortable and high-backed chairs; from the fork in your hand to the tablecloth; from the chandelier that catches the eye to the crystal vase, everything displayed indulgence and money.' The family was living in 'glaring wealth' (*göze batan zenginlik*).[176] They went on to play a vital role in Diyarbekir's political life and open a lucrative travel bureau in Istanbul. All in all, the genocide was a major impulse to the wealth and careers of low-level genocide perpetrators such as the Pirinççizâde cousins Aziz Feyzi and Bekir Sıdkı.

After these allocations, the economy was rebuilt with the start-up capital of Armenian property. To gain fresh insights on the Turkish state and society, in 1926 the Kemalists invited the philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952) and the German pedagogue George Kerschensteiner (1854–1932). Dewey travelled through Turkey, characterized the economic situation as 'a tragedy with only victims, not heroes', and observed:

> We were in Brusa, the seat of the Ottoman power before the capture of Constantinople, one of the most beautiful and in natural promise most prosperous of the cities of Anatolian Turkey. As we walked the streets we passed alternately by the closed shops and houses formerly kept by Greeks and Armenians who are now dead or deported in exchange for Turks in Greece, and by the ruins of buildings of the Turkish population burnt by the Greeks in their retreat . . . There was a jumble with no outstanding fact except that of general suffering and ruin.[177]

Dewey specifically commented on the disappearance of the tobacco industry, which 'told the same tale as the declining silk cocoon business, the latter languishing because it was the industry of Greeks now forced to remove'.[178] Due to his illness, Kerschensteiner sent his student Kühne, who issued a 1926 report in which he

advocated the abolition of Arabic script and the adoption of Latin letters, increased education for girls and recommended courses in home economics. He pointed out Turkey's dire need for skilled labour and technicians and proposed the establishment of vocational schools in all technical fields, for example, schools for machinists, architects, engineers and other groups to repair the damaged economy.[179] As a response to this kind of foreign advice and internal deliberations, the Kemalist government set up the Superior Economic Council in 1927 to advise the government concerning economic legislation and the start of the industrialization drive.[180]

In the 1930s, the Kemalists went through a distinct process of ideological change. But most of their ideals were in full consonance with those of the earlier days of the CUP, in particular their interpretation of progressivism and developmentalism. Turkey was to foster a strong and varied internal market through the power of the government to make, improve and reshape the society – with the aid of scientific knowledge, technology and practical experimentation.[181] To that end, the regime established 'model' institutions: 'model schools', 'model factories', 'model hospitals'. This was an expression of its ideological agenda of reshaping society through modernist architecture. Whereas Ankara is possibly the best example of this process, Diyarbekir too was reshaped through urban planning and continued economic nationalism. Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya laid out the principles of the Kemalists' ideology of developmentalism in his many public speeches. Kaya spoke of an 'economic war' (*iktisat savaşı*) and urged for vigilance:

> We need to really understand that we are facing a truly national and truly existential cause. It should be the duty of every citizen to willingly and lovingly use local products and build the independence of our national economy (*millî iktisadiyatımız*). The measures that our state has taken and will take regarding the building and completing of our national economy will very soon elevate our homeland and nation to the level of the advanced nations, and restore our historical and original role of avant-garde nation.[182]

Kaya gave the example of the copper mines of Ergani, which were being reached by rail for effective exploitation. Turkish engineers were working with Turkish rail workers and Turkish miners for the benefit of the Turkish economy. Thus, he concluded, it was a national duty to buy bonds from the Ergani Copper Route. One of the vectors of the 'national economy' was the 'Local Products Weeks' (*Yerli Mallar Haftası*). In a radio speech of 16 December 1935 Kaya addressed the nation, revelling in the fact that 'nowadays on the Istanbul markets, Diyarbekir grain is being sold. The same Istanbul where, until the Republican era, one would eat American flour and Romanian grain, and the Diyarbekir grain could not go south and would rot in the silos.'[183] As for manufactured products such as textiles, they used to be manufactured by Armenians, and now by Turks. The old Armenian crafts and artisanship were now reinvented through a modern prism by the local Young Turk

elite. The developmentalism of the Kemalists could also be seen as a panacea against the disappearance of those Armenian businesses. Three important economic fields needed to be revived: agriculture, silk and copper.

Agriculture in Diyarbekir had taken a serious blow. Whereas the (mostly Kurdish) pastoralist population was intact, a large group of the peasant population had been destroyed. The government now attempted to close the gap through a great leap forward. In the 1920s it established a model farm in the once-productive Syriac and Armenian village of Qitirbil to revive the 5,000 acres of barren, 'abandoned' land. The farm was to constitute a 'model' to be emulated by local farmers and generate agrarian development. A Fordson tractor was imported from the United States and the area was equipped with a rain meter and thermograph, imported from Western Europe. The government distributed free seed to peasants and helped them in the struggle against vermin.[184] A stallion stable was built for 50,000 liras and thousands of free saplings were distributed to the villagers.[185] The local authorities also collected agricultural know-how from old Armenian and Syriac villages such as Akpınar, Devegeçidi, Yeniköy, Kabiye, Qitirbil, Aşağıhanik, Yukarıhanik, Altıakar, Güzelşeh, Giyiktepe, Üçkuyu, Cimikan, Ekinciyan and Şerbeti. Provincial director of agrarian affairs, Halil Yardımcı of the Ensarioğlu tribe, sent envoys consisting of doctors, teachers, veterinarians and health inspectors to these villages to research their agrarian and social situations. More than 571 kilogrammes of oat seed, and 40 kilogrammes of melon and watermelon seeds were distributed free of charge. Furthermore, 500 Rhode Island and Leghorn chickens were given out to the villagers, with instructions on how to breed them.[186]

Industry was being developed too. Diyarbekir saw the construction of a power plant, the development of an electricity network and the establishment of liquor, brick and ice factories. The old flour factory of the Pirinççizâde family, established in 1912 just south of the city, first ran on a water mill.[187] In 1929 Aziz Feyzi modernized the factory by importing a gasoline motor of 55 horsepower from Dresden. The factory was worth 100,000 liras and could annually produce up to 40,000 sacks of flour, approximately 8million kilogrammes. In the 1930s a second flour factory was established, together with cocoon and silk workshops.[188] This brings us to two of Diyarbekir's most prized products: copper and silk.

On 27 January 1924 Kâzım Vehbi Oral spoke in a closed session of the Republican People's Party. A member of parliament for Diyarbekir, Oral argued that when the Maden Armenians were still exploiting the mines, the copper was being mined and 'the townsfolk were able to progress and flourish.' But, he regretted, unfortunately, after the war this modicum of development was nipped in the bud and the state-owned copper mines were lying fallow. Moreover, Oral concluded, this was not only the case with the Ergani-Maden copper mines, but also with the 'delicious and pleasant fruits of Malatya and the infinite agricultural potential of the valleys of Muş'. Oral urged the government to make serious work out of these industries and requested

funds for developing the copper mines in Diyarbekir.[189] Ten months later, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü conceded after a brief study that the Ergani mines indeed lacked mining and would be exploited.[190] When Celal Bayar toured the region in 1934 and 1936, he reported that the mines needed to be invested in.[191] Subsequently, the government invited Prof. Ernst Justus Kohlmeyer (1884–1962) in 1936 to Ergani to work on the mines.[192]

> In the Ergani Mines complete modernization is being carried out under the guidance of German experts, and includes structural renovations and the entire machinery and technical equipment. It is expected that the alterations will be terminated in May 1938, whereupon operations can begin on a large scale with all the aids of modern engineering. A yearly output ranging between 7,000 and 10,000 tons of copper ore is expected.[193]

Copper was then mined by the state-owned Etibank. The yield was 24,000 tons, of which 16,000 tons were exported to Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America – generating up to US$17 million. It took a while, but ultimately the copper mines did become profitable for the government.

The second important industry in Diyarbekir that had been dominated by Armenians was the textile industry, in particular the silk business. In 1922 an Armenian expert by the name of Grigor Torgomian could still write an Ottoman-language book on silk production. But this was an anachronism, a relic of the past fading away under the onslaught of Turkish modernity.[194] In Diyarbekir, the silk factory of Tirpanjian had been confiscated by Müftüzâde Hüseyin and Direkçizâde Tahir. Under their rule, the silk-weaving workplaces were gradually industrialized.[195] The government opened a vocational school for silk production in 1930, educated dozens of young apprentices and supported the nouveau riche by providing practical and financial help. Hüseyin and Tahir used the silk looms they had taken in 1915 and produced all kinds of textile products, such as shawls and overcoats.[196] During the 1938 İzmir fair, Diyarbekir's contribution to the 'national economy' was evaluated by the Kemalist regime. It boasted the quality and quantity of regional wheat, barley, watermelons, rice and other local produce. Various breeds of livestock and silk production were evaluated, with charts always moving onward and upward. The genocide had done enough damage as it is, but Uluğ's silk workshop in Diyarbekir city also contributed to the downfall of rural silk production because of centralization and government support. Table 6.1 summarizes the declining silk production.[197]

The craft was modestly industrialized. When the Kemalists held another economic forum at İzmir in 1938, one of the major factories boasted was the Hüseyin Uluğ Silk Textile Factory (*Hüseyin Uluğ İpek Dokuma Fabrikası*). The workshop expanded into a business with basic industrial methods and a nationwide clientele.[198]

Table 6.1 Silk production in Diyarbekir.

Years	Villages producing silk
1933	324
1934	135
1935	146
1936	103
1937	79
1938	n/a

Source: İzmir Fuarında Diyarbakır 1938, p.32.

The craftsmanship and virtuosity of Armenians was no longer a part of the production process, but the fertility of the soil and quality of the water still contributed to quality mulberry trees and silk worms.

In the late autumn of 1931 Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya took an inspection tour around the eastern provinces, especially along the Turkish–Syrian border. Kaya wrote an exceptional report on the economic situation in the area, including the silk business. He discussed the impact of the new border on Aleppo, once a centre of craft and trade, but now firmly in decline. According to Kaya, Aleppo had lost its hinterland, the strip of land from Adana to Diyarbekir, and was suffering for it. He noted that most merchants were Armenians and Syriacs, many of whom were still working in their traditional and ancestral professions, such as silk production. There was a considerable economic boom in the deportation region, roughly coinciding with the provinces of Aleppo and Der ez-Zor. Kaya observed with surprise that for the purpose of trade, Armenians were still travelling to the eastern provinces. (The eastern provinces had been a forbidden zone for Armenians since 1923.) They knew the language, the terrain, the climate, still maintained many personal contacts in the region and profited from the porous border to perpetuate their businesses. Diyarbekir Armenians would open up silk workshops wherever they had been stranded in Syria and would still supply their former neighbours in Diyarbekir with quality silk products. To Kaya's astonishment, in Diyarbekir, smuggled wear could make up to 60 per cent of the entire market in products such as sugar, petrol, matches, flints, alcohol, salt and most of all, silk. The reason was, according to local Turkish merchants who had spoken to Kaya, that they found the quality/price relationship simply impossible to compete with. Kaya concluded his report with several recommendations. He argued for a tightening up of the customs, (more resources, more funding, more manpower, more training, more jurisdiction, heavier punishments), sharper surveillance on the border, lowering the prices of smuggled goods in Turkey and combating smuggling and corruption.[199]

Apart from the fact that this report was written by one of the mid-level perpetrators of the genocide who, as an archnemesis, again pursued Armenians to assault

their livelihood, the report also truly captures the essence of 'national economy'. Even though economies have a tendency to organize themselves through supply and demand, the Young Turks intervened in multiple ways in the economy by controlling prices, warding off supply and forcibly excluding producers. A long-term consequence of Kaya's recommendations also was that the Turkish–Syrian border was hermetically sealed. The reality of Armenian manufacturers and Syriac workers from British-owned mines sending goods through German-owned railways and supplying French port cities had to be changed into Turkish workers drawing Turkish raw materials from Turkish mines and sending them by Turkish railways to supply Turkish consumers.

How successful was the new Turkish bourgeoisie ultimately? The list of members of Diyarbekir's Chamber of Commerce is telling. Originally, the chamber was established in December 1906 by the governor; the first chairman was Muharremoğlul Bekir and the first secretary was Ziya Gökalp. But the government had proclaimed law number 655 in 1925, which stipulated that the Chambers of Commerce in Turkey had to be 'beneficial to the national economy'. In Diyarbekir, the number of members grew rapidly, from 432 in 1934 to 800 in 1938. Its chairman during the 1930s was Nedim Pirinççioğlu, a cousin of Aziz Feyzi.[200] The Diyarbakir stock market was established in March 1931 and fully conformed to the 'national bourgeoisie' envisioned by the CUP. All members were CUP activists, including many *génocidaires*.[201] The Young Turks had successfully displaced the Armenians from their socioeconomic niches and replaced them, for example with intermediaries with western firms. According to reports in the 1930s, the importers and representatives of various companies including Ford, Dodge, and Chevrolet were men from the Pirinççioğlu and Uluğ families.[202] The national economy was beginning to take shape.

DISCUSSION

The genocide devastated Diyarbekir province. More than a hundred thousand human lives were destroyed, social ties were ravaged, the religious infrastructure demolished. Perhaps the deadliest blow had been dealt to the economy of Diyarbekir, city and countryside. After 1915 the bazaar was severely crippled and hundreds of villages with their farmland had been made defunct. The Ottoman province Diyarbekir served as a platform for exemplifying how local dynamics shaped the Armenian genocide at the provincial level as a product of competition between families. The competition between urban elites was a major factor that contributed to the intensity of the violence in Diyarbekir and the levels of popular involvement in spoliation. Before the war, the main families in the city were engaged in a fierce struggle for political and economic power. Such a structural factor could easily be

manipulated by the CUP dictatorship for its own ends, as collaboration would be rewarded. The war put even more pressure on this field of competition as resources became scarcer and passivity posed a threat to one's livelihood. A leading family such as the Pirinççizâdes emerged victorious from this competition by volunteering in the Special Organization militias, by being more ruthless in their competitive efforts and by actively collaborating with the campaign the CUP regime deemed most salient: the murder of their Armenian neighbours. The genocide then emerged as an opportunity for perpetrators to enrich themselves and thereby to solidify kin ties. When a man like Aziz Feyzi proved to be a most ruthless tormentor of Armenians, it is likely that in his eyes he was only pursuing the financial interests of his family.

The Pirinççizâde clan sustained and expanded its wealth and power. Aziz Feyzi had seven children: Edip, Vefik, Nezihe, Remziye, Hikmet, Kadriye and Ali Fethi.[203] The Pirinççizâde scions were successful in their professions. Vefik Pirinççioğlu (1909–1984) served as Finance Inspector, Interior Minister under İsmet İnönü, Minister of State and Diyarbekir's member of parliament for the Republican People's Party (CHP). He profited of the Wealth Tax, a thinly disguised measure that was imposed on non-Muslims (Jews, Greeks, Armenians, Levantines). Its consequences were large-scale dispossession and ruination of the victims, as well as property transfer, whose beneficiaries were Turks.[204]

Ali Fethi Pirinççioğlu began his career writing for the Kemalist newspaper *Cumhuriyet* and later became a public relations director at BP. He became General Director of Press and Tourism, and established a successful firm (*VIP Turizm*) in 1968. Later he worked for the New York office of the Directorate General of Press and Information of Turkey. His job description responsibility was the promotion of Turkey and Turkish tourism, and ever since, he was considered the doyen of Turkish tourism. His wife was equally impressive: Hayrünnisa İnci Pirinççioğlu (1923–2001) was the first Turkish woman to receive a Fulbright scholarship and go on to study as correspondent at Haverford College and Columbia University in the 1950s. She was a powerful symbol of emancipation and a role model for Turkish women professionals.[205] The couple returned from the United States after a few years, established an interpreters school and worked as tour operators. It can safely be said that the couple pioneered the tourism industry in Turkey. They moved back to New York City and worked there as tourism attachés. Their children Yasemin and Ceylan run the firm nowadays.[206] Ceylan Pirinççioğlu (1957), currently CEO of the firm, is one of the most successful tourism operators in Turkey. According to the company's website, 'it successfully completed thousands of individual and group journeys from all corners of the world, and secured the influx of millions of dollars in foreign currency to Turkey.'[207] Fluent in several languages, Ceylan was educated at Istanbul's French schools and studied at

Bogaziçi, Oxford and Yale Universities, as well as NYU. He was involved in a range of businesses, activities and associations, and even served as honorary consul general.

Diyarbekir Armenian families who had been dispossessed and destroyed fared ill. For example, a descendant of the silk-producing Tirpandjian family was encountered driving a taxi in New York City.[208] Ottoman society lost some of its best artisans, teachers, intellectuals, economists, writers and musicians. The French authorities in Syria kept a log of the professions and occupations of the Armenians expelled from Diyarbekir province in the 1920s. A list of 380 people, prepared from August to November 1929, demonstrates the following data for 186 men: 1 tiler, 8 cobblers, 3 stonemasons, 2 pottery workers, 2 plasterers, 4 tinsmiths, 17 laborers, 1 dyer, 7 blacksmiths, 111 farmers, 5 clergy, 2 grocers, 3 carpenters, 3 millers, 2 tailors, 1 candle manufacturer, 1 goldsmith, 2 sawyers, 2 merchants, 2 bricklayers, 1 baker, 1 fitter, 3 weavers, 1 saddler and a latherer. The other 194 were women, normally housewives, mothers and peasants.[209]

But the impoverishment as a result of the genocide was not only of a material nature; it also had an immaterial, cultural dimension. Among these expellees to Aleppo were the family of the magnificent musician Onnik Dinkjian, who would tour the world singing songs in Diyarbekir's Armenian dialect. Thanks to Dinkjian and artists like him, local 'Dikranagertsi' songs such as 'Amenoo Daran', 'Yardile', 'Es Kisher', and 'Hele Hele/Halay' were preserved.[210] Anything that was not preserved died an irreversible death.

7

Conclusion

On the eve of World War I, more than two million Armenians lived in the Ottoman Empire. Apart from a kaleidoscope of private property, that community owned 2,538 churches, 451 monasteries, and 1,996 schools. In the spring of 1915 the Young Turk government made several decisions that affected the Ottoman Armenian community in a profound and irreversible way. What made the massacres genocidal is that the killings targeted the abstract category of group identity, in that all Armenians, loyal or disloyal, were deported and massacred. By the end of the war the approximately 2,900 Anatolian Armenian settlements (villages, towns, neighbourhoods) were depopulated and the majority of its inhabitants massacred. Today, virtually no Armenians live in the Anatolian hinterland any longer. Outside of Istanbul, Armenians nowadays possess six churches, no monasteries, and no schools.[1] This raw material sketches the contours of a morally, emotionally, and politically sensitive and above all, complex history.

The evidence marshalled in this book may merit several conclusions. The genocide was sewn with many threads and in order to unravel the whole, it helps to analytically distinguish several processes in the genocide. Reducing the Armenian genocide to 'mere' mass murder would downplay its complexity. The genocide consisted of a set of overlapping processes that geared into each other and together produced an intended and coherent system of destruction. These processes were dismissals from office, expropriation, mass murder, deportations, forced assimilation, destruction of material culture and the construction of an artificially created famine region. So too the expropriation process cannot be pressed into a straitjacket of a single policy or law. The process consisted of direct versus technical looting, that is, erecting bureaucratic structures and legal directives to facilitate dispossession. The methods were manifold too and consisted, for example, of spoliation through purchase: amidst increasingly repressive conditions, Turks bought Armenian property to prevent it from going underground. Some property was sold to the government obligatorily, for public works, for example. Then there was spoliation through direct confiscation, the unilateral declaration that an owner has lost possession of his property or capital. At the outbreak of war, requisitioning was a pretext for massive dispossession of Armenians, in particular metals and resources for the war effort. Indirectly, the expropriation process can also be seen as a form of imposed compensation for Ottoman war losses, as the fallacy was that

'revolutionaries' had sabotaged the war effort. Finally, liquidation of all Armenian community organizations such as guilds and social clubs was a final form of spoliation.

We can now return to the questions posed in the first chapter.

The first question we posed was: was confiscation of the victim group economically motivated as a mere instrument for material gain? Or was it a corollary effect of the ideology of destruction? In other words, was the expropriation of Armenians an answer to the empire's fiscal crisis and economic malaise? No records indicate that financial or economic considerations were pertinent. Ideologically motivated elements of an anti-Armenian policy, which, although built on economic hostility to the Armenians and carrying economic consequences, were not primarily motivated by economic impulses and interests. The expropriation of Armenians was not an emergency measure the Young Turk regime took to close gaps in state finances. The Young Turks made it clear, time and again, that the 'Armenian question' constituted a national question, not an economic one.[2] Most of all, if the Armenians' ties to Anatolia comprised their ownership of property, then to break those ties, the property needed to be appropriated. In other words, the object of Young Turk policies was not the property, but the people.

The second, related problem is the axis of tension between national policy versus regional interpretation. Regionalism, and transcendence of regionalism, are important themes in recent genocide research. How did the expropriation of Armenians in the former provinces differ from the latter? The variations in which the Young Turk elites of Ottoman cities developed relatively independent approaches of their own were partly dependent on the degree of conviction of or scepticism regarding Turkish nationalism's economic elites. Talaat's many property directives sent signals to provincial party bosses that were unmistakable and triggered a widespread radicalization from below. Some did misread the laws and went on an orgy of pillage (and murder). This was an unintended consequence of the policy of 'Turkification', but very few culprits could count on draconic punishments. The only prowlers who were penalized were Kurdish chieftains who were deported in the 1920s and 1930s according to new, nationalist population policies.[3]

The local dynamics influenced the course and intensity of the genocidal processes. In Adana and Diyarbekir local political or social elites expedited and intensified the genocidal destruction steered from above.[4] The top political elite recruited local power holders for their ends, and conversely local power holders manipulated political elites to further their own interests. The potential of powerful local families to mobilize dozens, or in some cases, hundreds of potential killers contributed to them being favored by the centre. Mass murder developed from this mutual dependence and tacit pact: local elites depended on the centre to secure a power base, and the centre depended on local elites to carry out genocide. This dynamic gave rise to a mobilization process in which men participated in mass

killing in exchange for economic and political benefits granted by the regime. Thus, ethnic hatred significantly contributed to the destruction, but it does not necessarily satisfactorily explain the mobilization of perpetrators. Rather, maintaining and increasing power for local actors shaped patterns of recruitment for and participation in genocide.

The cases studied in this book suggest that after 1915 the process of state formation in Turkey was partly secured through the government's policy of property transfer. The expropriation process generated a nationwide network of notables loyal to the CUP in the coming decades, long enough to durably consolidate the party's grip on the state. The distribution of Armenian property was organized in such a way that it satisfied these influential families in the Ottoman Empire, but the relationship between the expropriations and the genocide was a two-way process: the Young Turk regime distributed Armenian property to local elites in exchange for support for the genocide. In other words, it was a win-win situation. The regime bought the loyalty of the old urban aristocracy by appealing to their sense of economic self-interest and thereby created a new bourgeoisie.

Third, what was the scope of the dispossession process? In other words, how wide was the circle of profiteurs? Did just the Young Turk elite, from the imperial capital down to the provincial towns, profit from it, or did much wider classes in Turkish society benefit? The state profited greatly from the expropriation: Ministries were lavished with Armenian property, in particular buildings and land. Institutional involvement was as significant as individual participation. In some cases there was direct state involvement; in other cases there was pressure on existing bureaucracies, such as civilian supervisory administration. Amidst the hardships of war, many bystanders too were easily tempted into a trade-off and got involved with the genocide one way or another. Although some elite families supported the destruction and expropriation out of ideological convictions, the evidence also suggests large-scale corruption and embezzlement in the confiscations. As a result, as Ayhan Aktar has cogently argued, the Young Turks 'became the only interpreters of the collective will'.[5] After their expulsion, businesses and properties belonging to Armenians were expropriated and most of them handed over to CUP supporters. The businesses were mismanaged and industries collapsed from lack of maintenance, proving disastrous for the already ailing economy. The Turkish middle class, new and old, profited in two ways from the economic destruction of Armenians: through the direct redistribution of wealth and the disappearance of competent competition.

What was the locus of the expropriation in the emerging Turkish nation state? Was the confiscation of Armenian property crucial for the viability of the Turkish nation state? Or did the event, catastrophic as it was for Ottoman Armenians, have a negligible impact on that state? When we look at Appendix 1, we cannot but suggest that all of this property must have had a very significant, traceable impact on the economic development of the Turkish Republic ['*Tableau approximatif des*

réparations et indemnités pour les dommages subis par la nation arménienne en Arménie de Turquie et dans la République arménienne du Caucase']. There is hardly a diplomatic way of phrasing these facts: the modern Turkish economy was for a large part established, quite fundamentally, on the Young Turk seizure of Ottoman Armenian property. Economic destruction served and precipitated economic construction. But how exactly the confiscations impacted the Turkish economy is a challenging question to research and answer.

In this book, we have discussed the economic consequences of the genocide for the victims, the perpetrators and the region, both in the short term and the long term. The axis of tension in this theme is ruination versus enrichment. One aspect we have not fully delved into is the consequence of the genocide for the region itself. On the short term, it can be argued that the Armenian genocide dictated the economic collapse of Eastern Anatolia. The peripheral region has lacked a crucial amount of farmers, craftsmen and intellectuals, as a result of which it has been hardly able to develop itself. Contemporary observers were aware of the fact that the genocide had profoundly corroded the economic fabric of the area. A British diplomat travelled to the east in 1929 and wrote about Bitlis:

> [. . .]a tragic spectacle. For a whole mile the ruined houses succeed one another on each of the steep sides of the gorge. Along the main street and here and there on the slopes houses have been made habitable. What was once a town of 40,000 is now a village of perhaps 5,000. Here, if anywhere, the expulsion of the Armenians has dealt the life of the place a deadly blow.[6]

Leading government officials of the Young Turk regime produced several economic reports lamenting the collapse of the eastern economy. Celal Bayar, İsmet İnönü, Şükrü Kaya and others embarked on expeditions to survey the state of the eastern economy. All of them concluded that the region was critically underdeveloped, Bayar being most unambiguous: 'This is a completely primitive economy without markets and production beyond what is necessary for personal use.'[7] Contemporary economists who had researched Turkey tended to overlook or neglect the fact that a major reason for Eastern Anatolia's economic wretchedness in the 'Year Zero' (1923) was the destruction and expulsion of its economic middle and upper classes. For example, the economic historian Zvi Herschlag wrote that after World War I, private initiative in Turkey was too weak and the state (via the Ministry of Economy) had to act as the chief engine of economic life in the eastern provinces.[8] But he forgot to discuss the problem that at that time, the bulk of those 'agents of private initiative' were suffering in the Syrian desert.

Modern researchers have not broached the issue much, either. The history of the Turkish Republic is one of countless publications on the 'Eastern question' (*Doğu sorunu*) – the economic underdevelopment of Eastern Anatolia.[9] But none of these studies took seriously the impact of the genocide. Writing from the prism of their

own discipline, economists run the risk of reducing economies to numbers, figures and charts, overlooking the fundamental truth that economies are formed by people. People form, organize and maintain economies at every level – household, local, national, transnational, international. A textbook example is an otherwise captivating study of the continuity of Eastern Turkey's underdevelopment. The study lacks a serious engagement with the impact of the war and the genocide on the local economy, as if they had never happened and economic backwardness was a natural given.[10] Genocide scholars, on the other hand, have postulated the consequences of the genocide without little detailed research. Roger Smith, for example, has argued that 'eighty-six years after the 1915 genocide of the Armenians, lands that were once highly productive lie barren in [E]astern Turkey'.[11] This claim might be correct, but still needs more research to clarify major issues.

Are we attempting to measure the immeasurable? Was not the region already underdeveloped in the first place? After all, the east was a borderland region where concerns of national security always trumped economic investment. The nature of the Soviet regime, fragile relations with Persia and the Kurdish insurrection in Iraq may have scared investors. Furthermore, the young and exhausted Turkish state was grappling with deficits and shortages amidst a devastating economic crisis. We also need to understand that some Armenian business fields were already vulnerable on purely economic grounds, such as the Armenian silk and cotton businesses of Diyarbekir and Adana. They were economically competing with stronger industries inside and outside the country. The geopolitical location of the region was not conducive to economic development either, situated far from both the former imperial capital Istanbul and the modern political capital Ankara. But none of this changes the reality that the facts are compelling. One Turkish economist conducted a comparative analysis of economic development in Western Turkey and Eastern Turkey. For example, per capita income per province demonstrates sharp disparities between the richest and poorest ten provinces as shown in Table 7.1.[12]

Table 7.1 Per capita income in twenty Turkish provinces (in USD $).

Province	Per capita income	Province	Per capita income
Kocaeli	7096	Iğdır	1108
Yalova	4379	Kars	1096
İzmir	4286	Bayburt	1019
Istanbul	4286	Van	997
Kırklareli	4242	Şırnak	972
Muğla	4223	Bingöl	915
Ankara	3976	Hakkari	863
Bilecik	3911	Bitlis	813
Kırıkkale	3904	Ağrı	667
Çanakkale	3872	Muş	654

Source: Sönmez, *Bölgesel Eşitsizlik*, pp. 263–65.

The contrasts in production, consumption, industry, agriculture, services, transport, communication, education, health, and so on, were significant up to the present day. In a recent comprehensive study, two Turkish economists have concluded that the long-term economic development displays decreasing inequities within regions, but increasing inequities between major regions, in particular the east/west divide, which has grown since 1923. Moreover, some provinces such as Muş, Bitlis, Van and Kars even experienced retrogression in economic life.[13] But the self-destructive nature of the genocide was also manifest at the heart of the country, in Istanbul. One of the most successful and wealthiest entrepreneurs ever was Calouste Gulbenkian (1869–1955), born in Üsküdar and educated in London and Paris. He is known for his successes in the oil business and having amassed a huge fortune and an impressive art collection. He had also served the interests of the Ottoman state and society by writing a study of the Iraqi oil fields for the Ministry of Mines. In 1936 he wanted to bequeath to charity all of his property in Turkey, but, citing Young Turk laws, the Kemalist regime confiscated it all. Gulbenkian ultimately settled in Lisbon, which reminded him of Istanbul.[14]

In this book, we have also argued that the continuities in the period 1915–1950 are striking: whatever their subtle differences, on Armenian property the Republican People Party's policies were fully consistent with the Committee of Union and Progress'. At no point did the Kemalists reverse the damage done by the CUP, and their policies were never beneficial to the Armenian citizens of the Turkish Republic. Whatever the nature, structure, development or context of the Armenian property situation was, the direction of it under Young Turk rule was never in doubt: comprehensive expropriation and dispossession. Instead of allowing Armenian craftsmen to return to their places of origin and resume their businesses, the Kemalist dictatorship made great efforts to exclude them from the nation state. Nationalism and ethnic homogeneity was superimposed on economic interests, and indeed in this particular constellation, ethnic nationalism was an economically irrational policy to follow, in the eastern provinces or elsewhere. The net result for Armenians was always decline, impoverishment and loss. Due to the complete economic devastation of the country, the Kemalists could make plausible to the general public that the magical year '1923' was a 'Year Zero' – thus purporting that Turkey had risen from the ashes like a phoenix. In ensuing decades, Kemalist economists would proudly chart the economic growth achieved under Mustafa Kemal.[15] This was hardly unobvious, considering the fact that the country had hit rock bottom due to war, genocide and multiple forced migrations. It was not all too difficult to present the post-1923 economic developments as an 'upward and onward' great leap forward. The war and especially the genocide had so fundamentally ruined the very fabric of the eastern economy that the economy could only improve.

Restitution is a politically explosive theme that is the subject of a different study and has deliberately not been discussed in this book. Article 17 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: '(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others; (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.'[16] The Young Turks, in two consecutive regimes, profoundly violated both rights of their own Armenian citizens. We can draw an analytical distinction between collective versus individual restitution. Collective restitution would constitute territorial concessions or the transfer of a lump sum to the Armenian Republic. Armenian nationalists may want to see the dubious political solution that would accord most of north-eastern Turkey to the Armenian nation state. This scenario is unlikely to result from any negotiations between the two states. A potential financial compensation would also constitute a problem regarding its size and legitimate recipients. Individual restitution is no less problematic. It remains an open question whether returning land to dispossessed Armenian families is practicable. Would they be willing and able to migrate from Glendale and Marseille to Adana and Diyarbekir and re-commence working in their grandparents' businesses and farms? Collective return to Eastern Turkey may also be unfeasible in terms of current owners of the property. In 2008 one of these owners, the Kurd Berzan Boti, in a highly symbolic and publicized act, bequeathed all his properties, lands owned by Syriacs before the genocide, to the Seyfo Center, a genocide studies institute based in the Netherlands and Sweden.[17]

Armenian claims for restitution have ranged from symbolic and small forms of compensation to complete revivalism of the Sèvres Treaty. Andranik Migranian, a former member of the Turkish–Armenian Reconciliation Commission (2001–2004), argued, 'Recognition of the genocide must have some material and territorial consequences. These include the building of memorials in major cities and where mass killings occurred, and symbolic territorial concessions such as the return of Armenians to Ararat and Ani.'[18] Journalist David Boyajian went further than that and wrote that Armenia must reclaim 'the lands of historical Western Armenia'. He does not rule out the possibility of war between Armenia and Turkey or between Russia and Turkey to bring about territorial change. Regarding the population issue, Boyajian considers the ethnic cleansing during the Karabagh war or the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey as legitimate precedents.[19] There are other voices, however. The untenability and undesirability of Lausanne revisionism or Sèvres revivalism is compounded by the problem that it is primarily the victims' heirs who are entitled to a say in the matter. These include Armenian genocide specialist Vahakn Dadrian, who once declared that if Turkey unequivocally recognizes the genocide, he is willing to relinquish his claims on his ancestors' land in Ankara province.[20] Other Armenians have indicated that Armenians should be offered the right to return without unequivocal right to reclaim property.[21] Armenian communities are divided and talk of restitution results in all kinds of quibbles.

Surely, ethnic cleansing cannot be reversed by ethnic cleansing. Donald Bloxham has questioned revanchist efforts requesting 'the possibility for Armenians to return to their homeland and to be allowed self-determination' as a political non sequitur. He concluded his discussion of the restitution problem by arguing that we need to decide 'whether recognition is really going to open the door to healing wounds and reconciliation, as we are often told, or whether it is a means of redressing nationalist grievances . . . there is no logical connection between the cause of genocide recognition and that of retrieving land from Turkey.'[22] Instead, other cases of restitution after genocidal dispossession in the modern era may serve as examples for the Turkish–Armenian case. A comparative perspective on the property rights of victim groups of other genocides may open doors in the Turkish–Armenian conflict.

The tragedy of it all is that the consequences of genocide are irreversible. Bitter as it is, genocides create new realities that often function as points of departure for future forms of coexistence. The dilemma is complex: no restitution would entail the perpetuation of a colossal injustice, whereas material restitution could cause new injustices.

Appendix 1

Partial List of Community Property Lost by the Adana Armenians

Neighborhood	Type of property	Year of deed	Surface (m^2)	Value (TL)
İcadiye	House	1904	160	500
İcadiye	Plot of community land	1903	1134	2500
İcadiye	Plot of community land	1913	850	1650
İcadiye	Plot of community land	1913	850	1500
Hıdır İlyas	Surp Asdvadzadzin church	1815	6000	25,000
Hıdır İlyas	House	1884	250	750
Hıdır İlyas	Two houses	1884	400	1000
Hıdır İlyas	House of Ohannes Yirikian	Deed no.9/107	300	800
Hıdır İlyas	House	Deed lost	450	900
Hıdır İlyas	House	1921	450	700
Hıdır İlyas	House of Krikor Bezdikian	1879	750	2250
Bucak	Surp Stepanos church	Deed lost	5000	18,000
Bucak	House	August 1889	300	750
Bucak	Three houses	October 1899	600	1500
Bucak	House	October 1899	200	600
Bucak	House	October 1899	250	600
Eski Hamam	House	May 1896	400	1200
Eski Hamam	House	August 1913	150	300
Eski Hamam	Plot of community land	August 1913	150	250
Necaran	Shop	February 1896	40	120
Necaran	House	February 1897	200	600
Döşeme Sokak	Plot of community land	November 1899	1160	3500
Mermerli	House and shop	June 1905	250	800
Mermerli	House	June 1905	150	500
Hacı Hamid	House	January 1898	200	400
Hacı Hamid	House of Yeghisabed Tatirossian	1911	650	1250
Karlı Hamam	Shop and plot	June 1887	450	1100
Karlı Hamam	Shop	June 1887	60	300
Karlı Hamam	Shop	March 1901	50	250
Karlı Hamam	Shop on Palanjilar Street	1880	80	400

Continued

Appendix 1 *Continued.*

Neighborhood	Type of property	Year of deed	Surface (m^2)	Value (TL)
Karlı Hamam	Plot of land	April 1915	40	150
Karlı Hamam	Plot of land	April 1915	80	200
Karlı Hamam	Plot of land	August 1913	40	125
Karlı Hamam	Plot of land	August 1913	54	150
Karlı Hamam	Plot of land	August 1913	30	100
Bab Tarsus	House	1886	250	750
Bab Tarsus	House	1886	300	800
Bab Tarsus	Casino with garden	December 1905	650	2500
Bab Tarsus	House	February 1900	200	550
Bab Tarsus	Shop and plot	March 1899	80	240
Bab Tarsus	Adana Chamber of Commerce, with 6 shops		8000	50,000
Çarçabuk	House	December 1899	200	600
Çarçabuk	Shop	December 1899	80	400
Çarçabuk	Shop with plot	December 1899	250	450
Çarçabuk	Eleven shops		850	3500
Taşçıkan	House	December 1871	250	750
Sarı Yakub	House of Krikor Bezdikian	December 1865	260	800
Sarı Yakub	House of Avedis Chorbajian	January 1863	300	850
Faki Durmuş	House and two shops of Krikor Bezdikian	August 1863	450	1200
Faki Durmuş	House		150	350
Hamamiyye	House with two shops	1885	750	1500
Eski Çarşı	House and shop	1898	300	550
Eski Çarşı	Shop	February 1914	80	200
Eski Çarşı	Abkarian school and 32 shops		25,000	32,500
Mestan Hamam	Hotel 'Taurus' and 18 shops		1550	6800
Mestan Hamam	Ten shops		1250	12,500
Khristiyan Köy	Church	March 1848	1000	1000
İncirlik	Church	Deed lost	800	800
Sheykh Murad	Church	Deed lost	1000	1000
Abdooğlu	Church	Deed lost	200	200
Missis	Church	Deed lost	400	400
Yılanlı	Vineyard	January 1902	13,000	1500
Kara Embiya	Vineyard of Stepan Aghdajian	September 1885	22,000	250
Şirmanlı	Vineyard of Stepan Aghdajian	September 1885	32,000	360
Şabaniyye	Armenian cemetery		50,000	20,000

Source: Kévork K. Baghdjian, *La confiscation, par le gouvernement turc, des biens arméniens – dits 'abandonnés'* (Montréal: K.K. Baghdjian, 1987), pp. 275–82.

Appendix 2

List of Turks Owning Abandoned Properties in Adana, 1924

Source: BCA, 272.11/19.96.19

Republic of Turkey
Province of Adana
Number 27
To the Ministry of Exchange, Public Works, and Settlement

In answer to your telegraph dated 30 June 1924, number 28245:
Sir, enclosed is the account book consisting of the number of houses from abandoned properties, occupied by civil servants, military officers, and members of the army. Prepared and entrusted by the Tenth Regional Settlement Directorate of Adana.

9 October 1924
To the Directorate of Settlement

Governor
(signed)

Neighborhood	House number	Annexes	Name and function of person	Family members
İcadiye	98	3	Teacher Ahmed Efendi	4
İcadiye	44	4	Policeman Mustafa Efendi	3
İcadiye	55	6	Policeman Veysi Bey	9
İcadiye	56	5	Policeman Mustafa Bey	9
İcadiye	58	6	Red Crescent clerk Hüseyin Bey	19
İcadiye	21	4	Telegraph head clerk Kâmil Bey	6
İcadiye	83	5	Correspondence official Mehmed Ali Bey	6
İcadiye	96	9	Major Hâdi Bey and Halil Bey	8

Continued

Appendix 2 *Continued.*

Neighborhood	House number	Annexes	Name and function of person	Family members
İcadiye	97	7	Captain Vasfi Bey	8
İcadiye	99	6	Artillery Major Cemal Bey	9
İcadiye	102	9	Colonel Ali Mustafa Bey	10
İcadiye	109	5	Lieutenant Rahim Bey	6
İcadiye	11	6	Lieutenant Cevdet Bey	6
İcadiye	104	8	Teacher Nali Bey	7
İcadiye	74	6	Correspondence official Saci Efendi	16
İcadiye	82	4	Policeman Ali Rıza Efendi	5
İcadiye	126	2	Policeman Naci	5
İcadiye	127	7	Police chief Kadri Bey	7
İcadiye	49	6	Lieutenant Hayri Bey	5
Çarçabuk	3	4	Retiree Fahri Bey	6
Çarçabuk	22	6	Policeman Zeki Bey	5
Çarçabuk	30	4	Policeman Kemal Bey	5
Çarçabuk	44	3	District governor Salih Bey and Captain Akif Bey	7
Çarçabuk	45	3	Civil inspector Sûad Bey	4
Çarçabuk	46	5	Policeman Abdullah Bey	5
Çarçabuk	47	3	Policeman Osman Bey	3
Çarçabuk	56	3	Captain Bedri Bey	8
Çarçabuk	61	6	Captain Zeki Bey	6
Çarçabuk	63	4	Captain Münir Bey	5
Çarçabuk	64	6	Artillery Captain İhsan Bey	8
Çarçabuk	65	8	Major Agah Bey	18
Çarçabuk	66	4	Captain Nuri Bey	6
Çarçabuk	68	4	Captain Behçet Bey	5
Çarçabuk	78	2	Deputy police chief Emin Bey	3
Çarçabuk	89	5	Policeman Safa Haydar Efendi	10
Çarçabuk	96	3	Policeman Faik Bey	3
Çarçabuk	136	4	Correspondence official Kâzım Bey	7
Çarçabuk	137	5	Policeman Numan Bey	8
Çarçabuk	141	4	Policeman Burhaneddin Bey	5
Çarçabuk	140	9	Head clerk Tevfik Bey	11
Çarçabuk	149	4	Telegraph clerk Cesim Bey	6
Çarçabuk	140	4	Mustafa Bey	3
Çarçabuk	163	4	Map official Said Bey	6
Çarçabuk	242	4	Lieutenant Abdülkadir Bey	7
Çarçabuk	218	6	Settlement official Arif Bey	5
Saçlı Hamid	4	3	Officials Salih and Rıfat Efendi	4
Bucak	15	1	Transfer official Feyzi Efendi	
Çarçabuk	144	2	Captain Şerafeddin Efendi	3
Çarçabuk	121	4	Captain Cemal Efendi	4

Continued

Appendix 2 *Continued.*

Neighborhood	House number	Annexes	Name and function of person	Family members
Çarçabuk	162	6	Correspondence official Seyfi Efendi	10
Döşeme Sokak	6	3	Teacher Hilmi Efendi	5
Döşeme Sokak	28	3	Hakkı Efendi	4
Döşeme Sokak	21	3	Health official Ahmed Hamdi Efendi	4
Döşeme Sokak	16	4	Teacher Mesud Efendi	7
Döşeme Sokak	36	2	Settlement official Ali Rıza Efendi	6
Döşeme Sokak	71	4	Policeman Salih Efendi	8
Döşeme Sokak	74	5	Dentist Celal Efendi	13
Döşeme Sokak	88	4	Captain İhsan Bey	6
Döşeme Sokak	81	2	Retired Lieutenant Hüseyin Bey	5
Döşeme Sokak	82	2	Municipal official Remzi Bey	2
Döşeme Sokak	83	1	Correspondence official Nüsret Bey	6
Döşeme Sokak	88	10	District governor Rüşdi Bey	17
Döşeme Sokak		4	Correspondence official Ziya Bey	2
Döşeme Sokak	85	9	Correspondence official Ali Bey	
Döşeme Sokak	37	3	Policeman Necib Bey	7
Döşeme Sokak	4	4	Health official Vasfi Bey	4
Yüksek Dolab	4	12	Communication chief Hamdi Bey	4
Yüksek Dolab		11	Governor Hilmi Bey	8
Yüksek Dolab	16	8	Teacher Ahmed Ziya Efendi	4
Yüksek Dolab		4	Correspondence clerk İsmail Bey	7
Yüksek Dolab	68	3	Teacher Hüseyin Bey	4
Serahan	1	4	Correspondent Lütfi Bey	5
Faki Durmuş	1	2	Finance clerk Ali Efendi	4
Faki Durmuş	17	3	Captain Nuri Remzi Bey	6
Hacı Faki	18	3	Lieutenant Rıf'at Efendi	6
Kara Sis	3	1	Telegrapher Kerim Efendi	5
Kara Sis	5	5	Doctor Remzi Efendi	9
Kara Sis	10	4	Doctor Feyzi Efendi	6
Kara Sis	9	4	Finance Department head clerk	
Eski Çarşı	3	3	Public examiner Asım Efendi	6
Eski Çarşı	8	3	Criminal investigator Şemseddin Bey	5
Eski Hamam	10	4	Official Süleyman Bey	7
Eski Hamam	24	2	Deputy police chief Celal Bey	4
Eski Hamam	26	2	Policeman Hayati Efendi	6
Eski Hamam	87	1	Policeman Beşir Efendi	4
Eski Hamam	5	2	Public debts head clerk Reşid Bey	6
Eski Hamam	69	1	Bailiff Cavid Bey	5
Eski Hamam	71	9	Public works supervisor Naci Bey	6
Eski Hamam	32	3	Music teacher Hasan Efendi	8

Continued

Appendix 2 *Continued.*

Neighborhood	House number	Annexes	Name and function of person	Family members
Eski Hamam	70	6	Doctor Feyzi Bey	6
Eski Hamam	33	2	Abdulkadir Efendi	7
Eski Hamam	35	2	Teacher Mehmed Efendi	2
Eski Hamam	21	1	Telegrapher Hüsnü Efendi	8
Eski Hamam	47	2	Policeman Abdurrahman Efendi	5
Mermerli	23	2	Captain Nuri Bey	3
Mermerli	37	4	Deputy police chief Aydın Bey	4
Mermerli	26	8	Captain Salih Bey	4
Mermerli	6	6	Court president Vahi Bey	1
Mermerli	30	6	Captain Şerafeddin Bey	12
Mermerli	64	5	Police chief Nuri Bey	9
Kuru Köprü	12	6	Settlement official Fehmi Bey	6
Kuru Köprü	31	2	Teacher Kamil Bey	10
Kuru Köprü	13	6	Settlement clerk Ekrem Bey	7
Kuru Köprü	24	4	Telegraph director Hamdi Bey	6
Kuru Köprü	23	4	Deputy police chief Mehmed Ali Bey	2
Kuru Köprü	10	6	Provincial assistant Hakkı Bey	7
Kuru Köprü	6	4	Policeman Arif Bey	5
Kuru Köprü	7	3	Director of National Property Yakub Bey	7
Hacı Hamid	10	3	Postal Accountant	3
Hacı Hamid	20	3	Hasib Bey	5
Hacı Hamid	22	8	Police chief Tevfik Bey	2
Hacı Hamid	31	4	Policeman Kemal Bey	9
Hacı Hamid	11	5	Policeman Muhsin Bey	4
Hacı Hamid	3	3	Captain Şevki Bey	5
Hacı Hamid	17	1	Teacher Halil Efendi	4
Saçlı Hamid	17	3	Post official Abdürrahim Efendi	3
Hıdır İlyas	18	3	Telegraph official Bayram Efendi	5
Saçlı Hamid	27	1	Policeman Avni Efendi	5
Saçlı Hamid	9	8	Fehmi and Mehmed Bey	34
Saçlı Hamid	22/2	2	Retired Policeman Mehfi Efendi	5
Saçlı Hamid	20	4	Policeman Celal Efendi	6
Saçlı Hamid	3	4	Major Reşad Bey	5
Hıdır İlyas	22	3	Telegraph official Rahmi Bey	4
Hıdır İlyas	11	4	Registry official Emin Bey	3
Hıdır İlyas	5	2	Director Kâzım Bey	5
Hıdır İlyas	2	1	Policeman Latif Bey	3
Hıdır İlyas	1	1	Policeman Naci Bey	3
Hıdır İlyas	13	2	Agriculture inspector Galib Bey	4
Hıdır İlyas		5	Telegraph director Galib Bey	6
Hıdır İlyas	17	5	Captain Refik Bey	5
Hıdır İlyas	10	3	Municipal official Hayriye Hanım	11

Continued

Appendix 2 *Continued.*

Neighborhood	House number	Annexes	Name and function of person	Family members
Hıdır İlyas	15	4	Special correspondence director Refik Bey	5
Bab Tarsus	33	5	Policeman Ali Ulvi Bey	7
Bab Tarsus	18	4	Teacher Azim Bey	3
Bab Tarsus	21	7	Deportation official Hasan Bey	3
Bab Tarsus	7	4	Accountant Kemal Bey	5
Bab Tarsus	17	7	Doctor Salih Yusuf Bey	7
Bab Tarsus	15	5	Settlement official Argab Bey	5
Bab Tarsus	14	1	Teacher Ahmed Efendi	2
Bucak	21	2	Head official Şaban Bey	7
Bucak	7	2	Policeman Hamdi Efendi	4
Bucak	22	12	Policeman Yekta	
Bucak	19	3	Telegraph Inspector Necati Bey	3
Karlı Hamam	23	3	Police chief Nazmi Bey	3
Karlı Hamam	26	7	Aide Feyzullah Bey	9
Karlı Hamam	10	7	Prison clerk İhsan Bey	4
Karlı Hamam	25	2	Lieutenant Emin Bey	4
Karlı Hamam	38	3	District governor Ali Rıza Bey	5
Karlı Hamam	5	4	Head Doctor Hamdi Bey	5
Karlı Hamam	22	4	Correspondence official Rühfetkar Efendi	5
Karlı Hamam	30	7	Cadastre head clerk Hüsni Efendi	6
Hamamiyye	7	8	Doctor Ruhi Bey	7
Hamamiyye	1	5	Telegraph clerk Said Bey	5
Tekerminan	3	3	Agriculture accountant Cafer Bey	7
Tekerminan	14	4	Deputy police chief Salih Nebari Bey	17
Tekerminan	3	5	Teacher Bekir Efendi	5
Tekerminan	7	1	Agriculture official Hayri Bey	4
Tekerminan	3	3	Agriculture official Rüşdü Bey	4
Kasab Bekir	2	3	Agriculture director Halil Bey	7
Necaran	16	8	Teacher Münire Hanım	8
Necaran	10	3	Major Şevket Bey	5
Hankarlı	47	6	Station chief Vahid Bey	6
Hankarlı	49	4	Police chief Ferid Bey	5
Hankarlı	12	4	Department chief Zeki Bey	2
Hankarlı	30	4	District governor Kazım Bey	6
Hankarlı	31	6	Veterinarian Faik Bey	5
Hankarlı	24	4	Accountant Kadri Bey	7
Hankarlı	13	7	Public prosecutor Feyzi Bey	2
Çınarlı	36	6	Telegrapher Said Efendi	3
Çınarlı	74	2	National Properties official Bekir Efendi	3
Çınarlı	65	6	Deputy police chief Hacı Mehmed Efendi	3

Continued

Appendix 2 *Continued.*

Neighborhood	House number	Annexes	Name and function of person	Family members
Çınarlı	36	2	Policeman Muharriri	1
Çınarlı	71	3	Teacher Fevzi Efendi	5
Çınarlı	57	2	Provincial janitor Ahmed Ağa	5
Çınarlı	17	2	Engineer Adil Bey	5
Şabaniyye	17	4	Lieutenant Hüsrev Efendi	2
Şabaniyye	69	3	Orphanage teacher Abdürrahim Efendi	6
Şabaniyye	12	5	Captain Tevfik Efendi	2
Şabaniyye	28	2	Policeman Ali Efendi	4
Şabaniyye	12	1	Municipal official Hayri Efendi	4
Çukur Mescid	8	8	Crime investigator Şemseddin Efendi	4
Çukur Mescid	11	4	Akif Bey	7
Çukur Mescid	56	1	Teacher Kenan Bey	3
Çukur Mescid	93	3	Police chief Onur Bey	7
Şabaniyye	1	1	Teacher Mehmed Efendi	3
Şabaniyye	83	6	Justice clerk Esad Efendi	3
Çınarlı	15	3	High school teacher Süreyya Bey	5
Kasab Bekir	5	7	Captain Salim Efendi	4
Necaran	15	7	Teacher Münire Hanım	8
Necaran	16	8	Teacher Münire Hanım	8
Çukur Mescid	8	3	Deputy police chief Şükrü Efendi	8
Çukur Mescid	4	6	Agriculture director Cevdet Efendi	4
Hankarlı	19	3	Settlement physician Mustafa Efendi	5
Yeni İstasyon	3	1	Policeman Tevfik Efendi	3
Yeni İstasyon	4	1	Gunsmith İsmail Efendi	3
Yeni İstasyon	19	1	Gunsmith Mehmed Efendi	3
Bab Tarsus	13	6	Teacher İbrahim Oğuz Efendi	10
Hamamiyye	6	2	Policeman Gani Efendi	5

Notes

Notes to Preface

1 A brief note about terminology is in order. In this study we will follow Zürcher's use of the term 'Young Turk era' to bundle together the Committee of Union and Progress (*Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) and its descendant, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). Together, this generation of politicians ruled the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic in the period 1913–1950. This study will assume the argument that strong continuities can be observed between the CUP era (1913–1918) and the Kemalist era (1919–1950). Erik-Jan Zürcher, 'The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodization', in: *Die Welt des Islams*, 32 (1992), 237–53.
2 'Tapu Arşivlerini "Sınırlı" Kullanın', *Hürriyet*, 19 September 2006.
3 Wolfgang Gust (ed.), *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/16: Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amts* (Hamburg: Zu Klampen, 2005); Ara Sarafian (ed.), *United States Official Records on the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1917* (Princeton and London: Gomidas Institute, 2004).

Notes to Chapter 1: Introduction and Problematization

1 Gerald E. Aylmer, 'Centre and Locality: the Nature of Power Elites', in Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.) *Power Elites and State Building* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 59–78 at 65–66.
2 Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 9.
3 Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 331.
4 Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (eds), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 2.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
6 Charles Tilly, *Warmaking and Statemaking as Organized Crime* (Center for Research on Social Organization Working Paper, no. 256, 1982), p. 18.

7 Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992).
8 Tilly, *Warmaking and Statemaking*, p. 16.
9 Anthony W. Marx, *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 13.
10 Charles Tilly, 'Survey Article: Power–Top Down and Bottom Up', in: *Journal of Political Philosophy*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1999), pp. 330–52 at 344.
11 Marx, *Faith in Nation*, p. 16.
12 Mann, *Sources*, pp. 422, 444.
13 Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 30.
14 For three recent volumes on the state of affairs in genocide studies, see: Dan Stone (ed.), *The Historiography of Genocide* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop (eds), *The Genocide Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
15 Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 17.
16 Hannes Heer, 'The Logic of the War of Extermination: The Wehrmacht and the Anti-Partisan War', in: Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds), *War of Extermination: The German Military in World War II, 1941–1944* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), pp. 92–126 at 113.
17 Kévork K. Baghdjian, *La confiscation, par le gouvernement turc, des biens arméniens – dits "abandonnés"* (Montréal: K.K. Baghdjian, 1987), p. 77.
18 For the heated discussion in the Ottoman assembly and Ahmet Rıza's intervention, see *Meclis-i Âyan Zabıt Ceridesi*, period 3, term 2, volume 1 (13 December 1915), pp. 133–6.
19 For an argument along these lines, see Donald Bloxham, 'Internal Colonization, Inter-imperial Conflict and the Armenian Genocide', in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), *Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History* (New York: Berghahn, 2008), pp. 325–42.
20 As early as the 1950s the late doyen of Holocaust research, Raul Hilberg (1926–2007), had underlined the functional and sequential connection between expropriation as both condition and consequence of a complex process of destruction. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (New York: Holmes and Meiers, 1985), pp. 53ff.
21 Götz Aly, *Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2005), Chapter 3.
22 Frank Bajohr, *"Arisierung" in Hamburg: die Verdrängung der jüdischen Unternehmer 1933–1945* (Hamburg: Christians, 1997).
23 Jacques Sémelin, *Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide* (London: Hurst & Co., 2007), pp. 193–95.
24 Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (London: Phoenix, 2004), pp. 265, 626.
25 A pertinent issue related to these questions is, of course: How much did the genocide cost? This too is beyond the scope of this socioeconomic historical study, which will limit itself to general estimates rather than precise calculations.

26 Claire Andrieu, 'Les banques et la spoliation des déposants, 1940–1944: acteurs ordinaires en régime autoritaire', in Michel Margairaz (ed.), *Banques, Banque de France et Seconde Guerre Mondiale* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002), pp. 87–129.

27 Sabrina P. Ramet, *Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 231.

28 Frank Bajohr, *Parvenüs und Profiteure: Korruption in der NS-Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2004).

29 The following two books have sections devoted to the confiscation process in the respective regions: Vahe Haig (ed.), *Kharpert yev anor Vosgeghen Tashduh* (New York: n.p., 1959); Puzant Yeghiayan, *Atanayi Hayots Patmutiun: Patmagrakan, Eghernagrakan, Azatagrakan, Mshakutayin, Azgagrakan, Vaveragrakan, Zhamanakagrakan* (Antelias: Tparan Katoghikosutean Hayots Metsi Tann Kilikioy, 1970).

30 Lutfik Kouyoumdjian, *Lkeal Goykeru Hartser* (Istanbul: General Yearbook of the National Hospital, 1928, 1929, 1931, 1932, 1939); E.G. Vardapet Krnazian, 'Hayots Lkeal Goyker', *Janaser*, 1–15 June 1968; Levon Vardan, *Haykakan Tasnhinge ev Hayeru Lkeal Goykere* (Beirut: L. Bedirian, 1970). The authors thank Bedross Der Matossian for drawing attention to these publications.

31 Donald Bloxham, *The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 63–4.

32 Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 108.

33 Ibid., p. 110.

34 Michelle G. Latham, 'Economic Motives for Total Genocide: A Comparison of the Armenian, The Holocaust and Rwandan Genocides' (unpublished MA thesis, Boston College, Department of Political Science, 2000), p. 31.

35 Christian Gerlach, 'Nationsbildung im Krieg: Wirtschaftliche Faktoren bei der Vernichtung der Armenier und beim Mord an den ungarischen Juden', in Hans-Lukas Kieser and Dominik Schaller (eds), *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah: The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah* (Zürich: Chronos, 2002), pp. 347–422. See also Christian Gerlach, *Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the Twentieth-Century World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 92–119.

36 Dickran Kouymjian, 'Confiscation of Armenian Property and the Destruction of Armenian Historical Monuments as a Manifestation of the Genocidal Process', in Alexandre Kimenyi and Otis L. Scott (eds), *Anatomy of Genocide: State-sponsored Mass-killings in the Twentieth Century* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), pp. 307–19.

37 Taner Akçam, *'Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur': Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere Yönelik Politikalar* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2007), pp. 223–36.

38 Hilmar Kaiser, 'Armenian Property, Ottoman Law and Nationality Policies during the Armenian Genocide, 1915–1916', in Olaf Farschid, Manfred Kropp and Stephan Dähne (eds), *The First World War as Remembered in the Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean* (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2006), pp. 49–71.

39 Bedross Der Matossian, 'From Confiscation to Appropriation: Historical Continuity and the Destruction of the "Armenian Economy" in the Ottoman Empire', *The Armenian Weekly*, 73:16 (24 April 2007), pp. 22–23, 27. Id., 'The Taboo within the Taboo: The Fate

of the 'Armenian Capital' at the End of the Ottoman Empire', *European Journal of Turkish Studies* (2011), forthcoming.

40 Sait Çetinoğlu, 'Sermayenin "Türk"leştirilmesi', in Fikret Başkaya (ed.), *Resmi Tarih Tartışmaları* (Istanbul: Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2006), vol. 2, pp. 79–152.

41 Nevzat Onaran, *Emval-i Metruke Olayı: Osmanlı'da ve Cumhuriyette Ermeni ve Rum Mallarının Türkleştirilmesi* (Istanbul: Belge, 2010).

42 Indicators as simple as the following example can shatter the myth that the CUP acted benevolently amidst pressing circumstances. There is compelling evidence that at some point in the expropriation process, the CUP elite categorically prohibited Armenians from sending their movable property to their new residences at their final destinations. This happened despite promises of safe passage of property or monetary compensation, even in cases where the deportation distance was as little as 200 kilometres. Kaiser, 'Armenian Property', p. 68.

43 See the otherwise thorough study Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de 'Millî İktisat' (1908–1918)* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982). Another monograph offers nothing more than an unsophisticated and sugarcoated apology: Ulaş Kipal and Özgür Uyanık, *Türkiye Milli İktisat Tarihi (Devletçilik)* (Istanbul: Kaynak, 2001).

44 Peter Kenez, 'Stalinism As Humdrum Politics', *Russian Review*, vol. 45, no. 4 (1986), pp. 398–99.

Notes to Chapter 2: Ideological Foundations: Constructing the Turkish 'National Economy'

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53 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/15, Interior Ministry to Adana, Haleb, Erzurum, Bitlis, Van, and Diyarbekir, 14 June 1915.
54 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/273, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 1 July 1915. Four days later, the Commission was established. *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/307, 5 July 1915.
55 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/106, Interior Ministry to the Chairmen of the Abandoned Property Commissions of Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Der Zor, Aleppo, İzmit, Kayseri, and Maraş, 22 June 1915.
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66 Kaiser, 'Armenian Property', p. 71.
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70 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/246, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 6 June 1915.
71 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/246, Interior Ministry to Konya, 30 June 1915.
72 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/246, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 1 July 1915.
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74 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 54/331, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 7 July 1915.
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81 Ternon, *Mardin 1915*, p. 162.
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84 *BCA*, 272.74/66.23.17, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 29 March 1918.
85 *Tanin*, 21 September 1917, quoted in Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, p. 157.
86 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 69/8, Interior Ministry to Urfa, 14 October 1916.
87 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 69/235, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 12 November 1916.
88 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 72/180, Interior Ministry to Elaziz, 8 February 1917.
89 Reshid, *Mülâhazât*, pp. 109–11.
90 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 56/315, Talaat to Reshid, 6 October 1915.
91 Kieser,'Dr. Mehmed Reshid', p. 265.
92 Al-Ghusayn, *Martyred Armenia*, p. 30.
93 Reshid, *Mülâhazât*, p. 109.
94 *Foreign Office* 371/4172/24597, folio 304.
95 For Ahmed Şükrü's deposition on 12 November 1918, see Osman S. Kocahanoğlu (ed.), *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Sorgulanması ve Yargılanması* (Istanbul: Temel, 1998), p. 195.
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103 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 70/237, Directorate for Employment to Diyarbekir, 12 December 1916.
104 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 69/191, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 5 November 1916.
105 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 71/53, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 21 December 1916.
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107 Kamal Madhar Ahmad, *Kurdistan During the First World War* (London: Saqi, 1994), pp. 131–32.
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109 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 68/91, Talaat to Diyarbekir, 23 September 1916.
110 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 78/237, Interior Ministry to Urfa, 30 July 1917.
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112 Hasan Hişyar Serdî, *Görüş ve Anılarım 1907–1985* (Istanbul: Med, 1994), p. 139.
113 Mehmed E. Zeki, *Kürdistan Tarihi* (Istanbul: Komal, 1977), p. 168.
114 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 82/180, Interior Ministry to Diyarbekir, 25 December 1917.
115 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 87/278, Talaat to Diyarbekir, 25 May 1918.
116 *BOA*, DH.ŞFR 89/38, Talaat to the provinces of Elaziz, Diyarbekir, and Erzurum, 7 July 1918.
117 *PAAA*, R14104, Karl Axenfeld to Embassy, 18 October 1918.
118 *BOA*, DH.EUM 68/71, Reshid to Talaat, 18 September 1915.
119 Rhétoré, *Les chrétiens aux bêtes!*, pp. 241–43.
120 Noel, *Diary of Major E. Noel*, p. 11.
121 Tashjian-Quiroga, *The Tragic Years*, pp. 99–100.
122 Vahé Tachjian, *La France en Cilicie et en Haute-Mésopotamie: aux confins de la Turquie, de la Syrie et de l'Irak (1919–1933)* (Paris: Karthala, 2004), p. 260.
123 Gustav Bredemann and Jakob Künzler, 'Über den Weinbau und die Aufbereitung der Trauben zu Wein und Traubenkonserven in Nordsyrien und Obermesopotamien', *Archiv für Wirtschaftsforschung im Orient*, vol. 4, no. 1/2 (Berlin, 1919), pp. 25–54. According to a regional historian, the highly appreciated Armenian-produced red wines of Ergani could be traced back centuries. The quality was such that they were even consumed at the Kremlin. Müslüm Üzülmez, 'Ergani'de Şarapçılık Yeniden Canlandırılamaz mı?', *Ergani Haber Gazetesi*, 16 and 23 December 2005. By 1937 the local authorities had to conclude that viticulture and vinegrowing was effectively dead in Diyarbekir. There had been some efforts to revive the business in Çermik and Lice, but to a negligible extent. The grapes were rare, specific for wine production and required special knowledge to grow. Bedri Günkut, *Diyarbekir Tarihi* (Diyarbakır: Diyarbekir Halkevi, 1937), p. 16. A scion of the Pirinççizâde clan wrote a book about the development of the wine production in Turkey. He misrepresents the underdevelopment of viticulture in Turkey, including Diyarbekir, as a natural product of history rather than a consequence of Young Turk policies. Nejat Pirinççioğlu, *Türkiye Şaraplık Üzüm Üretimi: Şarap Sanayiinin ve Dışsatımın Olanaklarının Geliştirilmesi* (Ankara: Millî Produktivite Merkezi Yayınları, 1983). Nowadays, the production of wine by autochtonous Syriacs and Armenians no longer exists. Other than the state-produced wines in Elazığ (such as *Buzbağ*), the only

indigenous wine left in the entire region was the Syriac brand *Circis* in Mardin province. However, the last Syriac winegrower, Circis Yüksel, was shot dead in Mardin by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on 19 September 1992. *Zur Lage der Christen im Tur Abdin* (Linz: Freunde des Tur Abdin, 1993), p. 2.

124 Ahmet Taşğın,'Diyarbakır'da Geleneksel Bir Meslek: Puşicilik', *Folklor Edebiyat*, vol. 35, no. 3 (2003), pp. 65–73.

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135 Zülküf Aydın, *Underdevelopment and rural structures in Southeastern Turkey: the household economy in Gisgis and Kalhana* (London: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, University of Durham Middle East monographs, 1986), pp. 125–26.

136 Salâhattin Güngör, 'Bir Canlı Tarih Konuşuyor', (part 3) in *Resimli Tarih Mecmuası*, vol. 4, no. 43 (July 1953), pp. 2444–45.

137 Mithat Şükrü Bleda, *İmparatorluğun Çöküşü* (Istanbul: Remzi, 1979), p. 59.

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140 *Hadisat*, 7 November 1918.

141 Feridun Kandemir, 'İlk İttihatçılardan Dr. Reşit'in intiharı', *Yakın Tarihimiz*, vol. II (1962), pp. 339–41.

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173 *BCA*, 030.10/196.342.11, decree dated 26 May 1927.

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176 Saba, 'Cahit'le Günlerimiz', p. 27.
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190 Ibid., pp. 576–77.
191 Celal Bayar, *Şark Raporu* (Istanbul: Kaynak, 2006), p. 104.
192 Kohlmeyer travelled to Turkey in 1936 on the invitation of the Eti Bank to advise the authorities for building a copper smelter. His personal file was kept at the archive of the Technische Universität Berlin, but the archive was completely destroyed during an Allied bombing raid in November 1943. E-mail correspondence with the TU Berlin, 28 September 2007.
193 August von Kral, *Das Land Kamâl Atatürks: Der Werdegang der modernen Türkei* (Wien: Braumüller, 1935), pp. 194–95.
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195 *Cumhuriyetin 15inci yılında Diyarbakır* (Diyarbakır: Diyarbakır Matbaası, 1938), p. 82.
196 Günkut, *Diyarbekir Tarihi*, p. 153.
197 *İzmir Fuarında Diyarbakır 1938* (Diyarbakır: Diyarbakır Basımevi, 1938), p. 32.
198 *İzmir Fuarında Diyarbakır 1938*, p. 38.
199 *BCA*, 030.10/180.244.6, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, 5 December 1931.
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202 *İzmir Fuarında Diyarbakır 1938*, pp. 40–43.
203 See the family tree at www.pirinccioglu.com Accessed on 30 September 2010.
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206 Cemal Kalyoncu, 'Sultan Süleyman'ın torunu', in *Aksiyon* (24 February 2001), p. 325.
207 www.vip. com.tr/a/tarihce_92 Accessed on 30 September 2010.
208 Personal communication by Richard G. Hovannisian, Los Angeles, 18 April 2010.
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210 His son Ara Dinkjian is a famous oud-player (The oud is a pear-shaped stringed instrument commonly used in Middle Eastern music) who continues to infuse Diyarbekir-inspired themes in his music. *Armenian-American Musicians* (Memphis, TN: Books LLC, 2010).

Notes to Chapter 7: Conclusion

1 For the 1914 figure, see Raymond H. Kévorkian and Paul B. Paboudjian, *Les Arméniens dans l'Empire ottoman à la veille du Génocide* (Paris: Arhis, 1992), pp. 57–60. For current figures on Armenian community life in Turkey, see Günay Göksu Özdoğan, Füsun Üstel, Karin Karakaşlı and Ferhat Kentel (eds), *Türkiye'de Ermeniler* (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009). Also see the website of the Armenian Patriarchate for current developments: www.lraper.org
2 The Turkish left, including political leaders such as İsmail Bilen, Behice Boran and İbrahim Kaypakkaya, has historically reduced the economic discrimination and exclusion of Ottoman Christians to Marxist arguments of class conflict or struggle against a supposed 'comprador bourgeoisie'. However, the expropriation of Ottoman Armenians was a nationalist and ideological process, aimed at the construction of a utopian society and economy, that destroyed Armenians of all occupations and classes, including working-class Armenians. See, e.g. İbrahim Kaypakkaya, *Seçme Yazılar* (Istanbul: Umut, 1992), p. 134. Dogu Ergil, 'A Reassessment: The Young Turks, their Politics and Anti-Colonial Struggle', *Balkan Studies*, vol. 16, no. 2 (1975), especially the section 'Breaking the Power of the Foreign and Minority Compradore Bourgeoisie: Armenian and Greek Operations of the Union and Progress', pp. 59ff.
3 Uğur Ümit Üngör, *The Making of Modern Turkey: Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913–1950* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 3.
4 Examples of local studies of genocide are: Tomislav Dulić, *Utopias of Nation: Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1941–1942* (Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 2005); Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009); Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (München: Oldenbourg, 1996); Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

5 Ayhan Aktar, 'Economic Nationalism in Turkey: The Formative Years, 1912–1925', *Boğaziçi Journal: Review of Social and Administrative Studies*, vol. 10, no. 1–2 (1996), pp. 263–90 at 283.
6 *NAUK*, FO 371/14579/E2678, Edmonds to Foreign Office, 26 May 1930.
7 Celal Bayar, *Şark Raporu* (Istanbul: Kaynak, 2006), p. 69
8 Zvi Y. Hershlag, *Turkey: An Economy in Transition* (The Hague: Van Keulen, 1958), pp. 39–40.
9 The number of Turkish-language publications is too large to quote. An interesting English-language study is: Majeed R. Jafar, *Under-underdevelopment: A Regional Case Study of the Kurdish Area in Turkey* (Helsinki: Social Policy Association in Finland, 1976).
10 Servet Mutlu, *Doğu Sorunu'nun Kökenleri: Ekonomik Açıdan* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 2002).
11 Roger W. Smith, 'Scarcity and Genocide', in Michael N. Dobkowski and Isidor Walliman (eds), *On the Edge of Scarcity: Environment, Resources, Population, Sustainability, and Conflict* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2002), pp. 140–41.
12 Mustafa Sönmez, *Bölgesel Eşitsizlik: Türkiye'de Doğu-Batı Uçurumu* (Istanbul: Alan, 1998).
13 Simay Karaalp and Fuat Erdal, 'Income Disparities between Provinces and Regions of Turkey: An Analysis of Sigma Convergence', paper presented at the conference *International Congress on Social and Economic Issues Shaping the World's Future: New Global Dialogue*, Isparta University, 25 September 2009.
14 *Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian: The Man and his Work* (Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 2010), pp. 55–7, 63.
15 As Şükrü Kaya spoke euphorically in 1937, 'Nowadays the Turkish nation, which has been accused of incompetence in the new works and inadequacy in the new life, is building factories, laying down and operating railways, drilling tunnels, finding and extracting minerals, opening banks, manufacturing bombs, rifles, and airplanes, constructing glass and textile factories, in short owning all ideological and technological platforms, the general staff, commanders, and armies, that civilized and progressive societies need.' Ekrem Ergüven (ed.), *Şükrü Kaya: Sözleri – Yazıları 1927–1937* (Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1937), p. 279.
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